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ABSTRACT

The Federalist Papers’ Account of Human Nature
by
Jeffrey P. Smith

Advisor: Benedetto Fontana
This paper is an analysis of the account of human nature found in The Federalist Papers.
This interpretation assumes The Federalist is a work of political rhetoric and advocacy, but also
one of genuine significance as political science and philosophy. As a book, The Federalist is a
coherent whole, which offers a coherent account of human nature, despite the collective nature of
its authorship, the time pressures of its publication, and the piecemeal nature of its workmanship.
This understanding of human nature is the thread which runs through all its analysis and numbers.
Its arguments asserting the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation and the advantages of
the Constitution are all grounded in key presuppositions about the nature of man.
There are two central facets of human nature depicted in The Federalist. First, was the
claim that human nature harbored its own moral Law of Nature, articulated by the Declaration of
Independence, which provided the ends of the Constitution. Second, was the belief this nature
exhibited universal laws of conduct gleaned through an assessment of the diverse facilities of the
human soul which determine man’s motivations. These ironclad motivations were the
psychological matter the Constitution had to negotiate. Through its orchestration of social and
political circumstances, the Constitution is able leverage those reliable and durable motives in the
interest of the constitutional good. Because of its practical nature the Constitution had to be more
than a parchment celebration of cherished principles, it had to work with man’s constitution and
devise a solid architecture of powers and procedures which both depend on and restrain human
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nature. Therefore, the Constitution’s arrangement of powers which shape, channel and restrain
man’s motives provides the constitutional means, to achieve the ends celebrated in the Declaration
and Preamble.
Lastly, Madison tells us that government is nothing other than the greatest reflection of
human nature. This makes political science and statesmanship a permanent quest for sufficient
knowledge of human nature. The science of politics is the science of human nature. All government
is rooted in some opinion regarding the nature of man. The Constitution is then designed to be an
arrangement of political powers commensurate to the nature, needs and faculties of man. Publius
described the provision of the Constitution as “inventions” rooted in “prudence,” not prophecy or
revolutionary zeal.
Hamilton claims the project they undertook was to create a “limited constitution.” The
limited scope of the powers provided by a limited Constitution necessarily produce limited
government. The powers of government must be limited because men are neither gods nor angels.
Since there are only ever imperfect men to rule over other imperfect men, it was necessary to
permanently inhibit their powers. Thus, a limited constitution was devised for a middle being,
forever caught between Heaven and Earth, who was himself fallible and limited. Part of the
prudence of their inventions was to abandon the “deceitful dream” of utopian hopes and the
perpetual perfectibility of man. The enduring success of the Constitution has been a product of
their willingness to take, and even appreciate, man as he is rather than try to change him into what
he is not and cannot be. Publius and the Founders understood that human nature fundamentally
transformed, is human nature abolished.
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The proper study of mankind is man.

-

Alexander Pope, “Essay on Man”

But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary.
- Madison, No. 51

Man, that flexible being who adapts himself in society to the thoughts and impressions of others,
is equally capable of knowing his own nature when it is shown to him, and of losing even the
feeling of it when it is concealed from him.
- Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws

Repeal the Missouri Compromise - repeal all compromises - repeal the Declaration of
Independence - repeal all past history, you still cannot repeal human nature.
- Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Repeal of the Missouri Compromise, October 16, 1854
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I.

Preface

Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan submitted by the convention, not
only without a disposition to find or to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that a
faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor, will they barely make allowances for the errors which may
be chargeable on the fallibility to which the convention, as a body of men, were liable; but will keep in
mind, that they themselves also are but men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the
fallible opinions of others.1
-

James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 37.

Written in 1787, The Federalist Papers sought to explain and promote the Constitution
during the vital period of its ratification and beyond. Alongside transcripts of the Convention, The
Federalist remains our principal source for the original reasonings and intentions behind the
enumerated powers of the Constitution. It is principal in that it is both the first, and the primary,
source for our understanding. Originally published as opinion essays in prominent newspapers, it
is a work of political science and advocacy. As the timely product of circumstances, it was written
to meet the demands of public debate over ratification. In providing their account of the
Constitution its authors have only occasional recourse to those philosophical first principles on
which their arguments are based. And yet, its numbers were also written with the intent of being
compiled into a single book-length volume as a keepsake for future generations of Americans
living under the republic whose foundations it explains. As a partisan document intended to
persuade the public of its day, it was also written to be read by those “unborn Millions” whose
political fate still lies in the hands of the Constitution it explains to this very day.2

1
2

No. 37.
George Washington. “General Orders.” July 2, 1776.

1

If The Federalist is not a work of political philosophy, it is an example of Modern political
science and rhetoric. Its numbers stand as a contribution to the great American tradition of political
pamphleteering so prevalent during the Founding Era. The progenitor of Modern political science
is Machiavelli. Declining those “Utopian speculations” of the Ancients, he sought to think and to
write in a manner that would minister to political practice, to statesmanship. Such a task cannot
avoid rhetoric and exhortation. By its very nature it is speech designed to provoke thought and
instigate action. Modern political science and rhetoric are then not entirely distinguishable,
because the end of this science is not contemplation of the whole, but the advancement of political
principles in a given time and place. The Federalist is dependent on first principles derived from
political philosophy, yet its practical task was to pull those ideas down from the clouds and apply
them to the building of an actual republic, not an imagined one.
Madison famously says that government, and by implication, the science of government,
is nothing less than “the greatest of all reflections of human nature.” When Hamilton asserts that
the “science of policy is the knowledge of human nature” he meant that institutional order and the
administration of government are the product of the science of man.3 The Federalist present one
of the most comprehensive illustrations of how an account of human nature manifests itself in
practical political infrastructure and policy, in contradistinction to mere observation and analysis.
From their study of man, drawn from life as much as from books, they were men capable of
drawing concrete prescriptions for action. The Federalist’s account of the Constitution illustrates
just how its practical policies are the product the Founders’ understanding of man.4 Like
Machiavelli, Publius’ arguments proceed from practical axioms and principles of government,

3

Michael P. Federici. The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2012. p. 50.
4
Ralph L. Ketcham. “James Madison and the Nature of Man.” Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan.,
1958). p. 62.
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such as the power of self-love or the frailty of man’s reason for example. He then provides
historical or hypothetical examples to animate and validate those principles in action. Few works
of political philosophy compare to The Federalist Papers in their granular analysis of how the
arrangement of political power actually generates the political ends to which they are dedicated.
These ends and principles were a product of their experiences of and refection’s on human nature.
No other work of such scope attempts to illustrate just how a given account of human nature and
the specific political ends its dictates, are manifest the minutiae of government mechanics and
procedure.
The Federalist provides the reasonings, and explains the experiences, on which Publius
believes the provisions of the Constitution are based. Madison, as the “Father of the Constitution,”
primary scribe of the Convention, and architect of the Bill of Rights, would have known, if anyone
did. Despite its many disputes, The Federalist closely tracks the logic of many of the arguments
presented at the Philadelphia Convention, an assembly cloaked in secrecy. Despite the
conspiratorial element of the Convention, the reasonings done before the public were
fundamentally similar to the deliberations carried on behind closed doors. The fidelity and validity
of The Federalist’s claims can be tested against the actual workings of the Constitution on display
in American history. This history is then, the great judge of the utility, justice and truth of the
Constitution.
The text of the Constitution is self-evidently the product of a process of political
compromise, and reflected in some way the interests of those involved in crafting it. How could it,
or any similar document made by mere men, not reflect such interests? The nation-wide ratification
process and subsequent publication of the Convention’s proceedings make this abundantly clear.
And yet, the serialized publication of The Federalist Papers and the public nature of the state
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conventions guaranteed the Constitution was publicly and transparently debated by a diverse set
of factional interests across the entire fledgling nation. It was ratified by states of diverse and
contrary interests: large and small, commercial and agrarian, Northern and Southern, slave and
free. If the provisions where merely the product of short-sighted self-serving partisanship, it is
hard to imagine how such a constitution would have endured longer than any other in existence
today, more than two-hundred years after its framing.
In his 1830 preface to the publication of his convention notes, Madison wrote, “there never
was an assembly of men, charged with a great and arduous trust, who were more pure in their
motives, or more exclusively or anxiously devoted to the object committed to them than were the
members of the Federal Convention of 1787, to the object of devising and proposing a
constitutional system which would best supply the defects of that which it was to replace, and best
secure the permanent liberty and happiness of their country.”5 Madison is of course speaking of
both his allies and adversaries at the Grand Convention. The Virginian was not a man given to
flattery or false praise. Meanwhile, in an 1852 speech criticizing the shortcomings of the
Constitution, former slave and abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, was still able to praise the
Founders Fathers. A man who was legally recognized as human chattel under the document they
framed, was still about to say that their “statesmanship looked beyond the passing moment, and
stretched away in strength into a distant future.”6 Douglass said, “They seized upon eternal
principles, and set a glorious example in their defense.”7
The Constitution was not simply a document born of political horse-trading. It was devised
to be in conformity with the character of American society and a universal conception of human
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James Madison. Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison. Athens:
Ohio University Press, 1966. p. 19.
6
Frederick Douglass. “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” Rochester, New York, July 5, 1852.
7
Ibid.

4

nature. No participant of the Grand Convention doubted this. In notes to one of his speeches
Madison wrote, “we must not shut our eyes to the nature of man, nor to the light of experience.”8
Disputes at the Convention were not over man’s fundamental nature, but how the needs and
aspirations of this nature might best be met, and his natural freedoms preserved. By 1787, the
American character was already decisively shaped by state constitutions which served as templates
for the new national government. Those constitutions were, in turn, imbued with the principles of
human nature advanced by the Declaration of Independence and held to be universal. Mankind
was equal in the rights with which it had been endowed by nature and nature’s God. The principles
of the Declaration were the common ground of all the Convention’s opposing factions. In fact,
numerous disputes involved opposing sides reasoning from the same premises, to different
conclusions. No one doubted, for example, that all government and politics are merely a reflection
of human nature. All political science and philosophy necessarily presuppose an account of human
nature. In this claim, the Constitution and The Federalist, are no different than any other political
work. As the canonical account of the Constitution, it helps itself to a particular image of human
nature and human character.
Political foundings, if they are to endure, are all the more indebted to some notion of human
nature. Human nature is the only matter with which political forms have to work. Unlike the
supreme law of the land, the daily scrum and machinations of politics is held in greater thrall to
immediate circumstance. Politics happens within the constraints of pre-existing institutional
structures, and is by its very nature and design, more responsive to chance and fortune. Publius
asserts that human nature itself provides “a standard for good government.”9 The account of human
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James Madison. Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison. Athens:
Ohio University Press, 1966. p. 75.
9
David Epstein. “The Political Theory of the Constitution.” Allan Bloom Ed. Confronting the Constitution. New
York: AEI Press, 1986. p. 138.
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nature in The Federalist rests on the premise that there are diverse, yet fixed ends, proper to
mankind by virtue of its very nature. Thus, whatever its precise contours, the Constitution
presupposes that a common and robust human nature actually exists. Its very arrangement of
powers polemically asserts that mankind’s identity exhibits a set of core characteristics that are
irrevocable. While fortune and circumstance are unpredictable, human character is variable in
foreseeable ways. Publius and the Founders accepted axiomatically John Adams’ assertion that
“human nature has always been and is everywhere the same.”10 Human nature is not a palimpsest,
“scraped clean and reinscribed exactly as often as is necessary.”11 Man’s nature cannot be simply
or completely written upon by history, progress or those who wield the instruments of political or
technological power. The central concern of Publius and the Founders in crafting free and durable
political institutions was expressed by Benjamin Rush when he asked, “What kind of beings are
men?”12
Following the famous path first trodden by Machiavelli, Publius and the Founders accepted
that man must be “studied as he is,” and “not as he ought to be.”13 The men of the Convention were
“practical men of varied talents,” most of whom repudiated speculative flights of fancy.14 Hamilton
contemptuously spurned what he called “philosophic politicians.”15 Likewise, Madison dismissed
the “artificial structure and regular symmetry” an “ingenious theorist” might attempt to “bestow
on a constitution planned in his closet.”16 History and experience, not religion, philosophy or
metaphysics, were the proper method for the study of human nature and political organization.17
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C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 139.
George Orwell. 1984. New York: Signet Classics, 1950. p. 40.
12
C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 148.
13
Gary McDowell. “Liberty’s Vestal Flame.” Times Literary Supplement. No. 5013(April 30, 1999). pp. 12-13. p.
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Dinesh D’Souza. The United States of Socialism. New York: All Points Books, 2020. p. 40.
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Gary McDowell. “Liberty’s Vestal Flame.” Times Literary Supplement. No. 5013(April 30, 1999). p. 12.
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No. 37.
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6

The political architecture of the Constitution would be “quarried from real experience” of human
nature, and not from pure logic or the pages of books.18 They took their cue, not from armchair
speculations, but from the “accumulated experience of ages.”19 The cornerstone of that architecture
was their experiences and observations of human nature. The goal of Publius and the Founders
was “an attempt to place Government upon the only Philosophy which can ever support it, the real
constitution of human nature, not upon any wild Visions of its perfectibility.”20
Observations of man’s imperfections were recognized by the Founders to be no less
germane to themselves. Men are neither gods nor angels. If the limits and fallibility of human
reason placed limits on human knowledge, no founder was ever in the position to completely
prescribe the order they set in motion, or foresee its consequences. Statesmen and citizens,
constrained by the founding order, must also have the freedom to be left to their own devices in
order to confront unforeseen challenges inevitably thrown up by fortune. If human nature is subject
to limit, it represents a limiting condition for all political experiments. The ramifications of such
limits are manifest in the powers the Constitution does, and does not grant. A nature with limits
leads to limited government and a “limited constitution.”21 In a letter written to Henry Lee,
Madison wrote that the federal government was “limited” to “specified powers,” and that “if not
only the means, but the objects are unlimited, the parchment had better be thrown into the fire at
once.”22
Human nature is a vast theme. The Federalist’s account of human nature was not intended
to be comprehensive. The goal was not to present a complete epistemological or psychological
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Ibid., p. 13.
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C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 119.
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Nos. 74, 78, 81.
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James Madison. Letter to Henry Lee. January 1, 1792.
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account of man, but to dwell on those faculties and behaviors relevant to the context of founding.23
Its essays address the study of man from the perspective of his political needs relevant to the
founding and maintenance of the American Regime.

24

While The Federalist presupposes other

elements, its account of human nature is primarily dedicated to an analysis of political psychology.
In particular its arguments are underwritten by a psychological theory of human motivation based
on the relevant faculties of the human mind. It animates this schema of motivation in practice as
the play of those faculties is illustrated through historical examples and the hypothetical
circumstances of the proposed Constitution. These faculties are the forces of the human soul the
Constitution is compelled by necessity to depend on and contend with. Publius points to ambition
as the arch passion which with the Constitution must simultaneously employ and defend against it
ravages.
This writing is not a simple commentary. It hopes to present The Federalist Papers’
account of human nature with an emphasis on its analysis of faculty psychology. It is an exegesis
of the text, synthesized with its context. In order to draw out its meaning it has been necessary,
when warranted, to read back into it presupposed philosophical principles and historical context.
It attempts to illuminate and clarify the underlying axioms on which Publius’ practical rules are
based within the scope of the central theme. Context includes the historical and intellectual climate
surrounding the Constitution, but also subsequent history which provides object lessons in the
working mechanics of the government it created. Also referenced are subsequent views of human
nature which have directly impacted our history, politics and the ongoing development of our
political institutions. These divergent and competing views of human nature provide foils which
allow us to see and to judge the Founders’ vision of human nature in greater relief and clarity.

23
24

C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 148.
Ibid., p. 119.
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The plan of The Federalist does not readily lend itself to this task. Not surprisingly, of its
eighty-five numbers, not one is exclusively dedicated to the theme of human nature, Natural rights
or faculty psychology. There is no linear development of this theme because it is not the basis of
the intent or structure of the text. And yet, since politics is a product of human nature, every number
illuminates some relevant facet of that theme. An account of man’s nature is the invisible thread
which weaves the two arguments of its plan together. Publius’ argument for the inadequacy of the
Articles of Confederation and his claims on behalf of the superiority of the Constitution, are both
dependent on a more or less implicit account of human nature. In order to glean this account, it has
been necessary to scour and parse the text to discern and bring together the most relevant passages.
Much that is stated about human nature and psychology is explicit or readily inferable, at other
times it is more dependent on source materials rarely referenced directly.
In order to infer this account of human nature it has been necessary to supplement The
Federalist Papers. Also referenced are other writings of its authors, their contemporaries, and
those intellectual forebears who offer the deeper underpinnings of their claims which they had
neither time, nor purpose, to provide. The direct influence of many sources is evident in the
language and nature of their arguments, other writings, or their biographies. Other sources exhibit
uncanny parallels and are at the very least, the product of convergent thinking and a common
intellectual climate, if not direct influence. During the course of this attempt, it became evident
that The Federalist’s account of human nature cannot be fully appreciated or understood without
reference to their respect for Biblical insights into man and the works of Locke, Montesquieu and
Hume. Lurking at a somewhat greater and more elusive depth are the works of Machiavelli and
Hobbes. At the very least they appear to have had a powerful indirect influence by way of the three
names mentioned. Important parallels exist, but conclusive proof of direct influence remains

9

tentative. And yet, the moral and intellectual climate of the Founding period, unlike our own, still
had a sense of discretion which tends to produce reticence. Discretion was once considered the
better part of valor.

10

II.

The Greatest of All Reflections

1. Introduction: The Inner Ramparts
On Earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordering finger of God am I - thus roars the monster.1
-

Friedrich Nietzsche. “On the New Idol” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra

In 1956 Albert Camus published The Rebel: Man in Revolt. This work is a book-length
meditation on the major revolutionary movements shaping events throughout the globe since the
end of the 18th century. In it, Camus dwells on the ever-increasing radicalism of these movements
as they developed into the 20th century. Their extremism was evident in their ever-broadening aims
and increasingly unlimited methods. An era which had begun by seeking to transfer sovereignty
from a king to a people, culminated in the attempt to destroy all received traditions, institutions
and ideas. Early revolts and revolutions sought to solve targeted and specific problems, but by the
19th century perfection was expected and a final solution demanded of all social, moral, economic
and political problems. Camus calls this radical posture “metaphysical rebellion.”2 This he defines
as modern man’s absolute protest “against his condition and against the whole of the creation.”3
Bernard Yack has described this is as “the longing for total revolution.”4
Revolutionaries came to believe “that a perfect secular order will emerge from the forcible
overthrow of traditional authority.”5 In his Manifesto Marx writes that the Communists “openly
declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social
conditions.”6 Alexander Herzen, the father of Russian Socialism, writes, “The annihilation of the

1

Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. New York: Modern Library, 1995, pp. 49.
Albert Camus. The Rebel: Man in Revolt. New York: Vintage Books, 1956. p. 23.
3
Ibid., p. 23.
4
Bernard Yack. The Longing for Total Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
5
James H. Billington. Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith. New York: Basic Books, 1980.
p. 3.
6
Karl Marx. The Communist Manifesto. New York: Tribeca Books, 2010. p. 64.
2
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past is the procreation of the future.”7 Nothing can be spared. Camus notes that the consequence
of the European revolts and revolutions was that absolute monarchy was merely replaced by “a
new form of absolutism.”8 Movements motivated by revolutionary absolutism refused “to accept
things as they are” including mankind himself.9 For Camus, this was rebellion without limit.
Everything was to be razed to the ground including human nature.
Human identity was in need of fundamental transformation. In the Social Contract
Rousseau says the founder-legislator much be capable “of changing human nature, of transforming
each individual” and “of altering man’s constitution.”10 Total revolution was made possible
intellectually by the rejection of either God or Nature, and the embrace of History as the ultimate
ground of human existence. In 1916 Gramsci wrote, “Man is above all else, mind, consciousness
– that is, he is a product of history, not nature.”11 Revolutionaries became the prophets of History
interpreting its will for the other mere mortals on Earth. With the deification of History, they began
to assert “the idea that man has not been endowed with a definitive nature, that he is not a finished
creation but an experiment of which he can be partly the creator.”12 Inspired by such thinking
Russian Communism, for example, sought to experiment on man’s nature and complete the
creation by producing Lysenko’s New Soviet Man. Meanwhile, in Communist China, Chairman
Mao asserted that “human knowledge and the capability to transform nature have no limit.”13 An
Indian diplomat once accused Mao of believing, as a political leader, he held the power to “alter

7
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human instinct and incentive.”14 An essential goal of 20th totalitarian Communism was the
fundamental transformation of human nature.
Pope John Paul II wrote that the “fundamental error of socialism” was “anthropological in
nature.”15 “Socialism,” said John Paul II, “considers the individual person simply as an element, a
molecule within the social organism, so that the good of the individual is completely subordinated
to the functioning of the socio-economic mechanism.”16 He asserted that Socialism holds “that the
good of the individual can be realized without reference to his free choice, to the unique and
exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of good or evil. Man is thus reduced to a
series of social relationships, and the concept of the person as the autonomous subject of moral
decision disappears, the very subject whose decisions build the social order.”17 Socialism’s denial
of property rights, was for the Pope, simply an extension of Socialism’s denial of the free and
voluntary moral existence he saw as synonymous with the full dignity of human nature itself.
Without right of property, all men inevitably “come to depend on the social machine and on those
who control it.”18
In God and State, the Russian revolutionary Bakunin keenly recognized that God sat at the
apex of traditional authority. God was the psychic, spiritual and customary foundation of the
Ancien Régime’s throne and altar. The only way to destroy traditional authority was to bring about
the death of God. Camus reminds us that once these movements opened the door to political
murder and regicide, deicide naturally followed in train.19 Nietzsche bluntly claimed that modern
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man had murdered God.20 For Nietzsche and others the death of God was to be taken literally and
figuratively. Hegel noted that God’s death opened “an abyss of nothingness into which all being
sinks.”21 God, as the source of all authority, truth and morality, had died. If the metaphysical source
and foundation of life’s sureties had perished, so too had they. Nietzsche’s assertion “Everything
is false,” was merely the secular corollary to the death of God. 22 Objective standards which might
ground truth, morality and politics had apparently been refuted or simply obliterated. Camus
explains that over time “amorality, scientific materialism, and atheism” begin to displace “the
antitheism of the rebels of former times.”23 He says that since the 19th century mankind has
attempted “to live without transcendence.”24 Camus’ emphasis on the unlimited nature of this
rebellion reminds us of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s conclusion that once God is dead, “everything
is permitted.”25 God, or the idea of God, represents among other things, ultimate and inextricable
limit. God means, man is an animate piece of clay, forever wedged between Heaven and Earth. It
reminds us that man is merely a finite middle being in the order of things, a creature of this world,
not a creator of a new one.
Hegel wrote that when God dies He is resurrected in this world.26 “The regicides of the
nineteenth century,” writes Camus, “are succeeded by the deicides of the twentieth” which “draw
the ultimate conclusions from the logic of rebellion and want to make the Earth a kingdom where
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man is God.”27 Nietzsche asks, “Must we ourselves not become gods” in order to be worthy of our
deicide? 28 He observed that once God is liquidated, the State becomes mankind’s “new idol” of
worship.29 Since there is no deity in heaven, the State becomes the highest being, a mortal god on
Earth. Camus writes that “despite the fact that there is no God,” a Church must still be built.30 In
spite of God’s death, man’s need and desire to believe does not itself die, but is redirected and
projected on this world. Politically the death of God means there no longer exists any being higher
or more powerful, or of greater authority, than the State. Mankind’s ultimate allegiances and
impulse to faith are merely transposed from an other-worldly Father, to a this-worldly Leviathan.
With God’s providence refuted “the State will play the part of Destiny.”31 With our patricide of
the Holy Father in Heaven, man, or his rulers on Earth, become the last gods standing.
Camus shows that once God is murdered the credo “Everything is permitted” becomes the
rallying cry of all revolutionaries complicit in the act. John Rawls once noted how the “radical is
so appalled by the present situation that he is willing to exchange it for virtually anything.”32 When
the revolutionary act is transformed from a means to an end in itself, all is permitted in its name.
Force and fraud, violence and deceit, become the coin of the revolutionary realm. “The ends justify
any means.”33 When revolution is the sole principle no method or goal can be considered evil. The
Russian revolutionary Uspensky makes this plainly clear saying, “It is not a question of right, but
of our duty to eliminate everything that may harm our cause.”34 “Everything,” in time, would come
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to mean tens of millions of human beings who stood in the way of the revolution. Camus writes,
“The greater the faith” placed in the final realization of the revolution, “the less the value of human
life.”35
Experience shows the radical revolutionary impulse always ends up devouring its own.
Machiavelli wrote in the midst of the “inconveniences” and “disorders” of revolutionary foundings
“there is no remedy more powerful, nor more valid, more secure, and more necessary, than to kill
the sons of Brutus.”36 “The Revolution,” writes Mallet du Pan, “like Saturn, devours its own
children.”37In overturning the past without any limiting principle, these radical movements negated
the worth of human life itself in the process. The Party begins by purging the ‘reactionary’
elements of society, the kulaks and the bourgeois; it then cannibalizes itself in a never-ending cycle
of political murder. The logic of unbounded revolution means that the common humanity and
dignity of its targets can be ignored precisely because they represent nothing more than the last
impediments to the full liberation of mankind and the true and final fulfillment of social justice.
The denial of all limits and foundations means that the logic of power is the only certain principle
of the unbounded revolution. Those with it thrive. Those without it perish at the hands who do.
Unbounded revolution seeks to deliver the heavenly kingdom of God to Earth by the hands
of mere mortals. Augustine’s distinction between the City of Man and the City of God is abolished.
The fulfillment of the prophecy of unlimited revolution is a society unitary, pure and equal. The
existence of diverse factions of opinion represents the ultimate heresy and thoughtcrime.
Robespierre’s famous speech on May 26, 1794, celebrated the criminalization of political
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differences.38 Those with different opinions were “enemies of the Nation.”39 Dissent was
tantamount to treason. At this moment terror and terrorism replace consent and political dispute as
the primary means of communal existence. Force deals a death blow to deliberation as the essence
of politics. Political murder becomes the inevitable tool necessary to purify the body politic. A
kind of political eugenics campaign ensues. Once minority factions are identified as obstacles to
the revolution, their common humanity can be denied with justice. Whether it was a King or the
royalists in the Vendée, the bourgeoisie, the capitalist or the Russian Kulak, the Gypsy or the Jew,
the “feeble-minded” or the Uyghur, enemies of the revolution can be eliminated without qualms.
Marat said, “Ah, what injustice! Who cannot see that I want to cut off a few heads in order to save
a great number?”40 For such magnanimity he arrogated to himself the title “philanthropist”, lover
of mankind. Unbounded revolution means whole peoples can be ‘liquidated’ with impunity so
long as the name “justice” is invoked with the proper conviction.
Camus argues that intellectual and political movements like nihilism, anarchism,
Communism and Fascism, despite their apparent differences along the left-right axis of the
ideological spectrum, are all united by their fundamental lack of any ideological limitation which
might circumscribe their principles, aims and methods. For Camus this lack of limit, both
theoretical and practical, was the philosophic lynchpin setting them on an inevitable path from
mere tyranny and slavery to totalitarianism and the denial of the intrinsic dignity of human life.
For these unbounded ideologies, political murder is a problem-solving method.41 Stalin was fond
of saying “Death solves all problems…no man, no problem.”42 No idol quip, this was the logical
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conclusion of ideology without limit. Once human beings are stripped of their dignity, they can be
reduced to mere “inconveniences.”
The capacious principles of these movements were so generous as to characterize genocide
as “rational” and “scientific”, or merely the inevitable workings of History through man. If History
is indeed a “slaughtering bench” on which nations and men are sacrificed, as Hegel suggested, it
must need a butcher to carry out its Will on Earth.43 These radical ideologies lacked an intellectual
anchor which might have prevented them from annihilating human beings in the process of
destroying an Ancien Régime. As proof, an estimated 25 million people were murdered in the
name of Fascism, while modest estimates conclude Communism killed “between 85 and 100
million” souls.44 As Stalin reminds us, “if millions die, that’s only statistics.”45
One need only look to the human economy of an Auschwitz or the Gulag where the Nazi
and Communist regimes merely fulfilled the logical consequences of unlimited revolution. In these
death camps human beings were reduced to mere matter in motion. In physics, Work done to move
matter in the world is equal to the Force applied to an object multiplied by the Distance it has
travelled, W = F ∙ D. Slave-laborers were treated as so many quanta of energy with the capacity to
accomplish a specified amount of work, a mere variable in a physics equation, or line item in a
book-keeping entry. In these camps efficiency and expediency were the only operative principles.
Food was rationed and systematically reduced to extract maximal labor from ‘human resources’
with the most minimal outlay of overhead expenditures. Albert Speer poignantly, if self-servingly,
describes an image of these human cogs. He writes, “What disturbs me more is that I failed to read
the physiognomy of the regime mirrored in the faces of those prisoner.”46 Naziism, among others,
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justified a total indifference to human life. Speaking of the slave labor under his supervision Speer
writes, “I realized that the sight of suffering people influenced only my emotions, but not my
conduct.”47 Speer, it turns out, was not particularly sociopathic, the ideology of his regime was.
The slave labor camps of the totalitarian regimes epitomize the ultimate experiment in the
centralized control, routinization and scientific social engineering of human life under ideological
conditions in which all experiments are permitted. This is how totalitarianism maximizes its return
on investments.
Looking back on this era which had begun with the American and French revolutions and
culminated in the totalitarian nightmare, Camus concludes, “We now know, at the end of this long
inquiry into rebellion and nihilism, that rebellion with no other limits but historical expediency
signifies unlimited slavery. To escape this fate, the revolutionary mind, if it wants to remain alive,
must therefore return again to the sources of rebellion and draw its inspiration from the only system
of thought which is faithful to its origins: thought that recognizes limits.”48 For Camus these origins
and limits were to be found in a common and recognized human nature shared by all human beings.
Human nature was the common measure to which we must defer for anything like remotely justice
to be established. Human nature is the great fulcrum around which social and political order must
revolve. It defines and delimits both the means and ends of rebellion, revolution and government
itself. He continues, “If the limit discovered by rebellion transfigures everything, if every thought,
every action that goes beyond a certain point negates itself, there is, in fact, a measure by which to
judge events and men.”49 When the revolution contradicts its own initial premise, when it begins
to devour its own, that limit has been reached. “In history,” writes Camus, “as in psychology,
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rebellion is an irregular pendulum, which swings in an erratic arc because it is looking for its most
perfect and profound rhythm. But its irregularity is not total: it functions around a pivot. Rebellion,
at the same time that it suggests a nature common to all men, brings to light the measure and the
limit which are the very principles of this nature.”50 Without regard for a common human nature
all rebellions and revolutions are mere euphemism for tyranny. Revolution must be taught
moderation. Moderation can only be achieved when revolution is anchored to a recognized
common human nature as the natural standard of justice, shared by all human beings.
Publius and the Founders built America’s institutions on belief that human nature itself was
the standard of good government and its justice. Political institutions must be made commensurate
to the being who both animates and is harnessed by them. The Federalist’s account of human
nature subscribes to what Thomas Sowell once called the “constrained vision” of human nature
and the justice commensurate to it.51 Man’s nature and condition provide the fundamental
constraints and limitations on his existence he must heed if he is to have any chance to be happy.
The constrained vision begins with the recognition of the limits of human nature and culminates
the necessity of limited government. There are limits on the ability of that nature to alter itself or
its circumstances. Adherence to an acknowledged human nature, far from reducing mankind to a
singular understanding is an acknowledgment and healthy respect of the human diversity that
nature produces and the wisdom of giving it the freedom to flourish rather than the folly of
imposing sameness and conformity on mankind. The fact of individual human diversity, difference
and inequality “is evident from the long record of human experience.”52 A “world of coerced
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uniformity” is therefore, be definition, antihuman.53 “Attempts to remake human beings,” or to
make them conform “to the same mold or perfect equality, inevitably lead to tyranny.54
Limits on what is possible, suggest the perfect should not be allowed to be the enemy of
the good and possible in this world. There were limits on man’s faculty of reason and his ability
to know, and to know what is right. Limit on human nature meant man was a being of passion in
which their reasoning is always mixed with their self-love. The constrained vision sought the
possible over the perfect. Reason’s limits, applied to founders and statesman as well as the people.
This means men do not have the right to tinker as gods with human nature and society because
they are fallible beings. Precisely because of this fallibility rulers are obliged to respect another
man’s opinions of his own life and aspirations. Limits on reason lead to the denial that the
systematic organization and social engineering of society was neither good, wise nor possible. The
constrained vision denies that man “can make everything to our pleasure” whether the character
of the individual or their society.55 Limits on man’s rational faculty lead to a limit on the
shoemaker’s knowledge about what is right for the wearer of the boot.
When The Federalists Papers were published in the aftermath of the Philadelphia
Convention their immediate purpose was to argue on two fronts. On one hand, they sought to
illustrate the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, and on the other to argue on behalf of
the nature and superiority of the newly proposed Union enshrined by the Constitution. The
inadequacies of the Articles were the very defects they believed the Constitution would solve.
These aims are really two facets of one continuous argument, connected as they are, by an account
of human nature. The Federalist’s account of human nature is the fulcrum around which all its
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claims revolve. This account is the logical and rhetorical lever used to demonstrate the failings of
the Articles, and justify the Constitution. This account establishes the vital and necessary
relationship between human nature, government and the science of politics.
The Federalist Papers were written to explain and defend the provisions for a national
government drafted by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. Their authors sought to provide an
“authoritative explication of the principles underlying the Constitution.”56 In No. 1 Hamilton lays
out the central objectives of The Federalist. Its goals were to demonstrate “the utility of the Union”,
the insufficiency of the Articles of Confederation, the necessity of energetic government, the
Constitution’s conformity to the principles of republicanism, and the “additional security” afforded
to “liberty and property” obtained by that “species of government.”57 At the foundation of this
explanation is an account of human nature. 58 It becomes apparent its authors presuppose a political
anthropology. In Aristotle’s works, anthropologos literally means “speaking of man,” or more
precisely, “an account of human being or human nature.”59 Broadly speaking an anthropology is a
science of human nature which addresses the body and soul, the physiology and psychology all
human beings hold in common. A political anthropology aims at a description and analysis of
those attributes and faculties of human nature particularly germane to political order. There is then
an underlying anthropology embedded in the two central tasks of The Federalist. This account of
human nature is the thread which binds together all its various claims.
Two central premises of this anthropology are that human nature is fixed in its essential
characteristics, and that in order for government to be just and achieve what Hamilton calls
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“political prosperity”, it must be founded in proper conformity with these characteristics.60 The
Federalist Papers presuppose that human nature is not indefinitely malleable, nor subject to
fundamental transformation by historical change or assertions of the human will. The relative
stability of human nature means that it is an étant donné, a given. The political scientist must
confront, recognize and account for human nature as the acknowledged cornerstone of political
inquiry. Likewise, the founder and the statesmen must, if they are to succeed, erect government on
this same edifice. They must build political institutions in conformity with the fundamental and
enduring characteristics of human nature.
The thoughts of Publius and the American Founders on the relationship between human
nature and government are no different than Aristotle’s Politics or Nicomachean Ethics. Moral
and political order must be in conformity with human nature. The happiness of mankind, in its
individual and collective forms, is predicated on the correct life in conformity with its own nature.
For Aristotle happiness was a product of the recognition and perfection of our nature, from a raw
and untutored condition to an educated and complete one. Moral and political institutions should
be designed to achieve or permit freedom for man to pursuit himself. The Founders of course did
not follow Aristotle particular prescriptions of education or regime they found appropriate for
American society, but the general recognition is the same.
Crafting political order appears to be a simple matter of making it conform to human nature.
The challenge presented is that human nature is complex, not simple. Mankind has a body and a
soul, reason and passions, an individual and collective existence. Human nature, because it is
manifold and divided, is or has the potential to be, in conflict with itself. Human nature, in
contradistinction to other animals, is really two natures. It consists of a first and second nature. Or,
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as the Founders and those they drew upon put it, there was a ‘human nature’ in contradistinction
to a ‘human character’ or spirit. The first nature exhibits a series of ironclad biological needs,
instincts, impulses and passions that are never completely transformed or eliminated by the
habituation of society or government. Those instincts, particularly ones detrimental to the common
interest, which cannot be educated away or altered by civil society, must be accommodated,
constrained and channeled by the appropriate political institutions and their proper arrangement.
The nature of these institutions and the arrangement of their powers must be in conformity with
the inextricable aspects of human nature. The permanent features of man’s nature cannot be
reeducated or fundamentally altered. Human nature must be taken as it is. Man, in short, is not a
blank slate.61
The Founder’s recognition of a fixed human nature provided numerous limits to their
thought. They identified human nature with limit. The American Founding recognized the
demands of human nature and sought to found a regime commensurate to it. Human nature was
bounded by limits, in particular life was a kind mean caught between liberty and necessity. The
institutional order provided by the Constitution attempts to balance between the demands of liberty
and those of necessity. This balance merely echoes the parameters of human nature and existence.
Like all life, human nature must recognize and account for necessity or mere life, on the other hand
to be a distinctly human existence it must also maintain a place for liberty. The arguments of The
Federalist recognize there is a deterministic element to human life, but that it is not entirely
determined by force and accident. Despite the force of the metaphor human beings are not fixed
cogs in a fixed social machine. They can live by some degree of freedom, of reflection and choice.
But nor are the wholly free to make and remake their nature or the type of political community
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that would be best in light of that nature. Human beings were not, as Rousseau suggested, “free
agents.” The balance the Constitution strikes between liberty and necessity is often referred to as
“ordered liberty.”62
The Founders recognized that human nature was bounded by its capacities and powers such
as the limits of reason and self-making, by its regularity and by “the infirmities and depravities of
the human character.”63 Their revolution was not radical, nor was its view of human nature. These
facts represent two sides of the same coin. The American Founding, from Revolution to
Constitution, maintained a sober view of human nature, simultaneously optimistic and reserved,
admiring but also suspicious. In No. 76 Hamilton concluded that “there is a portion of virtue and
honour among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence: and experience
justifies the theory.64 In No. 55 Madison writes that there is “a degree of depravity in mankind,
which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust: so there are other qualities in human
nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government
presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.”65 Echoing
Madison’s claim in No. 55, Hamilton writes in No. 76 that “the supposition of universal venality
in human nature, is little less an error in political reasoning, than that of universal rectitude.”66
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Publius and The Founders “took man to be a passionate animal endowed with but not in a
straightforward fashion governed by reason.”67 One of their central acknowledgements in founding
a political order, was that man’s reason was compelled to “recognize its own limitations.”68 This
meant Publius and the Founders would have to recognize the limits of their own powers of
reasoning, the precipice where reasoning stops and opinion, passion and interest began. Certainly,
they “did not believe that in the future men would subordinate passion to reason or self-interest to
the public good.”69 Lacking true knowledge on such matters, government has no legitimate basis
for defining completely the happiness of the people. In his “Vindication of the Funding System,”
Hamilton refers to “the difference between the true politician and the political-empyric.” He says
the “true politician...takes human nature as he finds it, a compound of good and ill qualities.”70
This distinction separates the prudent man of action with realistic expectations from the theorist
who has unreasonable expectations of human nature. Therefore the true statesman and political
scientist with this view of human nature “will not attempt to warp or distort it from its natural
direction.”71 In No. 6, Hamilton asks us to abandon “the fallacy and extravagance of those idle
theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, the
weaknesses, and the evils incident to society in every shape.”72 It is time, he says, “to awake from
the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our
political conduct” because we will never obtain either “perfect wisdom” or “perfect virtue.”73
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Publius and the Founders saw human nature as a mean between execs and deficiency.
Despite its acknowledged frailties, they held “a general consensus that all men had a capacity for
reason” sufficient to justify their experiment in self-government.74 Hamilton claims that if we
“view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues, or exaggerating its vices” we
discover that it has the resources to meet the demands of genuine republican self-government.75
Mankind had within itself the sufficient supply of reason and virtue for self-government, but is not
capable of that final historical perfection which would have unreason and vice extricated from its
nature altogether. In short, human nature had definable limits. In No. 11 Hamilton says, “It belongs
to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother,” the Europeans,
“moderation.”76 Hamilton and the Founders sought to teach them the meaning of limit.
For most of the Founders, their sober view of man, translated into an equally sober view
of revolution. Revolution was not, for them, an end in-itself, or an article of religious faith.77
Jefferson remarks that the Philadelphia Convention represented a magnificent example of
“changing a constitution, by assembling the wise men of state, instead of assembling armies.”78
One 20th century author writes that revolution is “perhaps the faith of our time.”79 “Modern
revolutionaries,” he continues, “are believers, no less committed and intense then were the
Christians or the Muslims of an earlier era.” 80 There was no Saint-Just, Robespierre, Lenin or Mao
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of the American Founding. Ironically it was in the Old World, not the New, where the fire of
revolutionary faith would become the ideological idée fixe.81 Unlike 19th century activists like
Proudhon, Bakunin, Marx or Nechayev, The Founders were not professional radicals,
revolutionaries, or even pure intellectuals. They were “practical men of varied talents.”82 Most
were neither “career politicians or mere men of letters.”83 They were soldiers, “scientists,
inventors, entrepreneurs and builders.”84 One could find an instructive comparison between the
lives of a Benjamin Franklin or a Hamilton on one hand, and that of a Marx, Nechayev or Trotsky
on the other. Each side of this biographical comparison serves a microcosm symbolizing the vast
differences of ideology, outlook and personal experience. The likes of Washington, Adams,
Madison and Hamilton drew much of their knowledge of the world and politics from hands on
experiences. Their thinking on the American experiment in self-government was profoundly
informed by the commonsense worlds they all inhabited as professionals, citizens and statemen.
They were practical men who knew how to build things, not just tear them down.
The Founders did not consider revolution as a positive good, as would those in the 19th
century. It was a necessary evil serving the negative function of throwing off our European
masters. The American Revolution did not seek complete or fundamental transformation of man
or his society. Its goals were primarily political and limited. Whatever transformation of society
had occurred in America, it happened organically and of its own impetuses. These changes were
not primarily the product of the war or the intention behind revolutionary principles. John Adams
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remarked, “The Revolution was effected before the War commenced,” he wrote. “The Revolution
was in the Minds and Hearts of the People. A Change in their Religious Sentiments of their Duties
and Obligations.”85
This was the result of a mentality born of a desire for liberty, not fraternity or
egalitarianism.86 It was a rebellion against tyranny. The vast differences between the American
project of liberty and the French project of egalitarianism are underwritten by their distinct
conceptions of human nature and their logical consequences and ramifications. Liberty is the
central principle of republicanism. Of the various governing principles of political regimes
throughout history, the Founding Fathers understood liberty, in the form of Natural Rights, to be
in the greatest conformity with human nature. Liberty is more in conformity with mankind’s
natural self-love than is fraternity or equality of outcome. The tendency toward self-love is a
tendency toward self-interest. Human beings are naturally inclined to perform deeds which benefit
themselves, or those extensions of themselves like family and immediate community. Self-love
suggests that we love what is ours and we love most what is most ours starting with our lives and
our bodies. The power of self-love limits the radius of our affections. Societies which attempt to
extend man’s affection beyond their proper sphere are rightly called tyrannical. One can respect,
but not love the stranger on the other side of the planet. Fraternité, and its corollary Egalité, are
both less natural than liberty. Liberty gives free play to self-love. Self-love is the norm because it
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is natural. Only through compulsion which goes against the grain of their own natures do men
achieve a society of identical and equal brotherhood. Madison rejects this kind of unrealistic
conformity and solidarity in No. 10. Such a bending of human nature, the Founder’s held, was at
too high a cost, with too little meaningful reward.
The Declaration of Independence is in many ways a radical document. Yet, while its
asserted universal principles of freedom, they were recognized as true only on behalf of the opinion
of the American people, not humanity itself. This limited and national recognition by the people
demanded only a Union of states, not the unity of humanity under a Global World Order. The
driving impulse on this side of the Atlantic was not a faith in revolution, but in the capacity for a
people to govern themselves under the right circumstances and institutions. The Founding credo
was not revolution, but the principles of life, liberty and happiness which provided its ends and
circumscribed its means.
This meant Americans sought to alter the government of former British colonies, not all of
Europe as with the French Revolution, or all the world as with the Communist one. The demand
for the global recognition of the universal rights of man is a recognition of the universal unity of
humanity which demands a war on behalf of “humanity” to achieve this unity in practice. The
attempt at the unity of globe and the denial of a diversity of self-determining nation-states,
necessarily leads to a war on humanity in the name of humanity. The natural diversity and plurality
of human nature left to itself tends towards factionalism, both domestically and globally. Thus, the
war in the name of the global unity of humanity is a war against human nature itself.
The American Revolution was not “a metaphysical revolt… against the conditions of life”
or “against creation itself.”87 Nor was it a rebellion against all received tradition and its institutions
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by bringing them before the tribunal of a merely human wisdom. The goal of the American
Revolution was not to begin anew, or fundamentally transform human nature, the American people
or their society. It did not seek the destruction of traditional religion, or its architectural and artistic
edifices. It did not desire to displace Biblical religion and morality by a religion of reason, or the
Culte de la Raison. It did not seek to rewrite time itself, the Gregorian calendar, or the days of the
week. The exodus of the Colonies from this condition was not to be achieved through transforming
human nature, but rather by transforming the circumstances and conditions of people so as to
encourage peaceful passions and discourage belligerent ones. They would establish a new political
order, dedicated to their own liberty, not the economic well-being of a mother country.
The Revolution did not seek kill a king, but only the form of government called monarchy.
It was not a root and branch revolution. On the contrary the American Revolution was to provide
a form of government commensurate to an American society which had gradually devolved away
from its European progenitors and their long historical memory during the hundred and fifty
intervening years between the settlement of the New World and the onset of the Revolution. This
society had developed increasing independency from its mother country since the early days of the
17th century and taken a distinct and definitive form by the 1760s. The revolution was not sought
to transform colonial America into a fundamentally new society, but to provide the necessary
political infrastructure to support the one which had already come to exist. They sought to conserve
a way of life, not invent a new one from whole cloth.
Adams wrote, “But what do we mean by the American Revolution? Do we mean the
American war?...This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the
people, was the real American Revolution. The victory did not happen on the battlefield, but in the
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hearts and minds of the citizens.”88 The war would merely re-instantiate the spirit of American
society already in existence, by making possible a government commensurate to it. The period
from independence to the Convention and ratification was one of consolidation as much as
innovation. The Revolution may have been conservative in some ways, as Burke suggested, but it
did not merely conserve the rights of British subjects, or elements of the English Constitution and
Common Law. Rather, it conserved a novel way of life that had developed in the New World based
on the sovereignty of the People, not the Crown.
The spirit of this revolution and its founding principles came from a heady tincture of
Enlightenment rationalism and Christian morality. This was a sober Enlightenment holding out a
tempered optimism for the future and the betterment of society.89 Their thinking was moored in
the deep pillars of wisdom inherited from Jerusalem and Athens. The Enlightenment of the
Founders was rational in that it sought to found a regime by the lights of human reason and
experience alone. If nature is the ultimate object of our rational faculty then it sought to erect a
regime on the principles of human nature. Of the Constitutional Convention, Clinton Rossiter
writes, “no one of this sober gathering would have dreamed of invoking the Goddess of Reason,
neither would anyone have dared to proclaim that his opinions had the support of the God of
Abraham and Paul. The Convention of 1787 was highly rationalist and even secular in spirit.”90
Rossiter illustrates how the Founders sought a path between the Scylla and Charybdis of religious
zealotry on the one hand, and an unbridled and unwarranted faith in human reason on the other.
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Even as Publius and the Founders may have believed, as Ethan Allan, that reason was “the
only oracle of man,”91 they did not fail to express Biblical doubts regarding reason’s limits. The
Founders’ rationalism contained within itself the seeds of a healthy skepticism toward the very
fruits of an all-too-human faculty. This rationalism was one that understood experience, not pure
speculative reason, was “the oracle of truth.”92 Unlike their French cousins the American Founders
rooted their thinking in a sober Enlightenment and not the Radical or the occult93 Enlightenment
which sought to transform human nature and society through a religion of reason94 or humanity
itself.95 This skepticism toward mankind’s faculties was aimed at themselves no less than society
at large. In No. 37 Madison says of the product of the Convention’s making, “that a faultless plan
was not to be expected.”96 He speaks of the “errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to
which the convention, as a body of men, were liable.” 97 Madison reminds the reader “that they
themselves also are but men,” subject like any other to “fallible opinions.”98
Despite the secular tenor of the Convention, the Founders nevertheless understood
Christian religion and morality as absolutely necessary to the experiment in republican self-
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government. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitutional Convention and its fruit were
not framed by any overt references to traditional Christianity, but their language was left
sufficiently open to harmonize with it. Whatever the exact nature of the Founders’ personal views
on revealed religion, they accepted the practical necessity of its morality. The spine of morality
was only provided by God, and faith in God. Religion in the people was required if republican
self-government was to be genuinely established and preserved. Therefore, religion and its
morality were considered both rational and correct.99 Religion was a moral precondition of
freedom.100 Christianity taught self-restraint. Self-restraint was a precondition of self-government.
All the Founders acknowledged that the restraints and limits provided by this morality were
necessary if American was to keep its republic.
The audacious, even radical, claim of the American Founding was to have erected a regime
on the principles of human nature itself. Burke thought the original aim of the American rebellion
“was not to secure independence from Britain, but to secure the legal rights of subjects under the
English constitution.”101 Burke saw the American revolution in conservative terms. For him the
Constitution was the capstone of the transplantation and “restoration” of English society in the
New World, whose essential features were to be found in the English Constitution.102 The
Revolution may have been conservative in some respects, but what did it seek to conserve other
than a new way of life which had developed in the New World. This new society asserted the
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sovereignty of the People, not the Crown. The belief in a “wholly popular” government wherein
the People are sovereign has no parallel in English political history and is unintelligible without
reference to the Natural Rights tradition of John Locke. The American Founders looked to Nature,
not History or divine right for their solution. In England the people’s rights were provisionally
secured from the King, in American they were “unalienable” and “endowed by their Creator.” The
Founders adapted Lockean principles to a society whose character was already significantly
shaped by them. John Adams himself asserted that the state constitutions on which the national
one was based, were in conformity with human nature itself. This made America the “natural rights
republic”, the regime founded on human nature.103 Zuckert writes, “the great novelty and power of
the American experiment: the regime based on nature, the regime ordered to natural rights.”104
Nature, not History, sits at the foundation of the American Founding. From the Revolution
to the Convention and its Constitution, to the publication of The Federalist Papers and ratification,
runs the thread of human nature. The Founders did not see themselves as on the right side of
history, rather historical chance had merely granted fortuitous circumstances. When Hegel had
seen Napoleon riding though Jena on October 13, 1806, he described the emperor as the historical
“World-Spirit on Horseback.”105 The Founders understood the history-making nature of their
endeavor, but did not believe themselves to be instruments of the transcendent, or prophets of
History. They were not merely children of 18th century Enlightenment optimism. Their success
was also the result of a providential wisdom, a discretion and a skepticism regarding the nature
and limits of men. For them the real was not by definition rational.
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In light of their combination of Enlightenment rationalism and Christian morality, Publius
and the Founders rejected, avant le lettre, all those historicisms, progressivisms and scientisms
which attempt to tether the human identity indiscriminately to time and history and willfully
reshape it in their own image. The unchanging “laws of nature and nature’s God”, not those of
time, history or progress, were the foundation of human identity. Human nature cannot be
refashioned by working on itself in time. The attempt to refashion human nature would simply
result in what C.S. Lewis called “the abolition of man.”106 Human nature transfigured, is human
nature extinguished.
The tragedy and carnage which has resulted from attempts to transform humanity in the
20th and 21st centuries have shown the Founder’s account of human nature to be providential. Man
comes from the Author with certain inextricable features and limits. To disrespect, to ignore, or to
willfully attempt to transform those features is a recipe for human misery tantamount to tyranny
and slavery. This is the errand of the zealot, the tyrant and the fool. Publius and the Founders were
the first founders in history who explicitly sought to found a regime on what they believed to be
the unchanging characteristics of human nature. This novel historical project is summed up in the
name “republic”. The American nation was to be a novel form of republic “erected on the simple
principles of nature.”107
“In framing a government,” writes Madison, “which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”108 Madison acknowledges that the central problem
the Constitution was designed to solve, and The Federalist Papers explain, was how to grant men
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the necessary and sufficient power to govern, yet guarantee the governed would remain free from
government tyranny. The very recognition of this predicament as a problem only obtains under the
premise of the principle of limited self-government whose raison d’etre is to secure the natural
liberties of its citizens. The sacred principle of a government “of the people, for the people, and by
the people”109 is only intelligible under the premise of a given, free and equal human nature. It is
a political consideration found only in a nation “conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the
proposition that all men are created equal.”110
Concern for the problem of limited self-government only exists if statesmen treat human
nature as given and morally equal. It rests on the premise that all human beings are by nature free
and equal, and are the product of a “Creator” independent from itself such as nature or nature’s
God. Only if human nature is given and rights unalienable because endowed by a power beyond
human artifice is the Founders’ concern for limited government even intelligible. To acknowledge
that human beings are endowed with a free and equal nature is to say that no man is the natural
ruler of any other man. Jefferson wrote that the “palpable truth,” is “that the mass of mankind has
not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few boote and spurre, ready to ride them
legitimately, by the grace of God.”111 This fact alone establishes limited government, the uniform
rule of law and points to the intrinsic problem of the necessity of the rule men over men. It is the
automatic repudiation of all forms of slavery and tyranny. It is because none of the political
ideologies generated since the Founding take freedom and equality as given by nature or God, that
they never bother themselves with limits on government or countenance the proposition that rights
come from anywhere but State.
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Today we do not understand nature and purpose of the specific provisions of the
Constitution and their peculiar arrangement. The logic of the Constitution is only revealed when
seen through the lens of the Founder’s understanding of human nature from which they are derived.
We do not understand how the Constitution is predicated on this particular account of human
nature, motive and conduct. Our failure is a product of our ignorance, or frank rejection of this
account. Often these two factors go hand in hand.
Why does the account of human nature in The Federalist Papers remain so vital to our national
identity, our politics and political science today? Why should we care about a theory of human
nature advanced by Publius in the distant, rickety era of 1787? We might as well ask, why care
about the Constitution?
The provisions of the Constitution are based on speculations about human nature which
sought to estimate how men would respond to the yoke of its powers and procedures. The
Constitution is designed to anticipate likely human motives and channel human conduct. Most of
The Federalist’s defense of the Constitution revolves around imagining how men will act under
its constraints. These were no idle imaginings, but were the product of long experience of the
actions of men, in the annals of history, but also as observed in the present. If our government is
the “greatest of all reflections on human nature” this account remains of utmost importance to our
understanding of the Constitution and the society it has fashioned.
The title of one historian’s book implies that The Federalist’s explanation of the
Constitution “explains America” itself.112 As our supreme law, the Constitution does not merely
structure government, but the society subordinate to it. Our own way of life, identity and outlook
as a people are shaped by it. Attorney General Robert Jackson, who would later become a Supreme
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Court justice and preside over the Nuremberg trials, said the Constitution not only “guarantees our
freedoms and the supremacy of law” but represents the “inner ramparts of our society.”113 The
Constitution not only guarantees our way of life, it is also our way of life. Our Founding documents
are the mirror in which we understand our history and ourselves. Since we continue to remain the
children of that 18th century document, it behooves us to be conversant with the core principles on
which it is based. To understand its account of human nature is to understand the Constitution, and
to understand the Constitution is to understand ourselves.
Echoing Publius, constitutional scholar Richard Epstein says “the choice of a constitution
rests in large measure upon our conception of human nature.”114 He says the “relation between
human nature and human government was well understood by the political writers who influenced
the framers of our own Constitution, but it is often lost sight of today.” 115 The permanent existence
of this relation should compel us to understand “the driving force[s] of human nature with which
constitutions must contend.”116 The Constitution “presupposed a distinctive view of human nature
and was intended to encourage the emergence of certain kinds of men.”117 The Founders believed
that our republic “could not and would not persist under any and all conditions.”118 For example
the Constitution presupposed a certain moral order of society where religion was central to its
fabric. Likewise, it was designed to produce men of sufficient virtue in government. Can our

113

Judge Jackson. “United States Attorneys Gear Their Work with National Defense.” Federal Probation. Volume
V, No. 1, (January-March, 1941). p. 38.
114
Richard A. Epstein. “Self-Interest and the Constitution.” Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1987).
p. 153.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Martin Diamond. “The American Idea of Man.” from The Americans: 1976 An Inquiry into Fundamental
Concepts of Man Underlying Various U.S. Institutions Critical Choices for Americans Volume II (ed. Irving Kristol
& Paul Weaver) Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976. p. 1.
118
Ibid.

39

constitutional republic persist under a condition of ignorance regarding the account of human
nature from which the Constitution’s powers and their arrangement stem?
The enduring relevance of The Federalist’s account of human nature rest on the assertion
that no amount of historical transformation, progress or new knowledge can avoid posing and
attempting to answer the question of the nature of mankind and the best possible order
commensurate to it. Ideological transformations in thinking about human nature since the
Founding illustrate the necessity of returning to a way of thinking which has been made
questionable. What of a political society that still functions on a document based on principles of
which the very people created by it, no longer know, understand or hold faith in? Does such a
circumstance promote what Publius calls our “political prosperity” or its opposite?
Another reason The Federalist’s account of human nature remains so important is that we
seem to be more conversant with ideologies which are rivals and challengers, even enemies, to the
Constitution. All political theories necessarily rest on some conception of human nature. How we
conceive that nature directly informs the principles on which we found, structure and reform
political communities. Its shapes and defines our relationships with fellow citizens and ourselves.
The account in The Federalist stands in direct opposition to various strands of thought percolating
since the time of the Founding which have flourished particularly since the 19th century and have
been transmitted into the 21st.
American history might well be conceived as a struggle over how we understand the
essential characteristics of our nation and its political psychology. When for example Montesquieu
speaks of the “spirit” of laws he is asserting the way the character of the regime through its laws
shapes the soul of its people. Constitutions craft and promote a certain way of life and
psychological type for a given people. American history exhibits a competition and synthesis of
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psychologies from the interested entrepreneurs of Jamestown and the inspired religious piety of
the Puritans, to the rationalist views of the Founders rooted in universal liberties inferred from a
common human nature. The first open wound of the Republic emerged in its first decade. The
sectionalism Washington feared in his Farewell Address was not simply a matter of competing
and divided geographical and economic interests, but became a struggle over the soul of a nation.
The early conflict between industry, the urban merchant, the banker and the “monied
interest” in contrast to Jefferson’s agrarian nation of country-side yeoman farmers, was not merely
a struggle over the dominate economic class on which the nation would be founded. It was a
struggle over its dominate moral psychology. Later Alexander Stephens would reject the
democratic founding principle of the equality of man in favor of the feudal and aristocratic masterslave relation as the “cornerstone” of the Confederacy. The Civil War was precipitated by a battle
over the “slave power” and sectional economic interests as well as the Constitutional extent of
“states’ rights,” but it was also a battle over the nation’s understanding of human nature. Were all
men equally “endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights” or was the “cornerstone”
of American society the natural inequality of men and the slavery that logically follows in train?
Lincoln would reassert the Founding principles inferred from human nature as an “apple
of gold” in the silver frame of the Constitution. In the 20th century the growth of government and
its never-ending encroachment on American society has been built in large part on the Progressive
vision of an indeterminate, self-made, or evolving human nature. This “evolution” has had a
parallel impact, evident in the speeches and policies of Wilson, FDR and later presidents, over our
conceptions of the origins and substance of the rights to which we think we are entitled.119 The
vision of an evolving human nature, individually and collectively, manifests in a change in the
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meaning of “rights” and the size, structure and role of government commensurate to this new
meaning. Was the first Bill of Rights enough, or do historical transformations demand a second?120
This vision of a dynamic human nature meant a dynamic or “living” Constitution whose meaning
does, in fact must, change with the spirit of each “new” age. Is our collective psychological to be
as John Adams put it, a “natural aristocracy”121 where happiness is a pursuit, or shall we guarantee
our happiness through equality of outcome, make government its distributor, and turn ourselves
into a nation of last men?122
The intellectual and political currents of the intervening two-hundred years since The
Founding have coalesced in an ongoing rejection of the Founders’ own self-understanding of the
political order they crafted and the account of human nature on which it is based. Progressivism
necessarily means progress away from the Founding. Only a short time after the nation’s birth,
American statesmen and European intellectuals and scholars began to systematically reject the
core philosophical principles on which our founding documents are based. Belief in a free and
equal, largely fixed human nature from which natural rights were derived and popular limited
government instituted to protect, was replaced by an ever-changing human condition and an evermalleable human personality definitively subject to History, circumstance, and the manipulation
of those in power.
Natural rights had been understood by Locke and Jefferson to be universal, even as they
have never been universally recognized by regimes past and present. The Founders statements
make clear they recognized the fundamental and contradictory disparity between the principles of
the Declarations and the laws of the Constitution. In spite of their personal conduct, they all
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understood and accepted that the agreed upon public meaning of the phrase “all men are created
equal” meant the moral equality of all human beings. “Men” referred neither to the male of the
species, nor exclusively white men in particular. This was simply the accepted term to speak of all
human beings.123 It was an utterly conventional and standardized usage of term. Natural rights were
the logical extension of a rational human nature capable of knowing the laws of its own conduct.
Natural rights are not speculative abstractions. They are reasoned inferences made from reflections
on the empirical evidence of human conduct. In his 1806 address to Congress, President Jefferson
was rather clear. He sought “to withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further
participation in those violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the
unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation, and the best interests of
our country, have long been eager to proscribe.”124
The struggle over Natural Rights first broke out in Southern politics. Many would
recognize universal equality in one breath, but defend the institution of slavery in another. No
better example of this paradoxical thinking exists than John Randolph, a follower of Jefferson.
Randolph embraced the injustice of slavery in theory but displayed an unprecedented ambivalence
and ambiguity in practice. He said “The question of slavery, as it is called, is to us a question of
life and death ... You will find no instance in history where two distinct races have occupied the
soil except in the relation of master and slave.”125 For Randolph, historical fact superseded the
moral theory of Natural Rights. Although he was “sensitive to the evils of slavery, Randolph
ultimately insisted that his race must triumph in an ongoing war with the black enemy within.”126
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He nonetheless made provisions in his will for the manumission of his own slaves. The conflict
between the principles of the Declaration and the quite acceptance of slavery in the Constitution,
the original sin of the Founding, persisted. In 1825 John Marshall’s opinion on the captured slave
ship Antelope summed up this conflict. In his opinion, he acknowledged slavery contrary to
Natural Law, but upheld the enslavement of the ship’s cargo of human chattel on the grounds of
established man-made positive law. Relying on the fact of acknowledged precedent, or stare
decisis, Marshall recognized slavery as “abhorrent”, yet acknowledge that it had “claimed all

the sanction which could be derived from long usage and general acquiescence.”127 It was John
C. Calhoun, that ardent defender of slavery, who in 1837 laid the groundwork for a new argument
on behalf of slavery through the abandonment of the principles of the Declaration altogether. His
direct attack against the principles of the Declaration only serves to confirm their original public
meaning. For Calhoun, slavery was not only legal under the Constitution, but Natural Right meant,
not equality but the natural right of the stronger to be master over the slave. The master-slave
relation, not equality, was natural. Slavery was no longer a necessary evil and by-product of Union,
but had become a “positive good.”128 In Calhoun’s view, “nothing could be more unfounded and
false than the opinion that all men are born free and equal; inequality was indispensable to
progress; government was not the result of compact, nor was it safe to entrust the suffrage to all.”129
By the mid-19th century Natural Rights had become something of an intellectual
embarrassment. Attacks came from both the left and the right of the intellectual and political
spectrum. They were increasingly treated as a kind of chimerical abstraction and intellectual
embarrassment. Elusory rights were a metaphysical and faith-based theological holdover, living
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on in an age of perpetual enlightenment increasingly rooted in the exclusive authority of material
natural science and its empiricist epistemology. In his Anarchical Fallacies, Bentham attacked the
notion that the central object of government was “the preservation of the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man.”130 “Natural rights” he said, “is simple nonsense, natural and
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts.”131 Thus the principles of the
Declaration and the form of government they gave rise to in the Constitution, were no longer
objective truths discerned through rational reflection on experience. Instead they were historicized
as mere prejudices and children of a now bygone age.
Locke had identified property in one’s body, its faculties and labor as the fundament of
natural liberty. Slavery was unjust because man was a rational animal capable of knowing its own
nature and its laws. Slavery was contrary to human nature itself. In the 19th century this position
dissolved. Bentham was clear, saying “there is no natural property” because “property is entirely
the creature of [positive] law.”132 Rights were a creature of law, and law was a product of men, the
state and History, not nature. Rights that can be created by men can also just as easily be taken
away.
What of a nation which no longer understands or believes in the founding principles of its
own social and political order? Woodrow Wilson was the first president to attack The Founding
and the Constitution as both a scholar and statesmen.133 He could not have been more unequivocal
when he asserted that the principles of the Declaration merely “speak the character of the men who
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drew them as clearly as they speak the circumstances of the time” and no more.134 Rejected was
the claim that the Founding principles reflected any evidence of the wisdom of the ages or the
accumulated experience of mankind.
Wilson said, “If you want to understand the real Declaration of Independence, do not repeat
the preface.”135 The “preface” is where the Declaration asserts the self-evident truths that “all men
are created equal,” and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Wilson dismissed such claims as mere
“rhetorical introduction” to the historically concrete grievances against the King. It was in the
itinerary of grievances where the truth of the document was to be found, in concrete empirical facts
alone.136 Wilson asserted that the ends and principles of the Founders do not “dictate the aims and
objects of any generation but their own.”137 Therefore, Wilson concluded, “We are not bound to
adhere to the doctrines held by the signers of the Declaration of Independence.”138 This was
because “we have come to a new age and a new attitude towards questions of government.”139
Wilson did not have to provide reasoned justifications for his repudiation of the Founding
principles, he merely had to assert the passage of time. This lazy method of argument, by the only
scholar-president in our nation’s history, lends itself to high-brow intellectual justification of our
own ignorance. Since the past is always become obsolete, ignorance of it becomes a virtue.
The technocratic or pseudo-scientific version of this argument was to say that the political
structure provided by the Constitution was antiquated. It was not up to the task of coping with new
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dynamic elements of modernity the Founders could have never foreseen - its novel technologies
such as new modes of communication and transportation and the novel social and economic
organization they made possible. The Founders and their ideas were nice, but past their sell-by
date. By the early decades of the 20th century, Natural Rights had become the mythopoetic cry of
the Revolution and no more.
This displacement of Nature in favor of History as the source of being went hand in hand
with claims which centered on economic class interest as the source of historical change and
political order. The Constitution was no longer a document grounded in a clear-eyed view of
human nature reached through forthright deliberations. Instead, it was a backroom deal, struck at
a secret convention where elites conspired to devise government in order to advance their own
economic class interests. This paradigm was firmly established in 1913 by Charles Beard’s
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. Beard’s argument, which dominated scholarship for
half a century, was based on “the hypothesis that economic elements are the chief factors in the
development of political institutions.”140
Beard found in the Convention and Constitution what he was looking for. The true cause
of the Constitution’s provisions, Beard asserted, was the “direct, impelling motive” of “economic
advantages which the beneficiaries expected would accrue to themselves first,” as a result of their
constitution making.141 This thesis was reasonable enough, but ultimately depended on the
empirical evidence, not the mere assertion of an historical method. Beard’s faulty claims and lack
of particulars to support them have long been exposed by numerous scholars, but the idea that the
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Founders acted merely out of grasping or bigoted class interest has only proliferated in the popular
conscience and in classrooms all across the nation.142
Today the logic of raw power and naked interest has long been extended beyond the
frontiers of class to race, sex, sexual orientation and beyond. Today the belief in the obsolescence
of the Founders’ wisdom, or that they merely sought to advance their interests as elite, white, men
of European racial and cultural descent are truisms of our Founding discourse. And yet, the authors
of the Declaration, Constitution and Federalist Papers asserted the universal validity and relevance
of their claims. Nor were the provisions of the Declaration and Constitution based on mere
“abstractions”143 as Beard and Wilson have it. Instead they were derived from candid and extensive
reflection on and concrete experience of the conduct and motives of men. In No. 51 Madison
claims that government is nothing other than “the greatest of all reflections on human nature.” If
this is so, the Constitution is primarily a reflection on human nature. The Federalist’s exegesis of
the government established by the Constitution it is then an exegesis of human nature itself.
This study will present The Federalist’s science of human nature. Publius’ account is
rendered in explicit claims about the nature of man and is implicit in the form of republican
government he explains and defends. While this study draws primarily on The Federalist,
complimentary sources are relied upon to flesh out its account of human nature. Writings and
speeches, particularly of Madison and Hamilton, both before and after the Convention and
publication of The Federalist, demonstrate the continuity of their principles and positions
sometimes only hinted at in their role as Publius. The history of the United States is an ongoing
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process of interpreting the Constitution and its account of human nature. The Federalist Papers,
even in times of their perceived irrelevance, has always been the first and primary source in our
nation’s attempt to glean the meaning of the Constitution. Citizens, commentators, politicians and
jurists alike have all turned to The Federalist, whether to celebrate or condemn our Founding.
Given its centrality, American history is an ongoing interpretation of The Federalist Papers as
well. It has become something akin to a national scripture for friends and foes alike.
The first task is to demonstrate the general importance of human nature to Publius’
understanding and defense of the government established by the Constitution. He claims the
peculiar nature and arrangement of powers granted by the Constitution are nothing but a reflection
of his and the other Founders’ experience and understanding of human nature. The second task is
to present the specific substance of this account by illuminating key presuppositions and distilling
and arranging various passages distributed throughout the text in an orderly manner.
There are two premises on which every argument of The Federalist is based. First, is the
necessary dependence on or identity between human nature and politics. An adequate
understanding and practice of the latter is dependent on a penetrating inquiry into the former.
Government is the human soul writ large. The parts and motives of the soul which impact politics
must be understood and accounted for. Publius acknowledges that devising the Constitution as the
means to promote “political prosperity” could only come from an exhaustive attempt to know the
human soul. Scanlan says The Federalist is committed “to a program of judging projected
institutions by examining the motives of men.”144 The second premise involves the findings of
their observations of human nature. Publius accepts certain general and constant characteristics of
human nature as they understood them through examples of history and their own experiences.
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Men are not angels and restraints are needed for ruler and ruled alike. Self-interest is the dominate
motive of men and it must be accounted for if good government is to be established.
The arguments of The Federalist Papers establish a necessary relationship between human
nature, government and the science of politics itself. This relationship is the central leitmotif
running throughout all its numbers. Publius’ account of human nature is architectonic, it provides
the foundation for all his arguments. The text repeatedly asserts that political order is a direct
expression of human nature. Therefore, the account of human nature provided by the authors of
The Federalist “logically shaped the kind of government they were advocating.”145 Madison
famously says government is the “greatest of all reflections on human nature.”146

In No. 15

Hamilton asks, “Why has government been instituted at all?” His answer? Human nature will not
“conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”147
Political science then must entail the study of human nature. At the Constitutional
Convention Hamilton is reported to have said that the “science of policy is the knowledge of human
nature.”148 In an 1784 letter to the citizens of New York Hamilton said “all political speculation to
be just, must be founded” on a clear understanding of the principles of human nature.149 He calls
political science simply “the science of human nature.”150 He asserts knowledge of human nature
is the foundation of all political speculation and practice.151 “No ruler of men,” says Hamilton,
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“certainly no builder of a new political system, could be ignorant of the most useful of all sciences
– the science of human nature.”152
The science of politics is the science of human nature. This science starts with a search for
and understanding of politically relevant knowledge of human nature recruited in the practical
service of political order and prosperity. Knowledge of human nature is ministerial to political
practice. If government is the greatest reflection on human nature, political administration and
policy participates in and depends on this knowledge. The central goals of Publius’ political
science are to identify the true and regular motivations of human nature and conduct, and to design
institutions which can properly account for them. In No. 15 Hamilton acknowledges that they seek
to know the “true springs by which human conduct is actuated.”153 The central problem of political
science is the problem of proper or sufficient knowledge of man’s faculties, motivations, vices and
virtues.
At the foundation of The Federalist’s account is an understanding of how and why human
nature necessitates government. Government and law in themselves are not “social constructs.”
They exist of necessity, not choice. They are necessitated by the defects of human nature, but can
also employ and exemplify its bests assets. Government is necessary because, as Madison says,
“men are not angels.” Hamilton translates this epigram by saying that the “passions of men will
not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”154 Human nature exhibits a
“defect of better motives.” This defect is caused by the fact that “momentary passions, and
immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct, than general
or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice.”155 Angels can govern themselves, men
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cannot. Government is needed because individually men lack the necessary internal motivational
resources to restrain themselves. Human nature necessitates the external restraint of government.
Once human nature is identified, the problem of political science is to build a constitutional
order commensurate to its demands. Government must provide the necessary order to establish
peace, yet enough liberty to allow a distinctly human nature to flourish. From the perspective of
Publius and the Founders, government commensurate to the demands of human nature is good
government. Institutions must simultaneously account for what is noble and what is base in
mankind. They must be devised in a manner to promote virtue and mitigate vice. In particular
government must acknowledge the fundamentally interested nature of mankind. In Nos. 55 and
76, Madison and Hamilton make clear that human nature is base enough to necessitate government,
but noble enough to make good government possible. They concluded that there was “a portion of
virtue and honour among mankind”156 which justifies our “esteem and confidence”157 that human
nature is capable of genuine republican self-government. In 1807 Jefferson echoed Publius’
sentiments when he said, “We are a people capable of self-government, and worthy of it.”158
Human nature is neither all good, nor all bad. Mankind lacks sufficient virtue and reason
to be simply self-governing, to live without external constraints at all. Yet, at the same time there
is sufficient supply of reason and virtue which makes human nature capable of the freest possible
form of political constraint. The motive of self-interest marks the mean between the extremes of
vice and virtue. It is neither particularly noble, nor is it diabolically base. That great French student
of the American Founding, Alexis de Tocqueville says, “Self-interest” as a “doctrine not very
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lofty, but clear and sure.”159 Self-interest is the “low but solid” foundation on which the
Constitution is built.
Publius’ science of human nature provides the grounds for demonstrating the inadequacies
of the Articles of Confederation, the validity of Union and the republican principles of the
Constitution. The failure of the Articles lay in their inability to properly meet the challenges posed
by human nature. Meanwhile Publius hopes to demonstrate how the republican provisions of the
Constitution are commensurate to this task. If our peculiar form of government is dictated by a
science of human nature, our comprehension of the Constitution is dependent on our
comprehension of this science.
In No. 9 Publius asserts that he a partisan of a new political science which had made
decisive improvements over Ancient Pagan and Christian thought and their Renaissance legacies.
Madison insisted that American government was “a system without a precedent ancient or
modern.”160 Gordon Wood for example has asserted that the Constitution and the political science
on which it is based marked “the end of classical politics.”161 This new science represented a partial
indictment of classical politics and political science. Publius’ new science rejected Ancient
political philosophy precisely for, among other things, its failure to properly account for the
deficiencies of human nature. Ancient theory and practice were seen as having failed to solve the
problems endemic to popular government. These problems were the result of unrealistic
expectations of the best citizens, and too low an opinion of the rest. Making unrealistic demands
on human nature is a recipe for both hypocrisy and corruption, if not tyranny itself.162
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Publius’s science follows in the footsteps of Machiavelli. It abandons airy speculations of
“imagined republics” and virtuous men untainted by the motives of self-interest. It replaces them
with hard-boiled mechanical analysis of human motives and institutions with an eye to the possible
and the likely. Their analysis focused on the real, rather than hoped for, dispositions of human
nature. What was achievable was precisely dictated by the parameters and limitations of human
nature. The new political science put a premium on self-interest over virtue so as not to make the
perfect the enemy of the good. The “decline of virtue had as its logical corollary the rise of
interest.”163 At the New York State Ratifying Convention Hamilton said: “Men will pursue their
interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as to oppose the strong current of the selfish
passions”164
While their attitude toward the Ancients was tinctured by influences from Machiavelli,
Locke, Montesquieu and Hume, they recognized and respected many of their conclusions as
inescapable. Therefore, the new science did not simply abandon all observations, conclusions or
goals of the Ancients. Among these was the necessity of virtue to good government and the belief
that government could be a positive good rather than merely a necessary evil designed simply to
restrain men. High office could still be a stage for human excellence and virtue, and the fulfillment
of the highest individual natures.
This new science of human nature was derived from modern natural philosophy which
sought to demystify the natural world.165 It was grounded in a materialism whose provenance can
be traced to Lucretius and Machiavelli, and later to Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Montesquieu, Hume
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and Smith.166 The science of man was increasingly modeled on natural sciences and the
“mechanical philosophy” of Hobbes and Descartes.167 In Leviathan and other works, Hobbes had
applied a rigidly geometric model of causation in explaining man’s psychological faculties,
motivation and conduct. Hobbes materialist bent allowed him to place human psychology “under
the rubric of physics.” 168 The title of La Mettrie’s book, L’homme Machine, indicates the spirit of
this aspiration.
The Federalist is replete with mechanical metaphors which describe the workings of
human psychology and government. The faculties of the human mind were “springs” of action. If
man is like a machine, both he and his society function on certain knowable and persistent laws of
conduct, however general. Conduct was based on motives generated by the faculties of the human
soul, a tincture of reason and passion. The Federalist’s analysis of the faculties assumes the human
soul is sufficiently mechanistic to be predictable within limits. Necessity, fear, ambition, desire for
material gain, self-love and self-interest are the recognizable regular springs of action evident
throughout the text.
Publius’ faculty psychology stresses the limits of reason, the all-too-human tendency to
succumb to passionate motives counter to the public interest. Self-interest is understood as the vera
causa of human motivation. Ancient political philosophy and republics alike had set their sights
too high regarding the ends of government. They overestimated the capacity of human beings to
act rationally and virtuously. And that, at the peril of the justice and longevity of regimes. This
wisdom regarding the limits of human nature had to be applied to founders and statesmen as well.
In asserting that the purpose of political order was human perfection, Ancient political science
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seemed to have confused its aspirations with its observations of human conduct. As a result, they
failed to take the necessary precautions and provide the proper sentinels to restrain and mitigate
human frailty.
The Federalist Papers’ conclusions regarding human nature then flow directly into its
conception of the political structure of the new American Republic. The crown jewel of Publius’
new science was a new and innovative form of republicanism. The Founders repeatedly asserted
that this republican form, by accepting the centrality of self-interest, was in harmony with human
nature itself. The modern republic would be “wholly popular”, “extended”, “commercial” and
“compound republic” with a separation of powers foreign to the ancients. It would be dedicated
more to commerce and liberty than to virtue and duty.
The method of Publius’ analysis of human nature falls into two categories, one more
rationalistic and inferential, the other more empirical and behaviorist. The first facet consists of
rational inferences made from human conduct. The arguments of The Federalist presuppose the
stability of human nature over time and the existence of moral laws of human nature, or Natural
Law. These presumptions are derivative of Locke’s understanding of the Law of Nature as found
in the Declaration of Independence. Locke called Natural Law a “dictate of Reason.”169 This law
is rationally deduced from experience of human nature. It is revealed through logical inferences
based on from observations of human conduct. In The Farmer Refuted Hamilton says that the
“sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records.
They are written with a sun beam in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity
itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.”170
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From human nature a set of universal moral principles or laws are deduced which dictate
how human beings should act. Natural Law stipulate obligations but also imply rights, particularly
in the Modern formulations of Hobbes and Locke. Self-preservation is for Locke both a right and
a duty. The human individual is forbidden to take their own life. The law of human nature dictates
Natural Rights and liberties. Republican self-government dedicated to the protection of Natural
Rights was understood by Publius to be in conformity with human nature itself. Natural Law
dictates how men ought to act and prescribes the ends of government, or the principles on which
it is founded. These ends are recapitulated in the preamble of the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the second behaviorist facet of The Federalist’s account of human nature
consists of empirical observations of human conduct made from history and their own personal
experiences. This component of their science involves a description and analysis of the reliable
and durable motivations which determine how people actually do act, despite the moral dictates
of reason. Much of The Federalist’s analysis of behavior focuses particular attention on, but is not
confined to, the motives of those who occupy various offices within the structure of the
Constitution and how the circumstances and powers of office direct, restraint and promote certain
motives and conduct in their holders.
This behavioral analysis is determined to illustrate how certain motives will be provoked
by the peculiar provision and arrangement of powers. The constitutional structure of powers must
anticipate these motivations in order to promote beneficial ones and thwart those destructive of the
public interest and the true ends of government. Publius’ overarching rhetorical goal, as advocate
for the Constitution, was to demonstrate just how it would accommodate these likely sources of
motivation. Lesser, but likely motivations would be channeled or constrained through various
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checks and balances such as public accountability, process of appointment and the specific nature
and arrangement of the powers granted to government.
The Federalist’s analysis of human nature can be viewed as a synthesis of the moral
philosophy and epistemology of Locke, Hume and Montesquieu. The rationalist Natural Law
theories of Locke and others are married to the psychological analysis of the Montesquieu and the
Scottish Enlightenment, particularly Hume. The combination of these sources represents a
marriage of Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism. Despite a large debt to Hume in a variety
of matters, Publius does not follow his rejection of social contract theory or his belief that all
regimes are founded on nothing more than force and habit. In No. 1 Hamilton makes clear that he
believes it possible for a regime to be founded on “reflection and choice” in contradistinction to
“accident and force.” Hume flatly denied the existence of practical reason and that it was capable
of establishing moral rules of human conduct.171 Man was primarily a being of passion where
reason was merely a servant to the master faculty. Despite his profound acknowledgement of
reason’s limits, Publius demonstrably rejects that reason is and ought to be nothing more than the
slave of the passions. The most obvious departure from the method of Hume is Hamilton’s
assertion in No. 31 of “certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent
reasonings must depend” derived from “internal evidence…antecedent to all reflection or
combination.”172 Like Euclidian geometry, ethics and politics have their axioms which are not
themselves observed, but drawn by “direct inference” from human nature. Hamilton continues that
such inferences are obvious “to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common-sense.”173 Here
Hamilton seems to hint at the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence.
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Meanwhile Publius followed Hume in his respect for experience as the “oracle of truth”174
and the “best oracle of wisdom.”175 Hamilton says that when the “responses” of this “oracle” are
“unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred.”176 If the provisions of the Constitution are
nothing other than “inventions of prudence,” Hobbes tells is that “prudence is but experience.”177
Publius insinuates that experience and history are the primary resources on which the Constitution
is built, not abstract reasonings.
But experience alone cannot determine the correct ends of our actions. A balance between
empirical observation and rational inference from experience is required. Here Montesquieu enters
the equation. While his influence is often confined to the role of “oracle” of the separation of
powers, his complex understanding of Natural Law appears to be central to The Federalist’s
arguments. In following the Natural Law tradition, Montesquieu takes into consideration historical
circumstance in a way Locke does not. He therefore serves as a bridge between these two
Enlightenment traditions often perceived to be in direct opposition.
If Locke is the philosopher of the Declaration of Independence, Montesquieu and Hume
are the philosophers of the Constitution. Locke’s arguments address the foundational moral theory.
Montesquieu addresses the practical implementation of Natural Law, its modification and adaption
to historical circumstance. Madison tells us that the Constitution is based on the “principles of the
revolution” and “the genius of the people of America.”178
The Federalist explains how the principles of Locke would be adapted to the conditions of
American society. Montesquieu provided the theoretical lead for the delicate business of adapting
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universal principles to the particular circumstances of a given society. These twin sources of the
Constitution can today be summed up by the distinction between legal Rationalism and legal
Pragmatism or realism. The Convention and its Constitution represent a synthesis of the two. This
distinction is manifest throughout Publius’ political science. This political science has a theoretical
underpinning rooted in a universal Natural Law theory, but is also geared toward solving the
practical exigencies of their application in the conditions of 1787. Pangle acknowledges that the
authors of The Federalist were “alive to this difficulty,” the challenge of adapting universal
principles of liberty to the particular circumstances of American society in ways that others, like
Jefferson, were not.179 In fact the essence of The Federalist is to explain just how the Constitution
had successfully adapted the universal principles of human nature to the social and political
exigencies of the day.
If the revolutionary period depended more on Natural Law inspired by Locke, the era of
the Convention and Constitution depended more on the principles of political realism derived from
Hume and perhaps even Machiavelli and Hobbes. This significant intellectual shift was largely
instigated by the distinct demands of the day rather than a supposed in a change in principles, or a
supposed “conservative counter-revolution.”180 The thrust of The Federalist’s analysis of human
nature involve speculations about how men will act under the constraints of the Constitution. Since
the novel Constitution had not been ratified, let alone implemented, Publius is forced to speculate
about future conduct under the Constitution, based on past experience. He is compelled to predict
behavior based on experience and his model of human motivation derived from it. And historical
hindsight demonstrates clear instances in which Publius was wrong in the predictions he made.
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But only Locke’s rationalism can define the ends and explain why we should want men to act as
the Constitution dictates. Lockean and Jeffersonian principles of Natural Right do not guarantee
themselves, or even spell out how them might be realized. It was Publius’ task to explain just who
the Constitution would preserve man’s liberties, while at the same time supply the defect of the
Articles of Confederation.
The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are parts of one
consistent whole, founded upon one and the same theory of government, then new, not as a theory,
for it had been working itself into the mind of man for many ages, and been especially expounded
in the writings of Locke, but had never before been adopted by a great nation in practice.181
-

John Quincy Adams, April 30, 1839

In 1839 John Quincy Adams stated, “The Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution…are parts of one consistent whole, founded upon one and the same theory of
government.”182 Locke’s Second Treatise, The Declaration of Independence and other writings
rooted in the Natural Law tradition are the presupposed intellectual background of the Constitution
and Publius’ analysis of it. Thomas Pangle writes The Federalist Papers insist “the American
Constitution must be understood as growing out of and intending to advance what Madison in No.
39 calls ‘the fundamental principles of the Revolution’.”183
That the Natural Law tradition provided this theoretical predicate to the Constitution was
perfectly obvious to enemies of the ‘Old’ Constitution such as Alexander Stephens, Frank
Goodnow, John Dewey and Woodrow Wilson. Pestritto says the “Progressives rightly understood”
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that the Declaration and its natural rights set “the purpose for the Constitution itself.”184 The
Declaration tells us that “Governments are instituted among Men” in order “to secure these rights.”
Yet it does not advance a specific form of government to secure them. This task was left to the
Articles of Confederation, and later, the Constitution. The Declaration’s Natural Rights establish
the ends of government. A version of these rights is listed in the Constitution’s Preamble. Its seven
articles enumerate a republican form of limited government designed to fulfill them. The very
notion of a limited constitution as a blueprint for limited government, is entirely unintelligible
without the logic of Natural Rights. Why would men want to limit government at all, if not to
protect their own pre-existing freedoms?
If the authors of The Federalist were fully committed to the principles of the Revolution,
why were they opposed for example to a bill of rights as found in most state constitutions?
Hamilton responds to the charge with a number of arguments. The most obvious is that political
liberty and the principle of free consent are established directly or indirectly in a “wholly popular”
government where offices holders would be determined by various means of elections or
appointment, and serve as representatives of the people. Hamilton acknowledges that although the
Constitution had no bill of rights at that time he said “it contains in the body of it, various
provisions in favour of particular privileges and rights, which, in substance, amount to the same
thing.”185 Hamilton mentions a series of constitutional clauses consistent with Natural Rights
thinking. The most notable of these is the denial of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, the
preservation of habeas corpus except in the most extreme circumstances and only altered by the
people’s representatives in the legislature. Add to this list, the denial of legal distinctions between
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classes through the denial of titles of nobility and feudal privilege, and guarantees of due process
through trial by jury as well as a very high bar on the capital crime of treason.186 In addition the
First Amendment’s establishment clause is implicit in the lack of provision for a state religion or
church.
Hamilton feared that the inclusion of a bill of rights would make it seem identical in nature
to the English Bill of Rights of 1688. The written enumeration of rights would make it appear as
if government was granting, rather than securing rights. In English history rights were freedoms
won from the Crown over time, not found in human nature universally.187 Lastly, Hamilton’s
insinuates that a parchment bill of rights provides only parchment guarantees. Despite the
American innovation of an expressed, explicit written Constitution, experience had taught
Hamilton paper constitutions by themselves were “frail and worthless fabrics.”188 While they
eliminate some of the mysteries and ambiguities of a tacit constitution both Hamilton and Madison
understood papered principles do not enforce themselves. In No. 48 Madison asks if the precision
and clarity of a written document is sufficient ground to trust “parchment barriers against the
encroaching spirit of power?”189 Antonin Scalia famously said “Every tin horn dictator in the world
today, every president for life, has a Bill of Rights. But, the real key to the distinctiveness of
America is the structure of our government.”190 The true guarantee of rights and liberties was to
be found in the proper structure of government which provided genuine limitations on its power,
not in parchment promises of moral rectitude.
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If adherence to the Enlightenment understanding of Natural Law is a central tenet of
Publius’ advocacy for the Constitution, why is discussion of it so conspicuously lacking in the
text? White says Publius “continued to rely on the same doctrine of natural law” that had inspired
the philosophy of the American Revolution a decade earlier. 191 Hamilton, Madison and Jay were
“just as committed to a rationalistic doctrine of natural law and natural right as Jefferson was,” yet
they “did not harp on these rights nor on their metaphysical and theological foundations” in the
arguments of The Federalist.192
Such omissions are a product of The Federalist’s scope and purpose. The Federalist is
more akin to Plato’s Laws than his Republic. It simply “does not tell the complete story or provide
all the answers.193 It is not “a treatise on political philosophy concerned with natural law, the origin
and nature of the state, or the best form of government in the abstract.”194 Whatever historical value
we attribute to The Federalist Papers it is not because of its comprehensive scope in arguing from
first principles, but in its advocacy of practical measures that might best secure them. The function
of the text was to discuss the appropriate form of government that could secure the natural rights
of the Declaration.
White concludes that the lack of discussion of natural rights in The Federalist is not
because Madison and Hamilton’s thought had evolved since the heady days of the Revolution.
Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike agreed that natural rights provided the proper ends of
government. Sidney Pearson says, “Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike used the same self-evident
truths derived from natural law to reach radically different conclusions.”195 Rather they disagreed
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over the appropriate means to best secure them. One side saw a strong national government as the
only secure means of protecting rights against the tyranny of the majority, while the other saw that
same national government as the central threat to their natural liberties. What practical value was
there, when space and time were precious commodities, in arguing for a premise which everyone
already agreed upon and was secondary to the purpose at hand?
Rossiter provides the historical background and explanation for Publius’ synthesis of
rationalism and empiricism. He says that although the Founders “stood fast in devotion to every
last teaching of the tradition of natural law and natural rights, they began to make room in their
minds for assumptions and suspicions that almost no American had entertained in the first heady
days of the Revolution.” 196 Although they maintained their fidelity to Natural Law teachers like
Locke, Sidney, Coke, Harrington, Cicero, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Montesquieu, Pufendorf and
Blackstone “they became slightly less uneasy in the presence of such hardheaded teachers of the
facts of political life as Hobbes, Hume, and Machiavelli.”197 Rossiter believes the enthusiasm for
the Revolution and its principles was displaced, not abandoned, when the post-revolutionary
reality of governance set in. He concludes that a “redirection of American thinking about the nature
of man” occurred between the Declaration and the Constitutional Convention.198 The redirection
was a response to changing circumstances. New circumstances which brought new problems
demanded new solutions. Justification for breaking bonds with King and Country were displaced
by the need to establish a working government dedicated to the principles of that act of rebellion.
Independence justified and fought for, gave way to the necessity of building political structures
which could properly realize its principles in practice.
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Enthusiasm for the moral principles which inspired the Revolution gave way to a concern
for the hard-boiled realities their mere assertion did not solve. The failure of the Articles of
Confederation encapsulated the changing nature and mood of the situation. Statesmen looked to
different sources and ideas to solve different problems. Rossiter says men like Adams, Madison
and Hamilton were “moving beyond Locke and Calvin to seek new lessons about human behavior
in their experience, and were finding that these lessons had already been confirmed in Adam
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature.”199
By and large the Framers came to the Convention “more tempered and sophisticated
political psychologists than they had been in 1776.”200 The “sobering effects” of the post-war
government compelled them to spend less time “celebrating the rights of men to speculate about
their interests”’ and to “notice how self-interested individuals cluster together in factions as they
struggle for gain, esteem, power, and security.”201 While the “tension in the nature of man between
frail virtue and well-armed vice” remained a central theme, they became “interested in the political
implications of morally neutral drives such as “the need for security, the hope of gain, and the love
of fame.”202 These were the topics of the new science of politics, initiated by Machiavelli and
developed by Montesquieu and Hume, which ceased speculations on “imagined republics” and
turned their attention to the sometimes brutal facts of existing ones. Thus, the effective truth of
human behavior took precedence over what rational speculation might glean beyond it.
Perhaps the primary reason The Federalist Papers do not address principles of Natural
Right in any great detail, is that the task was to argue on behalf of the means and mechanics by
which these ends were to be achieved rather than the ends themselves. The enumerated powers of
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the Constitution are “inventions of prudence,” tools designed by prudent judgment rather than
geometric rationalism. The constitutional provisions must concern themselves with how men
actually behave if they are to encourage men to act as they ought. Therefore, The Federalist’s
primary account of human nature comes in the form of political psychology. At the time of the
Founding such analysis came under the auspices of a specific subsection of moral philosophy
which has come to be called “faculty psychology”. Faculty psychology is a central branch of moral
philosophy concerned with the “divisions of knowledge concerned with the human subject.”203
Faculty psychology is “the science of human motivation.”204 Therefore the focus of The
Federalist’s account of human nature “is primarily a theory of motivation.”205 This science
attempts to fashion a theory of action based on the various faculties, or powers, of the human soul
which motivate men to act. It is determined to discover, as Hamilton says, “the true springs by
which human conduct is actuated.”206 It assesses the variety of springs and motives of human
action, and how the constitutional provisions properly channel them, balancing the demands of
order and liberty. The three central springs of action Publius identifies are reason, passion and selfinterest. In attempting to conform to human nature the Constitution must properly anticipate the
nature and strength of each spring, motives which compel men to act as they do, whether in private
society or public office.
If human nature’s deficiencies of reason and virtue necessitate the existence of government,
how is it men can ever truly govern themselves? At stake in Publius’ account of human nature is
this very possibility. If men are not angels, how can they institute good government when the same
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nature in need of rule, also rules? Who, or what will rule the rulers? When in No. 1 Hamilton raises
the specter of whether government can be instituted by “reflection and choice” in contradistinction
to “force and accident” he is raising a more general question: Is there a correct arrangement of
political power, in harmony with human nature, which can supply its defects and truly allow men
to freely govern themselves?
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2. The Federalist Papers Themselves

Understanding the literary form and function of The Federalist Papers is instrumental to
understanding its particular treatment of human nature. As indicated by the subtitle of numerous
editions, the function of The Federalist is to provide “a commentary on the Constitution of the
United States.”1 The first edition published as a single unitary volume was subtitled “a collection
of essays written in favor of the New Constitution.”2 It was to advocate for and explain the
provisions of the Constitution and their ramifications. The Federalist consists of a series of eightyfive essays written by Hamilton, Madison and Jay, addressed to “the People of the state of New
York” in order to “win public support for the ratification of the new Constitution.”3
The Philadelphia Convention had been convened from May 25 to September 17, 1787.
Shortly after its conclusion the numbers of The Federalist first appeared and were published
between October 1787 and May 1788. The state ratification process began immediately upon the
conclusion of the Grand Convention culminating in the national adoption of the Constitution in
June of 1788. Circulation of its numbers occurred during the proceedings of the state conventions.
Originally published as a series of newspaper articles, their immediate purpose was to advocate
for the Constitution in response to Anti-Federalist opposition and “the objections of many New
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Yorkers.”4 Its numbers provided arguments for delegates supporting ratification in the contentious,
and essential, states of New York and Virginia.5 Given the size and influence of these states it was
imperative they embrace the Constitution as bellwethers of an incipient nation.
All essays were written by its three authors anonymously, under the nom de plume,
“Publius”. In an 1818 letter Madison acknowledges they had originally proposed the name
“Citizen of New York” which was rejected in favor of “Publius.”6 Madison states the name refers
to Publius Valerius Publicola, a Roman whose life is recorded in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives. 7
According to Plutarch, Publicola was one of the founders and saviors of the Roman Republic.8 He
“laid the foundations of the Roman republic after the overthrow of the monarchy.”9 Plutarch says
he was so adored by the people they called him “Publicola,” or “friend of the people.” Publicola
had been a general and statesmen in the sixth century B.C. “renowned for his eloquence,
generosity, and dedication to republican principles of government.”10 A Roman noble, he helped
“depose the Tarquin kings, found the ancient Republic, and defend it against its enemies with
courage and prudence.”11 The name was synonymous with a great founding and popular
government. It was a nod to republicanism and its stress on liberty. Publicola had been a
conspirator whose overthrow of the Roman monarchy struck a bold parallel to colonial
independence from the King of England.
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Plutarch sets Publius’ life in parallel with another founder, Solon the Athenian lawgiver.
The author “gave higher rank to the Greek as the originator of republican laws”12 yet says, “Solon,
leaving his laws as soon as he had made them, engraven in wood, but destitute of a defender,
departed from Athens; whilst Publicola, remaining both in and out of office, laboured to establish
the government.”13 Whereas Solon was exiled from the city, the Roman Publius was both founder
and defender of a republican order against tyranny. The role of Publicola as a founder-statesman
parallels the role of those who both founded and then peopled the offices of the American republic
they formed. The new Publius might claim the originality of a Solon, “but he would not leave the
new republican laws of the United States” merely engraved in wood.14 Having thrown off George
III the states now needed to consolidate the gains of the Revolution in a new political form in order
to make their Union permanent. The new Publius would be both a founder and defender of the
principles of the revolution. As Founders and defenders, the Revolution and the Convention run
parallel to the Declaration and the Constitution.
The invocation of the Roman history evokes certain assumptions The Federalist made
about human nature and the government appropriate to it. The name harkens to the virtues and
qualities of that nature which Madison held made republican government possible. The invocation
of “Publius” stood for the “reinvigoration of the moral qualities displayed during the revolution: a
genuine sense of fraternity, a capacity for individual self-sacrifice.”15 The new Publius exhorted
his readers to dedicate themselves to the purposes of:
…one united people; a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their
12
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manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side
throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and independence.16

“Publius” represented a “wise lawgiver” who “contrived a complex machinery in harmony with
human nature for the welfare of the community.”17 If the new Publius was more circumspect in the
role of reason, virtue, and duty he nonetheless accepted the premise that the virtue of a political
order is but an extension of the virtue of the men who found it. The name’s connection to
republican government echoes the harmony between this form and human nature itself.
Hamilton had employed the pseudonym before. It reflected his love of Plutarch and the
ancient teachers of statesmanship. Under it he penned a series of published letters attacking Samuel
Chase in 1778. In them the new Publius identifies himself as a “partisan of aspirations for selfgovernment and liberation from tyranny.”18 The new Publius was a partisan of the new
republicanism. Pangle says the name “testifies to their intention to establish a highly visible line
with the Greco-Roman tradition of republicanism.”19 It alluded to the “spirit of classical
republicanism” found in the Constitution and its defense in The Federalist.20 The name signals a
rejection of monarchism in the name of a republican Constitution designed to organize, promote
and preserve popular self-government. The name was also a sop to the Anti-Federalist fear that the
Constitution enshrined an overly national government and was not “sufficiently federal” to secure
the rights they jealously guarded.21
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First published separately, the essays of The Federalist were written with the intention of
being collected as a single coherent volume designed to provide the only extended available public
commentary on the Constitution at that time. Despite the ebb and flow of time and reception, The
Federalist retains its title as the best sign commentary on the Constitution to this day. This
commentary on the Constitution was vital in lieu of convention notes from its participants. The
Convention had been highly secretive. It forbade contemporaneous and “licentious publication of
their proceedings” and deliberations.22 Newspapers described it as a “Dark Conclave” operating
under a “thick veil of secrecy.” 23 This secrecy was taken so seriously that no material leaks of its
internal deliberations occurred during either the Convention or ratification process.24 Delegates for
example “were forbidden from discussing proceedings with anyone other than fellow delegates,
and daily debate was held with windows closed and shades drawn.”25
The veil of secrecy was never officially lifted, and a full account of the proceeding was not
available for nearly half a century.26 Robert Yates did not publish his notes until 1820. And it was
only upon the death of James Madison in 1836, and the execution of his will, which finally
permitted publication of his notes in 1840.27 The most comprehensive account of the Convention’s
deliberations was not published until 1911, over a century later, in Farrand's Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787. Farrand brought “together the personal diaries and notes of several
of the Convention delegates and the official Journal of the Convention” which he then arranged
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chronologically.28 Meanwhile, the notes of New Yorker and fellow Convention delegate, John
Lansing, were only published in 1939.
Such secrecy meant The Federalist Papers provided the only public explanation of the
Constitution. The release of The Federalist Papers as a single complete volume occurred on March
22 and May 28, 1788, when each of its two volumes were respectively published.29 Its authors
sought to write a book of advocacy which would also serve as a permanent guide to the nation’s
political institutions. In the years and decades following ratification, a fledgling nation relied on
The Federalist Papers as the most comprehensive guide available to the meaning and intent of the
Constitution. Bailyn has described it as the “finest explanation of the principles that underlie the
American government and the most accurate analysis of the intentions of those who designed it.”30
This function has endured to the present day. Whatever their political persuasion, The Federalist
is still referred to by scholars, officeholders and Supreme Court justices alike as the gateway into
the meaning of the Constitution. This special function obliged the authors to maintain a substance
and tone designed to transcend daily rhetoric and its speedy obsolescence. Despite the dispatch
with which the text was written and published, the authors demonstrate a high degree of
coordination and coherence, and fashioned a penetrating work on themes they had been mulling
over for an extended period of time. They sought to speak to fellow citizens in the present and
across the ages.
The Federalist is no doubt “a partisan document written under pressure of time to win
ratification of the Constitution.”31 Yet, the ambitions of its authors drove them to a “high
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partisanship in the general cause of republican government.”32 It has become fashionable to treat
The Federalist as mere rhetoric or polemic. This is often done in order to dismiss its ongoing
relevance to our political system as it exists today. Some commentators view it merely as a “work
of political rhetoric written to gloss over the compromises of the Constitution and to make that
document look consistent.”33 One scholar has suggested it was a “debaters’ handbook for Federalist
delegates in the ratifying conventions of several states.”34 In fact, it is disputed the extent to which
the numbers of The Federalist had a decisive influence over the delegates to the New York State
Convention.35 Rather, Yarbrough says the “enduring claim of The Federalist does not rest
primarily” as a polemic on behalf of the Constitution, rather, from the time of its publication it was
“regarded as the most authoritative explication of the principles underlying the Constitution.”36
Many scholars like Balkin or Tribe, and even President Obama himself, see United States
politics as based on nothing more than a set of ongoing acts of “faith” in a series of historically
shifting “narratives” and “stories”37 constructed around our Founding its meaning.38 The history of
the United States and the meaning of our founding documents are little more than a series of
changing myths we tell ourselves adapted to the public opinion and tenor of the times. To Abbott,
Publius is little more than a “storyteller”;39 a bard reciting the comforting hymns of a nation’s birth.
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The Federalist is then just one of many fictive narratives we might choose to tell ourselves based
on the arbitrary and subjective tastes of the day. From this perspective The Federalist is little more
than a mythopoetic founding narrative of a Virgil, Livy or the Old Testament. This despite the fact
that the birth of the United States provides one of the most transparent, least mythic foundings in
world history in part because of the contemporaneous documentation The Federalist provides. The
primary truths of our nation’s birth are not the product of a hidden God we cannot know, nor have
they been lost to the mists of time and memory. This treatment as mere rhetoric or myth denies the
authors’ own self-understanding. They claim the text is a work of public reasoning which can and
should be rationally scrutinized and compared to the evidence of history and experience. They set
a high standard of scrutiny for their work and gladly invite our reasoned criticisms.
At first glance Publius is addressing neither philosophers, nor a timeless humanity. He
speaks as a citizen-statesman to fellow citizens. We immediately recognize The Federalist as a
polemical work of political persuasion. It was written by men whose political experience gave
them a keen sense of their audience’s dispositions and opinions. And yet, it is also a work of
political science. The same men steeped in the political machinations of the day were also
conversant with the great works of political philosophy and the lessons of the past learned through
books. Their willingness to appeal to the reason, not merely the passions, of their readers is evident
in the substance and tone of the text. This appeal to reason demonstrates that Publius set his sights
above the mere horizon of the day.
This concern for truth is evident in Publius’ refusal to flatter his audience and its prejudices.
Nor did they “write down to their audience.”40 The Federalist offers a frank assessment of human
nature and the mentality of the average citizen as an individual and as a collective member of
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groups and factions. Its arguments often closely track the closed-door debates of the Philadelphia
Convention whose proceedings were veiled in secrecy. This is in part because much of the material
Hamilton and Madison had compiled for the Convention and reiterated in their speeches served as
the foundation of the text. 41 When we compare them, we see the Convention’s frankness evident
in page after page of The Federalist. The Convention swore all participates to secrecy so that,
among other things, they might speak their minds freely, openly and honestly about contentious
and sensitive public matters. History shows that when C-SPAN peers onto the Senate floor or
television cameras take residence at the White House briefing room, speakers become keenly
aware of the public gaze and acted accordingly.
Secrecy was necessary in order to allow participates to speak freely on controversial
matters without the threat of the fickle fluctuations of public opinion which would have muddled
and confounded the already complicated and tenuous deliberations. Scholars agree that the primary
motive of this “mask of secrecy” was to permit the free and open discourse of the participants, to
permit them to voice frank truths and take experimental positions which publicity and its effects
would silence or censure.42 Gelman says that the “delegates operated with freedom to express their
views as a result of the rules of secrecy.”43 Rossiter says secrecy “stirred the imaginations and
loosened the tongues of delegates on the floor, permitted them to take advanced positions and then
to withdraw gracefully under fire, guarded them against both careless and willful
misinterpretations of their gropings for constitutional solutions and political compromises,
permitted one consensus after another to form out of a wealth of half-formed opinions and half-
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baked prejudices” and “encouraged them to express honest doubts.”44 The condition of secrecy
meant that “delegates should have been in a position to engage in true deliberation where opinions
were shared openly and decisions were the result of member preference over a given policy that
was influenced to some degree by the discussion that policy.”45 Rossiter describes the adoption of
secrecy as “the most critical decision of a procedural nature the Convention was ever to make.”46
George Mason found this veil a “necessary precaution to prevent misrepresentations or
mistakes.”47 Years later Madison insisted that “no Constitution would ever have been adopted by
the Convention if the debates had been public” 48
The new political science promoted by Publius was less oriented toward speculation about
timeless principles and more concerned with the practical mechanics and administration of
government. Machiavelli initiated the shift in modern political science toward the practical and
sought to collapse the distance between political analysis and political advocacy. Marx captured
the flavor of this shift by flamboyantly asserting that prior to the modern era philosophers had only
interpreted the world but the “point is to change it.” Publius might have responded as to the wisdom
of changing the world without sufficient reflection first. Publius straddles a line between timely
practical concerns and speculation on timeless truths and problems. Hamilton no doubt has his
rhetorical force and eloquence, Madison his concision and incisive penetration.
Yet the facts of the Convention and The Federalist do not simply point to motives at the
nexus of language and power. The reader notices the particular form in which Publius’s advocacy
is couched. He could have simply provided an article by article, section by section analysis of the
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Constitution. Instead, he does not fail to cloth certain arguments in universal claims regarding
human nature. He provides broad historical context and illuminates the operative general principles
behind Constitutional provisions rather than engaging in legalistic textual microscopy.
The Federalist and the Convention were central components of a genuinely deliberative
process. Publius treats his readers as the convention delegates were compelled to treat one another.
Human nature’s capacity for reasoned deliberation and genuine consent is only possible when
fostered by conditions which make reflection possible. Tocqueville says the Convention adopted
the Constitution “after long and mature deliberations.”49 The Convention established rules holding
its participates to an extremely high bar of decorum in order that these conditions might be
fulfilled. Delegates were “forbidden to whisper, read, or pass notes while one of their colleagues
was speaking” and could be called to order by any other member for errant conduct.50
These procedural rules permitted genuine “reflection”, which culminated in the people’s
“choice” of the Constitution through ratification. Such claims are of a nation founded on consent
and deliberation are course relative, a matter of degree, where historical context is illuminating.
We might compare the nature and method of the origins of the American system to that of
revolutionary France, Russia or China. In his speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison
says: “In this pursuit, we ought not to address our arguments to the feelings and passions, but to
those understandings which were selected by the people of this country, to decide this great
question, by a calm and rational investigation.”51
When Hamilton asks the question of whether good government can be established on the
basis of “reflection and choice” American exceptionalism is not being asserted as a fait accompli.
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At the time of ratification, the answer to this question was being determined. The Federalist Papers
sat at the center of this public process of reflection and choice. The authors’ tone enacts the
reflective and deliberative process advanced within the substance of its arguments. It would have
been contrary to Publius’ stated belief in the people’s capacity for self-government to advance
arguments draped in mere rhetoric or poetry which exclusively appealed to the people’s passions
while neglecting their reason. Despite claims of those who seek to undermine the authority of The
Federalist, it represents a high watermark of public political discourse in the history of mankind.
Our Founding was truly a deliberative and consensual act, rather than one coercion and force. The
authors of The Federalist were determined to transfer the deliberative decorum of the closed
Convention, into the open public square.
Hamilton, Madison and Jay made it clear exactly how they desired to be read and judged.
They sought to bring their claims before the tribunal of the reader’s reason. In Hamilton’s preface
to the first book format publication, he says “Respect for public opinion, not anxiety for the literary
character of the performance, dictates this remark. The great wish is, that it may promote the cause
of truth, and lead to a right judgment of the true interests of the community."52 The framework of
understanding was not sectarian or partisan faith, but “reason,” and “deliberation” and the “cause
of truth.”53
The very first sentence of The Federalist speaks directly to the reader. Hamilton invites the
reader “to deliberate upon a New Constitution for the United States of America.”54 While he
acknowledges an occasional “intemperance of expression” he addresses himself to the reasoned
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“judgments” of men, not their partisan zeal or aesthetic sense. The active citizen is being asked to
engage in an act of public deliberation by reading and scrutinizing his claims and arguments.
Hamilton concludes The Federalist by speaking directly to the reader again. He offers its
arguments up to the tribunal of the public’s judgement and speaks of the deliberative “spirit” in
which his endeavors have been conducted. He says:
Thus have I, fellow citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success your
conduct must determine…I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously
avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which
have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the constitution.

The permanent and accessible grounds of his arguments were nature and human nature
gleaned through experience reason. In No. 85 Hamilton says, “I frankly acknowledge to you my
convictions and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded.”55 In No. 1
Hamilton says, “My arguments will be open to all and may be judged by all. They shall at least be
offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.”56 Hamilton does not claim the
infallibility of his reasoning, but invites the reader to scrutinize and judge by that same fallible
faculty. In No. 38 Madison says that “every candid reader will make the proper reflections on
these important facts.”57 In No. 85 Hamilton asks the reader to pause and asks if “in the course of
these papers, the proposed constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated?”58 Posing this
question he speaks directly to the reader saying: “Every man is bound to answer these questions
to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act agreeably to the
genuine and sober dictates of his judgment.”59
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In No. 1 Hamilton says “that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country
to decide” whether good government can be established on the basis of “reflection and choice”
and that it is to be considered “the general misfortune of mankind” if they should fail in this task.60
We quickly realize the authors of The Federalist assume a grander purpose exceeding the bounds
of the American context alone. The Constitution is an experiment to determine whether
“mankind”, not just former British colonies, can establish good government.61 In No. 11 Hamilton
says, “It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming
brother,” the Europeans, “moderation.” If this is the true meaning of the Constitution then the
arguments of The Federalist must be advanced on universal grounds of nature, toward universal
goals recognizable by the rest of human history. Publius’ object is not merely an American ethos
but a fixed and eternal human nature.
The purpose of The Federalist straddles the line between the practical and theoretical, the
timely and timeless. The text is no doubt a “brilliant piece of political propaganda,”62 addressed
“to the circumstances of 1787,” but also to “political history and human nature generally.”63 Dietze
says Hamilton “refutes the idea that the Federalist is only a treatise on the practice of
government.”64 Epstein says its arguments do “not confine its analysis to America,” but reference
a broad spectrum of the world history and America’s place in it. In fact, it is rarely noted just how
theoretically oriented some numbers are. If we consider Nos. 1, 10, 15, 23, 31, 37-40 or 47-51 to
name a few, we see the extent of their theoretical orientation. Within them there is an intriguing
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parallel structure to Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses, in which general principles are asserted
and then exemplified by historical examples past and present. This suggests the text is not simply
speaking to citizens of the states, but intended as “a possession for all time.”
The Federalist occupies a distinct and unusual place in the history of political thought. Its
authors would be the first to acknowledge that, despite its philosophical claims, it was not a
philosophical treatise commencing with first philosophy. The text is not primarily “engaged in a
disinterested pursuit of the truth.”65 It does not explore or directly raise the fundamental perennial
questions of political philosophy such as the nature of the good life or the best regime simply.
Mansfield say that it is “not a work of political philosophy, but it shows the influence of political
philosophy in the thinking of the American founders.”66 The Federalist assumes as given the
principles of the Declaration of Independence such as the God-given “natural rights of man.” 67 In
so doing, it depends much on thought from Locke, Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment
and others.68 As a work of Modern political science it was not simply geared toward the practical
realities of politics generally, but with the exigencies of a particular and unique historical moment
in time. The Federalist might best be understood in relation to the long and great tradition of
political pamphleteering central to the burgeoning political discourse in 18th century America. The
text is a polemic engaged in one of the most consequential political debates of the nation’s history.
The Federalist no doubt has a practical political agenda, but it is “by no means simply a tract for
the times.”69
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The grand purpose and virtuoso execution of The Federalist Papers have made it the single
most important work of political theory in the American tradition and a classic generally. Editor J.
E. Cooke opens his edition by saying the “United States has produced three historic documents of
major importance: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and The Federalist.”70
Jefferson described the text as “the best commentary on the principles of government, which ever
was written.”71 Meanwhile Tocqueville thought it “an excellent book, though special to America,
ought to be familiar to statesmen of all countries.”72 Ironically the great Supreme Court justice
Joseph Story claimed that Tocqueville’s famed account of American democracy was in fact largely
a product of the Frenchman’s intimate familiarity with The Federalist and his own
Commentaries.73 In 1861, John Stuart Mill said The Federalist was “the most instructive treatise
we possess on federal government.”74 Theodore Roosevelt said “it is on the whole the greatest
book” on practical politics.75 An English journalist wrote that The Federalist can be called
“seriously, reverently, the Bible of Republicanism.”76
Madison’s biographer Ralph Ketcham says The Federalist is “the authoritative
commentary on the Constitution and the best-known work of political theory ever written in the
United States.”77 It has been repeatedly describe as “the most authoritative commentary on the
Constitution which exists,” or the “preeminent commentary on the substance and philosophy of
the Constitution.”78 Gary McDowell calls it simply the “bible that informs and guides American
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political thought.”79 The distinguished authority, Benjamin Wright wrote it is “by far the greatest
book on politics ever written in America.”80 Howe describes it as “a kind of secular scripture, an
authoritative statement of how American political institutions work or should work.”81 Yarbrough
says the “enduring claim of The Federalist does not rest primarily” as a polemic on behalf of the
Constitution, rather, from the time of its publication it was “regarded as the most authoritative
explication of the principles underlying the Constitution.”82 The fact that it is regularly cited by
scholars, officeholders and Supreme Court justices alike demonstrates its ongoing and
consequential role in our understanding of the Constitution today. Despite its immediate purpose
the text continues to play a central role not only in American politics and government, but our own
self-understanding as a people and a nation.
Publius’ grand purpose exemplifies the text’s psychological analysis of human ambition.
Given the centrality of its psychological theory of human motivation it is only natural to turn
Publius’ analysis on himself. In No. 72 Hamilton says “the love of fame is the ruling passion of
the noblest minds.”83 Douglas Adair and James Cesar both have applied this model, arguing
Publius was motivated by a desire for fame. Adair believes the Founders had “become fantastically
concerned with posterity’s judgment of their behavior,” and were “concerned with the image” that
would “remain in the world’s eye.”84 The desire for fame has the power to be “spur and a goad…to
act with nobleness and greatness, to make men rise above petty interests.”85 The love of fame could
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marry the boldest personal passions with the selfless demands of the public interest.86 In No. 38
Madison acknowledged for example that the Founding was “as fair a chance for immortality, as
Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on his own return from exile and
death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a better, but
until another should be agreed upon by this new assembly of Lawgivers.”87
It is likely then the text is motivated by a concern for the judgement of future generations
as much as present ones. Adair’s observation of the motives of Publius and the Founders partially
explains the grand historical context and meaning Hamilton attributes to the 1787 Founding in the
opening paragraphs of No. 1. Such motives raised their eyes above the day’s horizon to consider
the broader significance of their actions. The desire for fame could only be satisfied if the scale
and scope of the text were extended beyond the confines of the moment and addressed to all times.
Conscious of the unprecedented nature of the Revolution, the Convention and the Constitution it
crafted, Publius seems to have keenly sensed the opportunity to provide their definitive exegesis.
What mode of political statesmanship is more closely associated with fame than the act of founding
itself? As readers of the Bible, Plutarch, Livy and Machiavelli, they had a keen awareness of the
fame which attaches to founders.
The practical function of The Federalist affects the nature and scope of its arguments.
Hamilton, Madison and Jay did not write as dispassionate observers, but as practical, if reflective,
men of action.88 Progressive opponent of the Founding, Charles Beard compliments Madison and
Hamilton by saying they were “not closet philosophers,” or “dust sifters engaged in dissecting the
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ideas of other dust sifters.”89 They wrote as partisans of liberty and advocates of a political form
they thought would best secure it. The goal then was not to provide proofs of the theoretical
principles on which the Constitution was based, but demonstrate the practical correctness of its
“inventions of prudence”.
The Federalist is “not a treatise on political philosophy concerned with natural law, the
origin and nature of the state, or the best form of government in the abstract.”90 Huyler says, the
text “ is long on the science of politics but short on the philosophy that would inform such a
science.”91 Publius’ arguments do not “tell the complete story or provide all the answers” to the
theoretical assumptions which underly its argument. 92 The authors do not, like Hobbes, derive an
account of human nature by depicting its natural condition. Nor do they, like Locke, attempt to
demonstrate the existence and content of Natural Law in order to derive ultimate standards of a
just political order. White speculates this would have confused readers while giving others “the
opportunity to engage in … irrelevant controversy and logic-chopping.”93 The goal was not to
invent an account of human nature out of whole cloth, but to apply one in order to illuminate the
flaws of the Articles of Confederation and demonstrate the Constitution’s solution by its capacity
to accommodate the likely motivates and conduct of men.
Another source of the lack of theoretical reasoning was the prima facia agreement with the
Anti-Federalists over principles. Huyler argues that it was precisely because both parties agreed
on principles that The Federalist Papers do not bother to raise questions regarding the
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philosophical foundations of government.94 Both parties agreed upon an understanding of human
nature and the laws derived from it. Both parties acknowledged the intrinsic dangers of government
which inspired legitimate fear of tyranny. For both sides tyranny was in fact nothing more than a
pernicious compound mixture of interested ambitious human nature combined with power
concentrated and unrestrained. Since the central elements of human nature were not in dispute,
Publius treats them as axiomatic and in no need of making demonstrations. Therefore, Publius
took such principles for granted. Divisions between the parties were over the appropriate form
which might best guarantee liberty and order. Energy and space could be dedicated to explaining
how the constitutional form would manifest agreed on principles in practice.95
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3. Challenges of the Present Task
The political and rhetorical purpose of The Federalist presents challenges to discerning
from it a comprehensive theory of human nature. The task of the interpreter is to distill a political
philosophy from a text written collectively in a piecemeal manner whose goal was public
persuasion. Despite its practical function White says that “there is a psychological theory of human
nature to be found in The Federalist even though it is never systematically expounded by the
authors.”1 It does not present, but depends on, a complete account of human nature. The scope of
Publius’ account is tailored to its practical function. He concerns himself with those facets of
human nature relevant to the political arguments of its two volumes. This account is largely
confined to a political psychology focusing particular attention on a theory of human motivation.
It relies on a schema of human motivations which move men to act and attempts to illustrate the
way in which the Constitution will shape and respond to that schema. Given the voluntary and
capriciousness nature of human conduct such an analysis is as much art as science, a mixture of
prudent judgement and known fact.
Publius’ account of human motivation is complicated by the fact that he rarely defines
central terms such as “reason”, “passion” and “self-interest.” No doubt his understanding of them
was not entirely original, and piggy backs on the common currency of contemporaneous moral
and political discourse. Turning to the sources on which Publius likely drew, does not entirely
resolve the problem of decoding their precise meanings. These concepts of motivation were much
disputed at the time, as now, both in terms of their motivational efficacy and also there very
meaning. Their meanings were sufficiently fluid so as to be used in contradictory ways within
Eighteenth century moral philosophy.
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Self-interest is perhaps the most elusive spring of action even as it is often considered the
cornerstone of the constitutional edifice. Self-interest is a modern hybrid term combining reason
and passion. In self-interest, passions conspire with instrumental reasoning. Rational calculation
determines how best to achieve passion’s aims. However, there were varying degrees of rationality
associated with self-interest.”2 There is the myopia of immediate self-interest and the rational
foresight of self-interest properly understood. Likewise, “ambition” is often used as a generic term
for the assertion of one’s own interest. Elsewhere it connotes the love of power and the desire to
dominate. Other times it is more closely associated with the love of honor, and its extreme, the
love of fame. Sometimes ambition is given negative connotations, other times, positive. Is
ambition a passion or an interest?
Madison’s No. 37 is probably the most philosophically probing of all the numbers of The
Federalist. He raises complicated questions of epistemology such as the limits of reason and the
degree of certainty the knowledge on which the constitutional provisions and their explanations
are understood to rest. In No. 37 Madison acknowledges that these terms of motivation were
“plagued by obscurity.”3 He says they have “never yet been distinguished and defined, with
satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers.”4 This
obscurity is not merely a matter of the failures of philosophic insight or the limits of the rational
faculty, but arises from the object of inquiry itself. The ambiguities of the nature of the mind are
compounded because the object of inquiry is same as the tool of observation. As a matter of
principle, Publius was not interested in a factitious or sophistical precision. Publius’
acknowledgement of the fallibility of man’s reason produced a natural abhorrence of artificial
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certainty and utopian schemes which would reduce politics to ironclad geometrical reasoning. This
acknowledgement was a recognition of the value and necessity of prudence. The lack of a
crystalline system is a feature, not a bug, of their own political science.5 Government must be
limited and the people free, because the reason of a founder or central planner is unable to
anticipate and account for all historical contingencies.
The collective authorship of The Federalist poses another challenge to the task of
discerning a uniform account of human nature. Unlike today’s editions, the earliest book versions
of The Federalist were published under the name “Publius,” with no reference to its individual
authors. The single pseudonym signals a collective effort and unitary intent. The nom de plume is
a mask intended to conceal any distinction between the authors and their viewpoints.6 The name
focuses attention on arguments and rhetoric rather than the character and supposed authority of the
particular writer. The name celebrates the spirit of union over the spirit of faction in a politically
contentious time. This literary unity is analogous to the unity of political purpose necessary to
bring the states into a new Union. They wrote as patriots of the new republic willing to suppress
their individual ambitions in the service of the new nation by working anonymously and without
compensation. This is reinforced by the fact that all authors judiciously guarded their individual
participation. They kept their roles secret, not disclosing them until decades after the Grand
Convention. In 1802 for example, Hamilton rebuffed a publisher’s attempt to arrange the text
based on individual authorship of the numbers.7
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Along with a unity of purpose there is a continuity of treatment. Despite its plural
authorship and certain notable departures, The Federalist stands as a single unitary whole. The
Federalist is to be understood as a uniform work under the aegis of a single author with a single
point of view. One author with one largely coherent, message. Much evidence indicates they
actively sought to avoid disagreements and suppressed doctrinal differences and intraparty
squabbles in the service of a collective effort. The fact that they “took special pains to guard the
secrecy of authorship” lends credibility to their sincerity about presenting “a text of largely
uniform and singular design.”8 Despite Hamilton providing the lion’s share of the numbers, on the
last day of the Convention he said, “No man’s ideas were more remote from the plan than his were
known to be.”9 As Publius, Mansfield asserts that Hamilton and Madison speak “together in one
voice.”10 Under this name, Hamilton and Madison “thought alike and even wrote in styles so much
the same, that when a dispute arose after Hamilton’s death as to who wrote certain of the papers,
it became a feat of scholarship to decide which claim was correct.”11
The process of divining who wrote what has become an academic industry since the early
19th century. Today scholars often take authorial cleavages in the text for granted as obvious.
Meanwhile, at the time, discerning and intimate acquaintances of these men could not distinguish
the numbers by their individual authorship. George Washington, long time intimate of Hamilton,
struggled to distinguish between the numbers of Hamilton and Madison. In a letter Washington
asks an acquaintance “who the authors of the individual numbers” were.12 Jefferson, an intimate
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of Madison, asserted he “knew” that Madison had in fact written them.13 Mansfield reminds us that
the act of authorial dissection “ignores their cooperation and the texts’ coherence as a whole.”14
Authorship is usually credited in accord with the order of magnitude of each man’s
contribution to the project. Hamilton conceived and “organized the project”, writing a majority of
its numbers.15 Madison the second most and with the greatest scope and philosophic penetration.
Jay wrote the fewest and the duration of his involvement was the briefest. While there remain some
minor disputes,16 there is general agreement that Jay wrote five (Nos. 2–5 and 64), Hamilton fiftyone (Nos. 1, 6 –9, 11–13, 15–17, 21–36, 59–61, and 65–85), and Madison twenty-nine (Nos. 10,
14, 18 –20, 37–58, and 62–63).17 Hamilton and Madison provided the main thrust of the document,
its principles and arguments. This justifies the common focus scholars place on their involvement.
Both men were in a unique position to contribute to the nation’s Founding. Madison and Hamilton
were rare men whose characters combined political experience and book learning. They were
“philosopher-statesmen”18 or what Scigliano calls a “scholar-politician”
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Convention, William Pierce, described Madison as one who “blends together the profound
politician, with the scholar.”20
It is striking the extent to which The Founders were “practical men of varied talents.” 21
Most of the Founders were neither “career politicians or mere men of letters.”22 They were
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“scientists, inventors, entrepreneurs and builders.”23 Washington was for example “a farmer, a
whisky entrepreneur, military leader and stateman” while Franklin was “a publisher, inventor,
diplomat, philanthropist and author.”24 These men were not dreamers. Their varied experiences
kept them from the ethereal clouds of philosophical speculation and gave them a concreteness of
vision to craft a vast political edifice requiring the knowledge of numerous spheres of society.
Such a project required knowledge, moral and social, economic and political. Like Machiavelli,
both Hamilton and Madison were men of theoretical acumen, but also steeped in the practical
experience of men and politics. In their own way both exhibited their political wit in the early
years of the Republic even as they had vastly different public presences. Their grasp of the
intricacies of human motivation had great practical application in navigating their public offices
in ways that it did not for John Adams for example. Hamilton and Madison were no doubt the
more bookish of the Founders, with that prize going overwhelmingly to Madison who was
recognized as such by his contemporaries.
Both Hamilton and Madison were steeped in the first-hand experience of politics and war,
the traditions of the Bible, Classical Greece and Rome, as well as the innovations of modern moral
and political science. Madison had long been known and widely recognized as one of the most
brilliant minds of the post-revolutionary period, but was no less formidable as a public political
presence.25 Rossiter says Madison was “a combination of learning, experience, purpose, and
imagination that not even Adams or Jefferson could have equaled.26 He attended the College of
New Jersey under Reverend Witherspoon, the midwife of numerous revolutionary minds. After
his education he entered the Virginia House of Burgesses during the waning days of British
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colonial rule. During the Revolution, Madison and George Mason were instrumental in drafting
the constitution for the state of Virginia. He was then elected to the Second Continental Congress
from 1781-1786 representing his home state.
At the Philadelphia Convention Madison was the author of the Virginia Plan, one of the
two primary templates for the Constitution. He remains the ‘Father of the Constitution’ as one of
its primary authors and central Convention note-taker. In the year leading up to the Convention
Madison undertook “a systematic course of reading in political history with the apparent purpose
of applying that learning to the problems besetting the American Confederation.”27 He spent this
year studying Ancient and Modern confederacies. It was to Madison his colleagues would turn for
a comprehensive understanding of the underlying principles and history on which the American
confederacy was based. Rutland says “no other delegate came so well prepared.”28 Delegate
William Pierce of Georgia concluded that Madison was the “best informed Man of any point in
debate.”29
On the other hand, Hamilton had a native intellect and rhetorical flair. Of Hamilton, George
Washington said in 1781, “there are few men to be found, of his age, who has a more general
knowledge than he possesses, and none whose Soul is more firmly engaged in the cause.”30 In his
1787 Character Sketches William Pierce says, “Colo. Hamilton requires time to think—he
enquires into every part of his subject with the searchings of philosophy, and when he comes
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forward he comes highly charged with interesting matter, there is no skimming over the surface of
a subject with him, he must sink to the bottom to see what foundation it rests on.”31
Hamilton had been tutored by William Livingston, a leading intellectual and revolutionary.
As a youth in the 1760s Hamilton became a clerk at Beekman and Cruger, a local import-export
trading firm where he gained hands-on knowledge of the nuts and bolts of business, finance,
commerce and trade. This experience would impress on him the centrality of commerce to political
order and well-being. This experience foreshadowed his contribution on commercial republics in
The Federalist, his ascension to the role of Secretary of the Treasury in the Washington
administration, as well as his famed 1791 “Report on Manufactures.” Hamilton entered King's
College in 1773, graduating in May, 1774. He came into his own intellectually around the time of
the Revolution, penning both “A Full Vindication” and “The Farmer Refuted” in 1774. Both essays
signal his adherence to the Lockean Natural Rights tradition and established his revolutionary
bonafides. If Hamilton lacked the extent and depth of Madison’s book learning and philosophical
penetration, he acquitted himself as a quick-witted political operative whose mettle was proven
through years of exposure to the life of action in finance and trade, and no less as aid-de-camp to
General Washington during the war, as well as his role as representative to the Continental
Congress from the key state of New York.
There is a tendency for political scientists and historians to project subsequent political
differences and animosities between Hamilton and Madison back onto their time as Publius. It
should be kept in mind that these men had “cooperated under the Articles of Confederation and
the Continental Congress on various projects.”32 For example, they had collaborated to propose a
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constitutional convention at Annapolis a year prior to the Grand Convention.33 Bernard Bailyn
writes that between Hamilton and Madison there was “broad agreement on fundamental points.”34
Meanwhile Garry Willis says, “The two main authors of the series knew what their task was, and
made a common front in performing it.”35 Those searching for “any deep difference” between
them, Willis says, are “forgetting the occasion.”36 Willis sees their time spent in the role of Publius
as creating a deep intellectual and stylistic identification between the two authors. He sees a
“Madisonian” Hamilton and a “Hamiltonian” Madison by comparing analogous passages between
the two writers which are strikingly similar. He identifies numerous similar statements that mirror
the overlapping portion between two circles of a Venn diagram.37
Nevertheless, in 1850 John Quincy Adams wrote The Federalist was “not the production
of a single mind.”38 While Hamilton and Madison speak with one mostly unified voice, there are
notable cleavages in the text. Madison even acknowledged divergences “in the general complexion
of their political theories.”39 There exists differences based on interest and expertise “visible in the
division of labor.”40 McDonald says this division reflects “differences in temperament, talent, and
preoccupations.”41 Such parceling out of responsibilities was driven by practical exigencies.
Scigliano says “they assigned the numbers more or less according to their interests and also to the
time that they had available.”42 There is also to be found a distinction in style. Hamilton “tended
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to be more direct” and detail oriented while Madison writes in a “more theoretical” and sweeping
manner.43 Hamilton, a learned but practical man, dwells on the minutiae of government mechanics,
administration and policy. He did “most of the writing on national defense and matters concerning
the economy.”44 Meanwhile Madison wrote “most of the pieces on history and political theory.”45
As the more theoretic man, Madison delves more fully and broadly into the principles and realities
which underly government. One hedges more toward political history and experience, the other
toward speculation and political philosophy. These differences however turn out to be more
“complimentary” than contradictory.46
Madison and Hamilton are perhaps most coherent and consistent in their account of human
nature. Even as they emphasize different aspects of the human soul, there are no fundamental
discrepancies between them. Both men accepted the central thesis of human depravity. “Both
men,” says McDonald, “used the so-called pessimistic view of human nature as the basis of their
science of politics.”47 Both “maintained that men were governed by passion rather than by reason;
both believed that a great danger to liberty and good government in America lay in an excess of
unchecked power in the people, in the democracy or simple majority.”48 Both acknowledged the
higher and lower inclinations of human nature in equal portion. Both saw that human nature’s lack
of self-restraint necessitated government and that a government of men rather than angels must be
made to constraint itself. Despite what is often described as a “pessimistic view”, both held that
human nature had sufficient reason and virtue to make republican self-government possible if
properly constituted.

43

Ibid. p. 25.
Forrest McDonald. Alexander Hamilton: A Biography. New York. W.W. Norton & Co., 1982. p. 108.
45
Ibid.
46
Forrest McDonald. Alexander Hamilton: A Biography. New York. W.W. Norton & Co., 1982. p. 108.
47
Ibid., p. 111.
48
Ibid.
44

98

The positions of Madison and Hamilton are not mutually exclusive as the Constitution
represents a balancing act between freedom and restraint, efficiency and checks on it. Both
acknowledged that prudent institutions alone would never guarantee good government. They must
be occupied by men of some degree of virtue. The difference between Classical political science
and Publius is a dispute over virtue as the end of political community and the degree of their
dependence on virtue for good government. They could not transcend the need for virtue any more
than men can transcend their need of government. Government must give sufficient freedom and
impetus to promote reason and virtue while restraining vice.
McDonald correctly asserts they “reasoned in opposite directions” from the same
premises.49 While both recognized the deficiencies of human nature, Madison always seems to
have hewed toward a greater pessimism and sobriety associated with the Protestant Christian
intellectual heritage based on Calvin and Augustine which emphasized man’s sinfulness and
depravity. Politics is no place for visionaries, redemption is only to be found through God. But this
observation was not intended to condemn human nature nor provide impetus to save or perfect
men’s souls through political institutions. Man’s imperfect nature led Madison to dwell on how to
mitigate the negative effects of human depravity while preserving the liberty which inevitably
allows men to pursue their vices. This concern focused Madison on constitutional restraints such
as the separation of powers and the diffusion of the majority by factions dispersed in an extended
republic. Man’s depravity requires strong external “sentinels” and “auxiliary precautions” beyond
his own inner conscience, especially when given power. Internal restraints such as reason or moral
sentiment were not sufficient to bend men’s conduct toward justice. These precautions are
necessary because we can hope for, but not rely on, the better angels of our nature. For all his
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sobriety, Madison nevertheless speaks of those virtues which “justify a certain portion of esteem
and confidence,” in human nature and make republican self-government possible.
Hamilton echoes Madison in conceiving human nature as a mean between vice and virtue.
Yet, the “portion of esteem” he granted to the nature of a few was perhaps something greater than
Madison. He makes a wider distinction between the relative endowments of reason and virtue in
the few compared to the many unrefined. Hamilton dwells repeatedly on how combinations of the
many give way to their passions and become mobs. This is a running theme of Hamilton almost
completely absent in Madison’s speculations. Hamilton believed there existed a sufficient few
whose reason and virtue allowed them to be somewhat more trusted with power than Madison’s
men of crooked timber. More vulnerable to the inspiration and examples of great men in history,
Hamilton tends to grant higher motives more efficacy than Madison. He also demonstrates a
greater admiration for the double-edged sword of human greatness and ambition.
A key difference between Hamilton and Madison is the relative emphasis each place on
tyranny. Madison, a Federalist advocate for strong national government, nevertheless was the more
concerned with limitation on government. Unlimited power is ripe for abuse and the gateway to
tyranny. Meanwhile Hamilton “aimed not just at the creation of a free government” but of a “great
nation.”50 Their divergencies rest, in part, on their opinions of human greatness. While no less
cognizant of human limitation, Hamilton demonstrates a Pagan admiration for human excellence.
Hamilton placed more faith in the ambitious few. He celebrates the ambitious nature of great
statesmen, and the capacity of a rare few to exhibit public virtue. Madison is much less sanguine
and more fearful of the very same passions Hamilton celebrates. Madison rejected Hamilton’s
“disdain for constitutional limits and his equally wishful suggestion that an elite few could
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maintain the integrity of the constitution over an extended period of time.”51 Hamilton seems to
conceive of great offices like the executive as platforms for the perfection and display of human
excellence as an end in itself. For Madison government is primarily a restraint and necessary evil.
Hamilton suggests government could at its best be a positive good as a crucible and stage for
human greatness. Nevertheless, their conclusions are based on different judgements drawn from
the same premises of an identical human nature.
This appears to be a disagreement over how much some men can be trusted with power.
No doubt both entered the Convention as emphatic advocates of a strong national government. The
goal was to solve the deficiencies of the Articles without reintroducing the tyrannies abandon on
the shores of the Old World. Madison was the main author of the Virginia Plan which entirely
scraped the Articles. Despite his nationalism, Madison was the more skeptical of the two when
considering the ramifications of power placed in the hands of mere mortals. Madison’s vision of
power in the hands of faulty human nature led him to dwell on the need to neutralize those impulses
which lead to tyranny by neutralizing the possibility for concentrated power which gives such
impulses opportunity. Madison writes that the “accumulation of all powers”52 concentrated in the
“same hands”53 is “the very definition of tyranny.”54 Madison’s weariness toward ambition is
manifest in his leading role in the exposition of the separation of powers and the need for checks
and balances in Nos. 47-51. Meanwhile in No. 10 he dwells on the tyranny of the majority,
identifying the extended republic as one solution to protect minority rights. Three branches and a
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divided legislature provide some of the dilatory elements which serve as the cooling saucer of the
machinations and ambitions of men.
While Madison dwelt on checks to power, Hamilton’s attentions were drawn to matters of
efficacy and what he called “good administration.” This led him to emphasize the effectiveness,
“energy and efficiency” of government.55 Hamilton was far more comfortable with a more
centralized national government with fewer restraints, centered on a strong executive. Frederici
says Hamilton “was far less concerned about the prospect of tyranny’s emanating from centralized
power.”56 On June 18, 1787, after a period of silence, Hamilton made his sole speech to the
Convention. In it he proposed one of the most extreme nationalist models entertained at the
Convention. Hamilton’s executive looked conspicuously like a monarch. His proposal is
sometimes called the “British Plan” because according to Madison’s notes he said “the British
Government forms the best model the world ever produced.”57 This claim must have had an
unsettling effect on the members of the revolutionary generation on both sides of the constitutional
debate.
Hamilton advocated for a union so strong state sovereignty virtually vanished, with almost
all power concentrated in a national government. Senators would have life tenure. State governors
would be creatures of the national legislature and have an absolute veto over their state legislatures.
This is a far cry from Madison’s analysis of the wisdom of federalism and the distribution and
balance of power between the national government and the states.58 Hamilton argued for an
exceptionally strong executive, only to have virtually all his recommendations rebuffed and
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ignored. The executive is the only truly national office in the entire constitutional plan. He
proposed an executive elected for life with an absolute veto over the legislature and the sole power
to appoint department heads.59 Hamilton’s executive appeared to be nothing other than an elective
monarch. Some have claimed Hamilton’s proposal for such an extreme concentration of power
was a rhetorical device, a tactical maneuver to make the other plans for a strong national
government appear more moderate.60 Whatever the truth, it must be acknowledged that Hamilton
consistently demonstrates less discomfort with the idea of more power in fewer hands than
Madison ever did. While both held a jaundice view of most men, Hamilton seems to have believed
in a sufficient supply of great and virtuous individuals to fill such offices.
Echoes of Hamilton’s convention speech can be found in The Federalist. This is
particularly true of his numbers on the executive branch. In No. 1 he speaks of his “enlightened
zeal for the energy and efficiency of government.”61 If government is to be properly administration
it must have the power and efficiency to meet its task. Only through sufficient concentration of
power can government effectively stave off the anarchy and disorder which threaten liberty. But
liberty is also threated by excessive “energy and efficiency.” In later numbers he dwells on the
“energy”, “decision”, “dispatch”, “secrecy” and broad, even undefined, powers of the executive
which provide unity to the national government. Such energy and dispatch only come from power
concentrated in the hands of a unitary executive.
Hamilton seems to envision the executive as a constitutional version of Machiavelli’s
prince.62 It is the executive alone, as preserver of the Union, enforcer of law, Commander-in-chief
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and arch defender of the Constitution, whose passions and ambitions are, if under a narrow range
of circumstances, granted the freest rein of any constitutional officer. Locke called the broad
emergency powers granted to an executive in a crisis “prerogative”. Prerogative was the “power
to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law and
sometimes even against it.”63 Such justifications give the executive the ability to act with broad
discretion under conditions of “necessity” in matters of national self-preservation.64 Today such
powers come under the equally ubiquitous and ambiguous umbrella of “national security.”65
With his broad construal of executive power we can see in Hamilton’s analysis the first
inklings of the imperial presidency.66 In No. 70 Hamilton says “in the conduct of war” the “energy
of the executive is the bulwark of the national security.”67 In No. 72 Hamilton says that no nation
in the course of their history, has not experienced “certain emergencies of the state” and “an
absolute necessity of the services of particular men, in particular situations, perhaps it would not
be too strong to say, to the preservation of its political existence.”68 Here, Hamilton references the
potential need for a Roman dictator of sorts. Hamilton predicts that there are likely to be “certain
emergencies of the state,” where the presence of such men of extraordinary ambition “might be of
the greatest moment to the public interest or safety.”69 He concludes it unwise “to prohibit a nation
from making use of its own citizens, in the manner best suited to its exigencies and
circumstances.”70 There would be no Lincoln or FDR as we know them, without the potentially
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broad and relatively undefined powers of the presidency hinted at by Hamilton’s numbers on the
executive.
The Constitution, it has been said, is not a suicide pact. When abrogating habeas corpus
Lincoln asked, “Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces,
lest that one be violated?” Such powers border on the extra-constitutional. They are to be found in
the mysterious penumbra and implied powers of the text. Only a few short years after ratification
Hamilton argued for what has become known as the “inherent powers” of the presidency based on
his “broad construction”71 of executive power.72 In his 1793-1794 Helvidius-Pacificus debates
Hamilton publicly tangled with Madison over the scope of executive power. Hamilton’s argument
for broad powers hinges on the fact that Article II grants the “Executive power” to the presidency,
without the limiting “herein granted” clause of Article I.73
Hamilton seems to envision the executive office in more classical terms. Hamilton’s
powerful executive is however not only a tool of efficiency, but an outlet for political ambition
and honor seeking.74 Unlike Madison, Hamilton appears to be more comfortable with, and places
“more stress” on, the motive of ambition.75 Madison’s emphasis on human frailty compels him to
cast a more jaundice eye toward ambitious men and their designs. “Great men,” said Lord Acton,
“are almost always bad.”76 The presidency is designed to allow the rare natures’ of extraordinary
men to flourish. Unlike the numerous legislators, the unitary executive provides larger and less
crowded stage for human greatness. This seat was for men of “irregular” or extraordinary
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ambition.77 The presidency appears to be designed to complete and fulfill the excellence of
extraordinary human beings whose faculties and virtues find a commensurate office and
opportunity to express themselves.
The Executive office serves two psychological functions for Hamilton. In No. 72 he gives
a frank and comprehensive psychological analysis of the character type of the individuals likely to
seek it. Its first function is to perform the practical necessities of the executive function. The
challenge of the office could only be men by men psychologically willing to embrace it. Its second
is to serve as what Hamilton calls “the summit of his country’s honors.”78 It is a platform for human
excellence. Mansfield says, “no part of the Constitution is more welcoming to greatness than the
executive office.”79 Along with its imperial geographic extent Mansfield describes the presidency
as “the ground for America’s greatness.” 80 He says the Constitution “establishes the first republic
with a strong executive consistent with republicanism and not an exception from it like the Roman
dictator, the Venetian doge, or the Cromwellian Protector.”81 The constitutional executive is a
Machiavellian prince tamed by a republican form, bound by a written Constitution dedicated to
limited government in the service of the people.82 The presidency provides a home in the
constitutional edifice for those most capable individuals who harbor the most extreme and peculiar
ambitions. Men of such ambition are a double-edge sword. Ambition is necessary to meet the most
challenging of times, but perhaps also excessive, even tyrannical, in ordinary ones. As the highest
office it provides an outlet or release valve for individuals harboring radical ambition and seeking
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the highest honors.83 Thus the potential threat posed by these men’s nature and ambitions can be
restrained by the office, or perhaps even channeled through it into a positive good.
Ancient Greek democracy only entertained men of great ambition, like Solon, in times of
crisis. When they were not needed, they were not wanted. Ostracism allowed the political
community to come to terms with men of inordinate ambition. Hamilton asks whether it be wise
to deny the existence of an office for men of “irregular ambition”, men who might wander as
“discontented ghosts” in society without the opportunity it provides. He asks, “would it promote
the peace of the community, or the stability of the government, to have half a dozen men who had
had credit enough to raise themselves to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering among the
people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were destined never more to
possess?”84 Where would such a nature produce the greatest benefit and the least harm in American
society? Would they be better inside the tent of government under its constraints, or outside of
them? The executive is confined by Article II, constrained by the people and the other branches.
Hamilton suggests such men are better kept inside the tent. Is it really wise to encourage an
Alcibiades to join the Spartans and the Persians?
No doubt these incipient tensions between Madison and Hamilton reveal the seeds of their
future political disputes. Jefferson, for example in his Anas, saw Hamilton as a monarchist who
never ceased in his quest for a more centralized national government headed by a strong
executive.85 Meanwhile Madison abandoned the Federalists for Jefferson’s Republican party. Once
a strong national government had been founded Madison hewed toward the principles of limited
government, a restrained executive and robust state sovereignty. He would soon become the father
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of the Bill of Rights. Later disagreements between Madison and Hamilton, should however be
seen in light of political circumstances subsequent to the Founding where they were acting within
the very system they helped create. Matters shifted constitutional theory to practical policy. Men
who could agree on principles, could reasonably disagree over their practical application. While
they were not intimates, they had collaborated on key projects which lead to crafting the national
government. They acted as political allies in a united front on behalf of the Constitution. 86 It would
be inappropriate to retroactively project their future disputes back onto The Federalist and
exaggerate their differences in 1787.
It is rather misleading to characterize Madison as a “Jeffersonian.” Mathews says even
though Jefferson and Madison are often linked by their “great collaboration” in constructing
Jeffersonian Democracy their political theories are “qualitatively different.”87 Madison was “more
market-oriented and more anti-democratic” and “stood closer to Alexander Hamilton than to
Thomas Jefferson.”88 Jefferson asserted man’s natural sociability was grounded in social passions,
not reason. Contrary to Madison, he believed “that all men have a “moral sense” which means
“they can live in tranquility” without the Leviathan.89 Every observation about human nature made
by Madison in The Federalist militates against this point of view. Madison was a liberal
republican, not a Jeffersonian radical. This position is a direct product of his jaundiced view of
human nature. Sheldon Wolin also recognizes the distinct intellectual differences between
Madison and Jefferson when he says “the roots of the divergence between the liberal and the
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radical democratic traditions lie in their contrasting faiths concerning the ability of the human mind
to fathom reality and to translate the results into practical action.”90
Madison was no radical or utopian. He held roughly the same faith and skepticism in human
nature as Hamilton. Hamilton is often seen as a kind of Burkean conservative in his concern from
the preservation of tradition, his admiration for the British system and his belief in a strong central
government with a strong executive.91 This places him at a great distance from Jefferson’s
democratic communitarianism where, under the proper circumstances, men as farmers, could
largely government themselves autonomously.92 Matthews concludes, “Jefferson’s faith in
humanity’s ability to govern itself is what separates” him from the likes of Madison and
Hamilton.93 Their emphasis on the inefficacy of reason and moral sense is exactly why both
Madison and Hamilton, along with Washington, were strong advocates of a powerful national
government to displace the weak Articles of Confederation which had precisely depended too
much on mankind’s allegedly natural sociability.
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4. The Abolition of Man

The urge to save humanity is almost always a false face for the urge to rule it.
-

H.L. Mencken

Power always sincerely, conscientiously, de très bon foi, believes itself right. Power always thinks
it has a great soul and vast views, beyond the comprehension of the weak.1
-

John Adams, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 2, 1816.

In 2010 President Obama gave a speech celebrating the historic passage of his healthcare
reform bill. “Our future,” he said, “is what we make it.”2 A few years later at the 2016 Democratic
National Convention he reiterated this belief saying, “We don’t fear the future – We shape it.”
Taken a face value this language is little more than the sweeping rhetoric one expects to hear on
the campaign trail in any election year. Yet the passage of bills like the 2009 American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) were in line with the
visionary rhetoric; they were transformative works of legislation which appeared to demonstrate
our ability to transform the nation into whatever we choose to make it.
In the broader context of his public speeches and published writings these remarks revealed
President Obama’s underlying political philosophy and a conception of human identity and its
powers. His claims depend on the malleability of man and his society, and the degree of control
human agency has over history and chance. President Obama took a clear stance on the desirability
of transforming the current nature of American government and society. When Obama spoke of
“Hope and Change”, what he cryptically espoused was a vision of human progress. This vision is
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reiterated in his fondness for Martin Luther King Jr.’s assertion that “the arc of the moral universe
is long, but it bends toward justice.” Change can be good or bad, beneficial or harmful. Progress
is change toward a goal; change for the better.
But if we have the power to completely control our fate, human identity would be
contingent on history and subservient to human making. The nature of man and his society would
not be fixed, or in any sense meaningful, accept in regard to the assertions of power by any elite
capable of them. Society would be in a constant state of change and evolution. If human nature is
in no way fixed, it has no identifiable essential or enduring features that must be respected or
celebrated, in need of restrain or desiring fulfillment. We would be unable to indicate a specific
goal as better or worse because human nature provides the only known standard for some goal we
might agree on. If human identity is totally malleable, it would longer provide the standard and
measure for government and the justice it metes out. The goal, even obligation, of government or
a visionary leader would not be to craft justice commensurate to human nature, but to shape man
and his society into their own ideological self-image. Despite this, it would not be clear how change
could be considered good or bad, beneficial or harmful, because the standard of nature by which
this could be evaluated would have been obliterated in the process.
When Hamilton spoke of the establishment of the American Republic on the grounds of
“reflection and choice” over “accident and force” he hardly considered this proposition to mean
absolute control this implies. Rather, the Founding was to an historically unprecedented degree,
the result of the former over the latter. Nor would Hamilton or Madison have thought such total
shaping of society either possible or desirable. They would have called it tyranny. They hardly
denied that numerous accidents, that all actions in society and government would be based on
deliberate making, still less on the things outside of human control and making, would define the
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nature and operation of government and society. One of those “accidents” which shaped the
thought of the Founding was human nature itself. Human nature was given, not a contrivance of
man of History. Following Aristotle, the Founders acknowledged that things like the education or
habituation of human nature represent its extension and perfection, not a deviation or
transformation of its essential characteristics.
Even if we had the ability to radically transform man and his society, would it be either
desirable or just? The Founders numerous remarks illustrate that they believed human nature was
the standard on which their political regime would rest. Justice itself rested on this natural standard.
Government was “the greatest of all reflections on human nature.” The premise of Publius’ new
republicanism was that it was a more natural regime, more in conformity to human nature, than
any that had existed on Earth. It was the regime most in harmony with human nature. It was
precisely for this reason that they rejected the Articles of Confederation. The Articles were not
commensurate with the needs and demands of human nature. These shortcomings manifest in
practical problems evident in the history of the period. The Constitution’s durability and justice is
a reflection of its fidelity to that nature. Good government exhibits the most fidelity to human
nature. Human nature is the standard.
Lurking underneath Obama’s rhetoric of control was a desired “transformation” of
American society and government made possible by political and technological power. On the
2008 campaign trail he said the goal of his administration would be “fundamentally transforming
the United States of America.”3 Throughout his presidency this rhetoric of transformation was
never abandon. Today this mantel continues to be carried by President Biden. The current
President echoed President Obama’s language of twelve years before verbatim, saying that the
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crisis created by the coronavirus is an “incredible opportunity…to fundamentally transform the
country”4 In Obama’s First Inaugural Address he said that in “the midst of a crisis” the “time of
standing pat…and putting off unpleasant decisions” had passed and that through “the quiet force
of progress” it was time to begin “the work of remaking America.”5 He sought to
“transform…schools and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age” in which
the historical “ground has shifted.”6 He asserted there are “some who question the scale of our
ambitions- who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans.”7
As today with COVID-19, an opportunity for transformation was found in the 2008
financial crisis. Despite its depredations, it seemed a new America could emerge, a phoenix from
the ashes. In his Second Inaugural Address President Obama conceded that Americans have “never
relinquished our skepticism of central authority” or “succumbed to the fiction that all society’s ills
can be cured through government alone,” and yet he quickly pivoted to assert just the opposite,
saying “we have always understood that when times change, so must we.”8 Did the Constitution
and its account of human nature which gives rise to “our system” stand in the way of the ambitions
of this new age?
Legislation like the ARRA and the ACA appeared to demonstrate an incipient
transformation of American society through a new and expanded role for government, achieving
a new, more equitable, American society. This transformation would be made possible by the
president’s vision of history and human identity as it applied to the American regime. In his 2017
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Farwell Address President Obama said, “America is exceptional” not because of its Founding
principles but because of its “capacity to change.”9 “Constant change,” he said, “has been
America’s hallmark.”10
American exceptionalism has been traditionally associated with the fortuitous
circumstances of the nation’s birth coupled with its founding principles of natural justice, selfgovernment and the spirit of its people. Many have believed these virtues make the nation a shining
“city on a hill”, a standard of government for the rest of the world. In Federalist No. 1 Hamilton
says that of all the nations on Earth it “seems to have been reserved to the people of this country
to decide…whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government”
on the cornerstone of consent and liberty.11 The mantra of many needed reforms throughout
American history have not been couched in the language of fundamental change, but in a demand
she live up to the “promissory note” of her founding principles.12
In light of his goals and an ideology which suited them, it was not surprising that Senator
Obama announced his candidacy in 2007 by emphasizing that “the genius of our founders is that
they designed a system of government that can be changed.”13 He reminded his audience that they
“should take heart, because we’ve changed the country before.”14 He passionately exhorted them:
“Let us transform this nation.”15 He claimed the very reason he sought office was “to transform a
nation.” Invoking Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, Obama spoke of a “new birth of freedom on
Earth.” Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, preservation of the Union and the subsequent
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Reconstruction Era has often been described as a “Second Founding”.16 Historian Eric Foner has
said these changes were “so profound” that they “should be seen not simply as an alteration of an
existing structure but as a ‘second founding,” a ‘constitutional revolution’”17 Foner goes so far as
to call the transformation brought about by Reconstruction as a “regime change.” 18 The Civil War
was a second revolution. President Obama seemed to be hinting at a third.
What Foner’s calls a “regime change” would be described by many historians and political
scientists as part of the ongoing fulfillment, not transcendence, of the Founding principles.19 This
is certainly how Lincoln framed the Civil War at Gettysburg. It would be a new birth, of old
freedoms. Foner glosses over the fact that the Civil War victory, the elimination of slavery and
Reconstruction amendments were achieved through the assertion of the principles of the
Declaration, and through constitutional prerogatives and principles, all in the name of conserving
the old Constitution and the Union it forged. It is no small irony that it was the Confederacy no
less, that first modified the name of our Constitution with the adjective “old.” The principles of
the Reconstruction amendments can be seen as a reassertion of the Declaration’s freedoms and the
Bill of Rights now extended to all, that the Constitution had failed to fully live up to. The
Declaration holds simply that “all men are created equal.” Lincoln’s second founding was
achieved on the same principles as the first. The golden apple of the Declaration remained, while
the silver frame of the Constitution had its founding flaws polished away. Lincoln’s “new” birth
of freedom, was a revival of the old Founding freedoms.
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The very fact the South felt obliged to secede from the Union and replace the “old”
constitution with a new one speaks to their understanding of the founding principles they rejected.
Garrison’s “pact with the devil” had within itself the mechanisms to remedy itself. This is what
many of the Founders had hoped for all along, however feckless some may have been in failing to
achieve it themselves. Even the former slave and orator Frederick Douglass, departing from
Garrison, eventually came to believe that the Constitution was “a glorious liberty document.”20 He
was therefore in favor of the “strict construction” of its text.21 Foner even concedes that in the
“mid-1850’s, Douglass embraced the view that the federal government possessed the power,
without any change in the Constitution, to abolish slavery throughout the nation.”22 How can this
be a “regime change” as opposed to mere reform?
In recognizing the ingenuity of the Founding most politicians and political scientists tend
to celebrate the continuity and stability endowed on our regime by its founding documents.
Ironically despite its twenty-seven amendments, and the growth of government by statute and the
administrative Leviathan, no amendment has fundamentally transformed the enumerated powers
of its seven articles or the principles on which they are based.
In times of crisis, much of American history has consisted in statesmen reiterating and
reaffirming the principles on which the Constitution is founded not changing them. In his 1852
July Fourth Oration, as the storm of division gathered, Frederick Douglass described the principles
of the Declaration as “the ring-bolt to the chain” of the nation’s destiny which secured it.23 He said
the “principles contained in that instrument” are the “saving principles” of the nation.24 He
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implored the nation to “stand by those principles, be true to them on all occasions, in all places,
against all foes, and at whatever cost.” He implored his audience to “cling to it” because if that
ringbolt were broken, “all is lost.”25
America’s political institutions, despite certain changes foreign to the Framers intent, have
been significantly durable compared to the other leading nations of the world. The U.S.
Constitution is the oldest continuously operational constitution of any major nation in the world
by far. The wisdom and understanding of Founders must account for some of this durability. For
President Obama, it seems the Constitution, as a document of continuity expressing the essential
and fixed nature of the American republic, is instead a mechanism and lever of change.
The former president’s desire to fundamentally transform society is of course not new. He
merely gave new voice to an old Faustian desire as ancient as civilization itself. The economist
and social scientist Friedrich Hayek stated that “one of the dominant ideas which governs thinking
since the end of the Eighteenth century is the idea that we can make everything to our pleasure”
whether the character of the individual or their society.26 In 1603 Francis Bacon sought to clarify
the major forms of human ambition which he believed had shaped history. In his Novum Organum
he states “The first is of those who desire to extend their own power in their native country; which
kind is vulgar and degenerate. The second is of those who labour to extend the power of their
country and its dominion among men. This certainly has more dignity, though not less
covetousness. But if a man endeavour to establish and extend the power and dominion of the
human race over the universe, his ambition (if ambition it can be called) is without doubt a more
wholesome thing and more noble than the other two.”27
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With this statement in mind, it is no surprise Bacon, among others, gave impetus to an
intellectual revolution, through a “reformed natural science” which sought “the dominion of the
human race itself over the universe.”28 Bacon proclaimed that human beings were “not animals on
their hind legs, but mortal gods. God, the creator of the universe and you, gave you souls capable
of understanding the world but not to be satisfied with it alone.”29 As Karl Marx says in his Theses
on Feuerbach, modern science and philosophy are no longer satisfied to interpret the world, their
goal is to change it.
Given his ambitious nature, if mankind had such a power over the universe, what might he
do with it? In his 1930 book The Scientific Outlook Bertrand Russell gives us an insight into the
possibilities. He states that as scientific knowledge, technique and power increase mankind “will
tend more and more to view himself also as a manufacture product, and to minimize the share of
natural growth in the production of human beings. He will come to value only what is deliberately
caused by human agency, not what results from nature’s unaided handiwork. Men will acquire
power to alter themselves, and will inevitably use this power. What they will make of this species
I do not venture to predict.” 30 Nothing in human existence will be an étant donné, nothing will be
given, all will be made. A comparison to the powers of God during the period of Creation is not
hyperbolic, nor should it be overlooked. Such assertions indicate that the most ambitious among
us seek God-like power to make ourselves into any image they so choose. Mostly likely this will
be their own. If such a comprehensive power were developed and deployed we would become
what the historian Yuvel Harari has recently called “Homo Deus”31
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We see Russell explicitly takes up the call to ambition laid out by Francis Bacon. Russell
was a philosopher, mathematician, historian of philosophy, but is not typically credited as a
political philosopher or scientist. John Rawls however takes this Baconian dictum and transplants
it to his theory of justice. In his book A Theory of Justice, Rawls denies the time-honored notion
of desert based on human nature. Desert is a moral notion which holds that rewards or punishments
should be deserved based on an account of justice. His theory holds that the state should establish
its justice only on “what is deliberately caused by human agency, not what results from nature’s
unaided handiwork.” 32 All theories of justice assume good should be rewarded and bad punished.
What matters is the principle or criterion on which rewards and punishments should be meted out.
The traditional notion of desert ignores the underlying cause of your conduct as a relevant
factor of justice. If you act with virtue you are rewarded, if you act basely you are punished. In A
Theory of Justice Rawls denies the traditional notion based on the criteria of given talents and
flaws. Nature creates a “natural lottery” which confers benefits and demerits based factors like
nature and chance not fashioned by man and his institutions. Human conduct is the product of
genes and circumstances outside the control of the individual.33 As such this conduct is the product
of chance and therefore arbitrary.

Rawls believes that since nature and circumstance are

“arbitrary” endowments that they cannot serve as the basis of desert. We do not deserve to be
rewarded or punished based on something over which we have no control, but only something
man-made.34 Rawls asserts that our given faculties and our circumstances, our vices and virtues
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are “arbitrary from a moral point of view” since they are not the product of human making and
agency.35
For Rawls justice and desert must be “rational.” Rational here does not simply mean the
product of reflection, it means a construct established on a “non-arbitrary”, non-natural principles.
If justice is based on a “rational” principle then it can serve as a non-arbitrary standard for desert.
Rawls asserts two principles of justice as “rational”. These “rational” standards are the liberty
principle and the difference principles. In fact, these standards are merely based on the fantasies
and fears of those choosing from an imaginary “original position.” In such a condition none of
life’s necessities and desires are actually operative, they are only imaginary hypotheticals.
Therefore they do not and cannot properly inform Rawls decision making as they do in Hobbes’
and Locke’s account of the entirely plausible and ever-present state of nature.
Rawls logic is as follows: we do not deserve either the talents or demerits nature has given
us, or our fortuitous or unlucky circumstances, therefore we do not deserve either of their fruits.
Rawls says “the fixed points of our moral judgments” is that “no one deserves his place in the
distribution of natural assets any more than he deserves his initial starting place in society.”36
Nature and the natural distribution is arbitrary; therefore it cannot serve as a standard for justice.
Rawls always seems focused on the economic distribution, but the implications for criminal justice
would be astounding. Since our assets, or what Publius would call our natural “faculties”, are
arbitrary, a matter of chance, they are undeserved. Any distribution of goods pegged to these given
natural endowments would then be equally “arbitrary” and undeserved. It would in fact be
fundamentally unjust. Therefore, we have no natural right to either our faculties or their fruits. A
man-made system of justice must be built, not on the standard of nature, but in order to go to war
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with her. Rawls theory of justice is merely the political dimension of man’s “conquest of nature.”
Human nature must be conquered, perhaps abolished, if “justice” is to be served.
Rawls concludes that we must establish “a conception of justice that nullifies the accidents
of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance.”37 This Baconian impulse
desires to have, and to believe it is possible to have, systematic social control over every dimension
of society, big and small. Anything “arbitrary”, that is nature, is to be displaced by human construct
and conscious fashioning just as Russell predicted in the 1930s. Only social conditions that are
“deliberately caused by human agency,” and not the “results from nature’s unaided handiwork”
can be considered “justice.” Nature, in all its forms, turns out to be the fundamental injustice of
human existence. For Rawls the tragedy of Job need only be a children’s fable, never a reality. The
last man has come knocking. Nature “nullified,” is man abolished.
Such a position is fundamentally contrary to Locke and Madison who tells us that the
protection of “the diverse faculties of men” distributed by nature “from which the rights of property
originate…is the first object of government.”38 Despite the depth of their disputes, on this point
Jefferson whole heartedly agreed saying, “To take from one, because it is thought his own industry
and that of his fathers has acquired too much, in order to spare others, who, or whose fathers, have
not exercised equal industry and skill, is to violate arbitrarily the first principle of association, the
guarantee to everyone the free exercise of his industry and the fruits acquired by it.”39 Rawls
redistribution of assets was a fancy way of “wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's
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faces.” Lincoln understood Rawls’ theory of justice perfectly well. He called it slavery. Lincoln
was an advocate of free labor. “I always thought,” he said, “the man that made the corn should eat
the corn.” It is hard to imagine that economic complexities obscure this basic reality, but ever since
Wilson and FDR proposed prototypes of Rawls’ theory, many have attempted to say as much.
Madison and Jefferson saw that a system of justice pegged and responsive to our natural faculties
is the very opposite of arbitrary.
Like others before him, Rawls rejects the standard of nature and human nature. It can play
no role as guide or foundation for society and its conception of justice. In so doing he “repudiates
the conception –accepted from the Old Testament to recent times – that justice consists in giving
people what they deserve: reward for good conduct and punishment for bad.”40 Zuckert writes that
by “negating all given claims which might provide the basis for judging “fairness,” Rawls does
not supply a purer notion of fair exchange but again altogether loses the category of fair exchange
and thus of “justice” itself.41 Zuckert concludes that if “neither ability nor effort, level of need nor
any natural base is a legitimate factor in fair exchange, what we are actually doing is destroying
all criteria of exchange.”42 Rejecting nature as the standard, leaves us with no standard at all. By
creating a man-made foundation his standard is more, not less arbitrary than the natural one. Locke
and Madison thought the givenness and uniformity of human nature was the natural foundation for
the uniformity of the rule of law and the denial of legal classes, which liberated the United States
from a medieval privilege which treated our natural endowments arbitrarily.
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Leo Strauss has meditated on the dire implications of the modern conquest of nature more
than any other thinker. He says the “modern project was originated as required by nature.”43 This
project was meant to satisfy “the most powerful natural needs of men: nature was to be conquered
for the sake of man who himself was supposed to possess a nature, an unchangeable nature.” 44
Strauss continues saying that “after some time it appeared that the conquest of nature requires the
conquest of human nature and hence in the first place the questioning of the unchangeability of
human nature: an unchangeable human nature set absolute limits to progress. Accordingly, the
natural needs of men could no longer direct the conquest of nature; the direction had to come from
reason as distinguished from nature, from the rational Ought as distinguished from the neutral
Is.”45 This is exactly Rawls position broadly stated. But this is a “reason” fundamentally dirempt
from its object, nature. So long as reason is fallible and tinctured with self-love, as Madison says,
it is unable to make either conclusive determinations of the “ought” or ones absent self-interest.
When reason alone inevitably fails to provide an “ought” independent of nature, ambition, love of
power and the assertion of the will substitute for a reason now detached from the standard of
nature.
The words of Francis Bacon were neither intended nor taken as poetry. We are now told
by scientists that we live in the age of the “Anthropocene”. This fact is the result of a history set
in motion by the spirit of Bacon and his confrères. The Anthropocene is an epoch of geological
time dominated by human influence and control over the planet. This age is said to set “a different
trajectory for the Earth system” altogether.46 In 2002 Leon Kass, a medical doctor, professor at
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University of Chicago and member of The President’s Council on Bioethics said that today
“human nature itself lies on the operating table, ready for alteration, for eugenic and neuropsychic
‘enhancement,’ for wholesale redesign. In leading laboratories, academic and industrial, new
creators are confidently amassing their powers and quietly honing their skills, while on the street
their evangelists are zealously prophesying a posthuman future. For anyone who cares about
preserving our humanity, the time has come to pay attention.”47
A society with such awesome scientific powers and the ideology to wield them
indiscriminately would seek to transform society and human nature itself. Mankind would be
remade in the image of those who wield that power. Even in a democratic society, as Kass points
out, this power would only be wielded by the few at the expense of the many.48 In the Republic,
Plato has Thrasymachus says “justice is the interest of the stronger” In our posthuman age will say
“human identity is the image of the stronger.”
The very meaning of such dusty notions as “human nature” would be meretricious and
chimerical. The species would be mere clay in the hands of those who control scientific and
political power. We might ask just how could “a species that is a product of nature, ‘control’ the
very processes of nature from which it has emerged?”49 It seems such total control and refashioning
of our own nature would be something akin to sawing the very branch of the tree of nature on
which we sit. The complete conquest or transformation of human nature in contradistinction to its
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reform, habituation and perfection, is what C. S. Lewis called the “abolition of man.”50 Human
nature transformed, is human nature abolished.
Ironically enough, the Faustian ambition for the power to control the universe or remake
man and his society might well be seen as the primary attribute of a fixed human nature such
aspirations appear to deny. The attempted denial of human nature reveals a timeless motive of the
species. In his Epistles Horace says, “You may drive out nature with a pitchfork, yet still she will
return, and, insensibly victorious, will break through men’s improper disgusts.”51 Hume says: “For
whatever may be the consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would
endow them with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice; this concerns
not the magistrate who aims only at possibilities. He cannot cure every vice by substituting a virtue
in its place. Very often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that case, he ought to prefer
what is least pernicious to society.”52 No amount of moral, technological or biological
transformation will alter the all-too-human motives of ambition, love of power and self-interest.
Augustine held man’s libido dominandi, our “lust for mastery” and “desire to dominate others” is
an inextricable part of our nature. For Augustine, this passion was the root cause of civil society
which “arose out of man’s lust for power and violence.”53 Hamilton identifies our “defect of better
motives” than these as the “original inducements to the establishment of civil power.”54 This
passion “refuses to accept that all men are by nature equal.”55 Rousseau reminds us that only in
civil society do we find masters and slaves. If this passion founded government it is also in need
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of guidance and restraint by government. Cain slew Abel and founded a city. In time Babel and its
tower followed.
The Founders jaundiced view of human nature would have well recognized the
psychological forces at work in such grandiose ambitions. Underlying The Federalist Papers’
defense and explanation of the Constitution is a meditation on the limits of human nature. This
reflection largely focuses on political psychology and an assessment of human motivations. It
paints a portrait of human nature and identifies ambition as perhaps the central psychological
motor with which political order must contend. Ambition can be defined as “a strong desire to do
or to achieve something.”56 In this sense all human beings desire to achieve their goals. The ancient
Greek word for ambition, philotimia, literally means “love of honor”.57 But the truly ambitious
typically have grander aims and greater desire to fulfill them than the ordinary individual. Both
their aim and magnitude of the desire differ. The Federalist treats ambition as akin to an "eager or
inordinate desire for honor or preferment.”58 The ambitious seek not only to achieve goals, but
extraordinary ones which give them public honors from their fellow citizens and posterity.
At its root, ambition is a dramatic form of self-love and a special species of self-interest.
The Federalist identifies the most extreme form of ambition as the desire for “fame”. Fame is the
motive which inspires human beings to achieve monumental goals and be recognized, not only by
the living, but also by posterity. Bacon’s desire to control the universe through powers obtained
by natural science is perhaps the most radical ambition human beings might be capable of
imagining.

56

https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=ambition
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. p. 305.
58
https://www.yourdictionary.com/ambition
57

126

One can use power to gain recognition, and one can be ambitious to gain power simply for
the love of power itself. Thus, power and ambition go hand in hand. What is clear is that ambition
inspires the pursuit and use of power in self-serving ways. The goal of a republican political order
is to harness human nature and its ambition in the service of liberty and order. The authors of The
Federalist well understood that ambition was the double-edged sword of political order. Ambition
was the necessary psychological motor to propel men to seek power through public office and
meet its challenges. But it was also a constant threat inclining men to abuse those powers in order
to dominate others. The authors understood that power needs to be constrained, ambition educated,
by the force of other passions if necessary. This can only happen if human nature is obediently and
prudently recognized and obeyed, not willed out of existence. “Intelligent beings,” writes
Montesquieu, “may have laws of their own making; but they also have some which they never
made.”59

59

Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 41.

127

5. Human Nature in Context

The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records.
They are written with a sun beam in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity
itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.”
-

Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted

Transforming our nation would go hand in hand with the transformation of our
understanding of human nature and vice versa. All The Federalist’s arguments on behalf of the
Constitution are grounded in knowledge and experience of human nature. In his preface to The
Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu that “oracle” to the authors of The Federalist, says “I began by
examining men” and “did not draw my principles from my prejudices but from the nature of
things.”1 From his observations, Montesquieu concluded that “amidst the infinite diversity of laws
and mores, they were not led by their fancies alone.”2 In short men lived in conformity with an
underlying human nature and its laws in relationship to given historical circumstances. Publius’
arguments on behalf of the Constitution are also rooted in an account of a universal human nature
and its laws of motivation and conduct which underlie the kaleidoscopic diversity of time and
place.
Today it is not fashionable to speak of “human nature.” The expression reeks to some of
antiquarianism, of white ethnocentric European men in powdered wigs, knee-high stockings and
shoe buckles discoursing in candle lit drawing rooms, opining from the comfy security of the
armchair. We do not, often cannot, speak of human nature within the human sciences. This, even
as hard sciences like biology and genetics continue to plumb once dimly lit recesses of the species.
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To the contemporary ear such talk is at best quaint or ignorant of the historical use and abuse of
the term. At worst it is downright bigoted, wreaking of the pseudo-science of phrenology, colonial
claims of racial superiority, or the ethnocentric proprietorship of the mantle of civilization itself.
No doubt the word comes with historical baggage like any other. But no one would condemn
modern natural science itself just because, for example, Alexander Stephens believed that the
“physical, philosophical and moral… departments of science” of his day had definitely established
the racial inferiority of the black man.3
Today we ‘know’ there is no such thing as human nature. Instead we speak the language
of “identity”. This distinction of nomenclature is not without significance. While the term “human
nature” suggests all those things human individuals and communities hold in common as a species,
“identity,” ironically enough, speaks to the differences which make us unique and divide us into
factions and tribes. The vast array of individuals and groups seen throughout history and across
the globe, their many habits and ways of life, appear to attest to primacy of difference, and to deny
the very existence of a common human nature. Circumstance reigns. This diversity appears to
illustrate the way exogenous forces, like history and circumstance, completely determine human
identity. We ‘know’ that this diversity is the product of history, language and culture, the artificial
construction and socialization of mankind. There is no human nature, only a human condition
which we can likely alter with enough power as well.
We ‘know’ human nature is radically plural, indefinitely malleable, and nothing more than
a linguistic cudgel to subordinate out-groups. We ‘know’ “human nature” is a mere locution of
power, employed by self-interest to elevate the speaker and exclude others from the status of full
humanity. “Human nature” is reduced to a rhetorical tool in the hands of the powerful, those people
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with a voice. It is politically incorrect to even countenance the idea that there might exist certain
intractable truths or commonalities between human beings across time, space and culture. Perhaps
there exist common challenges of human nature which dictate certain fundamental needs and
problems of political order? This is what the Founders and the authors of The Federalist Papers
wisely took for granted.
Since shortly after the birth of the American Republic there have been numerous challenges
to the Founding. These have included such ideologies as slavery, historicism, pragmatism,
Progressivism and Postmodern Identity politics.4 All of these challengers and their cousin
ideologies subsumed under them reconceive our political, social and economic relationship with
nature, human nature and history. Today’s challengers to the Constitution reject its claims
regarding the proper ends of government because they reject the account of human nature on which
those ends are premised. They also reject it means, limited government with powers arranged and
separated in a manner which causes them to check and balance one another and create dastardly
inefficiencies of power. Constitutional scholar Richard Epstein concludes that the “remorseless
and enormous expansion in government power can only be explained by the systematic repudiation
of the basic principles of limited government which informed the original constitutional
structure.”5 And yet, the principles of limited government ultimately rest on an account of human
nature and its limits.
These fundamental transformations are a direct product of their denial of human nature. In
rejecting both the ends and the means of government as explained by The Federalist these
challengers implicitly or explicitly reject its account of human nature. The principle of limited
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government is built an acknowledgement of human nature’s intrinsic and permanent frailties. Since
men are not angels and governments are made of men you must enable “government to control the
governed” but also to “oblige it to control itself. If the Founders were wrong in their understanding
of human nature these errors would be reflected in own our history. They would give us reason to
change the constitutional order.
Constitutions and constitutional constructions do not spring from a mere process of philosophical
speculations and reasoning. They grow out of conditions, circumstances, events, sympathies,
prevailing interests.
-

Speech by Senator Karl Schurz on the Senate Floor, May 19, 1870

The Founders universalist claims, whether that of Natural Rights or a government
commensurate to human nature itself, were of course made in an historical context with its own
particular demands and interests. In light of inevitable limitations of foresight, the Founders may
well have reached the wrong conclusions about how precisely to mitigate the frailties of human
nature they observed. This ironically would only serve as a confirmation of them. Or, they may
have simply been wrong about the nature of man. They may have erred because the Constitutional
Convention was not a conclave of philosopher-kings at the Sacred Academia Grove. Instead it was
a meeting of politicians representing various interests and factions of post-revolutionary American
society circa 1787. Their purpose was not philosophic knowledge of the whole, but political
compromise in order to obtain practical goals under limiting circumstances. As Madison reminds
us, the Constitution was “the work of many heads and many hands.”6

6

Forrest McDonald. Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution. Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press, 1995. p. 225.

131

McDonald says the “diversity of interests and points of view among the delegates made for
alignments that shifted with circumstances and necessitated repeated compromises.”7 In fact
Publius’ judgment of human nature concludes philosophers would have been no less immune than
statesmen to the ills of self-interest, self-love and the distorting effects of passion on reason. In
No. 85. Hamilton says “I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect men. The result of the
deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of errors and
prejudices, as of good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed.”8 Both
Madison and Hamilton conceded that it is in the very nature of collective bodies that passions and
interest “wrest the sceptre from reason.”9 In No. 55 Madison asserts without irony that “had every
Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”10 It was
not simply a matter of what kind of government could be conceived in the human imagination, but
which was possible in practice and had a sufficient majority consent to it.
But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected, as the philosophical race of kings wished
for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous
advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side.
-

Madison, No. 49

Whatever flaws there may be in the Founder’s extrapolation from human nature to its
ramifications in the nature and arrangement of power, there is overwhelming historical evidence
of the general accuracy of their account in comparison to other modern regimes. Where are the
Communist regimes today hailed by intellectuals of the 1930s as the inevitable future of the planet
in the1930s? If the Founders were correct this should motivate us to understand them. It should
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give us great pause in transforming our form of government in the service of the transient and
emotional causes of the day. In particular the various currents of thought which repudiate the basic
principles of the Constitution have a marked tendency to ignore or reject the Founders wise
observations of human behavior, especially when wielding power.
Since the Founding there have been three major ideological challenges to The Federalist’s
account of human nature. Other challengers can be considered variants of these main three and
subsumed by them. The historical antecedents of these rivals were well known to the Founders,
but fully emerged as threats to the constitutional order only after the Founding. These challengers
remain to this day and retain the ideological core of their progenitors. Some have the explicit
intention of displacing the Founding account of human nature in order to displace the political
structure which it produced. Such a dispute is then not merely academic, but a fight for the soul of
a nation.
These three central challengers to the Founding as understood by The Federalist Papers
are Progressivism, Identity Politics and Transhumanism. All three ideologies or attitudes are
interlinked in a variety of ways and hold in common the central plank of the denial of a relatively
fixed human nature. All are rooted in a novel understanding of the relationship of human being to
time and History. All are beholden to some variety of historicism, the attitude that History, not
nature, is the prime mover of individual and collective human existence. All three conclude that
human identity is not significantly anchored in a fixed nature, therefore man and his society can,
or must under the specter of a categorical imperative, be radically remade in response to time and
history with no loss to human life or happiness, but only great gains. In practice this inevitably
means that man and his political institutions must be remade in the image and aspiration of each
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ideology. Happiness had once been understood as achieved only by a life or political order in
conformity with the dictates of our nature, now it is to be found in its fundamental transformation.11
The first threat to The Federalist’s account of human nature is Progressivism.
Progressivism was the first American political theory with the explicit intent of displacing the
principles of the Founding. If the Founding was to be displaced, an alternative source of political
theory was necessary. Progressivism represents the first foreign-born political theory to shape
American politics and society. Progressivism adopted elements of pragmatism, historicism and
Darwinism, and Marxism translating their philosophic and scientific tenants into political terms.
It was partially built on the first genuinely foreign influences in U.S. politics and political theory.
It imported the latest academic developments of the German University, its theories of history and
the state, and its analysis of modern bureaucratic administration.12
Progressivism was an American variety of Fascism, both established on the foundation of
European Historicism. Historicism is a philosophy that all expressions of human life and thought
are merely and necessarily “children of their times.” Humanity is unable to know the truth nor live
by it and an age or epoch is collectively infused by a ruling opinion or myth. Nature is that which
is fixed and eternal, independent of human artifice. Meanwhile custom connotes variable habits
which are the produce of human artifice, or a contingent response to historical circumstance. This
orientation is derived from the ramifications of Pascal’s conclusion that living by custom and habit
is the very nature of mankind. Pascal, as latter Historicism would do, conflates and confuses nature
and custom. “Custom,” he writes, “is natural to us.”13 He says, “Nature is itself only the first
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custom, just as custom is a second nature.” 14 “Custom is a second nature which destroys the first.”15
When Nature is entirely reduced to only to custom, History supersedes Nature as the ground and
foundation of human existence.
The arch claim of the American republic was that it was considered to have been founded
on the principles of human nature. The inalienable rights of the Declaration of Independence were
considered to be true and correct because in conformity with human nature. These principles
established not only a theory on which government would be based by a form which would
guarantee and secure these rights against government itself. With the development of Historicism,
the question of whether these rights were true, or merely an opinion, was displaced by the claim
that such assertions can be nothing other than opinion. One need no longer argue for their truth or
falsity, but simply claim time has passed. Famed scholar of the Declaration, American historian
Carl Becker argues that “to ask whether the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration of
Independence is true or false is essentially a meaningless question.”16 It is “meaningless” precisely
because Becker’s Historicism collapses the distinction between nature and custom. The distinction
between truth and opinion is replaced by a portrait of history as nothing more than a kaleidoscopic
mélange of essentially arbitrary opinions rooted in historical epochs which deterministically
dictate such worldviews.17 The rights of the Declaration are transformed from a truth claim, to
mere aesthetic self-expression of a bygone era. All claims to truth are reduced to historically
contingent acts of faith.
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Progressivism synthesizes Historicism with Darwinism and gives History a direction and
a goal called “Progress”. The first principle of Progressivism is that human nature is not fixed, but
contingent and progressive. It is in a perpetual process of evolution. Its synthesis of pragmatism
and Darwinism marries the primacy of historical contingency to “a faith in progress.” 18Human
nature is not permanent or cyclical but perpetually develops forward in novel ways. With
Progressivism, human nature is overcome by History. Progressivism historicizes human nature. It
reduces human identity to a condition and subjugates it to circumstance. If human nature is always
evolving then the constitutional edifice is obliged to constantly adapt in parallel to keep pace with
these transformations. This might be considered Progressivism’s very definition of justice.
President Obama’s “Hope and Change” mantra was a taciturn grandchild of Progressivism.
His desire for a visionary “transformation” of the United States is a direct descendent of this
intellectual and political lineage. The great exponent of Progressivism was Woodrow Wilson.
Surprisingly, Wilson did not hide either his contempt for the Declaration and Constitution or its
implications in theory or practice. He said, “We are not bound to adhere to the doctrines held by
the signers of the Declaration of Independence.”19 These attitudes made Wilson “the first president
to attack the founding.”20 Human nature and political order must evolve in tandem if justice is to
be achieved. If human society is constantly evolving we cannot be bound by the principles and
institutions of our forefathers. This would be an injustice. Jefferson says: “I set out on this ground,
which I suppose to be self-evident, 'that the Earth belongs in usufruct to the living:' that the dead
have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any individual ceases to be his
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when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society.”21 Two-Hundred years later Chief Justice
Earl Warren asserted much the same principle when he wrote the nature and complexity of
contemporary circumstances far outstrip the prudence of the Founders.22 Progress makes the 18th
century Constitution a suicide pact because as a child of its times, it could only confine itself to
their needs and concerns rather than those of the present and future. “Progress,” by definition,
meant, progress away from the Founding.
Since historical change, not nature, is fundamental there can be no fixed or true principles
on which government might rest. The value of principles is not to be found in their universality or
truth, but in their efficacy or pragmatic value, the concrete work they do in advancing one’s own
goals and interests. A flippant Wilson said, “If you want to understand the real Declaration of
Independence, do not repeat the preface.”23 The preface is of course where Jefferson articulates
those unalienable rights we are endowed with by our Creator. Universal claims are treated as
abstractions whereas, only motives connected to historical circumstance are considered “concrete”
and therefore real. Wilson added sardonically, that “the Declaration of Independence, so far as I
recollect, did not mention any of the issues of the year 1911.”24 Jürgen Habermas makes much the
same criticism writing a government founded on the basis of Natural Right is “the autonomous
creation by contract, of legal compulsion spring solely from the compulsion of philosophical
reason.”25 Habermas seems to miss the part where Americans chose to live by those dictates of
“philosophical reason,” and, doing so, found them practical and in conformity with their tastes.
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Wilson concluded that the words of the Declaration “lay no compulsion upon the thought
of any free man.”

26

Wilson is here laying the intellectual foundation for the wholesale

abandonment of the principles of the Declaration. Following its letter prevents the living from
satisfying the demands of their day. Wilson was unequivocal. He simply said, “we are as free” as
the Founders “to make and unmake governments. We are not here to worship men or a
document.”27 Instead we come to worship History and the men who guide it. He said that instead
of venerating the principles of our nations birth, “Every Fourth of July should be a time…for
determining afresh what principles and what forms of power we think most likely to effect our
safety and happiness.”28 This logic would hold no less true of the Constitution, or any amendment
or law which are perpetually subject be being transcended by the progress of time. Those who
question the “big plans” of a “new age” or attempt to hold onto time honored truths embodied in
the First and Second amendments are bitter clingers who simply will not let go of childish
illusions.29
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the nature and complexity of contemporary circumstances
far outstrip “the wisdom of even the wisest of the Founding Fathers.”30 A court which interprets
the rights found in the Constitution, for example, “must be an activist court” because they are not
to apply the language and meaning of the text directly, but rather consider its language as pointing
to a more general and abstract “moral theory” that is the basis for the language of the Constitution.
The consequence is the same, the living must be prepared to interpret the Constitution to suit its

26

Woodrow Wilson. “The Author and Signers of the Declaration of Independence.” The North American Review.
Vol.186, No. 622 (Sep., 1907). p. 25.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ed Pilkington. “Obama Angers Midwest Votes with Guns and Religion Remark.” The Guardian. April 14, 2008.
In 2008 President Obama said those who didn’t for progress, “They get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or
antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain
their frustrations.”29 Eight years later these people became Hillary Clinton’s “basket of deplorables”
30
Chief Justice Earl Warren. The Memoirs of Earl Warren. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1977. p. 333.

138

needs, circumstances and ideological preferences under the premise that the wisdom of the
Founders is not, or cannot be, applicable.
The Progressive vision of history demands the Constitution be a “living document.” An
evolving human nature must generate an evolving Constitution. The very meaning of the words of
the Constitution must be no less organic. Their meanings must “evolve” with the evolution man
and his society. The Constitution as a ‘living’ document” keeps up with the times, lest it become
retrograde and trap society in an unjust past.31 As Charles Kessler says that Progressivism
characterizes “What we have called ‘reality’ and ‘human nature’ in the past is a reflection of an
early and inferior stage of development.”32 The practical political consequence of this philosophy,
as Ronald Dworkin acknowledges, is the necessity of an “activist” judiciary33 whose primary
function is to “read its own meanings into the works of the Constitution.”34 “Living political
constitutions,” said Wilson “must be Darwinian in structure and in practice.”35 This is because:
Society is a living organism and must obey the laws of life, not of mechanics; it must develop. All
that progressives ask or desire is permission - in an era when "development," "evolution," is the
scientific word - to interpret the Constitution according to the Darwinian principle; all they ask is
recognition of the fact that a nation is a living thing and not a machine.36

Newton’s mechanical laws of matter and motion are replaced by the organic model of
Darwinian evolution. Wilson said that the trouble with the Newtonian model “is that government
is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the
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theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified by its environment,
necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can
have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is dependent
upon their quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence,
their amicable community of purpose.” 37 Meanwhile, the Constitution was based on a Newtonian
mechanical model of “action and counteraction,” which establishes equilibrium and is a “not meant
to go anywhere, not meant to make progress.”38 The Constitution lives by its “checks” of limited
government and the “offsets” established by the separation of powers. Wilson seems to think this
is exactly how society, as an organism, dies. The governing equilibrium it establishes posed a
fundamental obstacle to organic progress. What were once sentinels protecting rights emanating
from human nature, became obstacles to fulfilling Progressivism’s new conception of ever
evolving entitlements endowed by the state.
Like all things, Progressivism identifies Natural Rights within the progress of History. Cass
Sunstein says, “Rights are a product of wrongs.” 39 This is a precise paraphrase of Wilson’s
understanding of the true meaning and significance of The Declaration. Rights do not come from
nature, but as a response to specific historical injustices rectified. This model is explicitly derived
from conceptions of the development of the British Constitution and its Bill of Rights, contingent
freedoms wrested from the King over time. Thus, rights have no enduring significance beyond the
specific wrongs they sought to ameliorate in a specific time and place. In particular, says Sunstein,
rights emerge from times of historical crisis which serve to heighten people’s “appreciation of
human vulnerability” and “insecurity.40 This is precisely why Wilson elided the preface to the
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Declaration and sought refuge in the list of grievances against the king which is what really
justified the revolt. Progressivism comes to realize that rights the state did not guarantee in
response to history’s depredations necessitate new guardrails, new rights for the people, often ones
which contradict the old. Thus the threat posed by two World Wars, the Spanish Flu and the Great
Depression demanded the new or Second Bill of Rights proposed by FDR.41 This second or
Economic Bill of Rights such that citizen were no longer guaranteed the negative liberties of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but are now entitled to a “freedom from want” and even
“freedom from fear.”42 Now we can see, that the proper response to historical crisis demands a
Great Reset in response to COVID-19 and new “rights” were national sovereignty will be
abolished, and man will own nothing and be happy.43
The second principle of Progressivism is that the political community is not only an
evolving, but a unitary collective. The political community, as a “living organism, is not made of
individuals of a “separate and equal station”, as The Federalist describes them. The Progressive
description harkens to the tribe and family as the true model of political association. Naturally the
familial model of Progressivism tends toward paternalism. The paternal role is played by the State.
In his aptly titled book, Social Control, Progressive sociologist Edward Ross says that as the State
evolves it “becomes paternal and develops on the administrative side.”44 Political association, says
Wilson, is one based on blood and soil, rather than individuals living by commonly understood
and agreed upon ideals. Here Wilson rejects the wisdom Aristotle, Augustine, Hobbes, Locke and
the Founders accepted about the fundamental nature of political association as one which
transcends the family.
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Society is not an aggregate of “separate and equal” individuals engaging in consensual
associations, but an organism where the individual is only a derivative appendage. The human
individual is treated as a mere “fraction” of the whole, rather than a discrete “integer.” 45 The whole
can exist without one individual fragment, but the part cannot exist without dependency on the
whole. The well-being of the individual is completely dependent on and subordinate to the larger
organism. The organic State precedes the individual politically, morally, legally and economically.
Progressivism sees the individual as a cell of a larger organism on which they depend politically
and legally for both their rights and welfare. Rights are now a product of political community and
dependent on the wishes of the rulers.
This model precisely inverts the relation of the individual to government and its ends
spelled out by the Declaration and Constitution. The State is no longer “instituted among men” to
secure pre-existing Natural. Instead it exists to divine and execute the “democratic” majority will,
filtered by way of political parties as the head of the larger organism. Its task is to execute this will
as efficiently as possible through a technocratic regulatory bureaucracy. Through this process the
State is the ultimate arbiter of the nature and scope of its citizens rights. Human beings only have
rights in so far as they are members of the organism. Rights are endowed by the State, not a product
of human nature. This makes the State the ultimate source of power and authority on Earth. That
which can be given by the State, can be taken away.
Wilson and Progressives made clear that the “will of the people” was manifest by the State.
Nor was the State genuinely representative of the will of the majority, rather it would “manufacture
consent” and execute the very opinions it engineered. Progressive Edward Ross was quite clear on
this point: “The State is an organization that puts the wise minority in the saddle” and “aims more
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steadily at a rational safeguarding of the collective welfare than any organ society has yet
employed.” 46 Yet, the more power is asserted by the “wise minority,” the more they speak of “the
people” and the sanctity of “democracy.”
Ross writes that the State is an “independent center of social power” and control which “guide[s]
the society it professes to obey.” 47 The State channels the energies of the people, leading them to
pre-ordained opinions social engineers have already mapped out. This is nothing short of a
repudiation of the “wholly popular” constitutional republic structured by genuinely representative
institutions and a separation of powers and checks and balances designed to limit “State” power
over the people in order to protect their unalienable Natural Rights.
Progress implies that History has a definite and concrete direction and goal. Without
direction toward a goal, progress is mere change. Change can be for better or worse and progress
implies change for the better. The evolutionary model of Progressivism appears to admit a natural
telos toward which the State labors on behalf of society. This is a political goal beyond the static
ordered liberty aspired to by the Constitution and The Founders. There must be some preestablished positive, not merely negative, goals of political community. Happiness is to be defined
and provided by the State as it refines the opinion of the organism through its party structure and
the propagandistic shaping of public opinion.
On this Darwinian model Progressivism sought to develop a new social and political
science which departs from and displaces the political science of the Founders. This newer science
of politics would identify and implement policies designed to promote the great goal toward which
society would progress. Yet, this goal is left unnamed or vague by Progressivism, perhaps
intentionally. One cannot actually know what it is until one has met the novel circumstances of the
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future. The people are likely to find out after the fact, what the “wise minority” had in store for
them.
The goal of Progressivism is a cypher. Since human identity has no core and is in constant
flux, this grand telos is forever elusive. Kessler says, “Obama never discovered that this quandary
could be resolved by returning from history to nature as the unchanging ground of our changing
experience, as the foundation of morality and politics.”48 This is why for example, Obama spoke
of “change” and left his goals unspecified, like a picture screen on which admirers could project
their hopes and dreams. In practical terms however, as history shows, the State will, in name of
the people, seize on and define this ‘final’ goal as it sees fit in order to advance its own parochial
political interests. Meanwhile the “fourth branch of government”, an administrative state peopled
by wise technocrats will execute the plan. Here science of government administration would
devise, implement and minister to a new “non-political” administrative state that would engineer
the final goal into existence through “intentional”, “organized”49 and “deliberate social planning
and foresight.”50
The lynchpin of the newer science was that politics had to be replaced by the efficient and
knowledgeable administration of specialists. Politics as the play and struggle over opinions of the
good would be replaced by the expertise of those who know. This science would train men to
divine and “know” the good itself. Deliberate planning can only be achieved through the
abandonment of politics and its inefficiencies as it has been known since the Greeks. One cannot
advance toward the goal if government is in gridlock or constantly debating with itself over the
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means and end of its actions. The age of political deliberation, in any serious sense, must cease
and give way to the age of total social administration and engineering. This was progress.
The age of the expert had arrived. Politics would be reconceived as administration.
Administration meant technocratic management by experts.51 The techne of the expert could
replace the rhetoric and psychology of the orator. If so politics, as the realm of opinion and
persuasion, can then be “replaced by administration, by bureaucratic management of the society
and economy.”52 Frank Goodnow, professor and ideologist of Progressivism and the
Administrative State, and Wilson, believed administrators, in contradistinction to politicians were
“neutral,” technical experts whose goal was “the pursuit of truth.”53 “Politics”, says Goodnow is
“‘polluted’ and full of ‘bias,’ whereas administration is all about the ‘truth’.”54 Government does
not rest on opinion, and politics is no longer a factional struggle over opinions of what is right.
Instead, specialists in an unelected administrative bureaucracy manage society based on technical
knowledge and direction given to it by the State.
From the perspective of Progressivism, the constraints of limited government which place
restraining checks on the concentration of power and its corrupting effects are roadblocks to good
government, not the guarantees of it. They inhibit the fulfillment of the democratic will and the
deliberately planned transformation of society. Such outmoded mechanisms as federalism and
separation of powers disrupt the efficiency consolidated power makes possible. Even the political
choices of the people at election time are undercut by the existence of a permanent unelected and
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faceless administrative bureaucracy. In a democracy, faceless power, is power unaccountable.
Limited government inhibits the ability of the State to perfect man and his society.
The concentration of power would no longer be called tyranny, but progress. This new
power would work in the service of the people and the organism at large. The solution to achieving
greater efficiency was to have the administrate state surreptitiously take on the functions of all
three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. Pestritto says that while “the agencies
comprising the bureaucracy reside within the executive branch…their powers…include both
legislative and judicial functions,” and are “often exercised in a manner that is largely
independent” of any political control.55 The administrative state becomes the judge, jury and
executioner of interests it regulates without any check that would guarantee either uniform policy
or application. The Founders’ fear of tyranny produced by such a concentration of several powers
in the same hands is the worry of a bygone age transcended. The age-old warnings against the
perennial problems of judging in one’s own case become the political version of Aesop’s fables
for the young and naïve, or the Golden Oldies of a generation in its twilight.
The second threat comes from Identity Politics. Identity Politics is an ideology which
denies the existence of a common human nature and the meaningful efficacy of an end-determining
reason. Identity Politics is based on a more virulent, radical, or non-teleological historicism often
associated with Postmodernism. It has its roots in German historicism, and the marriage of
Marxism and Existentialism and their subsequent use in the assertion of minority and postcolonial
identities. Heidegger, Sartre, Simon de Beauvoir and Franz Fanon were some of the godfathers,
fathers and mothers of this movement, providing the thrust of its intellectual foundation.
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Intellectually, the politics of identity abandons history as goal oriented in favor of a purely
relativistic conception between human identity and morality and time. Unlike Progressivism, it
honestly acknowledges that goals are not the product of a grand historical eschaton, but are set by
particular factions and oriented to their particular ends. Black Power is for blacks, and so on.
Unmoored from either a fixed human nature or common historical destiny, identity is either a pure
product of the will, or a prisoner to genes and historical circumstance. Here we see the
commonality between these two ideologies. Since Progressivism cannot openly identify its
historical goal, the telos is merely left to the will and the power of various interest groups.
Human nature implies all that we hold in common with our fellow human beings, including
the existence of norms derived from this common nature. Identity Politics is determined to view
humanity from the perspective difference over identity. There is no common human nature that
binds us together with a common moral worth and dignity, common aspirations, faculties and
needs, as well as weaknesses. Rather there are only tribalistic warring factions of race, gender,
class, and other identifications engaged in a zero-sum competition, red in tooth and claw. These
groups, often under the guise of universalizing ideologies, are all really simply advancing their
own faction’s interests through the logic of might makes right.
Identity Politics self-consciously abandons the universalism of the American Founding. It
correctly identifies the hypocrisies of the Founding and its failings to establish a society where “all
men are created equal”56 meant all human beings, as the Founders themselves asserted.57 Identity
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Politics has quite reasonably sought to gain political, civil and moral recognition for historically
marginalized groups. Where once the civil rights movement sought refuge in a common humanity,
as with Dr. King, they have sought to assert elements of identity which distinguished them as
“Other.” For each member of a specified faction their identity is confined to an essentializing
stereotype from within as well as without.
Often it is the means of Identity Politics and their implications of them which condemns it
to reinscribe the injustices they seek to ameliorate. Like Progressivism, there are no natural
principles which impose guardrails on this form of popular will. What matters is the forcefulness
with which this will is asserted. Right does not make might as Lincoln would say, but might makes
right. Those who embrace Identity Politics speak the same language of Thrasymachus, Alexander
Stephens and Stephen Douglas.58 Stokely Carmichael makes this all too clear in his “Black Power”
speech of 1966. He says that the only thing that matters in society is “Who has power to make his
or her acts legitimate? That is all.”59 Society is a war of every identity against every other identity
where the law of the jungle is the only one really recognized. Moral principles are mere
rationalizations of force, that is all. The logic of Stokely Carmichael is also the logic of Stephen
Douglass and Alexander Stephens. One form of racism replaces another, one sexism with another.
If the logic of Identity Politics morally justifies “Black Power,” it also justifies the assertion of
“White Supremacy.”
Identity means only particular politically preferred facets of human identity are privileged.
Identification with a racial or ethnic minority, a sex, gender or sexual orientation becomes the new
class consciousness. Such identity consciousness has become the new bigotry and racism. Identity
political claims to liberate victim groups from the tragedies of the past, but it only gives you this
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helping hand up if you subscribe to their version of who you are. Carmichael makes clear that
blacks “must wield the power we have”, not as human individual, but as members of the black
identity.60 Much like Progressivism, the power, rights, dignity and identity of the individual only
come from membership in the group. Abandon the dominate ideological voice of your racial or
sexual faction and you lose the privileges of your identity. Blacks become “white” in doing so as
a current gubernatorial candidate in California has discovered.
Democrat representative Ayanna Pressley made this perfectly clear. She said that if a
minority is going to come to politics and public life that, “If you’re not prepared to come to that
table and represent that voice, don’t come.” Why? U.S. Representative made no bones about what
Identity Politics is and how it helps minorities. She said, “We don’t need black faces that don't
want to be a black voice. We don't need Muslims that don’t want to be a Muslim voice. We don’t
need queers that don't want to be a queer voice. If you’re worried about being marginalized and
stereotyped, please don't even show up because we need you to represent that voice.”61 Blacks only
have “black” lives, voices and thoughts. We have returned to the essentializing features that
Identity Politics claims to liberate groups from. This creates a categorical imperative, not only do
blacks have black voices, they must have black voices, or they are not truly black. If you do not
conform to the establishment vision of your identity, you are no less disenfranchised than under
the old bigotry. A Democrat nominee for president put it more bluntly, if you don’t vote for me,
then “you ain’t black.”
The conflict between politics based on difference in contradistinction to commonality calls
to mind a proud black man and former slave, Frederick Douglass. Douglass had once despised
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President Lincoln because he was “preeminently the white man’s President, entirely devoted to
the welfare of white men.”62 Douglass referred to him pointedly as merely a “white man” who,
however great, “shared the prejudices of his white fellow-countryman against the Negro.”63 This
attituded changed twenty years later in his 1893 autobiography the Life and Times of Frederick
Douglass. Douglass’ attitude began its transformation when he met Lincoln in the White House.
This chapter in his autobiography is aptly titled “The Black Man at the White House.”
He prefaces his account of the meeting by saying: “The distance then between the black
man and the white American citizen was immeasurable. I was an ex-slave, identified with a
despised race, and yet I was to meet the most exalted person in this great republic…I could not
know what kind of reception would be accorded me. I might be told to go home and mind my
business.”64 Go home and mind your own business, is precisely what Rep. Pressley has told the
uppity segment of her black constituency.
Despite the immeasurable distance between the black and white man, and their
disagreement over policy pertaining to black soldiers, Douglass said of Lincoln that he could still
“respect his humane spirit.”65 A spirit they held in common as human beings with human feeling
toward their fellow man precisely because of the recognition of their underlying common nature.
Douglass says that while he “was not entirely satisfied with his views” he was “so well satisfied
with the man and with the educating tendency of the conflict.”66 What Douglass discovered, despite
the vast gulf between their superficial identities was that he was in “the presence of an honest man
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– one whom I could love, honor, and trust without reserve or doubt.”67 Thus he was in the room
with a being identical to himself in the decisive respects despite their superficial differences.
In another White House meeting Lincoln bade Governor Buckingham to wait because he
wanted “to have a long talk with my friend Frederick Douglass.” 68 Douglass observes: “This was
probably the first time in the history of this Republic when its chief magistrate had found an
occasion or shown a disposition to exercise such an act of impartiality between persons so widely
different in their positions and supposed claims upon his attention.” 69 He continues writing that
“In his company I was never in any way reminded of my humble origin, or of my unpopular
color.”70 In short, Lincoln treated Douglass not as black man or a former slave, but as a man simply,
a human being with a common nature and equal dignity. Abolitionists and former slaves like
Douglass sought to have the black man’s universal and equal manhood recognized as no different
than the white man. They did not seek to be put in the “separate but equal” ghetto of black Identity
Politics. Rep. Pressley seems determined to put them all back in the intellectual chains of a new
plantation and call it “freedom.”
The consequence of the emphasis on difference over identity is that such norms of conduct
on which law is built are obliterated in favor of civil and legal ghettos tailored to the special
minority identities which divide us. This is a kind of new feudalism. The political consequence of
the denial of a common humanity is to undermine the notion of the rule of law and its equal
application founded on the natural moral equality of all human beings and their natural rights. In
the vacuum of the absence of natural moral equality emerges a tribalistic creation of legal
privileges based on identities one is born into and has no control over.
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Legal theories like Critical Race Theory (CRT) seek to institutionalize race in law. While
focus on the plight of blacks in America this ideology can, and is being redeployed for numerous
other victim groups. CRT is a branch of legal scholarship, derived from elements of Marxism,
which places race and racism as the prime mover of law and the administration of justice in the
United States. It also challenges the validity more fundamental philosophical tenants such
rationality, objective truth, and possibility of judicial neutrality.71 CRT takes the economic class
consciousness of Marx and repurposes to race. Thus race becomes the deterministic prime mover
of all conflict in society. Through the racial lens of CRT all individuals are reduced to than their
skin color in a manner consistent with that which they claim to fight against. It promotes the
divisive, destructive and false theory of systemic racism, where white supremacy is no longer a
fringe and irreputable phenomenon, but the essence of the American regime since its founding.
This means the Constitutions, all the laws, the capitalist economic system and all of society is a
systematic and institutionalized expression of white supremacy.
Derrick Bell sums up this condition saying that “traditions of racial subordination are
deeper than the legal sanctions."72 This implies no amount historical effort, civil rights reform, or
affirmative action can remedy the original sin of racism permanently etched into the American
ethos. Additionally, the amelioration of discrimination can never be a sufficient solution to such a
systemic and deeply rooted problem. Ultimately, only regime change, and the historical
transformation of the nation will liberate blacks from historical oppression. No amount of reform
is possible because of the intrinsic nature of the disease. Any thought contrary to its claims is
merely evidence of unconscious racism or a false consciousness promoted by the indoctrination of
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a white ruling class. Any appearance of progress toward equality is in fact an illusion born of the
system which actually facilitates ongoing oppression. “Progress in American race relations,” says
Bell, “is largely a mirage, obscuring the fact that whites continue, consciously or unconsciously to
do all in their power to ensure their dominion and maintain control.”73
CRT denies that any social or political institution is capable of serving as a neutral third
party in adjudicating justice. All is power, will and interest, despite the existence of institutions
designed to check such tendencies. This ideology self-segregates blacks onto an intellectual
plantation which says that so long as the nation operates under a republican constitution produced
by white men of European ancestry, they will remain a permanent victim class. Such victim
ideology is guaranteed to be self-fulfilling and even likely to conceal problems in need of honest
talk as much as redress.
Such theories are now a common place of the laws schools of Harvard and Yale
universities, along with gaining increasing influence in grade school education throughout the
country. Despite the challenges of achieving a color-blind society, the solution is surely not to
make such differences the foundation of law. Furthermore, the exaggerated and pernicious
interpretations of American history and its justice system are quite simply specious. These
specious claims do little than keep blacks ignorant about the complete history of the United States.
Such a strategy was employed effectively on plantations and can be read about in slave narratives.
Even the supposed arch-liberal and universalist John Rawls, the one-time standard bearer
of liberalism, acknowledged that “social institutions” would have to constantly intervene in society
in order to rectify the outcomes of the “disadvantaged”. Rather than producing a level playing field
where the rules were constant and known in advance, they would be constantly shifting and
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unanticipated by society’s actors. He has long been criticized for focusing on economic classes
and not explicitly mentioning matters of race and gender, but his framework can easily be adapted
to take them into account.74 As Justice Sotomayor put it, “I would hope that a wise Latina woman
with the richness of her experiences would, more often than not reach a better conclusion.”75 What
Justice Sotomayor seemed to be asserting was not the superiority of Latina judges, but rather that
they are the only ones capable to establish justice for Hispanic minorities because of sympathies
which arise from a common factional identity and historical circumstance. As if all Latinas have
the same nature and life circumstances. Legal prudence becomes a matter of identity, of empathy
and group identification rather than the equal application of law to facts based on precedent. From
this perspective, what was considered a radical achievement of the Constitution, the denial of legal
orders of rank in society, is now rejected and replaced by a series of minority factions in need of
special redress through a system of arbitrary judicial fiats.
For over fifty years the typical categories of identity have been race, gender and class and
sexual orientation. Once this logic is accepted the potential categories of identity are limitless
depending on the tenor of the times. These divisions are reinforced through government asking
identity information. In some cases, these identities are the creation of such categories through
their inclusion on government forms like the Census. Such documents include an incommensurate
set of rubrics, from race and national origin, to cultural heritage and skin color. Despite all the
concern for the protection of victim groups, the government still gets to determine who you are
under this ideology. Many politicians now want to include sexual orientation and gender identity,
as if these categories are the defining features of the people they apply to. For example the
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proposed The Census Equality Act would expand identity categories to include “questions to the
Census asking respondents about their sexual orientation and gender identity.”76
This emphasis on difference over common identity establishes an ethos in society that each
group should be a special interest entitled, not only to their own moral codes and systems of belief,
but their own legal codes. The way in which political campaigns and polls demographically ‘slice
and dice’ the electorate appears to filter into the legal system. For example if we are to truly respect
new immigrants when they come to the United States perhaps we are obliged to recognize the laws
they have brought in tow from foreign lands. Perhaps law and legal precedent should be based on
foreign examples from all over the world, rather than from within our own legal traditions and
philosophies. Here the rule of law would be replaced by a never-ending system of arbitrary legal
fiats adjudicated on the basis of group identification. Groups should not be subject uniformly to
the law, but have standards tailored to their own particular identity. Great Britain for example
permits Muslim communities to enforce Sharia law even if those laws are contrary to the laws of
the land. In 2018 a British court recognized “sharia law in landmark divorce case.”77
Identity groups would be treated legally in the same manner politicians tailor their political
rhetoric depending on who they believe they are talking to. The legal ghettoization of society
would dissolve the very ties that bind. These are the ties by which we recognize our common
citizenship in a single political community. One of the fundamental observations of all political
philosophers and scientists is that the nature and existence of political community is predicated on
legislating a common set of laws recognized by all from a single sovereign authority. If there is no
common acceptance of a single and uniform political authority as manifest through law, there is
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no political authority. If there is no genuine political authority, there is no political community to
speak of.
The third threat to the constitutional order described by The Federalist is Transhumanism,
also known as post-Humanism. This is an ideological movement which promotes the modification
of our psychological, physical and biological nature by means of scientific advancements in such
fields as genetics and computer technology. The Scientific Revolution, under its founding fathers
Bacon and Descartes, saw scientific knowledge about nature as a tool that could be used leveraged
to control nature in the service of the human will and the practical needs of mankind. Descartes
said “[t]he conquest of nature is to be achieved through number and measure.” We would establish
dominion over nature and thereby gain dominion over our own destiny as a species. The goal was
“the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate.” Transhumanism advocates the usurpation
of the role of nature in order to transform the species by means of its own hands. The conquest of
nature, which heretofore was content to control external factors and merely optimize our natural
capacities, now seeks to transform them limited only by our power and imagination with no
acknowledgement of limit but the will. At base, this is an ideology of the assertion of power as a
means to transform nature and human nature at the behest of those who have it, obviously in service
to their ends. This movement is particularly dangerous in light of the way it piggybacks on our
natural awe toward novel technologies, and our disposition as moderns, which accepts all
technological developments as routine and their role in society as inevitable. Transhumanism is
merely the latest iteration of the Scientific Revolution’s Faustian ambition to conquer nature in the
service of the human will and its passions. Now this conquest is extended over human nature itself.
Transhumanism’s desire to artificially control our physical development is a product of an
impulse which emerged in Progressivism. Progressivism had been inspired by a certain
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characterization of evolution where the species was under constant modification. Many
Progressives believed that this process which occurred spontaneously, must in the name of
Progress, be placed under the yoke of human choice, reason and science, under the
“administration” of technocrats in order to bring about superior form of society that could never
have been conceived of in the Founding era.
Transhumanism is the fulfillment of Russell’s prophetic words about advancements of
scientific knowledge and technology advance. He envisions a not too distance future in which
mankind “will tend more and more to view himself also as a manufacture product, and to minimize
the share of natural growth in the production of human beings.” 78 He writes that, “He will come
to value only what is deliberately caused by human agency, not what results from nature’s unaided
handiwork. Men will acquire power to alter themselves, and will inevitably use this power. What
they will make of this species I do not venture to predict.” 79 Leo Strauss acknowledged over a
half-century ago that at some point the modern conquest of nature appeared to require “the
conquest of human nature” and “the questioning of the unchangeability of human nature.”80
The impetus to change human nature psychologically and physically is as old as human
civilization. Modern science has amplified this taste as new insights into nature are discovered
along with the technological means which enhance our power to change it. Power breeds
opportunity, motive must be assumed. Mass and social media, medical research institutes,
universities, corporations, intelligence services and the defense industry in concert with other
research institutions have long been exploring and experimenting on altering or enhancing human
capacities or seeking new ways to control and modify human behavior. In 1971 Leon Kass wrote
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that “human nature itself lies on the operating table, ready for alteration, for eugenic and
neuropsychic ‘enhancement,’ for wholesale redesign. In leading laboratories, academic and
industrial, new creators are confidently amassing their powers and quietly honing their skills,
while on the street their evangelists are zealously prophesying a posthuman future. For anyone
who cares about preserving our humanity, the time has come to pay attention.”81
These technologies hold out the prospect of mankind fundamentally altering its own nature.
Given that this type of research and development requires massive funds it holds out the possibility
of government and large corporations actually claiming intellectual property over human identity
in the way a Monsanto holds intellectual property over its seeds. Furthermore, the expense of such
procedures, now a palpable reality, will make them only accessible to the ultra-wealthy who could
in theory establish an entirely distinct race between themselves and the many. Furthermore, these
technologies could be easily imposed on the populace at large in the name of matters of the “publicinterest”, “public health” or “national security” or the threat of “terrorism,” foreign or domestic.
What if claims of national security demanded a tracking chip in each human being or public health
a permanent regime of compulsory vaccines or certain genetic modifications? What if the
economic system demanded a subcutaneous chip as a form of electronic currency if one wanted to
participate in the economy at all? What if, in the name of public education, students were
compelled to have genetic modifications? What if in the name of the government of healthcare
cost reductions certain bodily modification were demanded? What if like vaccinations one could
be restricted from all kinds of institutions and opportunities if one did not accept these
modifications?
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Meanwhile a former member of the Yale University department of physiology is recorded
in the U.S. Congressional Record of 1972 on the topic of human freedom and the individual
liberties protected by our Founding documents. He said: “This kind of liberal orientation has great
appeal, but unfortunately its assumptions are not supported by neurophysiological and
psychological studies of intracerebral mechanisms."82 “We need a program of psychosurgery for
political control of our society. The purpose is physical control of the mind. Everyone who deviates
from the given norm can be surgically mutilated. The individual may think that the most important
reality is his own existence, but this is only his person view. This lacks historical perspective. Man
does not have the right to develop his own mind. This kind of liberal orientation has great appeal.
We must electrically control the brain. Someday armies and general will be controlled by electric
stimulation of the brain.”83
These modifications are not the stuff of the future, they have already long existed and are
merely being perfected as we speak. At least as early as 1999, DARPA was intent on the strategic
development of what they called “military transhumanism.”84 “Cyborgs” or “biohybrids” represent
the merger of man-made technology with living organisms including human beings. These
technical possibilities are no longer the stuff of science fiction but science fact. Through
modifications to the body and brain the Department of Defense is developing a human “supersoldier”.85 One primary ambition is the enhancement of human mental capacity, what they call
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“Augmented Cognition” or AugCog.86 By inserting electrodes directly into the brain or nervous
system, they have already succeeded in making rats and moths enabled to be steered remotely by
human beings with computer controls.87 Professor Yuvel Harari has recently said man is on the
way to become a “hackable human,” achieved through inserted computer chips and
nanotechnology which would create permanent connectivity of any human being by means of the
internet.88 We now live in a world of “smart” technology, that no longer is merely interested in an
“internet of things” but in an “internet of bodies” where all human beings could be permanently
connected to the internet, controlled and surveilled.89 How can privacy and freedom survive in
such a world?
This agenda is merely the continuation of pushing the limits of the changeability and
“perfectibility” of human species long practiced by regimes throughout history in a more
technologically sophisticated and invasive manner. But never has the human species had so much
knowledge and so much power to achieve these transformations. It is now claimed that we are
reaching an unprecedented historical moment in time of “technological singularity.” Technological
is a hypothetical point in time where technological development becomes uncontrollable and
irreversible, resulting in fundamental changes to human civilization. It is described as an event that
“will radically change human civilization, and perhaps even human nature itself, before the middle
of the 21st century.”90
These technologies are the H-bomb of our day. Rarely are their moral and political
implications adequately contemplated. The only boundaries to the exploration of these
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transformations are moral and ethical. Such goals would easily have far-reaching and unforeseen
political consequences especially when we consider who would likely wield and access such
technology, and who it might be used upon. The many would no doubt be at the mercy of a very
few. Once technology exists, history shows us that it is used one way or another. What if the total
annihilation of suffering, not merely its reduction and amelioration, became the end of a given
regime? At what cost does this goal come given the faulty implicit belief that such goals entail no
trade-offs? What if the rights of the individual stood in the way of this annihilation? What are we
to make of a human nature that can be remade on the basis of nothing more than mere will and
whim? Kass essentially asks, “At what price comes the relief of our estate?” What political brave
new world would we live under?
All three ideologies have one central feature in common: they replace Nature with History.
They see history as a record of change which demonstrates only diversity while denying
underlying commonalities. They see history as a “past” to be transcended rather than a reservoir
of knowledge usable to the present which reveals the same nature under different circumstances.
History appears to demonstrate that all is permitted because it is only bound by physical, not moral,
laws. It tells you what human beings can do, but less clearly what they should do, especially if
history has no goal or direction to guides it. History understood this way cannot, by itself, serve as
guide to human action unless it is approached under the assumption that a common nature is its
source. The Founders, by contrast, saw in history, a unity, where general truths about human nature
could be discovered. For Publius history was simply a record of human action which depicted the
diversity, possibilities and limits of human nature. History as a record of the past, merely records
the futility and limits of the human will in the face of larger natural forces which define it. The
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more they became acquainted with the past, the more they saw a common nature with common
motivations unfolding in unique circumstances.
While each challenger exhibits an “historical sense,” this sense manifests in two forms.
Progressivism and Marxism for example, own their debt to Hegel who propounded an account of
the rational development of history progressing toward a final eschaton or end state. There is a
chain of historical continuity from Europe to the United States which entrenched this line of
thought by the last decade of the 19th century. This thinking, fueled by the historical sense, begins
with Hegel and Darwin and proceeds to the pragmatism of Charles Pierce and William James and
is carried forth in the thought Woodrow Wilson and John Dewey, a student of James. Professor
Frank Goodnow became the academic and ideologist of Progressivism within and without the
university. These ideas were put into practice by Woodrow Wilson, a man deeply influence by the
German university and its cutting-edge thought. The pragmatism of progressive historicism was
coupled with an American optimism about the future and a sense of philanthropy to its fellow man
which concealed the darker and more radical implications of this political theory moored to time
and change and untethered from the ringbolt of nature.
Meanwhile Postmodern historicism traced to Rousseau and Nietzsche merely drew the
more radical and darker implications of the historical sense. Radical historicism denies a coherent
or rational direction to History. All is aleatory change in which human identity is either entirely
subject to circumstance, or the arbitrary product of assertions of the human will. And yet this view
claims that there can be no true knowledge of the nature or human nature, and that only the human
will ostensibly drives the historical process. “There are no facts, only interpretations.”91 The first
two challengers reconceive the relationship between human identity and time. As history changes,
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human nature changes with it. Human being has no independent integrity or reasonable autonomy
from circumstance. Nor is knowledge of human nature free from the situatedness of its zeitgeist.
Human nature becomes a product of History and completely situated knowledge cannot be
knowledge of nature. “Nature” becomes a word. The concept it signifies is a child of the changing
times, a more or less unconscious reflection of its prejudices.
The Founders were sufficiently conversant with incipient versions of these later theories.
The thought of Rousseau, Turgot, Condorcet and Thomas Jefferson foreshadowed 19th and 20th
century visions of the utopian perfection of mankind and the elimination of the human depravity
and self-interestedness on which the U.S. Constitution is based. While Madison and Hamilton did
not confront theories of progressive historical development along the lines of a Hegel or Marx, the
broad outlines of a theory of linear historical development had been established by Enlightenment
philosophers.
In his famous letter to Madison penned September 6, 1789, Jefferson “speculated that
constitutions were legitimate for only one generation, because each generation should be free to
create its own political system and laws without the prejudice of past generations.”92 Jefferson says:
“I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self-evident, that the Earth belongs in usufruct to
the living: that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any
individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society.”93 He concluded
that each generation needed to have its own constitutional convention. But by envisioning human
nature as sufficiently fixed from one generation to the next, Publius and the other Founders had
flatly, if implicitly, rejected such an alternative.
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Rousseau and the Radical Enlightenment had asserted ideas such as progressivism,
perfectionism, and the free agency or total malleability of human nature. In 1755 in his Second
Discourse Rousseau asserted there was no fixed human nature. Man was a “free agent”. Man’s
“perfectibility” was not to be found in the cultivation and extension of his natural faculties, but in
his historical malleability. Human nature was radically contingent, subject almost entirely to
circumstance or what he called a “fortuitous concatenation of circumstances.”94 Turgot and
Condorcet for example proposed a vision of the perpetual progress of the species. This was
proposed by a number of thinkers under an ideology that has come to be known as Perfectiblism.
This belief has persisted in the form of Marx’s “species being” or Woodrow Wilson’s perpetual
organic evolution of human nature or, in the extreme of Lysenkoism and the New Soviet man of
Communist Russia.
Not long after the ratification of the Constitution the Cult of Reason, Robespierre’s Cult of
the Supreme Being emerged in the midst of the French Revolution. This faith believed in the
infinite perfectibility of human nature. In America, Thomas Paine became a great admirer of this
intellectual and political ideology which he summarized in his book The Age of Reason. If only all
received opinions could be held up to the genuine scrutiny of reason for the first time in human
history, then reason and science could and would remake man and his society in toto. Reason
would liberate human nature from the chains of tradition and superstition. Once the patinaed layers
of historical varnish were removed by the corrosive and illuminating effects of reason, a
fundamentally new and different being would be revealed and a society commensurate to it
realized. Robespierre sought not a republic of liberty and order, but one of virtue in which public
vice was the enemy of the people. On 25 December 1793 Robespierre asserted: "The revolutionary
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government owes to the good citizen the fullest protections the state; it owes nothing to the
Enemies of the People but death.”95 In the name of “public safety” political differences were
criminalized. Political criminals were put to death in the name of justice, virtue and The Goddess
of Reason.
In all of these visions, politics as an area of debate over opinions is replaced by the unipolar
state technocratically establishing a blueprint for the future and working singularly to bring about
a new type of citizen, and a new type of human being. This citizen would be historically
unprecedented, one totally reconciled with their regime by premediated design. The slave would
be so adapted to his slavery, he would perceive it as freedom. Human depravity would be
habituated out of the species. Is such a thing possible? Would human interestedness or evil
dissipate just because the species was altered in some fundamental way? Or is it the case, as Leo
Strauss put it, that “no bloody or unbloody change of society can eradicate the evil in man.”96
Strauss says “as long as there will be men, there will be malice, envy and hatred, and hence there
cannot be a society which does not have to employ coercive restraint”97
Even the most ideologically disparate interpreters of The Federalist Papers have arrived at
the same conclusions regarding Publius’ understanding of the inextricable limitations of human
nature. Miller claims Publius concluded that “the doctrine of the perfectibility of Man” was “a
preposterous fiction.”98 Clinton Rossiter says the Constitutional Conventions marked a “refusal to
engage in social engineering.”99 Instead it maintained “the continuity of experience with the
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English and American pasts, the continuity of principles with the teachings of Cicero and Locke,”
and maintained a “moderately pessimistic view of human nature that pervaded the debates,” and a
“cautiously optimistic view of human destiny that had persuaded these men to come together."”100
Richard Hofstadter says “One thing that the Fathers did not propose to do, because they thought it
impossible, was to change the nature of man to conform with a more ideal system.” 101 Rather “human

nature presupposed that men in all ages and all places have been actuated by essentially the same
desires and passions and that they would always continue to act in the same way. There was no
possibility of an improvement in man’s nature: the mold had been fixed for all time and the laws
governing human behavior were as immutable as the laws of nature.” 102 Government then is
primarily, if not exclusively, a medicament of mitigation, not a panacea for the ills of human
nature. When men seek to cure human nature of its ills, the remedy is always far worse than the
disease.
Human nature exhibited vices which required government and self-restraint which made
self-government possible. What of the role of reason in the Founding? Most of the Founders
rejected this type of excessive faith in reason, which in their mind was an excessive faith in the
rational faculties of man. Publius did not think that “the kingdom of darkness could be replaced
by the republic of universal light.”103 Such views played no role in the substance of the Constitution
or the early politics of the republic. West says “for the most part, the founders’ stance toward the

100

Clinton Rossiter. 1787: The Grand Convention. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987. p. 270.
Richard Hofstadter. The American Political Tradition. New York: Alfred Knopf Inc, 1946. p. 9.
102
John C. Miller. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of a New Nation. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1958. p. 198.
103
Leo Strauss. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe: Free Press, 1952. p. 33.
101

166

Enlightenment was sober and cautious, even if they did at times express strong hopes for a more
general diffusion of knowledge.”104
For the Founders the fully rational position was to see and accept the limits of reason.
Hamilton and Madison follow the observations of Christianity, but also Hume and others, which
say that human nature is generally passionate and succumbs too easily to immediate interest.
Reason is too fallible and the flaws of human nature too inextricable. Reason, is but all-too-human
reasoning. It is typically too weak to be relied upon by itself. In No. 37 Madison is clear that our
knowledge is imperfect and uncertain, not simply because we are motivated by our interests, but
because of the relative weakness of our faculties compared to the elusive objects they seek to
understand. Hume says this weakness is “incurable in human nature” and therefore men must
“endeavor to palliate what they cannot cure.”105 For this reason Madison and Hamilton did not
conceive politics as “an historical process by which human beings were progressing toward greater
and greater freedom.”106 The Federalist Papers make very clear such unbridled faith in reason is
an unbridled faith in man. It is as unwarranted as it is unwise.
Yet, the third threat from Transhumanism, however, is an historically unpreceded direct
assault on our physical and psychological makeup itself. This assault is often framed by or coupled
with modernist celebration of novelty and innovation often combined with progressive or relativist
notions of human identity. If human nature is in a constant state of evolution how can this moving
target be taken as the standard for government and justice especially when government is reflecting
or directing this change? “Evolution” will be achieved by “intentional”, “organized”107 and
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“deliberate social planning and foresight.” 108 Now progress, which was once viewed as caused by
nature or world historical forces outside human control in a Hegel or Marx, might now be directed
by the reason, will or passions of mankind. More likely it will be controlled by an elite minority
within it.109 This means that the few will be shaping not only the political order, but the very nature
of the many without their consent. And, no doubt, the natural tendencies of this elite would be the
motivating springs of their actions. And as John Quincy Adams reminds us, that “Power always
sincerely, conscientiously, de très bon foi, believes itself right. Power always thinks it has a great soul and
vast views, beyond the comprehension of the weak.110 Those in power always act “in very good faith.” For

all the progressivist assertions of the denial and demise of human nature, we have now come full
circle. Ambition.
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6. Human Nature, Now & Then

Whoever considers present and ancient things easily knows that in all cities and in all peoples there are
the same desires and the same humors, and there always have been. So it is an easy thing for whoever
examines past things diligently to foresee future things in every republic and to take the remedies for
them that were used by the ancients, or, if they do not find any that were used, to think up new ones
through the similarity of accidents. But because these considerations are neglected or not understood
by whoever reads, or, If they are understood, they are not known to whoever governs, It follows that
there are always the same scandals m every time. 1
-

Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses

In his Discourses Machiavelli says: “Whoever considers present and ancient things easily
knows that in all cities and in all peoples there are the same desires and the same humors, and there
always have been…But because these considerations are neglected or not understood by whoever
reads, or, if they are understood, they are not known to whoever governs, it follows that there are
always the same scandals in every time.”2 When Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu or
Publius spoke of a universal human nature they never denied the multiplicity of ways of living or
the multiplicity of human character. All they denied however was that change were fundamental
or essential. While human character changes, human nature gives rise to “the same desires and the
same humors” and “the same scandals in every time.”3 Publius and The Founders conceived of
human nature in a narrow, but also a hardened way. There was a small tranche of human identity
which remained rigidly fixed and predictable, despite change. Reason was what separated man
from animal, but men are more reasoning than reasonable animals. This meant the passions
generally dominate in all men taken as they are in aggregate, and that the passion of ambition in
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all its forms is the double-edged sword of human civilization. Meanwhile, man’s needs of selfpreservation coupled with both his reason and his passion incline all men to pursue their selfinterest first and foremost. While circumstances change, constant are the problems of political
order produced by the constant springs of human conduct which give rise to them.
A delegate from New York to the Philadelphia Convention, Melancton Smith gives perfect
expression to The Federalist’s take on human nature. He said “the same passions and prejudices
govern all men” and yet “the circumstances in which men are placed in great measure give a
[unique] cast to the human character.”4 Human nature is fixed; human character is variable. 5 Such
an observation is at least as old as Aristotle. There is a first and second nature of mankind.
Mankind’s first nature is fixed, the second is shaped by habit, custom and education. Montesquieu
reiterates this tradition when he said political communities and their laws are the result of both
nature and nurture, where human character, or “spirit,” is shaped by circumstances of history and
climate. When Publius asserts the universality of human nature he implicitly distinguishes between
a human nature that is fixed and a variable human character built on top of that fixed foundation.
More specifically in speaking of this nature he focuses, not on ways of life, but on the constancy
of unchanging needs and springs of motivation.
Today we tend to deny a fixed common denominator of human conduct and psychology
across time and space which would justify the use of the expression “human nature”. We accept
human identity as radically malleable and plural. Today, we hold this truth to be self-evident, that
there are only a series of identities which are the product of human agency or historical
circumstance. All of Publius’ claims about human nature are underwritten by the assumption that

4

Melancton Smith. Objections to the Constitution in the New York Ratifying Convention. June 20, 1788
Michael P. Federici. The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2012. p. 51-2.

5

170

it is universal. At the very moment during the period of the Late or Radical Enlightenment when
History and Progress began to replace Nature as the standard for man and his society, Publius
clearly rejected any form of historicism which denied the continuity of human nature through time.
Publius denies mankind can be fundamentally altered by History. Nature, not History,
dictates the demands of moral and political order. Howe says “probably every reader of The
Federalist has noticed that its arguments are based on ideas about universal human nature.”6
Progressive historian Benjamin Wright says, the “universal element is its recognition of the
importance of human nature in politics, together with its remarkably penetrating analysis of the
motives and behavior of men in a free society.”7 Howe says the text appeals “to immutable
scientific laws of human behavior illustrated by historical examples and confirmed by the
Americans’ own experiment in free government.”8
In identifying this constant human nature, history and experience played a central role for
Publius. In his Enquiry Hume says that history demonstrates “the constant and universal principles
of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations” and acquaints
us “with the regular springs of human action and behavior.”9 White says “For Publius the
psychological laws of nature record the behavior of actual men; and Publius thought we establish
these laws by recourse to experience and history.10 The psychological springs of human action
remain constant across the ages. Political order and constitutions must contend with these springs
if they are to perpetuate themselves and flourish. When Madison says government is a reflection

6

Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3,
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). pp. 486.
7
Benjamin F. Wright. “The Federalist on the Nature of Political Man,” Ethics, Vol. 59, No. 2, Part 2: The Federalist
on the Nature of Political Man (Jan.,1949). p. 31
8
Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3,
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 491.
9
David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.1748. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007. p. 76.
10
Morton White. Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. p. 89.

171

on human nature he acknowledges that while its structure and laws may vary, its existence and
necessity do not. Government and law are products of human nature.
In No. 6 Hamilton speaks of “the uniform course of human events,” evident in the “the
accumulated experience of ages.”11 History, the record of concrete and particular events, is
“uniform” because it is underwritten by a constant human nature with the same passions,
disposition and motivations. Miller says Publius’ “view of human nature presupposed that men in
all ages and all places have been actuated by essentially the same desires and passions and that
they would always continue to act in the same way. There was no possibility of an improvement
in man’s nature: the mold had been fixed for all time and the laws governing human behavior were
as immutable as the laws of nature.”12 Only in this way are the motives of the men of antiquity
intelligible to us Moderns, precisely because they are actuated by the same impulses as men of the
18th or 21st century.
Since there is a definable and fixed nature, it comes with its own given fixed limits. These
parameters are based on the constancy of human faculties, needs and desires which delimit the
extent to which human nature can be bent. There is no historical perfectibility. No amount of
progress will overcome the intractable realities of human nature. Federici says: “Hamilton believed
that much could be done to change the basic maladies that stemmed from the human condition.
Evil was a permanent part of existential, social, and political life, but the fallen nature of man did
not negate the possibility of ordered liberty.”13 Frederici says that the “imperfectability of man is
at the core of Hamilton’s political philosophy.”14 In No. 6 Hamilton says it is “time to awake from
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the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our
political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the
happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?”15
Men can never be made into angels. All government must account for the problems created
by self-love, evil and the limitations of reason and virtue. The permanent need of government is
an expression of the permanent limitations of human nature. The immutable law of human
motivation on which the Constitution is based is the principle of self-interest. It is precisely because
men have diverse and conflicting motives that they do not and cannot follow moral law uniformly.
Distinct bodies with their diverse faculties and motivations means diverse interests. The object of
the Constitution is to provide the tools to manage conflicting interests in the service of the common
one.
As he was about to take the reins of the presidency in February 1789, George Washington
said to Henry Knox he felt like “a culprit who is going to the place of his execution.”16 Three years
into his presidency, Donald J. Trump could have expressed a similar sentiment, only dropping the
word “like.” On December 10, 2019, the House of Representatives passed H. RES 755 impeaching
the 45th president of the United States. The president was charged with two articles of
impeachment, “abuse of power” and “obstruction of congress.” In their opening arguments House
managers claimed the president “used the powers of his office...for his own personal benefit.”17
The first article of impeachment states the president abused his powers “by ignoring and injuring
national security and other vital national interests to obtain an improper personal political
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benefit.”18 This charge was predicated on the assertion that the president personally benefited from
the exercise of his office at the expense of the nation.
One of the more curious premises of both indictment articles is that the president was
accused of committing impeachable acts on the grounds that he pursued policies designed to
benefit his own self-interest. The articles alleged the he “engaged in this…course of conduct for
corrupt purposes in pursuit of personal political benefit.”19 He used his Article II powers in order
to “benefit his reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the
United States Presidential election to his advantage.”20 By pursuing his self-interest he not only
“ignored and injured the interests of the nation”21 but such use constituted a “threat to national
security and the Constitution” and was in the last, “grossly incompatible with self-government and
the rule of law.”22 Such self-interested conduct, so said the House Articles, rose to the level of
“High Crimes and Misdemeanors.”
The premise of the charge was that self-interested motive alone was intrinsically contrary
to national security and the national interest. Therefore, self-interested use of Article II powers
alone constituted an abuse of those powers.23 The House managers’ arguments hinged on selfinterest as a “corrupt” and therefore impeachable motive. Implicit in the articles was an admission
that the president’s actions were not in themselves criminal or impeachable. The articles failed to
charge either statutory or constitutional crimes such as treason, bribery, extortion or other high
crimes and misdemeanors. Rather such conduct was impeachable solely because it was perpetrated

18

House Resolution 755: Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for high crimes and
misdemeanors. December 10, 2019. p. 5.
19
Ibid, p. 3.
20
Ibid., p. 2-3.
21
Ibid., p. 3.
22
Ibid, p. 2.
23
Jerrold Nadler. Transcript of the Impeachment of Donald J. Trump. Day 2

174

under “corrupt motives.”24 The president’s actions were corrupt precisely because they were
motived by “personal benefit” which was claimed to be contrary to the oath he swore to uphold.25
The articles assumed these ends were by their very nature, mutually exclusive.
Evidence of corrupt motive was found in the fact the president’s actions ran counter to the
policy opinions of what unelected Executive branch officials and the House managers themselves
believed to be in the national interest.26 This despite the fact that under Article II, the president is
the sole and superior officer of the executive branch as well as “the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations” and “sole representative with foreign nations.”27 It would seem, as it pertains to
foreign affairs, the Constitution places broad power to determine policy and the very meaning of
the national interest in the hands and opinions of the president. Oddly the House managers’
arguments presume that the greater danger comes from the political authority of an elected
constitutional officer directly accountable to the people, rather than the “interagency consensus”28
of an “unelected mandarin class” of bureaucrats who persist from one administration to the next
suffering no direct democratic accountability for their actions.29
Unacknowledged in and contradicted by the impeachment articles is a central assumption
which undergirds the entire constitutional arrangement of power: which policy or conduct is
considered in the national interest is fundamentally a question of political opinion. The preamble
of the Constitution enumerates the central ends which comprise the national interest. They include
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the establishment of justice, the promotion of public tranquility and the general welfare, to provide
for the common defense and secure the blessings of liberty. The Constitution’s subsequent
enumerated powers and their arrangement are the means to these ends. In most, but not all,
circumstances, none of these ends dictate a clear or self-evident best policy or use of the
Constitution’s powers that would guarantee them. They are a matter of political preference,
opinion, judgement and prudence. The national interest is like happiness, we all know we want it
and that it should motivate all our actions, but nonetheless we disagree on both what it is and how
we might achieve it.
Following Hume, Madison says in No. 49 that “all governments rest on opinion.”30
Government rests on opinion from top to bottom, from the most fundamental constitutional
principles to the most superficial political disputes. Even serious matters of public interest like
national security and self-preservation do not simply recommend a single or unequivocal policy
which might ensure their fulfillment. What was the right thing to do for Lincoln when Fort Sumter
was attacked? Or what of the decision to go into Iraq after 9/11 under the premise of national
security and the threat of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction? Men can easily reason from
the same facts to different conclusions. Such issues remain matters of opinion. As a matter of
opinion, they are fundamentally disputable. The very existence of factions such as political parties
presupposes the existence of groups built around competing claims as to what the national interest
in fact is. The nature of the national interest is the very object of virtually all political dispute,
debate and deliberation. Every law passed and presidential action taken is claimed by their authors
to be in the nation’s best interest. The House impeachment articles take the national interest for
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granted as self-evident, a kind of summum bonum, or as simply synonymous with the opinions of
their authors.
The second article of impeachment claims the President obstructed congress by asserting
the very prerogatives and privileges of office afforded by the Constitution, law and legal precedent.
He was accused of having “directed the unprecedented, categorical, and indiscriminate defiance
of subpoenas issued by the House of Representatives pursuant to its ‘‘sole Power of
Impeachment.”31 The House had subpoenaed executive branch officials as part of their ongoing
impeachment inquiry and the president had “without lawful cause or excuse…directed Executive
Branch agencies, offices, and officials not to comply” with them.32 The House managers argument
seems to rest on interpreting their “sole power” to mean that they, and only they, were to be the
total arbiters of the impeachment process. If the president defended himself from their charges and
respected the benefits afforded to him by the separation of powers and the judicial precedent of
executive privilege, he had therefore usurped their “sole” power, thereby violating the Constitution
and committing an impeachable offense.
What the President had in fact done was provide legal rationales for non-compliance with
potentially faulty subpoenas resting on the assertion of executive privilege. The president then
sought redress from the Judicial Branch on the validity of the House’s subpoenas. Such rationales
presented by the president’s lawyers could simply be adjudicated by the Judicial branch and
deemed legally valid or not. By seeking to resolve his inter-branch conflict with the House through
remedy in Article III courts the president was accused of obstructing congress, acting outside the
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constraints of the Constitution, and even usurping powers left solely to the legislative branch.33
Drawing up an article of impeachment was an odd course over what is considered standard
operating procedure for the Executive branch. All administrations jealously seek to preserve the
powers of the presidency itself, not merely the power of the individual occupant, from the natural
and ongoing incursions of other branches. The other branches tend to follow suit in this regard.
Madison explains all this in No. 51.
Thomas Jefferson holds the honor as the first President to be issued a subpoena. It
demanded he appear in the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr. He was subpoenaed, duces tecum,
which “orders a person to appear in court and “bring with you” certain specified documents.”34 On
June 13, 1807, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall issued his opinion declaring the subpoena of
the president and executive branch documents constitutionally valid.35 Despite the subpoena and
Marshall’s ruling, Jefferson never appeared in court. Nor did he even formally acknowledge the
existence or legitimacy of either the subpoena or Marshall’s opinion. In fact, Jefferson argued for
the principle of “executive privilege” by maintaining that the “President must be the sole judge of
which documents could be safely disclosed” in “the interests of national security.”36 Of course
what counted as a matter of “national security” was left to the President’s discretion. Jefferson
went a step further, citing the separation of powers. He did not recognize the power of the judiciary
to compel the executive branch “to answer legal process” at all.37
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Despite such defiance, the President surreptitiously produced some measure of the relevant
documents demanded by the court. Marshall tacitly deemed this acceptable.38 The matter was
resolved by personal judgements, not constitutional bludgeons, through the discretion and
prudence of persons acting on behalf of the two branches. Marshall accepted voluntarily the
documents Jefferson had produced voluntarily, thus avoiding the use of the awesome compulsory
powers afforded by the Constitution. The constitutional authority of either the subpoena or the
president’s right to resist it, was never fully tested or clarified. Rather the solution was achieved
informally by tacit horse trading so that the constitutional powers of both branches need not be
either invoked or tested. Thus, an awkward constitutional crisis was averted. This is how such
interbranch disputes have often been dealt with throughout our political history. The participants
understood the negative constitutional consequences of an open declaration of war between the
branches.
The irony of the allegations against President Trump is that they make criminal and
impeachable the very conduct the constitutional framework is precisely designed to encourage
when agreement between branches is not to be found. In Nos. 47-51 Madison makes this patently
clear, and it is one of is great innovations of republican government. Again, the articles assert that
by seeking redress the president acted out of self-interest and therefore in violation of the House’s
constitutional powers of impeachment. And yet, in No. 51 Madison says that in their disputes the
Constitution must provide each branch with “the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments” of the others branches.39 How could conduct the Constitution is
designed to encourage, interbranch conflict through assertion of countervailing interests, be
deemed unconstitutional? Resistance is not merely self-interested. The pursuit of self-interest is
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made a virtue, a kind of constitutional duty which preserves the discrete nature of the branches and
inhibits deleterious usurpations.
In light of their views on human nature, the divisive partisanship of the recent impeachment
battle would have hardly surprised the Founders.40 In No. 10 Madison tells us the spirit of faction
is “sown in the nature of man.”41 Factions such as parties are but collections of individuals built
on and actuated by common passion, opinion or interest. Factions are but the means to amplify the
power needed to promote and achieve one’s aims. In No. 65 Hamilton says impeachments “will
seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties.”42 He says
an impeachment “will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their
animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases there
will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative
strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” 43 Hamilton’s words
were rather prescient. Presidents Johnson, Clinton and Trump would all have agreed, and with
good reason.
But how strangely these charges would have rung in the Founder’s ears in light of their
account of human nature and conduct. Their understanding of human nature sits as the axiomatic
foundation of all the Constitution’s enumerated powers and their peculiar arrangement. Their
conclusion that government rested on opinion, not knowledge, of things like the national interest
was a direct consequence of this understanding. Based on careful observation of the faculties and
deficiencies of human nature they admitted that no party or individual can claim omniscient
knowledge of the nations’ “true” interests.
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They observed that human reason is fallible and limited in general, but particularly so under
the enticements and charms of power. In No. 10 Madison says of man so “long as the connection
subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal
influence on each other.”44 Passions and self-interest always color and distort political opinion of
things like the national interest. Therefore, matters of national interest are not, cannot be, and
should not be decided on the grounds of who claims to have genuine knowledge of such things.
Rather they are decided by public opinion regarding the apparent knowledge or ignorance of the
actors involved. If a party or politician is deemed ignorant of the nation’s interests they will simply
be held accountable to the opinions of the people in the next election.
The second premise of the impeachment articles is equally foreign to the Founders: that a
constitutional officeholder can act “corruptly” and “abuse their power” simply by acting in their
own self-interest, without the additional specification of the assertion or evidence of actual crimes.
This premise flies in the face of the central observation about human nature which undergirds the
constitutional order. Men are not angels. Passions like self-love, ambition and love of power
incline men to err, to be myopic in their aims, and to abuse power in pursuit of their own selfinterest. Men are not angels because their passions “will not conform to the dictates of reason and
justice, without constraint.”45 Human nature exhibits a “defect of better motives.” Motives superior
to self-interest cannot reasonably be relied upon by themselves. Therefore, they should not be
relied upon. Sentinels of external constraint are always necessary. It is folly to expect self-restraint
or for human beings to hold themselves accountable. Angels regulate themselves. Men require
laws and force.
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In light of the venality of human nature the Founders conceded that our expectations of
human conduct must be realistically tempered by the probable and likely motive of self-interest.
The tincture of power and self-interest cannot be undone; it is all too engrained in human nature
to act on one’s own behalf. This permanent feature needs to be accepted, and even exploited, in
order to be accounted for. It cannot be wished away by moral condemnation alone. Our natural
moral defect is that better motives such as reason and virtue are both too scarce and too weak.
They lack sufficient incentive for most men to regularly act upon them, precisely in those decisive
moments when it is hard to act on them. While the Founders hardly denied the existence of real
virtue or moral sentiments like “sympathy”46 and “humanity”47, they nevertheless did not believe
these motives held sufficient sway over men to compel them to act virtuously under the beguiling
effects of power.
In No. 51 Madison, the Father of the Constitution, plainly asserts that the marriage of selfinterest and the powers of office is the natural constitutional course of things. Self-interest as a
motive, is not merely to be expected, but depended upon in the proper operation of the
constitutional mechanism. Even if self-interest leads to criminal conduct, it will depend on the
interested assertion of other officers to hold that conduct accountable. Take for example the
election of 1864. It occurred in the midst of a raging Civil War, a fight for the preservation of the
Union. Lincoln granted Union troops leave from the battlefield so they could vote for him and help
ensure his reelection. Assistant Secretary of War Dana said that “all the power and influence of
the War Department…was employed to secure the reelection of Mr. Lincoln.”48 Meanwhile
Secretary of War Stanton deployed “immense power to bring military voters into line” to ensure
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they either voted for Lincoln “or kept their Democratic opinions to themselves” as the New York
Times puts it.49
In the midst of a civil war, the existence of the Union at stake, Lincoln used the mighty
powers of the War Department, the executive branch, to secure a personal benefit in the service of
his reelection. He used his powers just as the impeachment articles describe: to “benefit his
reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the United States
Presidential election to his advantage.”50 In fact he went so far as to penalize soldiers who would
not vote for him. Secretary Staton dismissed dozens of officers in the months prior to the election
because they were either Democrats or preferred Gen. McClellan for president.51 When an officer
protested their dismissal Stanton replied, “When a young man receives his pay from an
administration and spends his evenings denouncing it in offensive terms, he cannot be surprised if
the administration prefers a friend on the job.”52
Was this an impeachable abuse of power? Were the interests and national security of the
Union harmed by pulling soldiers off a live battlefield merely for the personal benefit of Lincoln’s
reelection? We can wonder to what extent Lincoln’s election ploy negatively affected the war
effort. Meanwhile the House managers in the Trump impeachment, despite claims of
compromising national security, were unable to adduce any evidence that the pause in the
president’s foreign aid to Ukraine, an utterly common and routine procedure in such matters,
caused any threat to the national security of either the United States or Ukraine.
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The problem for the Founders was not self-interest as such. In asserting that men are not
angels, Madison intimates how the Constitution accepts and expects officeholders to act with a
permanent eye on their own self-interest. Madison tells us in No. 10 that eliminating the liberty
which permits free men to pursue self-interest is undesirable and unrealistic. It is too Spartan, too
contrary to the regular dispositions of human nature. The cure is worse than the disease. Having
accepted the disease, the true problem is fashioning institutions which properly channel and
constrain its worst effects while the competing aims of order and liberty. If not constrained by
properly designed institutions self-interest is averse to both liberty and order.
Here Publius and the Founders abandoned Plato and Aristotle’s hope of the coincidence of
wisdom and power in the ruling class as a fantasy of an “imagined republic.” The marriage of
power and interest is the necessary and proper course of the constitutional order. The solution is
not to eliminate self-interest but temper its worst effects. This marriage of interest and the powers
of office turns out to be the innovative solution of the Founders novel science of politics which
gave birth to their novel form of republicanism. The expectation of interestedness can be employed
and leveraged against the worst abuses of self-interest. The constraint Hamilton speaks of in No.
15 is achieved through leveraging interest against itself. This is precisely what Madison means
when he says the “defect of better motives” will be remedied through the “policy of
supplying…opposite and rival interests.”53Madison concludes this strategy of countervailing and
rival interests “might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as
public.”54
Motives such as reason, virtue and duty were not so much abandoned, as demoted, and the
republic was to be founded on the lower but firmer foundation of self-interest. His claim illustrates

53
54

No. 10.
Ibid.

184

the centrality of this innovation and the permanence of self-interest or the defect of better motives.
Self-interest is the primary feature of human nature with which social and political order must
contend if it is to succeed. The mechanical equilibrium of the Constitution depends on such
motives. In No. 72 Hamilton, discussing the executive’s motives for action, states the obvious,
“that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct.”55 From this
observation he concludes that “the best security for the fidelity of mankind,” to the national
interest, “is to make interest coincide with duty.”56 The success of separate branches checking and
balancing one another in order to prevent a dangerous concentration of power in one branch is
directly dependent on officeholders asserting their own self-interest through the tools and powers
of their office.
Interests check and balance one another only when they are married to the powers of office
and set in countervailing opposition. Checking and balancing is not the result of a spontaneous
generation of order. Private vices do not simply make public virtues. Virtue remains necessary but
a greater burden is placed on well fashioned institutions which mitigate vice and promote virtue
through external constraint. Officers are compelled to be “virtuous”. It is achieved by mixing and
“blending” the three branches properly so that they have distinct but also over lapping prerogatives
which become the constitutional territory over which they assert their claims.57 It seems
counterintuitive but an absolute separation between the branches results in mere “parchment
barriers” because it denies a domain of contested prerogatives. It is precisely this area of redundant
prerogatives which provide the leverage, the actual rather than merely nominal power, for the
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branches to restrain and defend the attack of the other. But this power must be used. It is activated
only through the motive and assertion of self-interest.
Checks are achieved through a system of countervailing interests. Equilibrium only occurs
when the appropriate “constitutional means” are properly married to “personal motives.”58 Francis
Bacon, the scientist and statesman well known to the Founders, says in order for “nature to be
commanded, must be obeyed.”59 Understanding the prior cause results in being able to predict the
future effect. Or as Machiavelli puts it in slightly different terms: “whoever examines past things
diligently” will be able “to foresee future things in every republic.”60 Hume says that that “a
remedy” for the ills of human nature, “can never be effectual without correcting this propensity;
and as ‘tis impossible to change or correct any thing material in our nature, the utmost we can do
is to change our circumstances and situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice our
nearest interest and their violation our most remote.”61 Once the law of self-interest could be
identified, the institutional dykes and damns could direct human passions and ambitions
accordingly. In the service of order and liberty the Constitution was designed to control and contain
human nature by obeying its ironclad law of self-interest on display throughout history. This
system seems to paradoxically preserve liberty provide security, by placing the motives of men
under circumstances of near necessity.62
In April 1787, one month prior to the Philadelphia convention, James Madison penned a
series of observations titled the “Vices of the Political System of the United States.” These notes
were an itemized analysis of the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation. Underlying his many
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detailed criticisms lay the general weakness of the national government. Without the requisite
power it was unable enforce its will on the states nor protect them from one another in their
disputes. The lack of central power left the states too free and independent, which in turn bred the
spirit anarchy and faction among them and left them vulnerable to foreign meddling. These
conclusions were drawn from his own experiences as a member of the Virginia House of Delegates
and as a delegate to the Congress of the Confederation under the Articles. They were no less
informed by his extensive reading on the fate and flaws of such confederacies throughout history.
A year prior, in 1786, Madison had made extensive study titled “Notes on Ancient and Modern
Confederacies.” The broad conclusion of Madison’s investigations was that the political structure
of confederacies such as the Articles did not properly account for the regular tendencies and defects
of human nature.
The Articles of Confederation were too weak to overcome the ills of self-interest
factionalism sown into human nature. Howe says Publius’ analysis of human nature provides “his
basis for discrediting the Articles of Confederation."63 The Articles were an “odious…engine of
government,”64 so “radically vicious and unsound”,65 precisely because they were not properly
reconciled with human nature. Howe says the particular flaw of the Articles was that it relied too
much on "the weaker springs of the human character."66 They lacked a respect for the power of
self-interest and had insufficient “sentinels” and “auxiliary precautions” needed to restrain factions
and preserve the “public rights.” A more perfect Union was needed because the Articles did not
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provide a government commensurate with human nature. They did not solve the problems raised
by the defects of human nature.
In the wake of Shays Rebellion Washington said “We have, probably, had too good an
opinion of human nature in forming our confederation.”67 Meanwhile Jay had written Jefferson
saying of the Articles “there is reason to fear that too much has been expected of the virtue and
good sense of the people.”68 Hamilton says in No. 23 that the Articles "presumed that a sense of
their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for
the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the federal head. The experiment has,
however, demonstrated that this expectation was ill-founded and illusory"69 In No. 15 Hamilton
asserts the Articles of Confederation were erroneously founded on a belief that “a sense of common
interest would preside over the conduct” of the states and “would beget a full compliance with all
the constitutional requisitions.” This hope for the Articles, says Hamilton, clearly “betrayed an
ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original
inducements to the establishment of civil power.” The tendency of human nature toward selfinterest, its “defect of better motives”, its inability to seek the “common interest” without external
remedy, are the primeval cause of the establishment of government itself.
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III.

The Regime Founded on Human Nature
1. City and Soul

As the story goes Benjamin Franklin was walking down the street shortly following the
resolution of the Constitutional Convention and was confronted by a woman asking about the
nature and form of government its members had fashioned. His answer? “A republic, if you can
keep it.” What did he mean? The type of republic proposed by the convention was in many ways
without precedent in the annals of human history. Republican government is a form of selfgovernment. The question was implicitly raised: Was human nature, being what it is, truly capable
of genuine self-government? Does human nature have the resources, the self-restraint and moral
virtue to maintain self-government? Publius and the members of the Convention answered in the
affirmative. Human nature held a mixture of vice and virtue which, if the proper moral and
constitutional restraints where devised, was capable of genuine self-government. Franklin’s
admonition is of course an acknowledge of the tenuous balance that must be struck in order for
human beings to truly govern themselves. Nonetheless republican government was possible
because of its commensurability to the vices and virtues of human nature itself.
What justifies The Federalist’s account of human nature in a book on government? In the
Laws, Plato says the theory and practice of politics is rooted in knowledge of the natures and habits
of human souls.1 Plato’s Athenian stranger says “it would be one of the most useful tools – this
ability to know the nature and disposition of people’s souls – for that art or science whose function
it is to look after these things. And that, of course is the science of politics.”2 Long says political
order “needs to be compatible with the interests, consent, and aptitudes of the persons, who make
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up” its “diverse living parts.”3 “External political order is to be mirrored by internal psychological
order” and vice versa.4 “Hence the virtues of the state as a whole,” says Long, “are to have their
counterpart in the virtues of the individual citizens.” 5 It is because of this relationship between
government and the human soul that Aristotle can say in the Nicomachean Ethics “that the
politician ought to know” and “contemplate the soul.”6 Political science is the science of the human
soul.
In the Republic Plato establishes the fundamental relationship between the soul of the
citizen and the soul of the regime of which they are a part. Thomas Reid says, “In the most ancient
philosophy” such as the “Pythagorean school, the mind of man was compared to a state or
commonwealth, in which there are various powers, some that ought to govern, and others that
ought to be subordinate.”7 Plato asserts that the parts and attributes found in the individual human
soul naturally find their magnified expression in the city. This city is nothing other than the
arrangement of many souls. As such it reflects the needs and faculties of the human soul writ large.
Plato’s description of this relationship has come to be known as the “city-soul analogy.” This socalled analogy between the soul of the city and the individual soul asserts that the constitutional
order of the city is a parallel macrocosm to the microcosm of its citizens’ individual souls. Like
Plato, this analogy allows The Federalist to treat “politics and psychology as two aspects of a
single investigation.”8
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Psychology is the science of the soul. Given its centrality to politics, political science is a
form of psychology. It requires knowledge of the human soul pertinent to public order. For Plato
human nature consisted of a body and a soul. The soul was the ruler of the body and the organizing
principle of its actions. The parts of the soul represented disparate sources of motivation. These
motivations were divided between reason and the passions. These parts and their accompanying
motivations were responsible for organizing and guiding the series of actions which make a human
life. The soul had needs and appetites connected to the animal self-preservation of the body, and
needs and appetites connected with the mind or intellect. All these appetites govern the actions of
the individual. By shaping their character these appetites ultimately shape their way of life.
Like the individual, the city also had a body and soul. The body is its substance and its
soul, the particular constitutional form given to it. The people are its body, and its soul is the form
of government which shapes the life of the people into a genuinely political community. What
truly makes a group into a people, is their constitution, the politeia. The politeia is the soul of the
city. It is the city’s form of government, and the arrangement of its powers. The city is “given its
character and its peculiar way of life is established by the organization of the city's diverse
elements.”9 The politeia is their organizing principle of the city and determines their way of life.
The soul of the city, its politeia, is the soul of the citizens writ large. The soul of the city is both
the shaper and expression of the citizens’ souls. The harmony of city and soul is made possible by
the way in which the city’s soul educates, shapes and habituates the souls of its citizens through
its fundamental principles manifest in its laws.
Every city has those who rule and those who are ruled. As a regime’s constitution or
structure, the politeia is primarily connected with the ruling class, or politeuma, those who
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governed.10 Who rules determines that structure of government and the nature of its laws. Plato
acknowledges that the ruling class make laws in their own self-image and self-interest.11 The ruling
class shapes the life of the city by impressing their own image on the citizens through the laws
they make. 12 The laws of the city are guided by and manifestations of the citizens’ opinion of their
own happiness. As the city legislates, its laws regulate the conduct of citizens. This regulation
shapes and habituates the citizen’s souls, and their moral taste, their conceptions of what is right
and wrong, just and unjust, good and evil, beneficial and harmful. This moral taste makes and
shapes the way of life of the city. Thus the soul of the individual citizen echoes the soul or
constitution of the city.
A soul, like a city, is said by Plato and Aristotle to have a ruling part and a part that is ruled
by it. The politeia represents the part of the city which rules. The ruling class guides and organizes
the body of its citizens just as the soul rules over the body of the individual. Within the soul itself,
Plato and Aristotle, understood that reason was the rightful ruler over the passions, just as the city’s
politeuma, are the rightful rulers of the city. The parts of the soul of the citizen, reason and passion,
are reflected in the factions of the city and the motivations of its citizens. Each form of government
represents a different ruling principle, or dominate appetite of the human soul. The various types
of regimes were understood as expressions of different parts of the soul, different ruling appetites,
each with a distinct ruling motivational passion. This ruling passion rules as a “monarch” over the
entire city and everyone in it.13
In the Republic, Plato’s divides the soul into reason and passion. In all the soul consists of
three irreducible parts, reason, spiritedness and appetite. In a sense all three parts of the soul are
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appetites, motivational sources who differ in the nature and object of their respective desire. Each
has a specific object of desire which motives action toward that end. These motivational
components exist in a hierarchy of worth and dignity with reason atop and bodily appetite below.
For Plato, just as the soul rules the body, reason was the rightful ruler of the soul. Reason should
rule, and its rule consists of regulating the passions. The rule of reason produced harmony and
order in the soul and was synonymous with human happiness. Plato asserts that “the harmonious
and just soul is the soul ruled by reason.”14 Just as reason must rule in the soul to produce order
and harmony, reason must also rule the soul of the city if it is to achieve order and harmony and
establish justice.
The ruling appetite of the rulers is the true ruler of the city. The principal motivation which
rules and shapes the souls of the citizen, also rules and shaped the regime at large. Democracy
imbues its citizens with a democratic soul, aristocracy an aristocratic one, and so on. In Book 8 of
the Republic for example, Plato claims that the arrangement of the soul of the democratic citizen
resembles the democratic city.15 Plato’s narrow claim that the parts of the soul are literally writ
large in any city is much disputed, but the more general claim that any given form of government
is an expression of the various needs and desires of human nature is irrefutable. While not simply
identical there is an identifiable relationship between the nature of the political regime and the
psychology of its citizens.
Plato’s treatment of the relationship between regime and its dominate psychological type
is echoed in Montesquieu treatment of regimes in The Spirit of Laws. For Montesquieu each regime
has a nature and structure as well as a defining principle of soul. This principle of soul is either a
passion or a virtue. Montesquieu, following in the footsteps of Plato, says that each regime does
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not exist merely as an institutional order, but as a “certain quality” or “modification of the soul.”16
Montesquieu views both city and soul on the analogy of a watch. A “certain spring” and “a certain
gear” make the watch move, just as a certain psychic spring of society motivates its laws and way
of life collectively and individually.17 This “modification” is the same spring in the soul of the
citizen, as in the mechanism of the regime.
Montesquieu’s “modification of the soul” is the spirit of the regime. This spirit shapes its
peculiar way of life and form of justice. It is the organizing principle of its form of government,
its laws and the souls and habits of its citizens. Each regime has its own unique spirit which orders
the souls of its citizens in a particular way, drawing on one psychic source as the dominate spring
of action. Montesquieu’s arch principles of government are also what he identifies as the prime
ruling passions of the soul which cause men to act as they do. From this modification of soul is
derived a peculiar passion or virtue that is the “spring that makes a government act.”18 In a 1792
essay, Madison glosses The Spirit of Laws saying, “Montesquieu has resolved the great operative
principles of government into fear, honor, and virtue.”19 Just as each individual type is driven by a
peculiar psychic spring, so too is each unique form of government.
Scholars have asked of the city-soul analogy: Is it politics or is it psychology?20 The answer
is both. They are inextricably linked. The analogy between the individual soul and political
community, “in which there are various powers, some that ought to govern and others that ought
to be subordinate,” is one of the oldest staples of philosophical discourse.”21 Adam Ferguson
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asserted: “The seeds of every form of government are lodged in human nature; they spring up and
ripen with the season.”22
The relationship between the human soul and government is a central leitmotif running
throughout The Federalist Papers. Publius repeatedly asserts the essential relationship between
human nature, government and the science of politics.23 Its observations and analysis of human
nature are architectonic and provide the foundation to all its arguments. All its claims are generated
out of insights into the nature and behavior of mankind. This relationship is what justifies
Madison’s claim that government is nothing but the “greatest of all reflections on human
nature.”24At the Constitutional Convention Hamilton asserted that “The science of policy is the
knowledge of human nature.”25 Despite the vast differences of time and outlook, this claim is
virtually identical to Plato’s in his Laws. Hamilton and Madison acknowledge the fundamental
relationship between constitutional order and the order of the human soul. In asserting the primacy
of this relationship Publius merely recapitulates an ancient observation of moral and political
philosophy.
The Constitution defends by Publius is based on a reasoned vision of the human soul writ
large in the context of a specific political community. Publius makes clear that government is the
necessary byproduct of human nature because of its “defect of better motive.” Men are not angels.
The Federalist also makes clear how the proposed Constitution is in harmony not only with the
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general principles of human nature, but the particular habits of American society shaped before,
during and after the Revolution.
The implications of this analogy are that the peculiar nature and arrangement of the
Constitution are nothing but a reflection of the Founders experience and understanding of human
nature. The authors did not go fishing in human nature for elements that demonstrate their desired
a priori ideology, rather they build their political order on the foundation of human nature in a
manner few theorists in history ever have. Williams says, Publius’ account of the “nature of man
logically shaped the kind of government they were advocating.”26 Hirschman captures the circular
relationship between the government and the human soul by saying that the concerns of Publius
“had started with the state; when it turned to consider problems of individual conduct, and in due
course the insights” about the nature of human conduct “yielded by this phase were imported back
into the theory of politics.”27
Through The Federalist’s arguments “runs an implicit analogy between the human mind
and the body politic. Just as the mind has faculties of reason (knowing wisdom and virtue),
prudence (knowing self-interest), and the passions, so there are in society a small natural
aristocracy of wisdom and virtue, a larger group of prudent men capable of understanding their
enlightened self-interest, and the turbulent masses, who are typically motivated by passion and
immediate advantage.”28 Howe says: “In Publius's argument there is a marked, if implicit,
tendency for the different branches of government to mirror particular faculties of mind.”29 He
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says “Publius's rhetoric sorted his potential audience into three horizontally defined, hierarchically
ordered groups-rational men, self-interested men, and passionate men-and addressed only the first
two.”30 Publius has broken society down into the parts of the soul which are operative in different
groups and factions. For Publius the central faculties of the soul were reason, interest and the
passion, which parallel these three society constituencies. All this suggests that the authors of The
Federalist had to take the nature and complexity of the human soul seriously. Despite their
disagreements with Classical philosophy, they inherited its basic conception of the soul along with
much of the faculty psychology generated by the Scottish Enlightenment. And, despite its vital
departures, the Scottish Enlightenment owes much of the general structure of its moral psychology
to the Ancient Greeks.
In the Laws, Plato envisions the human being as a divine puppet, a puppet of the gods,
whose soul consists of three strings which animate its actions in different and potentially contrary
ways. Plato’s Athenian stranger says “Let's think about these things in this way. Let's consider
each of us living beings to be a divine puppet, put together either for their play or for some serious
purpose—which, we don’t know.”31 Mankind is a puppet with three strings attached to the gods
which represent the three distinct sources of motivation within the human soul. These three strings
or chords represent the parts of the soul and their pull on our motivations and conduct. Plato’s
distinguished the motivational sources of the tripartite soul into logos (reason), thumos
(spiritedness) and epithumia (appetite). Plato and Aristotle initially divide the soul in two, between
reason and the passions, and subsequently subdivide the passions into spiritedness and appetite.
Plato’s Athenian Stranger says “these passions work within us like tendons or cords, drawing us
and pulling against one another in opposite directions toward opposing deeds struggling in the
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region where virtue and vice lie separated from one another.”32 In the myth of the divine puppet,
the soul is pulled by two iron string which represent the ineluctable forces of the passions, and a
golden thread which represents the “sacred pull of calculation” or reason.
Taken allegorically, these strings represent our internal psychological endowment of our
faculties given from nature. They are inner forces which produce outward actions. The problem is
that these internal forces are not intrinsically in harmony with one another left to themselves. They
represent conflicting sources of motivation, naturally pulling our impulses and conduct in opposite
directions. They draw us forward “pulling against one another in opposite directions toward
opposing deeds.”33 The divergent tugs of each chord illustrate how different motivational sources
guide us toward different objects of desire, and hence toward different courses of action all at the
same time. It is this simultaneous divergence of impulses that creates the conflict of human life
and ultimately the need for government.
Of the three cords two are iron, the passions, and one is golden, reason. Plato appears to be
making a reference to Hesiod’s Ages of Mankind. The Golden Age is one of near human perfection
and harmony, whereas the Iron Age is the period furthest in time from this state of perfection,
representative of the present. Here iron symbolizes a deterioration of worth, but also is emblematic
of strife and war. The existence of these multiple sources of motivation demonstrates that the
psychology of the individual and the collective are always potentially in conflict with themselves.
This conflict is in permanent need of some kind of reconciliation or amelioration. The Athenian
Stanger says “each person should always follow one of the cords, never letting go of it and pulling
with it against the others.”34 The thread human beings should follow is the “is the golden and
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sacred pull of reason.”35 The pull of reason should rule as master. The dominate thread of reason
should always be the one which determines our course of action. The pull of reason is the guide to
life because it is the only one with the capacity to see the consequences of man’s actions. Reason
has foresight, whereas the passions are blind. They do not see the consequences of their desires.
Reason sits in the seat of the soul as a judge. It judges the proper course of action. Reason is the
true and correct guide to the life of the individual and the political community. Naturally, following
the pull of reason produces virtue and harmony, whereas following the threads of passion alone
produces vice and what the Greeks called stasis. Stasis is strife and faction which produce vice
individually and collective. Stasis is civil war in the soul and the city.
The Athenian stranger identifies the dictates of reason as synonymous with law. Reason
“is called the common law of the city.”36 Only if political community is guided by the pull of
reason as manifest in law can it be harmonious and achieve political prosperity. If reason truly
rules in the soul of the city, the three strings will work in mutual harmony with one another and
avoid the conflict which produces warring factions within civil society. When in No. 15 Hamilton
asks, “Why has government been instituted at all?”37 his answer is in conformity with Plato’s
depiction of the human soul. He says “the passions” in the souls of men “will not conform to the
dictates of reason and justice.”38
The golden thread of reason is described as “soft”, which suggests flexibility and elasticity.
The thread of the passions is made of iron. Their pull is ironclad. The passions are forceful,
unremitting and beyond our control. They have no elasticity; they cannot be altered. The iron
thread of the passions represents the “hard-wired” instincts. Reason rules not by might like the
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passions. Rather its voice, unlike the passion, can be ignored. It rules precisely because it is correct.
It rules through reflection, deliberation and rational persuasion rather than its force. The elasticity
of the golden thread of reason appears to have two meanings. The golden thread does not pull
ineluctably or as forcefully as the others. Reason can be ignored despite is correctness. Its
flexibility also implies a degree of freedom from pure determinism which separates the mere
locomotion of animals based on pleasure and pain, from the moral realm of human action based
on categories of good and evil. Human action is life in accord with moral categories. While
Madison and Hamilton where all too aware of the passionate and interested nature of human
psychology, they concluded human history demonstrates that human nature has sufficient rational
power to discriminate between virtue and vice and to choose to act in accord with this rational
discrimination.
The problem is that while the golden pull of reason has the moral authority, it lacks the
force of the passions. That which is right, lacks the might. It has the weakest pull or mildest voice
within the soul. On the other hand, the pull of the passions is hardest and inflexible. In No. 42
Madison says “the mild voice of reason” pleads “the cause of an enlarged and permanent
interest.”39 Likewise in No. 34 he says “the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human
breast with much more powerful sway, than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that
to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, would be to calculate on
the weaker springs of the human character.”40
The problem of the pull of the golden thread is an exact description of the “defect of better
motives” which shows that the passions “will not confirm to the dictates of reason and justice
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without constraint.”41 The defect of human psychology is the inefficacy of reason. The Athenian
stranger says that “It is necessary always to assist this most noble pull of law because reason, while
noble, is gentle rather than violent, and its pull is in need of helpers if the race of gold is to be
victorious for us over the other races.”42 In light of its “mild voice”, reason needs assistance, it “is
need of helpers.” If reason is to have real efficacy over men’s actions, Publius makes clear that the
internal pull of reason, needs external allies. Publius speaks of “sentinels” and “auxiliary
precautions” which will act as external constraints on the passions and assist reason in the process.
The Athenian stranger says one who seeks to be beneficial to the individual and the city
should “acquire within himself true reasoning about these cords and live according to it, while a
city should take over a reasoning either from one of the gods or from this knower of these things,
and then set up the reasoning as the law for itself and for its relations with other cities. Thus,
certainly, vice and virtue would be more clearly distinguished for us.”43
What would be beneficial for the political community is for the political scientist to have
true understanding of the human soul, its motivations and their consequences for the well-being of
any political community. This “true reasoning” would be the science of politics itself. Political
science rests on a foundation of knowledge of the human soul and its motivations. One must now
the nature and object of these motivations, their relative force and the consequences of their
fulfillment in terms of virtue and vice, and the order and justice of the political community. With
this knowledge in hand, the science of politics would be able to craft a just constitutional. Plato
asserts that in order to establish harmony and justice it is necessary to know the science of the soul
which is knowledge of these three conflicting parts of the soul and how to manage them and
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subordinate them to the mild voice of reason. A just regime would be capable of promoting reason
and vitiating the disharmonious effects of the passions.
Like Plato, The Federalist envisions human psychology as a polytropic.44 The soul consists
of a diversity of faculties: reason, passions and interests. The core springs of conduct, reason and
passion, are capable of producing a mixture of vices and virtues. Publius was “steeped in classical
philosophy” and believed “man was mired by passions, self-interest, and habits of vice but also
capable of self-control, reason, and habits of virtue.”45 Like Plato, Publius’ account of the soul
consists of multiple motivational sources with the capacity to pull in contrary directions at the
same time. The soul is rent into factions which places it in conflict with itself on the individual and
collective level. The individual will be pulled by their faculties in different directions, one way by
reason, and another by passions. If, for example, men yield to their immediate interest, they work
against both their own true interest and that of their political community. In Madison’s discussion
of the diversity of men’s faculties in No. 10, he acknowledges that the desires and abilities of
different groups and individuals exhibit their different faculties, varying in degree and mixture.
The diversity of faculties among men is the root cause of faction and conflict in society.
Plato and Publius are separated by a fundamental disagreement characteristic of the divide
between Classical and Modern political philosophy. Both diagnose the same psychological
deficiencies which are the seeds of conflict in civil society. Both accept the essential role and
necessity of reason. Yet, they disagree on the remedy. This is largely because they disagree on the
ends of political community and the means of achieving them. For the Ancients the end of political
community was human excellence. Philosophy was the true good and the highest form of life for
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the human being as such. Short of that, the best life was that of the good citizen rooted in moral
virtue and patriotism which prioritized duties over rights and freedoms.
Classical political philosophy identified justice as the aim of government. Justice was
achieved by shaping the souls of the citizens in conformity with its demands. Statecraft was
soulcraft.46 Soulcraft was moral or civic education, or what the Greek’s called paideia and
Renaissance Humanists called institutio.47 The soul of the citizens would be shaped by habits
engrained by law and education. Learning “conditions conduct” and shapes the lives and souls of
citizens.48 The laws educate the citizens’ souls. Laws rear citizens and make them who they are.
Good laws make good citizens. Almost all legislation was understood as “moral legislation
because it conditions the action and the thoughts of the nation in broad and important spheres in
life.”49 For Plato true or liberal education was training in virtue in order to make the “perfect citizen
who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice.” 50
The Modern political science of The Federalist does not, as the Classical tradition had, see
“politics, fundamentally, as soulcraft.”51 Or rather, Modern political science has a radically
different conception of soulcraft. In fact, Publius’ new science and its new republicanism represent
an explicit departure of statecraft as this type of soulcraft. Government and its laws were not to be
part of moral education, or if so, only in the most minimal way. Government would not “legislate
morality”, at least not in the intrusive manner of the Ancients. At the very least this would be left,
in a composite republic, to state government and local municipalities. The goal of Modern
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government was neither to save or perfect men’s souls. Hume says: “For whatever may be the
consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every
species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice; this concerns not the magistrate who
aims only at possibilities.”52 The ends of government would be liberty, order, and comfortable selfpreservation in the form of economic well-being. Justice would be grounded in durable motives
like self-interest, not lofty ones like duty and virtue.
The Federalist does not abandon soulcraft any more than any political science can. George
Will says: “Without soulcraft of some kind all statecraft must fail.”53 Soulcraft is mostly “opaque
to contemporary political scientists” and this is why they fail to understand things political.54 The
influences of behaviorism and social science based on the Modern natural science have made the
human soul into something meaningless or nonexistent. They do not consider the soul and its
relationship to government. Justice Felix Frankfurter said: “Law is concerned with external
behavior and not with the inner life of man.”55 If Justice Frankfurter meant the Constitution did
not represent a large intrusion into the souls of citizens this is true. But Frankfurter is blind to the
fact that all rules of conduct, such as laws, necessarily shape and habituate the souls of citizens.
This is the very definition of habit. Publius however, was no Skinnerian avant le lettre.
Frankfurter’s distinction between superficial “behavior” and “the inner life of man” is utterly
foreign to The Federalist’s analysis of human nature. Given the invisibility of the inner life of man,
gauging the exact nature of the relationship between inner and outer is challenging. These
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challenges do not deny the existence of the connection however, only the limits of the observer. If
one sought a certain effect of conduct, one would have to tinker on the level of inner causes to
achieve this. One must first know and obey, if one is to control. This like Modern natural science,
the new political science remained a science of causes. For Publius, conduct was an outward
expression of the inner springs of the man. Man’s faculties are the inner cause of the outer effect.
The Federalist is replete with psychological analysis of the inner springs which motivate outward
actions. When the music stops men’s true motives are revealed.
The provisions of the Constitution are a mechanism to shape and influence men’s motives.
Features like accountability though elections, duration of terms, and the tripartite separation of
powers, were all strategies of coaxing conduct by influencing motive, toward the common interest.
The “proper structure”56 to account for the psychological defects of better motives “involves
checks and balances of the separation of powers, and the dispersal of powers through a federal
system.” 57 This external system is designed “to channel and manipulate self-interestedness into
social equilibrium.”58 Tocqueville said of self-interest that through “its admirable conformity to
human weaknesses it easily obtains great dominion; nor is that dominion precarious, since the
principle checks one personal interest by another, and uses, to direct the passions, the very same
instrument that excites them.” 59
The need for soulcraft remains, but the ends and means of this moral education were
different. The Classical tradition demanded that the passions be strictly educated to the extent they
can, and repressed to the extent they cannot. As Madison says in No. 10 this solution is only
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possible by attempting to give all citizens the same opinion through law and education. Political
order is achieved at the price of freedom and man’s natural dispositions. This is the hard Spartan
virtue of the Ancients. Plato demanded a Spartan order of city and soul. Publius’ analysis of
Ancient republics concluded this was a failure of theory and practice. More to the point, it was a
theory and ideal rarely if ever achieved in practice. Instead they saw in the Ancient republic, the
perennial play of passions and interest untethered from proper constitutional restraints.
The soulcraft of The Federalist is the statecraft of self-interest. The principle of taking men
as they are meant accepting the psychic springs and motives they typically exhibit. The weak and
inconsistent voice of reason would not be made to directly compete with the superior force and
certain regularity of the passions and the interests. Publius’ new republicanism lowers the sites of
political order by placing liberty and comfortable self-preservation through the promotion of
property rights, commerce and industry at the center of its ends. Self-interest is the “low but solid”
foundation. The solution was to apply reason’s foresight to crafting political institutions arranged
to employ the power of the passions and the interests against themselves when necessary.
Tocqueville says that “the principle of self-interest rightly understood is not a lofty one, but it is
clear and sure. It does not aim at mighty objects, but it attains without excessive exertion all those
at which it aims. As it lies within the reach of all capacities, everyone can without difficulty learn
and retain it.”60 The central moral teaching of the American Republic, as Tocqueville saw so well,
was training in “self-interest rightly understood.” For the Ancients this would have been no moral
education at all.
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The central moral principle of Publius’ arguments is the teaching of natural liberty. Liberty
is the central principle of his new republicanism. Virtue is not the central end of the political order,
but liberty provides a place for the life of genuine virtue. The Constitution does not demand, but
rather rejects, the ironclad and static hierarchical society depicted in the Republic. Instead the
principle of liberty permits faction through the now liberated pursuit of self-interest. Plato says
that in a democracy there is “freedom and free speech”, each man organizes “his life in it privately
just as it pleases him.”61 He says, “Just like a many-colored cloak decorated in all hues, this regime”
is “decorated with all [psychological] dispositions.”62 When liberty is the principle of a regime, it
gives free play to the passions and interests of the individual just as it gives free play to the passions
and opinions of factions within society. In No. 10 Madison depicts a society whose factions are
the product of the free expression of the diverse faculties of its citizens.
Society is free to contest and compete with itself without resulting in Plato’s much feared
stasis.63 Stasis is the factionalization of society which culminates in debilitating internal conflict.
Stasis would be diffused through the diffusion of factions in an extended republic. For Madison
the play of factions is as much a horizontal conflict as it is vertical. To the extent there is hierarchy,
it is one of merit, and appears to be naturally generated out of men’s faculties relative to the needs
and demands of civil society.
Harmful passions would be mitigated not educated away. In Publius’ new republicanism
“the task of restraining and transforming the appetites is replaced by the task of directing them into
useful, or at least not harmful, channels.”64 This is achieved through a system which exploits “the
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principle of countervailing passions.”65 Passion is set against passion, interest against interest,
avarice against avarice, and ambition will counteract ambition. Following the logic of Publius,
Adams opines that it is perhaps possible that a well-ordered constitution could prove that a republic
can exist “even among highwaymen, by setting one rogue to watch another; and the knaves
themselves may in time be made honest men by the struggle.”66 Perhaps well-ordered institutions
could make a republic of knaves. For Plato good government was the product of virtuous men.
Adams for example reversed the causal relation between government and virtue. Meanwhile for
Adams in the best republics virtue was an “effect of the well-ordered constitution rather than the
cause.”67
Another facet of this disagreement rests on the Modern distinction between state and
society. There is no corresponding distinction between state and society in the Greek city. Greek
political theory and practice do not recognize this difference. With the city, regime and society are
one. This means there was little freedom of distinction between the soul of the regime and the soul
of the citizen. The Constitution represents, on the other hand, the bare minimum of powers to
promote liberty and order. By design it was not intended to provide the rigorous moral education
of the Ancient city. Federalism distributes responsibility for the souls of citizens to state and local
government as much as it distributes sovereignty. The Modern state manages justice on the level
of necessity, freedom, order and public tranquility, while it leaves moral education to citizens to
society.
The Modern distinction between state and society manifests a greater distance between
public and private life. The spirit of the laws would be increasingly distant from the soul of the
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citizen. Jefferson went so far as to say that the moral spirit of the people would certainly not be
found in the Constitution, “but merely in the spirit of the people.”68 Jefferson’s extreme view that
the politeia was neither architectonic nor had any direct effect on the spirit of society was a
minority one among the Founders. For them the relationship between state and society remained,
but the demands and influence of the national government on society would be reduced.
Citizenship would entail less duties, demand less virtue, be less public. These were the products
of liberty, the lowered ends of political community and the distance of man from state. In the
Ancient regime the name “citizen” was a near synonym for statesman. In Modern regimes
citizenship takes on a more legalistic meaning. Driven by private interests over public duties in
“society” citizens would have the minimum obligation to follow the law, be industrious and pursue
their interests in ways that benefit the economic them and the well-being of society as a whole.
Most citizens would live an increasingly private life of industry and commercial activity.69 Citizens
would not be legislators deliberating, but employees and consumers.
The distinction between state and society explains the utter absence, outside of No. 10, of
virtually any discussion of society, religion or any form of education, moral or otherwise in The
Federalist Papers. Therefore, while Jefferson may have overstated things, there is something vital
in his observation about the distance of the national government to the people, and with this
distance, the precise role it would play in their lives. The national government was not responsible
for these parts of the citizen’s soul. We can see just how far we have come regarding the everyday
role of the federal government in the lives of ordinary Americans if we compare The Federalist’s
picture with today’s ever-increasing intrusion into the private realm. Yet, the Founders hardly
abandoned the soulcraft moral education. The Federalist presents a composite republic foreign to
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the Ancients. The full constitution of the American regime consists in three strata of government,
not one. Thus, the national government of the Constitution represented “the state” while state and
local governments more directly regulate “society.” Outside the broad principles of liberty and
self-interest, the details of moral and religious education would be delegated to state and local
governments.70 One need only examine the Revolutionary Era constitutions of the states to see that
almost all had a Bill of Rights, and explicit provisions promoting religion and virtue. The 1780
constitution of the Massachusetts states that “the happiness of a people, and the good order and
preservation of civil government, essentially depend on piety, religion and morality.”71 The
Massachusetts constitution was hardly unique in this regard, and yet this type of language is
conspicuously omitted in the national Constitution.
The national government formed by the Constitution represents the supreme law of the
land, but not its only law. This constitutional layer was largely about an arrangement of powers
which would provide the most basic ends of government by in part neutralizing the worst
tendencies of human nature. While the national government is designed to mitigate evils than the
promote social goods, it maintained an increasingly negative role compared to most regimes of the
past. Government was a necessary evil, less a positive good. It is not that soulcraft ceased to be
essential to a self-governing people, rather these were matters for the mediating institutions
referenced by Tocqueville, which are closer and more accountable to the people. The distinction
between state and society does not eliminate the obligation of moral education and its cultivation
of moral or social sentiments. Mention of the moral sentiments are not absence in The Federalist.
Hamilton and Madison speak of the moral sentiments of “humanity” and “sympathy”.72 But such
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sentiments are not so much formed by the Constitution as presumed. The Constitution presumed
self-interest and was designed to encourage self-interest rightly understood. Moral sentiments were
the prerequisites demanded of the ethos of a self-governing society. In his Farwell Address, George
Washington writes, “virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government.”73 In his First
Inaugural Address, Washington states, “there is no truth more thoroughly established than that
there exists in the economy and course of nature an indissoluble union between virtue and
happiness.” Publius and others made clear that only a moral society can be a self-governing
society. In 1775 John Adams stated, “Public virtue cannot exist in a Nation without private Virtue,
and public Virtue is the only Foundation of Republics.”74 For republican self-government to
succeed “public passion must be superior to all private passions.”75 “We have no government,”
said Adams, “armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality
and religion. Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry would break the strongest cords of our
Constitution as a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution was made only for a moral and
religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.” 76 Benjamin Rush
illustrated the causal chain between religion, virtue and liberty. In his essay on the moral education
proper to a republic, he stated the only foundation for “a republic is to be laid in Religion. Without
this there can be no virtue, and without virtue there can be no liberty, and liberty is the object and
life of all republican governments.”
77
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2. The Regime Founded on Nature

The Constitution of 1795, like its predecessors, was made for man. In the course of my life I have
seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians etc.; I know, too, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be a
Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists, his is unknown
to me.1
-

Joseph de Maistre, Considerations on France

The American Revolution represented a partial “emancipation from history” which
allowed the new nation and its Founders to attempt an experimental founding of a regime based
on the principles of human nature.2 Founding a regime on nature meant building it on the twin
cornerstones of human nature: Natural Rights, on the one hand, and its faculties of mind which
generate the likely and durable motives by which the actions of those in society and government
can be reasonably predicted Was the American republic founded on nature or history? The answer
is that Publius does not make the schismatic distinction between these two phenomena, that would
be characteristic of historicist thought of the 19th and 20th centuries. Human nature was the unifying
ground of human history and therefore human nature could be inferred from history, properly
understood, as an inquiry into the actions of men.
In No. 39 Publius asserts that the Constitution is consistent with both history and nature.
He says it is in harmony with “the genius of the people of America” and “the fundamental
principles of the revolution.”3 The Constitution would be rooted in the American ethos and the
Natural Rights of the Declaration which provided the Revolution with its principles. Yet, this ethos
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was itself decisively shaped by Natural Rights thinking already embedded, as it was, in the
Revolution and the state constitutions which were its fruits. American society itself appeared to
the Founders to have some of the admirable attributes and liberty of a nation founded increasing
in conformity with human nature, and in particular with the human equality not recognized in
European class societies and constitutions. John Adams himself asserted that the state constitutions
on which the national one was based, were erected in conformity with human nature itself. The
Founders’ synthesis of Enlightenment rationalism with religion, allowed them to reject, avant le
lettre, all those historicisms, progressivisms and scientisms which attempt to tether the being of
man indiscriminately to time and history and willfully reshape it in their own image. The
unchanging “laws of nature and nature’s God”, not those of time, history or progress, were the
guidepost of human identity and conduct.
This conformity with man’s nature did not simply mean, of course, that the Constitution,
or its underlying principles, were “written on a blank slate.”4 When Hamilton speaks of a Founding
based on “reflection and choice,” rather than “accident and force” he does not claim that they entire
nature of the regime was the product of rational speculation and a rejection of all received tradition
handed down by the accidents of history. Nonetheless, these traditions would be brought before
reason’s tribunal and refashioned in a novel manner. History was seen, not only as an accidental
force which imposed its standards on the present, but as a repository of human action for men to
weigh, consider and judge in the present. Publius and Founders concretely adapted Lockean
principles to a society already significantly shaped by them. Edmond Burke attempted to claim
that the American Constitution “reflected national character and history” and “not any abstract
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‘rights of man.’”5 The problem with this assertion is that it does not seriously take into
consideration an American society of 1787 imbued with those “abstract” principles. Nor is it
accurate to say that Lockean rights are mere abstractions. There is nothing abstract about the right
to life or to justly defend yourself from the threat of violent death. At the base of Lockean rights
is the primordial and concrete biological imperative of self-preservation and its ramifications.
In the Social Contract Rousseau says the founder-legislator must be capable “of changing
human nature, of transforming each individual” and “of altering man’s constitution.”6 For
Rousseau the legislator was a singular being who crafted the keystone of law alone through selfcontained and conscious exertions of intellect, as opposed to a collective, unconscious and
spontaneous process of historical trial, error and correction. Speaking of such founders, Hayek
says “all the famous law-givers did not intend to create new law but merely to state what law was
and had always been.”7 Publius and the rest of the members of the Grand Convention acted neither
like Rousseau’s Great Legislator, nor did they simply capitulate to the mere facts of history by
simply reasserting their rights as Englishman.
The American Revolution was no doubt conservative in some ways, as Burke suggested,
but it was no longer merely determined to conserve the rights of British subjects, elements of the
English Constitution or English Common Law. Instead, the Revolution and the Constitution sought
to conserve a new and distinct way of life that had developed in the New World which asserted
the sovereignty of the People, not the Crown. This practical assertion that it is the people who are
truly sovereign has no parallel in English history and is unintelligible without reference to the
Natural Rights tradition of John Locke and others. Burke thought the original aim of the American
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Founding “was not to secure independence from Britain, but to secure the legal rights of subjects
under the English constitution.”8 The radical, even audacious, claim of the American Founding
was to have erected a regime on the principles of nature itself. Nature, not history was the
foundation and standard of the Revolutionary period from 1776 to the Grand Convention and
subsequent ratification. The Founders did not see themselves as on the right side of history, rather
historical chance had merely granted fortuitous circumstances to implement this unprecedented
form of regime. When Hegel had seen Napoleon in Jena on October 13, 1806, he described him
as the “World-Spirit on Horseback.” The Founders understood the history-making nature of their
endeavor, but did not believe themselves to be the instruments of the transcendent, or prophets of
History.
Edmond Burke had written, for example, that "the people of America had ... formed a
constitution as well adapted to their circumstances as they could.”9 Burke saw the American
revolution in primarily conservative terms. The Constitution was merely the capstone of the
transplantation and “restoration” of English society in the New World whose essential form was
to be found in the English Constitution.10 It is no doubt true that the “constitution was the product
of centuries of tradition, wisdom and experience.”11 No one doubted this vital inheritance. Of
course it not a speculative document but an “invention of prudence” which found its wisdom in an
ingenious reflection on past experience. Wisdom is by definition a product of experience, and as
such a product of reflection on the past. But prudent conclusions about the past do not entail the
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dogmatic recitation of our forefather’s wisdom. Hamilton and Madison repeatedly stress the
novelty of the constitutional experiment. Publius and the Founders talk not as if they are merely
securing the rights of Englishmen, but rather assert the novelty of their enterprise. The evidence
for this novelty is evident first and foremost in the provisions of the Constitution itself. The proof
that received tradition is not the whole story is evident in the difference between the constitutions
of American and England.
Look no further than the repudiation of monarchy and a full dependence on the People as
the essence of the regime. One regime enshrined equal rights under the law, the other maintained
a multitiered feudal class system which was a legacy of the Middle Ages. No regime in history at
that time, had ever asserted equality under the law or the moral premise on which it rested, that
‘abstraction’ that “all men are created equal.” One distinguished noble from commoner, the other
did not. One constitution was written and expressed, the other existed only as an unwritten set of
traditions and habits. One was literally the product of the piecemeal accumulation of historical
precedents, the other of a Convention which devised the social compact in its entirety based on
conscious deliberations. One was a monarchy, the other a republic. One pledged fealty to the
Crown, the other placed sovereignty in the People. One blended the executive and legislative in
parliamentary fashion, while the other established a strong separation of powers which would be
guarded jealously. One had would have a Bill of Rights based on moral principle, while the other
would have one based solely on historical precedent.
Hamilton argues that the inclusion of a Bill of Rights would made it seem that government
was granting to the citizens that which they already possessed by nature.12 He explicitly invokes
the model of the English Bill of Rights of 1688, in which rights had been wrested from the Crown,
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as that which was rejected. Hamilton feared that the inclusion of a bill of rights would make it
seem identical in nature to the English Bill of Rights. The written enumeration of rights would
make it appear as if government was granting, rather than securing rights. In English history rights
were freedoms won from the Crown over time, not found in human nature universally.13
In the Spirit of Law, Montesquieu writes that the “government most in conformity with
nature is the one whose particular arrangement best relates to the disposition of the people for
whom it is established.”14 The relationship between city and the soul, government and human
nature, illustrates how political order is a direct product of human nature. Government is the
outward expression of our inner nature. 15 Political science and statesmanship therefore necessarily
depend on a “view of human nature, and the government…appropriate” to it.16 Human nature is in
need of a form commensurate to it. For Montesquieu, the government that is most nature, is also
most compatible with the faculties and interests of the people, as human beings and members of a
particular society.17
Good government is that form most in harmony with human nature. All thinking about the
best regime simply, or the best possible, is predicated on a form which might best perfect or fulfill
human nature in its individual and collective existence. Government’s conformity to human nature
culminates in political prosperity and human happiness. If government is nothing less than the
greatest reflection on human nature, the men who crafted the Constitution simultaneously sought
to navigate the horse trading of the Convention, while hewing as closely as possible to human
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nature and the particulars of the American spirit. Publius and the American Founders believed that
in fact, the novel republican form they had devised was more in conformity with human nature
than any other regime in history. The American republic would be the first regime truly founded
on human nature. Madison describes American republicanism imbued with a “manly spirit,” which
“posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous
innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favour of private rights and public happiness.”18
The explicit goal of the American Founding was to contrive a regime in harmony with the
human soul itself. Williams says The Federalist’s view of the “nature of man logically shaped the
kind of government they were advocating.”19 This statement does not go far enough in clarifying
the Founders’ intent. They sought to devise and justify the Founding precisely because it was seen
as in conformity with the universal characteristics of human nature. By erecting a regime on “the
simple principles of nature” the Founders sought a form of government that would stand as more
than a mere child of its times.20
In response to the 1795 constitution of the French Republic and the Universal Rights of
Man proclaimed by the French Revolution, Joseph de Maistre famously said that he had searched
in vain for this universal “man,” and had found only Frenchmen.21 de Maistre saw “man” as such
and his “universal” rights, as mere abstractions. For de Maistre human life existed only within the
particular and concrete confines of a specific historically rooted regime. This criticism echoes
Wilson’s latter remarks that no mention of the concerns of 1911 are to be found in the 1776
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Declaration. In this same vein Habermas concludes that a government founded on the basis of
Natural Right is “the autonomous creation by contract, of legal compulsion spring solely from the
compulsion of philosophical reason.”22 By contrast, most regimes throughout history, like England
and its ancient constitution, have conceived of the principles of their national identity, their rights
and their duties, as rooted in the particulars of their histories. These regimes had seen their
constitutional principles as primarily the product of historical development over time. Their nation
was a natural outgrowth of their particular history, habits and institutions, not a universal notion
of human nature. The distinct social conditions of the colonies, uprooted and distant from the long
historical memory of the Europe, held out the promise of a new type of regime. The United States
of America would instead be built on the cornerstone of man qua man. This is the universalist
creed of the American.
In Federalist No. 1 Hamilton writes that the proposed constitution conforms with “the true
principles of republican government.”23 Publius’ “revised republican form” was considered to be
more “consonant” with the “constitution of human nature.”24 In his Political Sketches of 1787,
congressman William Van Murray, speaking of the states, said the “American republics” were
“built upon the realities of human nature.”25 They were “free and responsive to the people, framed
so as to give ‘fair play’ to the actions of human nature.”26 The “true principles” of republicanism
were understood as themselves in harmony with human nature. They were “true” precisely in so
far as they were natural. In 1787 on the verge of the Convention, John Adams wrote that the
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constitutions which would provide the template for the national government were “perhaps, the
first example of governments erected on the simple principles of nature.”27 At the Convention
George Mason said “republican governments” were “in favor of the rights of the people—in favor
of human nature” itself.28 In his Farewell Address, Washington had written that the foundation of
the American regime “was not laid in the gloomy age of Ignorance and Superstition; but at an
Epoch when the rights of mankind were better understood and more clearly defined, than at any
other period.” Michael Zuckert writes, “the great novelty and power of the American experiment”
was to found a “regime based on nature, the regime ordered to natural rights.”29
If the Constitution asserts the “true principles of republican government,” Publius and
Founders believed in turn, these principles were in conformity with human nature itself. The “true
principles” of the American republic are synonymous with the “simple principles of nature.” The
Lockean rights of the Revolution and the novel political science on which the Constitution was
based convinced the Founders they were establishing a historically unique regime precisely
because of such a conformity. Epstein says that “republican government, because it is wholly
popular, might be said to take its essential character from human nature, its blending of qualities
derives from the way in which human nature may be expected to behave in certain prescribed
circumstances.”30 George Mason said republicanism was “in favor of the rights of the people.”31
Adams echoes this assertion almost verbatim writing that republican principles were “in favor of
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the rights of mankind.”32 Zuckert has described this new form of republicanism, in harmony with
human nature, as the “the natural rights republic.”33
The Federalists and the Anti-Federalists had debated tirelessly over the precise meaning of
“republicanism.” Was America to have the hallmarks of a Classical Republic, or would it
increasingly yield the Republicanism of modern liberals dedicated to popular sovereignty like John
Locke? Clearly the solution explained by Publius is heavily indebted to Modern liberalism and
Modern Republicanism, yet with an eye to vital dimensions of the Classical tradition that could
not be ignored. What is a republic? The central principles both sides agreed on was that a republic
was a form of government in which all were equal under the law, and primarily dedicated to the
sovereignty and the liberty of the people. Therefore a republic was “natural” precisely because its
political structure made all men equal under the law, and reflected the natural moral equality of
mankind. John Adams in 1787 defined a republic as “a government, in which all men, rich and
poor, magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and servants, the first citizen and the
last, are equally subject to the laws.”34 This form of government originates with a written
constitution dedicated in principle to the res publica.
A republic, or res publica, was literally the common “thing of the people.”35 It was a form
of government which was the property of the people. Adams says the word res, “signified in the
Roman language wealth, riches, property; the word publicus, quasi populicus, and per syncope
poplicus, signified public, common, belonging to the people; res publica, therefore, was publica
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res, the wealth, riches, or property of the people”36 A republic was “a government in which the
property of the people predominated and governed; and it had more relation to property than
liberty.” 37 A republic “signified a government, in which the property of the public, or people, and
of every one of them, was secured and protected by law. This idea, indeed, implies liberty; because
property cannot be secure unless the man be at liberty to acquire, use, or part with it, at his
discretion, and unless he have his personal liberty of life and limb, motion and rest, for that
purpose. It implies, moreover, that the property and liberty of all men, not merely of a majority,
should be safe.”38 Therefore, the government is the property every man, because “every man has a
share in government.”39
What do Adams and Mason mean when they affirm the American republic as “natural”?
The claim of a government “erected on the simple principles of nature” should not be overconstrued. This profession was simultaneously bold and humble. In fact they were negating
historical claims of divine authorship and implicitly calling the fruits of their own deliberations
before the tribunal of public scrutiny to an historically unprecedented degree. The Convention was
not the stormy peak of Sinai. The Founding would not be set in a mythical past lost to the mists of
time, but reported in the daily paper. For all its secrecy, the Convention was not a conclave whose
proceeding remained permanently concealed in order to perpetrate a fraud. The fidelity of The
Federalist to many of the arguments proposed at the Convention is a testament to this ultimate
transparency.
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A natural regime does not claim divine authorship or authority. It is a founding publicly
acknowledged as natural, not supernatural. It is made by men and their reasonings not gods or
heroes and their omnipotence. There was virtually no invocation of God or the divine in the
rhetoric of either the Convention or The Federalist. It a regime based on empirical observations
of human conduct by mere mortals and established through the self-acknowledged imperfect
reasonings of men. It instantiates mortal opinions about human nature in a self-acknowledged
man-made document evident for all to see. Adams writes the nation was not founded on “artifice,
imposture, hypocrisy” or “superstition.”40 It would rest on “the natural authority of the people
alone, without pretense to miracle or mystery.”41 Adams makes clear that “It will never be
pretended that any persons employed in that service had interviews with the gods, or were in any
degree under the inspiration of Heaven.”42 He concludes that “Neither the people, nor their
conventions…considered legislation in any other light than” the mundane, “as ordinary arts and
sciences.”43 The regime founded on nature can be judged before nature’s tribunal of reason and
experience. It was literally an experiment whose results could be rationally and empirically tested.
American history is this test. The self-conscious absence of supernatural rhetoric in the founding,
at that point unique in history, is a central dimension of the naturalness of the American regime.
The attempted conformity of the American republic to human nature is evident in a variety
of ways: The central meaning Publius and the Founders attributed to the term “natural” was
government that rested in “the natural authority of the people alone.”44 Popular sovereignty was
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dictated by man’s moral equality of Natural Rights which manifests politically as a “wholly
popular” government, of, by and for the people. The republican form was singularly associated
with the natural principle of liberty. A fully human existence demands liberty. Government by the
people’s consent is then consistent with the Natural Rights inferred from human nature. Writing
in April of 1787 in his Vices of the Political System of the United States, and repeated verbatim in
his speech on the merits of the New Jersey Plan to the Convention on 19 June, Madison said
“Where slavery exists the republican theory becomes still more fallacious.”45 Republican theory is
contradicted by slavery because liberty is its essential principle. The distinct dignity of human
nature conferred by its rational faculty necessitates liberty.
This new form of republic was a popular government. Popular government is in conformity
with the natural liberty of mankind. It was an expression of the law of human nature and its Natural
as understood by the statesmen and philosophers of the day. Popular government is rooted in action
based on the distinctively human act of deliberation and consent rather than mere impulse or
animal coercion. Popular government is a recognition of natural human equality. There are no
natural rulers or those who should be ruled. The supreme law of this regime recognizes man’s
natural moral equality, his equality of rights. This is achieved through the equal application of the
law and the political and legal denial of a hereditary nobility, or any other acknowledgement of a
fixed hierarchy of class distinction within society. All men would be equally subject to the same
laws in the same way. Nonetheless it recognizes the natural or given distinction of men’s birth and
faculties, which if utilized, allow men to prosper and distinguish themselves in accord with their
merit. This would establish a “natural aristocracy among men”46 and “obtain for rulers” men of the
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highest virtue.47 Diverse men with diverse births and faculties will benefit differently under the
same laws.
The natural regime takes men as they are given, naturally. Taking men as they are means
taking into account those features given by nature. This meant respecting their actual conduct and
natural or likely motives. It would be based on how men actually behave rather than beatific images
of how they ought to. This principal manifests in a healthy respect for the diversity of actual human
types and their real motivations. Central was an acknowledgement of the natural gravitational role
of self-interest as the prime mover and shaper of human action. Taking men as they are naturally
meant respecting both the vices and virtues of human nature. Recognizing its vices, this regime
acknowledges the limits and fallibility of human reason. Government would be grounded
theoretically and practically in the authority of opinion and respect its natural diversity. Opinion,
not the fallacious mantle of authoritative truth or divine right, would rule. Taking men as they are
motivated the Modern liberal attitude of tolerance to the diversity of men and their opinions.
If the essence of the republican form is liberty, the essence of the novel republicanism of
Publius is a priority on civil, as opposed to political, liberty. This realism led the Modern republic
to be dedicated to the civil, not political, liberty of all the people. Civil liberty would be manifest
and maintained through the rejection of the small, homogeneous, public spirited, mixed regime of
Classical republicanism. The modern republic would be extended, commercial, wholly popular
and dedicated to the protection of civil liberties and the right of property in particular. It would be
a regime largely dedicated to private self-interest which would leave its citizens free to pursue
their own needs, desires and happiness. The pursuit of self-interest would particularly come in the
form of the pursuit of economic well-being within the context of a commercial society which
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would promote its tendencies as virtues. The principle of civil liberty promoted by modern
republicanism was understood as more in conformity to human nature than the excessive political
liberty of classical republics and the pure democracies of the Ancient world. Classical republics
concerned themselves with cultivating the distinctly human features of its citizens through public
life. They concerned themselves with the rigorous demands of human excellence. As Madison
reminds the reader in No. 10, extraordinary Spartan measures, were necessary to shape and unify
the citizens of the Classical republic. These regimes had to expressly go against the grain of the
natural inclinations of human nature. In rejecting the Classical republic Montesquieu had observed
that in a commercial society like England, “the inhabitants are the least coerced, the least
“modified” in their souls, and the least “artificially educated.”48 Instead, with their civil liberties
protected “each individual, always independent, would follow to a great extend his caprices and
fantasies.”49
The liberal and commercial society of the Modern republic was often considered the least
coercive, and therefore the least obstructive to the natural tendencies, needs and desires of the
diversity of human beings. A society in which those desires are liberated therefore gives us a more
accurate vision of the nature of man acting under his free inclinations. Montesquieu suggests that
the political scientist is able, through observations of man largely left free to his own devices in a
liberal commercial society dedicated to civil liberty, to arrive “at the true science of human
nature.”50 The Ancients had presented a distorted, even fallacious, image of man solely by
observing extraordinary examples of excellence, rather than men as they are ordinarily. The
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science of human nature on which Modern republicanism is built, claims then to be superior to,
and supersede, the Ancient science of human nature which identifies its destination as the closed
and morally demanding Ancient city.
Acknowledging the frailties of human nature meant striking the proper balance between
order and liberty. The lurking passions and defects of human nature demand external constraints.
The principles of liberty and consent would be counterbalanced by the appropriate checks. This
was a workable form of ‘wholly popular’ government with sentinels against the deficiencies of
popular rule like majority tyranny. Natural rights dictate limits to what the majority can consent
to, and the Constitution provides sentinels to make those boundaries real. Republican government
is a mean between pure democracy and aristocracy. Through representation consent is preserved.
Meanwhile the passions of the many are channeled and filtered through their representatives who
are also their rulers.
A political science which frames the evaluation of regimes by their degree of naturalness
was hardly new or unusual. Political philosophers since Plato have viewed regimes as more or less
natural, more or less in conformity with human nature. This was no less true of the political science
of the 18th century. They typically assessed the degree to which human nature was bent in
conformity to the demands of a particular regime or allowed to more freely express its universal
characteristics. Plato’s Republic was to be a regime rooted in nature, by means of the rule of reason.
No doubt between the Ancient city and the Modern commercial republic, the meaning of what was
“natural” had changed, from the highest ends of man’s soul, to the lower needs of mere life pursued
by the body. Yet, even Plato acknowledges the way democracy gives free reign to the natural
diversity and impulses of the human soul and does not make burdensome and distorting demands
of it. In his political essays, Hume writes “Sovereigns must take mankind as they find them, and
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cannot pretend to introduce any violent change in their principles and ways of thinking… And the
less natural any set of principles are, which support a particular society, the more difficulty will a
legislator meet with in raising and cultivating them.”51 Hume, like Montesquieu, captures the
ambiguity of human nature: What is natural to man as such, is different from what is “natural” to
an already formed nation whose character has been habituated into a particular second nature.
Hume identifies the practical advantages and justice of a regime whose principles are in the
greatest possible conformity with our first and fixed nature. Hume notes for example that the
principles of the Romans were “somewhat more natural” than those of Sparta.52 The extreme
habituation required to cultivate Spartan virtue in the Ancient republic is not natural by Modern
standards. Spartan soulcraft sought to make a virtuous second nature through a discipline so
extreme as to be contrary to the natural inclinations of our first. Taking men as they are does not
mean abandoning the cultivation of a second nature; it means having a more healthy respect for
the first.
The novel republicanism articulated in The Federalist Papers was the experimental answer
to an age-old question. How can institutions of genuine self-government be contrived in such a
way so as to avoid the inevitable diseases to which they are prone? The problem of popular
government is a conundrum of human nature. Human nature is complex, not simple. The faculties
of reason and passion are the crosscurrents of the human soul. Both must be respected. Liberty is
in conformity with the rational element of man’s nature, but the restraints of and on government
are required by reason’s weakness and the dominance of the passions. The running thread of The
Federalist Papers is that while human nature demands liberty, history shows self-government has
failed to properly secure the blessings of nature it was intended to establish. The central problem
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was how to contrive a form of popular government which could successfully withstand the ills
incident to popular government by supplying the defects of human nature, while remaining both
free and stable.
In Volume I The Federalist illustrates the failures of the Articles to properly anticipate the
defect of better motives in human nature. These deficiencies are presented as an emblematic
instance of the more general historical failings of popular governments. The deficiencies of
democracy were the deficiencies of human nature writ large. Publius and the Founders “distrusted
democracy for the same reason that they distrusted aristocracy – because they distrusted human
nature.”53 Both give human nature, whether the few or the many, too much free rein. Both expect
more virtue than man is capable of. The government of the Articles lacked the power and structure
to confront these deficiencies. It did not respect or mitigate the factious tendencies “sown in the
nature of man.” The first government was unable to manage conflict created by competing
factional interests. The Articles did not attempt to unnaturally bend human nature so much as
expect more natural virtue and sociability than is reasonable. In light of their experiences under
the Articles, the Philadelphia Convention concluded the republic “could not live on virtue alone.”54
Volume II of The Federalist is dedicated to the republican principles, and an account of
the mechanics, which could remedy the problems incident to popular government. Publius explains
the arrangement of powers designed to solve the problems posed by self-interest and the passionate
nature of man. He provides a detailed account of how the enumerated powers and procedures of
the Constitution can check the defects of human nature. In No. 51 Madison acknowledges that the
“great difficulty” of “framing government” is that it is “administered by men over men.”
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Government needs sufficient power to rule men, but not so much that men in power can tyrannize
over them.
Publius and the Founders sought to solve the deficiencies of democracy without
abandoning the principle of popular sovereignty. The solution was a novel form of republicanism.
The Federalist’s answer was to apply the “republican remedy for the diseases most incident to
republican government.”55 At the Convention Madison said a republic is the only “defence against
the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of government.”56 A
peculiar and innovative form of popular government is the solution to the ills of popular
government. “A republican system,” said Madison “will control all the evils which have been
experienced.” 57 The answer to the problem of popular government was a regime founded in proper
conformity with the vices and virtues of human nature. This started with a more honest assessment
of the deficiencies of human nature but also a greater appreciation for the common nature of the
many, and new thinking about the institutions which would be up to the task.
The Constitution represents this “republican remedy.”58 The constitutional order would
provide the “dykes and dams” to restrain, channel and control the vicious elements of human nature
while amplifying the virtuous ones.59 The Constitution channels passions and promotes virtues
the Founders saw as necessary to the public good, without making excessive or unrealistic
demands on human nature. The appropriate constitutional mechanisms would be necessary to both
preserve popular sovereignty and simultaneously mitigate its ills, the ills of human nature. The
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provisions of the Constitution needed to be based on motives more reliable and durable than virtue,
honor, duty or some innate moral sense. The Founders did not believe reason, virtue or moral
sentiments alone were sufficient deterrents to conduct contrary to the public good.
The Founders’ republicanism was designed to balance the demands of security, stability
and liberty demanded by human nature in order for all citizens to pursue the good life. It would be
“wholly popular,” but would both represent and restrain the people. Political liberty would be the
privilege of an elective aristocracy. The American republic hoped to supply both a sufficient grant
of freedom commensurate with the reason and dignity of human nature, but also sentinels to guard
against its own ills and vices. It provides mechanisms for the voice of the people to be heard and
checks to constrain it Popular sovereignty was consistent with man’s natural liberty, while
representative institutions would “refine and enlarge” popular opinion for the sake of the common
interest. The governing majority is constrained by the principles of natural right and the checks of
separated powers. Constraints would help guarantee liberty would not become license. Selfgovernance would require industry and accumulation but also moderation, freedom but also
rational self-restraint. Self-restraint would be fortified by various checks, like the separation of
powers, and a moral education which cultivated religious opinion and the citizens’ deliberative
faculties. The need for reason and virtue remained unabated, but the Founders understood the
historical calamity of making man’s rational faculty shoulder more than it could bear.
The liberal principles of American republicanism place it more closely in line with the
natural inclinations of human beings. Publius and the Founders believed that the way the
Constitution respected both human vice and virtue made it more natural than any other form. If
human nature is a mean between vice and virtue, republican government would be a mean between
the acceptance of vice and the promotion of and dependence on virtue. The regime will not bend
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and habituate human nature in the name of extreme virtue or self-sacrifice, but only to the extent
political prosperity demands it. Herbert Storing asserts that Publius rested “his argument for the
primacy of the Union, not on any notion of a band of brothers or popular patriotism and selfrestraint, but on self-interest and private passion, properly regulated.”60
Self-interest was accepted as the natural motor of human conduct. The American regime
embraces self-interest as harmonious with our natural rights, and encourages it, if only to the extent
in can be leveraged for the common interest. The self-interest of our first nature, however, must
be educated into a second nature self-interest understood rightly. Civic virtue would be patriotism
to a regime dedicated to the liberty of the individual. Likewise the republican form would leverage
certain “vices” of our first nature for public benefit. It would be a commercial republic. Ancient
acquisitive vices could be deemed modern commercial virtues. Part of the “republican remedy”
was a self-conscious de-escalation, of the national level, of the conflict between desire and duty,
private interest and public. “Private rights and public happiness” would be brought as closely in
line with each other as possible.61 This de-escalation allows for sufficient conformity between the
passions and interests of the individual and those of the political community in order to solve an
age-old problem.
Nonetheless, the success of the republican experiment depended on the proper estimation
man’s ability to live by his deliberative faculty. What was the natural quotient of reason within
society at large and how can those more exceptional faculties be recruited into public service?
Whatever the differences in “the relative strength or exercise of the rational faculty among
individual men” which Publius and the Founders “readily admitted,” there was “little doubt that
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the faculty itself was universal.”62 Despite the acknowledged frailties there “was a general
consensus that all men had a capacity for reason.” 63 Echoing Madison’s claim in No. 55, Hamilton
writes in No. 76, “the supposition of universal venality in human nature, is little less an error in
political reasoning, than that of universal rectitude.”64 Hamilton claims that if we view “view
human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues, or exaggerating its vices” that it has
sufficient reason and virtue to meet the demands of republican self-government.65 Hamilton
concludes that “there is a portion of virtue and honour among mankind, which may be a reasonable
foundation of confidence: and experience justifies the theory.66 In No. 55 Madison writes that
there is “a degree of depravity in mankind, which requires a certain degree of circumspection and
distrust: so there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and
confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree
than any other form.”67
Publius and the Founders believed the true principles of republicanism were synonymous
with the true principles of human nature. If the solutions Publius proposed are correct, then their
novel republicanism was not only consistent with the American ethos, but with human nature itself.
Yet, the republican solution is only possible if human character stands as a mean between virtue
and vice, between reason and passion. Republican liberty is designed to accommodate both what
is noble and what is base in human nature. The depravity of human nature, its “defect of better
motives,” necessitates government. Yet men must also have sufficient reason and virtue to devise
a regime to compensate for those defects. In No. 39 Madison writes of republicanism that “no
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other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental
[and universal] principles of the revolution; or with that honourable determination which animates
every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for selfgovernment.”68 Speaking of the provisions of the Constitution, Hamilton writes in No. 57 that “It
is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of men. But are
they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise?”69 This constitutional
republic was an experiment to determine whether men were sufficiently rational to genuinely
govern themselves. The answer was not a foregone conclusion and held consequences for the fate
of mankind, not merely the United States.
The natural regime is not a utopian scheme. The regime rooted in nature, is a more modest
claim than it might first appear. Publius’ republicanism acknowledges that human nature lacks
sufficient reason and virtue to be simply self-governing, to live without external constraints at all.
Men are neither gods nor angels. At the same time there is a sufficient supply to give us “esteem
and confidence” that mankind is capable of the freest possible form of political constraint.
Ironically, writes Rahe, this arrangement “seeks to vindicate man’s capacity for self-government
by teaching him to acknowledge” the limits of this same capacity.70 In 1807 Jefferson’s sentiments
echoed Publius’ underlying premise of the Constitution when he said, “We are a people capable
of self-government, and worthy of it.” This is an affirmation human nature and the American ethos.
In 1797 Jefferson observed that “It was by the sober sense of our citizens that we were safely and
steadily conducted from monarchy to republicanism, and it is by the same agency alone we can be
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kept from falling back.”71 Burke sounds the warning regarding the ever-present reality of this
precipice. “Society cannot exist,” he says, “unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be
placed somewhere; and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained
in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions
forge their fetters.”72
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3. Men Are Not Angels

As all those demonstrate who reason on a civil way of life, and as every history is full of examples,
it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws in it to presuppose that all men are
bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free
opportunity for it. When any malignity remains hidden for a time, this proceeds from a hidden
cause, which is not recognized because no contrary experience has been seen. But time. which they
say is the father of every truth. exposes it later.1
-

Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses
-

Journalist Horace White once claimed the Constitution “is based upon the philosophy of
Hobbes and the religion of Calvin. It assumes that the natural state of mankind is a state of war,
and that the carnal mind is at enmity with God.”2 Historian Richard Hofstadter says the authors of
Constitution and the Federalist Papers “had a vivid Calvinistic sense of human evil and damnation
and believed with Hobbes that men are selfish and contentious.” 3 He says these men of experience,
“having seen human nature on display in the market place, the courtroom, the legislative chamber,
and in every secret path and alleyway where wealth and power are courted, they felt they knew it
in all its frailty. To them a human being was an atom of self-interest. They did not believe in man,
but they did believe in the power of a good political constitution to control him.”4
While the tenor of both man’s claims is overblown, the general substance is accurate with
the appropriate caveats. Benjamin Wright says “at first glance the conception of human nature
stated, reiterated, and depended upon in The Federalist is pessimistic or, in the most unusual sense
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of the word, realistic”5 Lovejoy say Publius presents “a sound and realistic theory of human
nature.”6 Dietze writes, Publius “depicts man as able and worthy of self-government but does not
hesitate to show that frailty of human nature which brought about the crisis under the
Confederation.”7 Diamond describes The Federalist as presenting “a sober argument for
democracy, derived from a sober idea of man and the propensities of his nature.”8 In 1788 at the
Virginia ratifying convention, Madison said that in a “candid examination of history we shall find
that turbulence, violence, and abuse of power by the majority trampling on the rights of the
minority, have produced factions and commotions, which in republics, have more frequently than
any other cause produced despotism.”9
In No. 6 Hamilton reminds the reader that “men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.”10
In No. 15 he concludes government is necessary because of the “folly and wickedness of
mankind.”11 Men are prone to wickedness and folly because their passions do not “conform to the
dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”12 Even Hume, a man inclined to embrace man’s
petty foibles, speaks of how good institutions can be a “considerable check on the natural depravity
of mankind.”13
Hume acknowledges the “frailty” and “perverseness of our nature,” saying that “it is
impossible to keep men, faithfully and unerringly, in the paths of justice” because “he is seduced
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from his great and important, but distant interests, by the allurement of present, though often very
frivolous temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human nature.”14 Hamilton, quoting
Hume approvingly, said that “in contriving any system of government…every man ought to be
supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, but private interest.” 15 A “knave”
is a “self-interested creature” who ignores the harm they commit to the good of others, while
blindly pursuing their own.16 Machiavelli is rather more blunt. He says it is “necessary” for anyone
devising a republic “to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the
malignity of their spirit whenever they have free opportunity for it.”17 In short, The Federalist
acknowledges that the Constitution presupposes that men are not angels.
Men are not angels. This is the central insight of The Federalist. It is the permanent political
problem presented by human nature. This observation haunts the analysis of every aspect of social
and political relations in The Federalist. It found its way into the minds of Hamilton and Madison
by way of their faith, their education, their intellectual heritage, and no less from their reasonings
on and experience of their fellow man. It represents what Hamilton calls “the accumulated
experience of ages.”18 That men are imperfect, and their imperfections are in need of restraint, is a
problem evident throughout history, across time and place. This matter cannot be wished away or
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made to disappear through progress, the accumulation of scientific knowledge, or utopian schemes
exhibiting the most virtuous arrangements of political power.
The Founders and the authors of The Federalist rejected “the popular Enlightenment view
that man was basically good, and corrupted only from without by faulty institutions such as
monarchy or mercantilism.”19 The view that men were by nature good led to the conclusion that if
faulty institutions were merely overthrown, men would “live together in harmony with little or no
government.”20 Instead venality, corruption, discord, enmity and evil were permanently “sown in
the nature of man.”21 Man’s shortcomings could never entirely be blamed on exogenous factors
such as institutions or his circumstances. These flaws were as elements of a cosmic periodic table
which cannot be fully extricated from his nature. 22 Therefore, they cannot be ignored, only
accounted for.23 Since no arrangement of political institutions, however virtuous, can eliminate
depravity and evil altogether and make men good simply, government and the threat of coercion,
would always be necessary.24 Thus, the cause of the imperfections observed in man and his society
are imperfections intrinsic to his nature; they are not the product of imperfect institutions alone. If
human nature has definitive defects and limits, neither mankind nor his institutions are perfectible,
or subject to final solutions. The lesson to be learned from the fact that men are not angels is that
the role of government and social policy is to mitigate existing ills, not transform man and his
society in order to banish them from human nature itself. Abolish man’s imperfections and abolish
man.
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The inextricable problem is the depravity and limits of human nature. Yet, if the Founders
had been as pessimistic about man as Hobbes, they would have advocated for a Leviathan, a statist
vision of monolithic government rooted in quivering fear of a Mortal God. Instead, they advocated
for republican self-government rooted in liberty and self-interest rightly understood. Despite their
belief in the existence of sufficient virtue for self-government, this observation meant government
itself was in need of restraint as much as those it governed. A limited government, whose sole
purpose would be to secure Natural Rights, is the novel goal which stems from this observation.
The Federalist does not present government merely a necessary evil, but they are at great pains to
acknowledge the evils of power unrestrained. Power unrestrained gives force to the less than
angelic impulses of human nature. The authors of The Federalist do not, like Hobbes or Spinoza
see everything natural in man from a morally neutral or amoral perspective. They were moral
realists who identify good and evil as inevitable products of human nature, not the artificial
constructs of naming and society. Their thinking on morality and justice is more in line with
Christian Theology and John Locke. Human depravity or evil was not a social construct. Strauss
puts this attitude rather tersely: “no bloody or unbloody change of society can eradicate the evil in
man.”25
When Madison invoked “angels” in contradistinction to “men” he raised the specter of his
Calvinist outlook on man. Calvinist theology “stressed the fallen state of human nature.”26 A
notebook from Madison’s teenage days as a student contains the following syllogism:
1. No sinners are happy.
2. Angels are happy; therefore
3. Angels are not sinners.27
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The implication of this syllogism’s conclusion, “Angels are not sinners” is that if men are sinners,
they are not angels. Man, is that “ambiguous being, in between, more than an animal, less than a
god.”28 Madison’s syllogism represents a sound rejection of the theory of the natural goodness of
mankind or the belief in historical progress and human perfectibility. Both Hamilton and Madison
speak in a language tinctured by Christian traditions including the Calvinist Protestantism woven
into the fabric of colonial America. They speak of man’s “wickedness” and “depravity”. In No. 55
Madison says, “there is a degree of depravity in mankind, which requires a certain degree of
circumspection and distrust.”29 In responding the Federal Farmer, Hamilton says “Your conduct,
in every respect, affords a striking instance of the depravity of human nature.”

30

The term

“depravity”, used twice in The Federalist, is of unmistakably religious origin. It was the coin of
the realm for the Christian thought which dominated America from its colonial foundings onward.
In the Christina context the term signifies man’s terrestrial limitations and fallenness, in short, his
sinfulness. The Westminster Confession was “the creedal authority of English Calvinism familiar
to all Colonial Presbyterians.”31 In said, “From…original corruption…we are utterly indisposed,
disabled, and made opposite to all good and wholly inclined to evil.” 32 This is the very definition
of man’s depravity and fallenness.
What are men truly like? In No. 1 Hamilton lists the permanent and prevailing motives of
human conduct as “ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other
motives, not more laudable than these.”33 In No. 57 Hamilton writes of the “caprice and wickedness
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of men.”34 In No. 72 he speaks of their “avarice” “vanity” and “ambition”. In Nos. 6 and 73
Hamilton writes of their “love of power” and dominion.35 In No. 6 he writes how popular
assemblies are “frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of
other irregular and violent propensities.”36 Such sentiments on human Hamilton nature echoed his
remarks at the Constitutional Convention. On June 22, 1787, he announced: “Take mankind in
general, they are vicious... Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their
passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy
motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing
passions are ambition and interest; it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of
these passions, in order to make them subservient to the public good.”37 In No. 78 Hamilton says
that social and political conflicts “grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind.”38 Throughout
The Federalist Hamilton and Madison speak of how human nature is subject to “quarrels,
jealousies, and envy” prompted by its “love of preeminence” and “wounded pride,” which lead to
political “vindictiveness” and strife.39
Men are all the more unmoved by their better angels when assembled in a mass. Speaking
of “great councils,” Madison writes in No. 37, that their goal is to reconcile discordant opinions,
and assuage mutual jealousies, but has been little more than “a history of factions, contentions,
and disappointments; and may be classed among the most dark and degrading pictures, which
display the infirmities and depravities of the human character.”40 In No. 49 Madison says “a nation
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of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato.”41
There are no mortal men of perfect wisdom or virtue. In No. 55 Madison doubles down, saying
that even if “every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have
been a mob.”42 In No. 15 Hamilton concludes government is necessary because “the passions of
men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice.”43
The central concern in the observation of man’s depravity was not the redemption of his
soul, despite the centrality of Christian influences in these observations. No doubt, Publius paints
a compelling Christian portrait of fallen man colored by the language and observations of
Augustine and Calvin. For Augustine, fallen man, because he was “governed by self-love, is
constantly subject to destructive emotions and impulses. He is envious and vindictive; he loves
glory; he desires material riches; he is consumed by what Augustine calls libido dominandi, the
lust for mastery, the desire to dominate others.”44 This desire for mastery “refuses to accept that
all men are by nature equal.”45 Augustine held man’s libido dominandi, its “lust for mastery” and
“desire to dominate others" was the arch passion of the soul that posed the central problems of the
City of Man. This passion was both the root cause of evil, but also the origin of civil society which
“arose out of man’s lust for power and violence.”46 A jealous Cain, slew his brother Abel, and
founded a city. Departing from his Pagan forebears, Augustine understood government as an
expression of the base impulses of a fallen human nature.47 Government “arose out of man’s lust
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for power and violence… and it has always existed largely to acquire and preserve those things
which man desires only because he is greedy and sinful.”48
Depravity is a synonym for what Hamilton calls in No. 24 “the frailty of human nature.”49
Human beings have neither “perfect wisdom” nor “perfect virtue.”50 What is the cause of these
limitations? In No. 55 Madison says the “passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason.”51
Reason fails to overcome the dominion of the passions. In his Essay on Man, Alexander Pope
writes, “The ruling passion conquers reason still.”52 Hamilton and Madison follow Hume’s
observation which identifies the fundamental flaw in human nature that man is primarily a being
of passion succumbs to immediate interest because his reason is typically too weak to dictate action
based on considerations of long-term interest. Reason is limited, either because it is made
inoperative by the passions, or in light of its insufficient knowledge of its objects of understanding.
The limits of reason in most men and society at large are identified as the cause of injustice.
Madison merely paraphrases Augustine when he says, “If men were angels, no government would
be necessary.”53 Since men are fallen beings, with reason frail and unruly passions, unable to
restrain themselves by internal means alone, the external restraint of government is necessary.
The concern for Publius and the Founders, however, was not to save souls, but preserve
life and liberty. The problem of human nature was political, not moral. Unlike Augustine and
Calvin, Publius is too concerned with the City of Man to simply condemn the depravity of human
nature. The very name “Publius” illustrates their respect for worldly ambition and the glory of the
City of Man. Rather, this is a disinterested scientific observation of man’s limitations the political
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scientist and founder must consider. Despite his central concern for the unruly passions which
militate against the common good, there is a quiet celebration of its self-interestedness. Avarice
can be channeled into industriousness and ambition trained and tempered by restraints and
provided the proper objects of desire.
Human nature is naturally egoistic, inclined to self-interest and self-love. Evil exits because
men are willing to harm others in order to benefit themselves. Man’s natural sociability inclines
him not only to amity and harmony, but also to enmity and conflict. Conflict and enmity are no
less a product of man’s sociability as is harmony. Men desire and perhaps even need enemies as
well as friends. Hobbes illustrates how men desire dominion, mastery, honors and glory in a zerosum game of recognition. If some desire to be masters, there must have slaves to realize and
recognize their dominion. The conflict between individual and common good, and the failure to
glean long-term interests, is as much the product of natural egoism and reason’s limits, as it is
man’s natural diversity and individuality.
Hume says the source of all injustice is our self-love, untutored and unrestrained. “Selflove”, says Hume, “when it acts at its liberty,… is the source of all injustice and violence.”54 Hume
observes the dire and “pernicious effects” of self-love, when given unrestrained liberty, culminate
in “the total dissolution of society.”55 Hume says it is evident that “each person loves himself better
than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations
and acquaintance.”56 This propensity to self-love, however must “necessarily produce an
opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions; which cannot but be dangerous”
to civil society.57 Self-love naturally inclines men “to extend his acquisitions as much as
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possible.”58 The acquisitive impulse is merely an extension of man’s self- love. Hume says the
avidity “of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable,
perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society.”59 As man extends the sphere of his
acquisitive impulse, he necessarily begins to encroach and invade on others and commit injustice.
Depravity suggests our myopia to discern our own interests even when we seek to
understand them rightly. This myopia is caused by the connection which subsists between man’s
“reason and his self-love,” which cause his opinions and his passions to “have a reciprocal
influence on each other.”60 The problem is that our opinion of our self-interest is always tinctured
with self-love. Our interest comes in a form as it “appears” to us, rather than in its “real and intrinsic
value.”61 Self-love conspires with reason to distort our understanding of our genuine interests. Selflove inclines men to be increasing indifferent to things and people sufficiently remote to our own
immediate sphere of existence.62 When people are sufficiently remote committing injustice against
those who are anonymous becomes permissible because we cannot see how it might harm our own
interest.
Both our affections and understanding diminish as people and things become increasingly
remote in time or space. At such a distance, we lack the ability to sympathize and see others as an
extension of our own sphere of self-love. Hume says, “There is no quality in human nature, which
causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to
the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their
intrinsic value.”63 Men, says Hume, are always “inclined to prefer present interest to distant and
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remote.”64 They are unable “to resist the temptation of any advantage, that they may immediately
enjoy, in the apprehension of an evil, that lies at a distance from them.”

65

Since distance

anaesthetizes us to those things sufficiently remote to ourselves, we are willing to pursue our raw
desires without the call of pity, or the pangs of conscience, guilt or shame. This reciprocal influence
means men will always consider their own interest first, and when considering themselves, their
immediate interest over remote. This is why no man can be a judge in his own case and government
becomes necessary to the third-party administration of justice. This explains why self-love needs
to be transmuted by good government into self-interest properly understood.
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4. The Original Inducements to Civil Power

A Government like ours has so many safety values, giving vent to over heated passions, that it
carries within itself a relief against the infirmities from which the best of human Institutions cannot
be exempt.1
-

James Madison, Letter to General LaFayettte, November 25, 1809

“Government,” says Madison, is nothing less than the “greatest of all reflections on human
nature.” Government is a product and expression of human nature. All political science and
philosophy, all government, is nothing less than a great meditation on human nature. Governance
is an act of steering or guiding, commanding or ruling. Its very existence indicates men do not or
cannot simply direct their either their individual or collective lives by themselves. They are unable
to rule themselves by internal controls alone. Unlike angels who need no government, men require
external channels to guide and restrain their motivations and actions. The necessity and structure
of law and government is the most telling admission that the uneducated and unrestrained passions
and interests of human nature are averse to the rights of others and the public interest because it
cannot restrain itself through internal means alone. The existence and necessity of government is
an admission of a central fact of a human nature: “men are not angels.” Therefore, man is in need
of external constraint.
Government is a consequence of a nature incapable of ruling itself simply. To say men are
not angels is to say that “human nature does not by “itself generate social harmony.”2 Rather civic
harmony necessitates government and the “appropriate legislation.”3 Hamilton asks, “Why has
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government been instituted at all?” He answers: “Because the passions of men will not conform to
the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”4 In the Social Contract, Rousseau writes,
“If there were a people consisting of Gods, it would govern itself democratically. So perfect a
Government is not suited to men.”5 Thus popular government cannot simply recognize the consent
of the people. Government exists because men exhibit a “defect of better motives, they lack
sufficient self-control and are therefore need external constraint. In No. 78 Hamilton writes that
the constitutional order is a product of “the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human
nature.”6 The very existence and structure of government are a product of the peculiar nature of
mankind and its weaknesses.
In language evocative of Madison’s No. 51, Hume speaks of the “ills” of human nature and
its only “remedy.” Hume says “a remedy” for these ills “can never be effectual without correcting
this propensity.”7 Yet, such weaknesses are “incurable in human nature” and therefore men must
“endeavour to palliate what they cannot cure.”8 The observation of the incurability of man’s
limitations sits as the foundation of Publius political philosophy.9 Only through “reflection and
experience,” by can man learn the “pernicious effects” of self-love at its liberty.10 Only when his
“original inclination” is “checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or observation” can
man begin to mitigate the negative consequences of his destructive passions.11 And, since it is
impossible to “change or correct any thing material” in human nature, the best that can be done “is
to change our circumstances and situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice our
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nearest interest and their violation our most remote.”12 In language later echoed by Madison, Hume
says it is through civil society alone that mankind “is able to supply his defects and raise himself
up to an equality with his fellow-creatures.” 13 “By society,” Hume writes, “all his infirmities are
compensated.”14 And yet, passions which place man in a State of Nature, then, also become the
very inducements by which he will liberate himself from it. Government is the only palliative for
the defects of human nature.
Government represents the “remedy for the deficiencies” of human nature.15 It is the mark
of Cain indicating man’s limits. The opening lines of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, illustrate
the relationship sitting at the heart of Publius’ essays. Paine says: “Society is produced by our
wants and governments by our wickedness…government in its best state is but a necessary evil.”16
The existence of society demonstrates we are not self-sufficient, we have needs which our own
individual powers, of themselves, cannot satisfy. Meanwhile the existence of government provides
the monopoly of coercion to compel citizens to the performance of their covenant, to follow the
laws which protect their neighbor from their malignant desires. Man harbors numerous desires
destructive of the happiness and well-being of others. The very existence of government proves
the existence of such malignant passions within the soul of man which would harm others.
Paine says society “promotes our happiness positively” while government promotes our
well-being “negatively by restraining our vices.” 17 The necessity of force and compulsion, and the
loss of some portion of man’s total liberty is proof of man’s depravity. “Like a dress,” Paine writes,
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government “is a badge of lost innocence.”18 Government is an emblem of the limits of human
nature. In 1776 Paine asserted that the primordial function of government is “to supply the defect
of moral virtue” found lacking in our nature.19 In 1787 Madison tells us that government exists
because of the “defect of better motives” in human nature. Our internal motives, reason and virtue,
lack sufficient efficacy. Paine tells us that government is “rendered necessary by the inability of
moral virtue to govern the world.”20 Man’s depravity, his lack of better motives, are the “original
inducements to the establishment of civil power.”21
The original function of government is “to control the caprice and wickedness of men.”22
Human nature needs government because it is made of a crooked and incompatible timber. The
interests of the individual or group do not naturally conform with the interests of the political
community. Government is necessary because the “passions of men will not conform to the
dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”23 The seeds of strife in society are “sown in the
nature of man.”24 From this Spinoza concluded that “no society can exit without government and
force, and hence laws to control and restrain the unruly appetites and impulses of men.”25 The
ultimate function of government is to establish “the degree of authority required to direct the
passions of so large a society to the public good.”26 Since men are ruled by their passions rather
than their reason, they do not simply rule or govern themselves. While laws, customs and habits
vary over time and place there is no functioning society which lacks them in the service of peace,

18

Ibid., p. 5,7.
Ibid., p. 6.
20
Thomas G. West. The Political Theory of the American Founding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
p. 183-4.
21
No. 15.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
No. 10.
25
Baruch Spinoza. Theological-Political Treatise. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Inc., 2001. Book V.
26
No. 13.
19

251

security and the hope of political prosperity. In No. 6 Hamilton asserts that it is “time to awake
from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of
our political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the
happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?” Epstein concludes that those theorists and
statemen “who would like to adopt a more flattering view of human nature should not merely reject
Madison’s plan for “controls on government”; they must also deny the necessity of government
altogether.”27 Since these flaws are inextricable they must “be accommodated, not denied.”28
The function of government is to compensate for this “defect of better motives” lacking in
man naturally. This means that the ordinary and reliable motives of men are not sufficient in
themselves for men to govern themselves simply. It must supply adequate incentive through its
arrangement of man’s condition and circumstance to good conduct. In 1790 Adams says: “I am
for seeking institutions which may supply in some degree the defect [of our nature]. If there were
no ignorance, error, or vice, there would be neither principles nor system of civil or political
government.”29 Having accepted the fundamentally passionate and self-interested nature of
mankind, the central question arose of just how to “bind him down from mischief.” 30
Publius’ solution “The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the
government.”31The reason of the public alone,” he writes, “ought to control and regulate the
government.”32 The question remains how this is to be done, given man’s passionate nature and
the frailty of his reasonings. Publius concluded that political order and liberty cannot reasonably
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depend on reason, virtue and the moral sentiments alone. These motives are not reliable because
they are not sufficiently strong enough sources of motivation by themselves. They must be fortified
by institutions which provide more robust deterrents and incentives. In No. 10 Madison admits
that “neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control.” Thus, external
restrains become mandatory for a just and civil order. Men are not naturally good, they are made
good by external restrain. Only good fences make good neighbors.
The purpose of government is to provide the external constraints necessary to compensate
for the internal deficiencies of human nature. Publius is unequivocal on this. This is not the only
function of government, but it is the first one. As the greatest reflections on human nature the
“fundamental and principal object of government is the administration of justice” because it is
more advantageous to the needs and interests of society than the alternative.

33

Without the

establishment of justice in a community, “there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor
mutual intercourse.”34 Government must provide security from threats foreign and domestic. Thus,
government exists because limits of human nature necessitate that an external power administer
justice. Justice is a virtue only found and acquired in civil society and more specifically under
good government. It is necessary because it is the only remedy for what Locke calls the
“inconveniences” of the state of nature.
In No. 54 Hamilton writes, “Government is instituted no less for protection of the property,
than of the persons of individuals.”35 And, in No. 10 Madison writes that it is the protection of the
human faculties, particularly of those which generate property, that “is the first object of
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government.”36 Government must protect life, liberty and property through force or the threat of
force. These threats are a product of the deficiencies and realities of human nature. Government
must induce respect in all for the well-being of others through compulsion or the threat of coercion.
In this matter Publius, like Locke, is a Hobbesian. History shows man’s defects inextricable. These
defects place both the liberty and order of civil society at risk. Madison and Hamilton characterize
the condition of the nation under the Articles of Confederation, in many ways which echo the
shortcoming of the State of Nature. The problems of the Articles were for Publius symptomatic of
the State of Nature where there is no sufficient “common power” to compel all equally to the
actions demanded by justice and the common good. It was the civil turbulences under the Article
of Confederation while had illustrate their inability to remedy and mitigate the inherent the defects
of man’s nature.
This portrait of the passionate and depraved human nature and the government it
necessitates, follows closely the teachings of Hobbes and Locke. As the founders of the Modern
liberal tradition, they understood that man’s unruliness, if left in the State of Nature without proper
institutions, tends toward a disposition to and condition of war. It is regularly ignored, perhaps
because of their captivating images of the State of Nature as a condition lacking any government,
that both Hobbes and Locke recognized this state of war obtains, not only in a condition lacking
institutions, but in a circumstance of flawed and imperfect institutions incapable of properly
administering justice and the uniform rule of law. The conflict in this condition, which is a product
of human nature, is also incompatible with the natural strivings and goals of that nature. The State
of Nature is designed to illustrate that government is at least a necessary evil which provides a
needed monopoly of coercive power to restrain men, and confine their liberties to the pursuit of

36

No. 10.

254

only those goods harmonious and compatible with the life and liberty of their fellow citizens. The
state of war, the passion of self-preservation is the cause of strife, but also the potential impetus to
peace. The very passions which set man one against another, in the state of war, are also some of
the same passions which provide the incentives for man to liberate himself from this destructive
and tenuous condition.
The problem of government is then a problem of human motivation. Government cannot
depend on extraordinarily rare or insufficiently reliable motives. It must provide an impetus to
motivations which human nature lacks by itself in sufficient supply. Institutions must provide what
Hamilton calls in No. 30, “incitements…to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.”37 What
motivations did the Framers and Publius believe they could reasonably depend upon in fashioning
a regime? There was a great divide in the disciple of political psychology since Machiavelli over
the primary and dependable psychic springs which motivate humans to act. The Enlightenment
thinkers Publius drew on were never in “strict agreement on the overall character and prospects of
humanity.”38 However they “generally accorded mankind a significantly greater native capacity
for sociability than Hobbes.”39 They believed “man possessed a moral sense, an innate
understanding that certain actions are right and others wrong.”40 Moral sense was a faculty which
motivated man’s natural sociability. The school of moral sense considered the very existence of
morality, and conduct in accordance with the well-being of others, as a product of mankind’s first
nature. It did not need to be “artificially” compelled through “terror” and “awe” as Hobbes
describes. Man’s natural sociability would be facilitated by sympathy. Sympathy and identification
with one’s fellow man or citizen, would naturally encourage to appreciate the sentiments of others
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and promote benevolence, peace and harmony. Thus, social cooperation with their fellow man
was possible without the draconian measures of the Leviathan.
By contrast, Hobbes maintains a hard-boiled attitude regarding our sociability. He
explicitly denies the existence, not merely the efficacy, of a morality native to human being.
Morality is an artificial construct, where men abide by their social compacts not because it is right,
but because it is prudent. For Hobbes the names “right” and “wrong”, “just” and “unjust”, have no
place, no status in the State of Nature until there is a “common power” to over-awe men to the
compulsion of their duties.41 Men act passionately and always and only ever in their strict selfinterest. When they reason, it is on the strict basis of rational calculations of self-interest and gain.
Evil, if it can be called that, is not wrong, merely foolish, only because it runs generally counter to
one’s interests. Hobbes denies the existence of pure self-sacrifice or what later came to be known
as “altruism.” We do not naturally seek to benefit others for their own sake. We seek profit even
at the expense of our neighbor, especially if there are no real consequence for the harm done which
might alter the course of our calculations of rewards and punishments. Since there was no natural
sociability in man, the function of the Leviathan was to instill the necessary awe and terror, the
fear of God, in order to inspire men to the “performance of their covenants.” For Hobbes humans
“do the right thing” purely out of rational calculation, or cost-benefit analysis of their own selfinterest. They weigh whether doing the right thing will actually benefit their self-interest. For
Hobbes, the only way for government to compel men to comply with the demands of justice, is to
make sure that there are greater costs for pursuing injurious desires, than rewards for fulfilling
them. Hobbes implies that this logic of rewards and punishments provides the only tried-and-true
motivation magistrates can depend on for compelling just conduct.
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Such an attitude, clothed in more delicate rhetoric, was also held by Locke, Montesquieu
and Hume even when they acknowledged the existence of the very moral sentiments Hobbes
appears to deny. Those like Hume, Hutchinson, Rousseau and Adam Smith hardly denied the
significance of self-interest, but believed certain social passions or “moral sentiments” like
“humanity,” “sympathy”, “pity” or “compassion” played a greater role in making men concerned
for others. Hume dubbed the thought of Hobbes and Locke, rooted as it is in self-interest, as the
“selfish system of morals.”42 Despite his condemnation of the selfish system in matters of society,
he recognized that in matters pertaining to political justice the only appeal to be made was to man’s
self-interest, and not his moral sentiments. All agreed in matters of justice, men are not naturally
good, they are only made good external restraints.
Publius acknowledges the existence and role of social sentiments. Yet, he concludes the
efficacy of such sentiment is only made possible by the coercive power of political order, not the
cause of it. Unaided moral sentiment is too weak for a durable and just political order to depend
upon. Jefferson, by contrast, asserted the natural goodness of mankind. His study of the American
Indians led him to believe “that man was a [sufficiently] social, harmonious, cooperative, and just
creature who, under the appropriate socioeconomic conditions, could happily live in a community
that did not need the presence of the Leviathan.”43 Publius’ lack of faith in man’s natural sociability
lead him to follow the “selfish system” by placing self-interest as the central spring which
motivates human action. This hard-boiled decision reflects Publius’ observations of men, past and
present, which illustrated that moral sentiments cannot be reliably counted on to restrain their
passions. Departing from the Scottish Enlightenment, reliable social sentiments are actually
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derived from the mutual recognition of self-interest. This mutual recognition is only achieved
through the coercive power of government at all levels. The political founder must therefore
perspicuously build his edifice on the cornerstone of self-interest and devise various external
sentinels in proper conformity with it.
The role in ameliorating the defect of better motives makes the Constitution a
psychological mechanism designed to navigate the conflict within man’s soul. It is designed to
mitigate the pitfalls of the passions and promote and strengthen fragile reason and moral sentiment.
Government is instituted in order to apply the necessary external constraints and pression so that
the man’s passions will conform to the obligatory demands of political justice.44 Such constraints
are a properly order constitutional edifice.45 This process of amelioration of man’s defects is
achieved through mechanisms like a written constitution, popular sovereignty through periodic
elections, representation, federalism, and the separation of powers with its checks and balances.
These stratagems are all designed to “refine” and “enlarge” public opinion. They dilatory
mechanisms are designed to cool and channel the passions, and encourage reflection and
deliberation such manner that the only actions government can take are based on constitutional
consensus and are therefore likely to be the most reasonable ones possible
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5. Impulse, Power & Opportunity

There is danger from all men. The only maxim of a free government ought to be to trust no man
living with power to endanger the public liberty.1
– John Adams, Notes for an Oration at Braintree, Spring,1772.

The authors of The Federalist were nothing if not astute observers of men. With few
exceptions, most of the Founders concurred with Publius’ sober appraisal of human nature. This
view was all the more jaundiced when passion and self-interest were alloyed with the awesome
powers of government. On the floor of the Philadelphia Convention Madison said, “The truth is,
all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain degree.”2 In the Kentucky Resolutions of
1789, Jefferson writes, “In questions of power then let no more be heard of confidence in man, but
bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.”3 On July 11, at the Grand
Convention Morris said, “The truth was that all men having power ought to be distrusted to a
certain degree.4 Meanwhile Roger Sherman asserted that, “From the nature of man we may be
sure, that those who have power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it.”5
The central assumption on which the powers of the Constitution are granted and arranged
is that the concentration of power necessarily leads to its abuse, abuse to tyranny. These features
are an implicit commentary on human nature. “Eternal experience,” writes Montesquieu, “shows
that any men who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits.”6 Hume writes
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that in “reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature” such “that no man can safely
be trusted with unlimited authority.”7 Power unlimited is power concentrated. Power concentrated
is power undivided and unchecked. Power corrupts precisely because it gives opportunity to the
lesser yet more powerful motives of men. The defect of better motives is that men do not achieve
self-restraint by internal means alone. Jefferson asserted that political power “affords the greatest
temptations for human weakness.”8 If it is true, as Lord Acton said, that “Power tends to corrupt,
and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” it is precisely these features of human motivation that
make our nature susceptible to such corruption. “Every man,” writes Montesquieu in The Spirit of
Laws, “who holds power is brought to abuse it.” 9 Such power is the calling card of tyranny and a
permanent threat to man’s liberties. John Adams wrote that the only maxim “which can ever
preserve the liberties of any people” is “Nip the shoots of arbitrary power in the bud.”10
Given man’s nature, Publius and the Founders identified government as the midwife of
tyranny. If not constructed properly its powers were little more than the instruments of the passions
of those who ruled. As a monopoly of legitimate force, it is a manifestation of concentrated power
subject to abuse. Government is necessary to protect citizens and provide for the common good,
but the monopoly necessary for such a task consolidates power in the hands of mere mortals apt to
use it contrary to its original purpose. In No. 48 Madison say, “It will not be denied, that power is
of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits
assigned to it.”11 By its very nature, power inclines to invasion and usurpation. On the floor of
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Congress Madison said “all power is subject to abuse.”12 “So that none can abuse power,” writes
Montesquieu, “we must arrange, by the disposition of things, that power shall check power.”13
There must be an equal and opposing external force if this satisfaction is to be thwarted. The
provisions of the Constitution assume that men are unable to restrain themselves where no external
constraint exist. In light of the depravity of human nature, government breeds a fatal tincture of
power and interest. Power produces opportunity and interest motivates its abuses. Concentrated
power allows individuals to act on their passions because it removes impediments to their
satisfaction. Power concentrated is a synonym for tyranny.
The Federalist’s science of man is primarily a science of human motivation. The central
flaw of human nature is its “defect of better motives.” Men are not angels because they lack an
internal motive with sufficient force to restraint those passions which run counter to the common
interest. In light of these defects, private interest never coincides with public interest without
external regulation. Power concentrated creates a circumstance in which human virtue cannot bear
it’s temptations.14 Hamilton illustrates how external sentinels to protect against abuses of power
are necessary because of what he calls “the force” of the “obvious distinction between the interests
of the people in the public felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and
consequence of their offices.”15 Scanlan writes, “in any political system, the immediate and
personal interests of the rulers may be opposed to the interests of the ruled, and may motivate the
rulers to use their power for oppression.” 16
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The simple problem which makes the abuse of power an ever-present threat is that the
“passions of men do not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint.” The
passions are blind to the consequences of their own appetites. And yet they are the dominate spring
of the human soul. The flaw of human nature resides in its lack of internal checks when external
circumstances are discovered to be propitious to the satisfaction of their desires. Higher motives
such as reason are no less real as the passions, yet it is weaker and languishes without the assistance
of external reinforcements. In fact, without proper external constraint reason is likely to conspire
with the passions in order to better satisfy them. The simple conclusion to be reached is that no
human being can or should be trusted with unchecked power. Unchecked power is arbitrary power,
arbitrary power is tyranny. All men therefore need guardians. But, men cannot be their own
guardians. Rulers must check the ruled, but the rulers themselves are also in need of restraint. Who
or what will rule the rulers?
Evil is the inevitable consequence when opportunity and power have been obtained without
any counterbalancing check. The Federalist’s account of human nature is predicated on the everpresent evidence of history and experience of the corrupting nature of power in the hands of mere
mortals. Whether their knowledge came from portraits painted in books, such as histories, Plutarch
or the Bible, or from their own experiences on the front lines of politics and war, all these sources
placed them face to face with the limitations of men. If their religious educations did not instill a
simple orthodox belief in the divine or metaphysical existence of evil, it certainly made them open
to its reality as a real and permanent empirical feature of human nature. Whether because our faith
in progress, our increasing public detachment from religion, or as the progeny of Rousseau’s
dictum of natural goodness where men are only made bad by society, we have lost not only the
taste, but the belief that men are truly capable of genuine and profound evil. This is an admission
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about our nature we do not easily countenance: Men are not naturally good. They are made good
by external restraint.
Publius and the rest of the Founders would have had an embarrassed laugh at the venerable
Ghandi’s letter to his “Dear Friend” Hitler in July of 1939.17 In it Ghandi makes an impassioned
plea to the Fuhrer in the name of “humanity”18 encouraging him, in effect, to “Make love, not war.”
Ghandi appeals to a “universal friendliness” which knows no “race, color or creed” in the face of
Hitler’s military aggression and genocidal racism which he characterizes as “monstrous and
unbecoming of human dignity.”19 Ghandi never seems to consider the possibility, despite the facts
before him, that brotherly love and understanding are not the sole features of “humanity.” One
cannot but imagine Hitler blushing more for Ghandi’s sake than his own while reading this
hackneyed treacle. Ghandi does not seem to understand that which he abhors so much, is the very
thing Hitler exalts. Socrates put Thrasymachus in his place before promoting justice as a virtue.
Ghandi’s plea shows a megalomaniacal over-estimation of the power of his pacificist principles.
He is tone deaf to what some men really want and will do when their natural impulses conjoin with
the power to fulfill them. The pacificist alone does not have the tools to defeat those actually
willing to wage war at their expense. In fact, the pacificist is blind to the very impulses that must
be acknowledged. The problem is that human nature bears impulses such that the only reasonable
resistance, is violent resistance. One must also carry a big stick.
In a spirit Ghandi would have recognized, The Federalist does not depart from Sydney and
Locke in their understanding of the Law of Nature. Its central concern is human liberty. Publius
follows their fundamental belief in the dignity of all men. They assault despotism as contrary to
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this dignity which is the product of the rational nature of mankind. Since The Federalist is an
account of political order, its main theme is the proper arrangement of powers that will realize the
principles of a Sydney and a Locke. Moral principles do not enforce themselves. Like Machiavelli
or Hobbes, the central theme is power and the likely psychological motives that will weld it. The
Constitution is an enforcement mechanism. It is an enumeration of powers granted to the officers
of government. The goal was to arrange those powers in order to balance the sometimes-conflicting
demands of liberty and order. Might does not make right, but right cannot be achieved if might is
not properly ordered. The Founders faced this problem much more squarely than a Ghandi. They
not only repulsed an Empire but engaged in the positive work of building a new nation. They were
men unafraid to get their hands soiled. “War does not determine who is right,” but they well knew
it determines “who is left.”20 What would have been the meaning of the principles of 1776 had
America lost the war? Publius takes men as they are rather than as they would like them to be.
Despite their love for the principles of the Revolution, the Founders did not believe mere
“parchment” assertion would guarantee their realization. As practical men they understood the
necessity of force. Of course force without right is tyranny. Yet, force as a necessary component
of social and political order is a direct product of the animal dimension of human nature: man is a
centaur.
The lack of faith in the natural goodness of mankind is as much a matter of self-preservation
as principle. The premise of The Federalist is that human nature will transgress against religion,
morality, law and the public interest when motive and opportunity coincide. In No. 53 Publius
says, “No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connexion subsists
between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations
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of power.”21 Madison and Hamilton speak of the “depravity” of human nature. Men are depraved
because they are naturally passionate and reason all too fallible. Hamilton tells us that “momentary
passions and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct
than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice.”22 Reason was “likely to be
over-whelmed by man’s passions.”23 The ultimate function of government is to establish “the
degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good.”24 In his
October 24, 1787 letter to Jefferson, Madison writes that it is not reasonable to expect individuals
to have “a prudent regard to private or partial good, as essentially involved in the general and
permanent good of the whole.”25 And thus, the passions of men will not conform to the common
interest without a properly ordered constitutional edifice.26
The evil they sought to mitigate does obtained from natural desires under inauspicious
circumstances. Following Hobbes, men will break the rules if their natural motives are given
opportunity. If both motive and opportunity exist, there is action. If there is no opportunity,
inaction. Madison says in No. 10, “If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we
well know, that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They
are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in
proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes
needful.”27 In human nature we find no want of motives. Publius itemizes a vast array of passions
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throughout The Federalist, leaving no doubt than there is no lack of motives on behalf of tyranny.
Thus, to commit a crime, all that is needed is opportunity, motive is given.
In Book I of Plato’s Republic it appears self-evident to all speakers present except Socrates
that human happiness is found in doing whatever one pleases. Justice is not a virtue, but an
impediment to the satisfaction of desires which make us happy. Justice is contrary to our selfinterest. To most present, justice is benefiting others at one’s own expense, while injustice is
benefiting oneself at another’s expense. Justice is an onerous good which benefits others by
demanding we refrain from any desire that might harm them. This line of reasoning is Plato’s
admission that men harbor an array of natural desires harmful to others. Furthermore, he
acknowledges that we are selfish enough to be willing to satisfy these desires at the expense of
others if not restrained by law. But, power does not merely facilitate the satisfaction of existing
desires, it piques the mind to as yet unimagined ones. It whets the appetite regarding which desires
human beings might even consider entertaining. This fact is illustrated in the story of Gyges. The
myth of Gyges in Book II of the Republic is an allegory of tyranny. The tyrant is a tyrant in part
by virtue of his individual nature, but also by virtue of the opportunity despotic power presents to
that nature. Gyges’ ring represents not only invisibility or concealment, but the absolute power to
satisfy any desire that comes from it and the ability to avoid all earthly consequences. Interestingly,
Gyges ambitions direct him to sexual and political conquest. The story of Gyges illustrates what
the desire generated by human nature would look like if completely unleashed without any external
constraint whatsoever. Gyges is the archetype of the ambitious ruler and a lover of power. The
love of power “is a problem because at least some men feel it and especially because they can be
successful in obtaining what they want. Men can be attractive enough to attract partisans, or clever
enough to lull other men who are inattentive or foolish. These qualities mean that the love of power

266

will not be a vain desire. All government involves the existence of power and thereby raises the
possibility of ambition.” 28
This wise skepticism of The Federalist regarding the efficacy of reason, virtue and the
moral sentiments is all the more germane as men accede to the powers of office. The central
problem the Constitution had to solve, and The Federalist Papers explain, was how to grant men
the necessary and sufficient power to govern, yet guarantee the governed remain free from tyranny.
The recognition of this problem as a problem is only obtains under the premise of the principle of
limited self-government whose raison d’etre is to secure the natural rights of its citizens. In No.
10 Madison makes clear that the destruction of liberty is a remedy worse than the disease. Madison
denies that there are durable and certain remedies to transform the motives of men. In the service
of liberty, Publius is inclined to tolerate certain acceptable foibles of human nature. The flame of
liberty, while just, will actually promote these foibles. So how does one grant power and
successfully mitigate the defects of those who wield it?
Given all men are subject to the same depredations of their own nature, men must rule, and
the rulers must be themselves ruled in some manner. The problem in framing government is that
the same problematic nature in need of rule, also rules. “In framing a government,” Madison says
“which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”29 Lincoln
provided an exegesis of Madison. He said no man “was good enough to govern another man, with
the other’s consent.”30 But the protection of the liberty and consent of the man who is ruled cannot
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be achieved through good will or the mere assertion of principle, but only by providing the proper
kind and arrangement to government powers.
In the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788 Patrick Henry stated that the “Constitution
is not an instrument for the government to restrain the people, it is an instrument for the people to
restrain the government - lest it come to dominate our lives and interests.”31 But how, if their nature
lacks the necessary internal sentinels which might restrain them, can officeholders be expected to
rule themselves? How can rulers rule themselves when they are only men, not angels? In light of
the “defect of better motives,” how can men govern themselves in an orderly fashion and yet
remain free? The primary task of The Federalist is to illustrate, in the face of Anti-Federalist
opposition, just how the Constitution might check and channel these lesser motives of rulers in
order to make free and stable government possible.
The conclusion reached by Madison and Hamilton, as well as the members of the
Convention, is that no human being can or should be trusted with unchecked power. Therefore, as
Machiavelli puts it, “it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws in it to
presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit
whenever they have a free opportunity for it.”32 The fanciful coincidence of political power and
wisdom in the philosopher-king cannot be the basis of any wise political order. Political order and
liberty cannot reasonably depend on the reason and virtue of rulers alone, because they are not
reliable sources of motivation. Since men are neither angels nor philosopher-kings all are in need
of external constraint. The flaw of human nature resides in its lack of internal checks when external
circumstances are propitious to the satisfaction of their desires. Power corrupts precisely because
it gives opportunity to the lesser but more powerful motives of men.
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Montesquieu asserts that “the abuse of power is greatest when laws do not anticipate it.”33
Wise legislators cannot expect to appeal to internal motives in order to restrain and channel
fractious behavior. One is forced to seek and depend on external controls. Given the ever-present
existence of a panoply of motives, the lack of opportunity is the only true restraint on men’s
actions. Scanlan characterizes this solution by writing that “wherever possible, and to whatever
extent possible, the power or opportunity to act must be withheld from those who might act on
motives productive of conflict and oppression.” 34 Then, Scanlan writes, “where power cannot be
withheld – because…withholding it would be inconsistent with the intrinsic requirements of
federal, republican government - those who are invested with power should have, or be provided
with, strong motives to use it properly. If the political system can be organized in such a way that
no individuals or groups will have both strong antagonistic motives and the power to act on them,
solutions to all the above problems” 35
The people need rulers, yet the people cannot forfeit their power and rights to a government
that can easily abuse its power. Government power must be limited by a variety of constraints. The
Constitution will rule the rulers. More to the point its strategy of separated powers in which these
powers are set as countervailing forces against one another will rule them. Madison explains in
No. 10 and Nos. 47-51 that the Constitution’s solution to guarding against tyranny is by preventing
the “gradual concentration of the several powers” whether in the same department or in any faction
of society.36 “There can be no liberty,” Montesquieu writes, “where the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates” or “if the power of judging be not
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separated from the legislative and executive powers.”37 This concentration is a recipe for
despotism. “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,” writes Madison, “because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment” and he would have the concentrated power to enforce
it.38 Judging one’s own case makes the accused his own jury and sentencer. In No. 47 Madison
says, “The accumulation of all powers… in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,…may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”39 Since there can be no guarantee of internal
self-restraint, no guarantee that power will be used to serve virtue rather than immediate selfinterest, the only solution to the problem of power is to divide it against itself. Powers must be set
against themselves as countervailing forces which control and inhibit one another. The separation
of powers Madison describes as the “sacred maxim of free government.”40 Power must stop power
because no man can be trusted with such power that it endangers liberty.41
Lack of opportunity comes first and foremost from outright deterrence. Rulers must simply
be denied a given power or the necessary lethal combination of powers. But since rulers must have
power they need to be “provided” with “strong motives” in order to deter its abuse. These “strong
motives” are provided by constitutional circumstance of office and their incentives and deterrents.
They come by arranging power such that there is a directly opposing equal force. Power must be
divided and set against itself in a strategy of “divide and conquer.” This is a system of
countervailing powers motivated by the countervailing passions and interests of officeholders. For
those who must have power in order to meet the ends and obligations of government,
circumstances must be orchestrated to incline them toward motivations consistent with the
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common interest. Montesquieu writes, “It is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, though
their passions may prompt them to be wicked, they have nevertheless an interest in not being so.”42
Checks with teeth will alter their calculations of their own self-interest. Strong motives toward
good conduct will be forged as their perception of a given action’s consequences are altered by an
arrangement of power with the ever-present likelihood of an equal and opposite reaction to their
potential abuses. Power,” writes Montesquieu, “must check power.”43 Since power only recognizes
power, only an equal and opposite force can thwart it.
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6. The Vera Causa

No one will really understand politics until they understand that politicians are not trying to solve our
problems. They are trying to solve their own problems -- of which getting elected and re-elected are
No. 1 and No. 2. Whatever is No. 3 is far behind.1
-

Thomas Sowell

Publius and the Founders made the radical claim to have founded a regime on human nature
itself. This claim is summed up in the name “republic” and the novel form given to it by them.
What does it mean for a regime to be founded in harmony with human nature? The Federalist’s
account of human nature is primarily couched in a science of human motivation. For Publius
accurate knowledge of human nature would only be discovered by taking human nature as it is,
rather than as one would hope to find it. The meant knowledge of human conduct would primarily
be gleaned from experience and history. Publius and the Founders sought to identify the natural
springs of human conduct. They sought to identify the durable and regular motives of men in order
to provide a political order commensurate to them. A natural regime is one in conformity with
those regular and predictable springs of human action. The central principle of a republic is liberty.
Human nature left freely to its own natural devices pursues its own self-interest. Self-interest is
then the natural byproduct of the republican principle of liberty and the central motor of human
conduct.
Taylor asks, “What, then, are the basic traits which men at all times, in all societies under
all government allegedly possess? His answer is that the “most fundamental” impulse of human
nature is self-preservation followed by the “the native desire to secure one’s own well-being.”2
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“All men desire liberty” and are naturally inclined to “self-love or self-interest.”3 In his Full
Vindication, Hamilton writes, “A vast majority of mankind is entirely biased by motives of selfinterest. Most men are glad to remove any burthens off themselves, and place them upon the necks
of their neighbors.”4 The conclusion that self-interest must be understood as the central driver of
human conduct was as much the result of observation as prudent judgment about what civil society
can reasonably expect from human conduct, and what it must be prepared to contend with and
accommodate.
Publius’ answer as to the central law of human conduct was rooted in his experiences of
men and the new natural science of human nature of the day. Moral psychology and philosophy
set out on a scientific quest to determine the true cause of human conduct. Following Hume, the
goal of this new science was “to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature by
showing men in all variety of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from
which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human
action and behavior.”5 In his Treatise, Hume acknowledges Francis Bacon as the “father of
experimental physics” and that he sits at the foundation of a group of scientists “who have begun
to put the science of man on a new footing.”6 Thus, the moral philosophers of the 18th century were
attempting a similar type of scientific revolution in matters of morality, moral and political
psychology.7 The method of this new science of man was rooted in the empirical evidence of
experience and history, and generally accepted that “knowledge of human nature ought to be
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obtained through an application of the scientific method of Bacon and Newton.”8 Its scientific
method was founded upon appeals to reason, history or experience, and human nature itself.9
Hume tells us that “the great moral and political philosophers since Hobbes, and including Locke,
Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson and Butler, though they differed on many key points
regarding the specific nature of man’s moral faculties “seem all to agree in founding their accurate
disquisitions of human nature entirely upon experience.”10
Human nature, says Hume, was the central object of the “system of the sciences.”11 He
says “almost all the sciences are comprehended in the science of human nature, and are dependent
on it.”12 The primary end of this science, writes Hume, was “to explain the principles and
operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas; morals and criticism regard our
tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each
other.”13 The goal was to determine the moral laws of human conduct and society through the
empirical study of man. In a letter to Montesquieu, Charles Bonnet wrote “Newton discovered the
laws of the material world. You, Monsieur, have discovered the laws of the intelligent world.”14
Madison was to say in 1792 that Montesquieu was to the science of man “what Bacon was in
universal science.”
The central debate which emerged within the new science of man initiated by Bacon and
others was the question of prime or true cause, the vera causa, of human conduct. The vera causa,
or true or real cause, was a technical concept of Newtonian philosophy which stood for “the true
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cause of a natural phenomenon,” whose existence is known independently of its causal role and
the effects it produces.15 Thus the paradigm of Newtonian mechanics and kinesthetics was applied
by way of analogy to human psychology and the faculties which motivate men’s actions. The “vera
causa principle” developed by Newton would be analogous to the pursuit of the prime cause of
human conduct in the thought of Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, Hume and others.16 The quest for
this vera causa was motivated by another question: What was the psychological prime mover
within human nature which compels men to act generally as they do, and what are its moral, social
and political consequences? They sought to parse the “passions, motives, volitions and thoughts”
of man in order to determine the causes of conduct that produce harmony and conflict in society
and to attempt to devise systems of social and political organization to ameliorate man’s natural
deficiencies and promote those tendencies beneficial to social and political order.17 Self-interest
would stand as the vera causa of human motivation and law of gravity of human conduct.
Publius and the Founders were on the whole influenced by a school of thought which Hume
had come to call the “selfish system of morals.”18 This school posited self-interest as the prime
mover of human conduct. Self-interest came to be treated as a quasi-scientific term. Numerous
Enlightenment thinkers regarded self-interest “as a law of the social world akin to the principle of
universal gravitation in the physical world.”19 It was the ironclad law of man’s psychological
world, just as gravity was the central law of the physical one. Interest meant mankind’s conduct
was subject to regular rules which could be described and anticipated. This element of
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predictability meant society could be thought of as akin to a Newtonian mechanism. “Interest,” it
was said, “governs the World.”20 It was “a part in the movements” of a great “machine.”21 God
was a watchmaker who had made an elegant mechanism which ran on ironclad laws of cause and
effect. Man was merely a component of that mechanism. These features made interest amenable
to a more mechanistic account of individual and collective behavior. In his De L’Esprit of 1759,
Helvétius would say, “As the physical world is ruled by the laws of movement so is the moral
universe ruled by laws of interest.”22 Self-interest was considered the motivational law of gravity
of man’s psychological faculties and the true cause of men’s conduct.
Self-interest was now “the principle motive” and “driving force” of all human action.23
Cardinal de Retz had summed up this view saying, “The most correct maxim for accurately
appraising the intentions of men is to examine their interests which are the most common motive
for the actions.”24 de Retz was a keen reader of Machiavelli, and Madison was well acquainted
with his commentaries on the nature of man and society.25 Meanwhile Rohan had captured the
radical role assumed to be played by interest saying “princes order their people around and interest
orders princes around.”26 Interest was the “tyrant of tyrants” and the “commander of princes.”27 It
was interest which ruled the rulers as the true sovereign of the world.
The philosophy which posited self-interest as the vera causa of man’s conduct was closely
associated with the economic and political liberalism central to the American Founding.28 This
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natural republic would be built on the true cornerstone of self-interest. When Montesquieu writes
that “self-interest is the strongest monarch in the world” he implies that it is the single and true
ruler of all men.29 A natural regime must assume self-interest as the natural and regular cause of
human conduct. In 1776, Smith would say interest is a “desire of bettering our condition.”30 Here,
the seeds of the “pursuit of the Happiness” and the American Dream are sow. If, for example,
Publius and The Founders could have never foreseen the scale and complexities of the modern
administrative or national security state, or the degree of centralization in Washington D.C., their
clear-eyed vision of human nature correctly foresaw the self-interested nature wielding those
immense powers. Self-interest rules all.
Interest is a modern term of moral psychology unmentioned by the Ancients. The language
of interest was well-worn by the time of the American Founding. Self-interest is not simply
identical to self-love. Interest is a hybrid notion, a synthesis of reason and passion. An interest is
a form of motivation which involves a desire for some good deemed advantageous, whose pursuit
is the product of calculating reason working in concert with the passions to in order to satisfy them.
An interest is passion modified by rational foresight. Rational calculation can foresee the
consequences of acting indiscriminately or impulsively. Reason transmutes the object of
immediate interest into a long-term interest, or interest “properly understood.” Tocqueville writes
that the principle of self-interest rightly understood “obtains a great empire with ease, and
preserves it without difficulty because it turns personal interest against itself, and to direct the
passions it makes use of the spur that excites them.”31 Long-term interest counteracts and checks
immediate interest. Reason works to mitigate the consequences of passions, but also to alter their
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object. Calculating reason teaches the passion how to better satisfy themselves without suffering
their pitfalls. And, self-interest rightly understood teaches others how to satisfy those desires in a
manner that is mutually harmonious with the interests of others.
The history of self-interest never confined this notion to any single object of desire, but
rather the selfish and calculating manner in which one pursued it. An interest could be any type of
good perceived as advantageous by an individual. Only in the 19th century did the concept become
decisively primarily associated with material well-being.32 This shift was not so much a deviation
from its historical use, as a definite narrowing of its scope. While the notion became increasingly
associated with economic striving, it did not begin that way. From the Renaissance to the
Enlightenment its meaning had never been limited to material welfare.33 Instead, for Publius and
the Founders, “interest,” encompassed “the totality of human aspirations.”34
“The essence of all political thinking,” said Attorney General William Barr, “is about how
to reconcile the claims of the individual with the interests of the broader community.”35 The
problem of government remains the problem of self-interest, or the gap between the interest of the
individual and the broader community. The existence of government necessarily implies human
beings have desires and motivations which run contrary to the public interest. Hume says, “The
private interest of everyone is different; and though the public interest in itself be always one and
the same, yet it becomes the source of as great dissentions, by reason of the different opinions of
particular persons concerning it.”36 Human nature itself creates a conflict between individual selfinterest and the common one in need of management. Government must establish a harmony
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between the two. Achieving this reconciliation while maintaining order and liberty was the
challenging goal of republican justice the Convention and The Federalist Papers sought to solve
and explain.
From this quest for the vera causa of the human soul emerged a fundamental dispute over
the central psychogenic motor of man’s conduct. This dispute had powerful implications for the
nature of political order. If political order must be commensurate to human nature, any dispute
over that nature necessarily leads to a dispute over the best possible arrangement of government.
The answer over the role self-interest played in human conduct divided moral philosophers and
psychologists into two conflicting camps. One believed mankind was fundamentally selfish, and
the other, while often acknowledging the role played by self-interest, also recognized the material
effects of man’s natural moral or social sentiments. Of these two schools of psychology, one
believed in the universal natural self-interest of man while the other believed in the efficacy of
altruism manifest through moral sentiments and sympathy. Their different conclusions as to the
true mover of man’s conduct had vital implications for the best possible political order suited to
man’s natural dispositions. Each school posited, by its interpretation of man’s moral psychology,
either a greater or smaller distance between the natural interest of the individual and the common
interest of the political community. The further the distance between these two the more hardened
political institutions needed to be in order to bring them into sufficient alignment. If human nature
had sufficient natural resources inclining it to social harmony, man could be more trusted with
power and government need not be a fear-inducing Leviathan of compulsion. If human nature
evinced a lack of such resources, government would have to be primarily geared to providing the
necessary “dykes and damns” to restrain and manage man’s factious and conflictual tendencies.
Man could not be trusted with power.
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The centrality of self-interest to political science and philosophy traces its provenance to
those hard-boiled observers of human conduct such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and
Mandeville. Their thought asserted a more egoistic model of human motivation centered on selfinterest. Tracing the origin of this way of thinking to Hobbes, Hume dubbed this school the “selfish
system of morals.”37 For this school “the fundamental and ruling passion is self-interest.”38 The
thesis of the selfish system is that “all human action can be explained in terms of a calculation of
self-interest.”39
Despite their vital differences, both schools agreed in their unwillingness to afford reason
the exalted place in either man’s soul or his society, as master of his conduct, that the Ancients
had given it. Hobbes, Mandeville and even Locke asserted that human nature was primarily
motivated by passions and calculations of self-interest. Meanwhile those like Hume, Hutcheson
Smith and Rousseau gave much greater credence to natural sentiments that had a fundamental
social and moral content inclining men naturally to co-exist in harmony with their fellow man, not
simply out of need or utility, but out of a deep emotional sense of shared humanity manifest in
such sentiments. Hume, in many ways split the difference between these two schools. He was
openly critical of Hobbes and Mandeville, acknowledging the vital role played by moral
sentiments. Yet, at the same time, he resigned himself to the fact that self-interest was the prime
mover and bedrock of human conduct especially in matters of political order and community. In
matters of political organization, all men, said Hume, must be considered a self-interested knave.
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The Federalist Papers account of human nature identifies self-interest as the architectonic
spring of human motivation. It was the true spring, or vera causa, of human action. Founders are
obliged, by this dictate of human nature, to build and orchestrate the arrangement of political
powers in conformity with the ironclad law of conduct. Hume writes that in framing wise political
institutions “every man must be supposed a knave.”40 A “knave” is by its very nature a “selfinterested creature.”41 In other words he must be supposed “to be always seeking his own
interest.”42 Hamilton’s speech at the New York State Ratifying Convention in 1788 follows in the
footsteps of the selfish school. He asserted the doctrine of self-interest plainly saying that “Men
will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as to oppose the strong current43
of the selfish passion. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to
the public good.”44
The Federalist Papers identifies self-interest as the fulcrum of the constitutional order. For
society to rely on motives such as reason or virtue is to expect the unlikely coincidence of wisdom
and political power. Therefore, it is unwise for the founder or statesman to assume men in society,
or those holding political power, will act disinterestedly on their own. Paraphrasing Publius,
constitutional scholar Richard Epstein asks: “What is the driving force of human nature with which
constitutions must contend?”45 His answer: “self-interest.”46 He writes that there is “unfortunately
no set of institutions which can escape the ravages of misdirected self-interest.”47 The problem,
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writes Epstein, “is to design a set of institutions which at some real, admitted, positive cost curbs
the worst of its excesses. In order to design that system of governance, it is not enough to simply
condemn self-interest. Such condemnation cuts too broadly, for then there is nothing left to praise.
It is necessary therefore to distinguish among the different manifestations of self-interest.”48 To
simply condemn self-interest is to condemn human nature without solving the problems it poses.
Mansfield concludes the “constitutional republicanism” of the American regime, “is based on selfinterest.”49
The Constitution is designed as a mechanism of impulse control which compels “men to
take long views” of their interests.50 In 1784 Hamilton wrote that, “The safest reliance of every
government is on man’s interests. This is a principle of human nature, on which all political
speculation to be just, must be founded.”51 The Constitution allows them “to identify their private
interests with the general good” by erecting “an edifice of reason and virtue on a foundation of
passion.”52 This requires an understanding of both what is to be expected from citizens in their
aims as well as the aims of government. A rights-based, rights ensuring government is by definition
designed to be in harmony with the enlightened self-interest of its citizens. The Constitution is
designed to produce circumstances and situations which encourage citizens to pursue their own
self-interest in a manner that does not jeopardize the right of another to do the same. “Private rights
and public happiness” would be brought in line with one another as the common interest demands
self-interest be pursued correctly.53
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Self-interest boils down to the way in which human action is motivated by common sense
perceptions of potential rewards and punishments. It is another way of speaking of those two
universal masters of all human conduct, pleasure and pain. Helvétius had said that “pleasure and
pain are, and always will be, the only principles of action in man.”54 Men seek pleasures for
themselves and to avoid the pains that might befall them. Pleasure and pain are the signposts on
the path of a human life. Nor are men inclined, without consequence, to concern themselves with
the inconveniences incurred by the satisfaction of their desires suffered by others. In No. 72
Hamilton says “the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct.”55 The
corollary to “reward” is the “fear of punishment.” In No. 65 Hamilton describes the “fear of
punishment and disgrace” as the “motive to good behaviour.”56
Civil society itself is nothing other than “a web of reciprocal pleasures and pains created
by everyone’s conduct.”57 But just how we define “pleasure” and “pain” matters. What is
pleasurable is often bad, and what is “painful” is often good. Through the best political order
possible, society must be habituated to the correct understanding of pleasure and pain in order to
bring it into general alignment with what is good and bad in relation to the common interest. Yet
if society is to obtain the correct understanding of pleasures and pains and the proper impetus to
pursue these particular pleasures, a system which punishes conduct contrary to those ends must be
established. Government is the monopoly of legitimate coercion and force which is the arbiter of
rewards and punishments in its establishment of justice. Everyone’s self-interest is served by
pursuing pleasures and avoiding pain. The goal of the Constitution is to set up a system of rewards
and punishment operating in conformity with man’s natural selfishness which would satisfy the
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needs of liberty and order. By appealing to man’s self-interest, they could partially transcend it.
Through its arrangement of powers, a set of circumstances which create the right incentives and
deterrents could motivate and shape men’s individual interests to conform to the common one.
Even J. G. A. Pocock’s more classical rendering of the American Founding acknowledges
that in the arguments of The Federalist human beings “were less and less seen as possessing virtue
in the classical sense.”58 Pocock says The Federalist Papers represent the “locus classicus” of “an
increasing recognition of the importance, and the legitimacy” of individuals and factions pursuing
“particular interest.”59 The shift from a dependence on virtue to interest marks the transition from
Classical republicanism to Publius’ novel liberal republicanism.60 Taylor writes that the political
science of The Federalist accepts “the prevalence of self-interested behavior” as “compatible with
republican government” and acknowledges that classical civic virtue was “not essential for its
viability.”61 He describes this assertion as “one of the most startling political revelations to appear
since the Renaissance.”62 If the central virtue in a republic is patriotism,63 in a liberal republic civic
virtue would entail love of a nation dedicated to a form of liberty which allows each citizen to
pursue their own individual self-interest.
While Publius acknowledges the necessity for a certain degree of virtue in both the rulers
and the ruled in a self-governing republic, history taught that republics which lean to heavily on
virtue come to their ruin. Good government must depend on reliable and durable motives as their
cornerstone, even as this reliance is merely necessary, if not entirely sufficient. The Federalist
“seeks to ground republican government on the most reliable aspect of human nature: self-interest.
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By self-interest, Publius means that most men, if left alone, will naturally seek to satisfy their own
interests and desire, rather than look to the well-being of the whole.”64 Publius’ depiction of selfinterest as the motor of the republic, whether government or society, comes in the form of
“interest” as distinct from “ambition.” All men are interested in society, some are ambitious. In
this distinction we have the distinction between the few and the many or the rulers and the ruled.
Some will be ambitious enough to seek fame and glory and others will seek their interest primarily
in the form of material or economic well-being.65
Self-interest will substitute for virtue as the psychic spring of a modern extended
commercial republic. The Modern republic would “be based on liberty and commerce rather than
virtue, and was to emphasize the private life rather than communal solidarity.” 66 Hamilton simply
asserts that, “Men will pursue their interests.”67 The Constitution is designed in a manor so as not
to “demand self-sacrifice” but to “attempt to channel self-interest in useful directions.”68 Publius
does not condemn such impulses as selfish or ignoble. Instead of a system which would education
such passion and interests out of men, or to moderate them in the Classical sense, these impulses
will be prudentially diverted, directed and channeled, to the greatest degree possible, toward the
public good.69
The great French student of The Federalist Papers and the American Founding, Alexis de
Tocqueville, described “private self-interest” as the “only immutable point in the human heart.”70
Writing in the Age of Jackson he says that the doctrine of self-interest is “not new; but among
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Americans of our day it has been universally accepted.”71 Self-interest is the “low but solid”
foundation on which the Constitution is built.72 Tocqueville writes that principle of self-interest
takes human nature as it is by being “marvelously accommodating to the weaknesses of men.”73
The doctrine of self-interest does not aim “at mighty objects, but it attains without excessive
exertion all those at which it aims. As it lies within the reach of all capacities, everyone can without
difficulty learn and retain it.”74 Tocqueville writes, “If the principle of interest rightly understood
were to sway the whole moral world, extraordinary virtues would doubtless be more rare; but I
think that gross depravity would then also be less common.”75 “This principle,” writes Tocqueville
“perhaps prevents men from rising far above the level of mankind, but a great number of other
men, who were falling far below it, are caught and restrained by it. Observe some few individuals,
they are lowered by it; survey mankind, they are raised.” 76 While the sights of the few are lowered
by the doctrine of self-interest, those of the many are raised. As an “immutable” element of human
nature it was a “clear and sure” cornerstone on which political order could be founded.
Raw, untutored self-interest however, is in need of education. Mansfield writes that
American republicanism is really only based “on self-interest properly understood.”77 Self-interest
must be “self-interest rightly understood.”78 The pursuit of enlightened or rational self-interest is
only possible when citizens are guided by good government. “Self-interest rightly understood,”
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writes Tocqueville, “is a doctrine not very lofty, but clear and sure.”79 Tocqueville illustrates how
far the dependence of Publius’ political science on self-interest deviates from Classical political
philosophy. He writes that while self-interest rightly understood “suggests daily acts of selfdenial,” it “produces no great acts of self-sacrifice” and “by itself it cannot suffice to make a man
virtuous.”80 Nonetheless it “forms a multitude of citizens who are well regulated, temperate,
moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves; and if it does not lead directly to virtue through the
will, it brings them near to it insensibly through habits.”81 Tocqueville concludes that “the minds
of the moralists of our day ought to turn” toward the doctrine of self-interest as the vera causa of
human conduct. Even if “they judge it imperfect, they would still have to adopt it as necessary.”82
The centrality of self-interest in The Federalist’s arguments is less an unmitigated
celebration selfishness, than a realist’s observation about human motivation. Self-interest must be
rightly understood. Immediate or impulsive pursuit of interest is represented throughout The
Federalist as a vice and an evil which threatens political prosperity. Meanwhile the calculations
of remote or long-term interest, while something short of virtue itself, are understood as virtually
synonymous with the common interest. Publius does not pretend to make a virtue of naked selfinterest or greed. The thinking of Publius and the Founders rejects pure selfishness and regard it
as a vice. To coin a phrase, greed is not good.
Compare this attitude to the title of Ayn Rand’s book, The Virtue of Selfishness. For Rand
selfishness is a virtue in the economic sphere. All the Founders, influenced by Christianity morality
and the moral thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, thought the interests of men in society must
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be made to converge toward mutual concern, lest they diverge toward raw individualism and the
deadly disease of faction. This is the very individualism observed by Tocqueville in the 1830s,
which he identified as a dangerous threat to American society and the Founders’ achievement.
Excessive divergence of interests would lead to excessive factionalism and spell the end of the
American experiment in republican self-government. Publius and the Founders did not rely on the
spontaneous generation of order in a free-market sans the restraints of moral education. Rather
they all saw that avarice in office needs either to be checked by an equal and opposite
countervailing force, or coaxed in society by moral education into self-interest rightly understood.
Under the correct restraints, modern commercial virtues like “industry” and “enterprise” could be
mutually beneficial to members of society.
Publius’ emphasis on self-interest is an indictment of the Ancient trust in reason no less
than the Modern faith in mankind’s natural benevolent sentiments. This emphasis departed from
both classical republicanism and contemporaneous theories which emphasized the efficacy of
moral sentiments. Those like Hume, Hutchinson, Rousseau and Adam Smith, hardly denied the
significance of self-interest, but believed certain social passions or “moral sentiments” like
“humanity,” “sympathy”, “pity” or “compassion” played a greater role in making men concerned
for one other. Jefferson, for example, asserted the natural goodness of mankind. He believed moral
precepts were impressed “so indelibly on our hearts that they shall not be effaced by the subtleties
of our brains.”83 He wrote to John Adam’s that man’s sense of justice is “innate”, a matter of
“instinct” and that “the moral sense is as much a part of our constitution as that of feeling, seeing,
or hearing.” 84 His study of the American Indians led him to conclude “that man was a social,
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harmonious, cooperative, and just creature who, under the appropriate socioeconomic conditions,
could happily live in a community that did not need the presence of the Leviathan.”85
In founding their system of government on self-interest, Publius and the Founders selfconsciously rejected the supposed efficacy of sympathy to produce social harmony. They did not
believe that moral sentiments alone could bring the interest of the individual spontaneously in line
with the common one. Publius acknowledges the existence and role of such sentiments, but does
not trust them. The hard-boiled decision to place self-interest at the center of human motivation
reflects Publius’ conclusions from observations of men, past and present, that moral sentiments
cannot be reliably counted on to restrain men’s behavior. Experience shows they are not the central
spring which motivates human action. They are too weak for durable and just political order to
depend upon them. Moral sentiments were real and vital, but they could not be trusted as the prime
movers of men. It is precisely this observation that makes self-interest the vera causa. While
sympathy might be considered the foundation of a social order, Publius, like Hume, suggest that it
cannot be the cornerstone of a political one. For Publius such sentiments only find sufficient
encouragement once the Damocles’ sword of the Leviathan already hangs over the people’s heads.
Self-interest, not moral sentiment, must therefore be considered, the natural law of political order.
Political order then, must be founded on calculations of self-interest. Taking men as they
are means neither celebrating nor condemning human nature, but correctly provisioning for its
tendencies and limitations. Hume does not place blame on the perceived vices or virtues of human
nature but on the wisdom or foolishness of civic designs to remedy its vulnerabilities. Civic order
must obey the regular laws of human nature. Hume agreed with the “selfish system of morals”
which rooted political order in a foundation of self-interest. Hume says, “Nothing is more certain,
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than that men are, in a great measure, govern’d by interest, and that even when they extend their
concern beyond themselves, ’tis not to any great distance; nor is it usual for them, in common life,
to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance. ’Tis no less certain, that ’tis impossible
for men to consult their interest in so effectual a manner, as by an universal and inflexible
observance of the rules of justice, by which alone they can preserve society, and keep themselves
from falling into that wretched and savage condition.”86 This is why the founder or statesmen
crafting or maintaining political order must consider men as self-interested “knaves.” Thus within
the domain of society and the family moral sentiment can play a central role in social order, but
political order must then be founded on calculations of self-interest
In his account of the origins of justice, Hume makes clear that the moral sentiments
communicated by sympathy are not sufficiently strong to establish it. It turns out justice itself is a
product of the collective expression of self-interest, each man advocating for himself for equal
treatment under the law. He says, “If public benevolence, therefore, or a regard to the interests of
mankind, cannot be the original motive to justice, much less can private benevolence, or a regard
to the interests of the party concern’d, be this motive.”87 He says that “in general, it may be
affirm’d, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such,
independent of person qualities of services, or of relation to ourself.” 88 Hume acknowledges that
our selfishness is central to our bonds to those around us and that if civil society is to be successful
as a remedy for our natural deficiencies, it must successfully appeal to our selfishness.89
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Indeed, Hume concludes that self-interest was “the original motive to the establishment of
justice.”90 Hume acknowledges that the “principle of sympathy is too weak to control our
passions.”91 There was no faculty in man’s psychological endowment which would naturally
motivate them to the compliance of obligations which justice demands. The existence of
government and “an universal and inflexible observance of justice” turns out to be the best way to
serve one’s interest, “preserve society, and keep themselves from falling into that wretched and
savage condition.”92 Only from “the selfishness and confined generosity of man, along with the
scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin and we should add,
necessity.”93
Taking men as they are means neither celebrating nor condemning human nature, but
correctly provisioning for its limitations. Pointing to a central strategy later employed by Hamilton
in No. 72, Hume acknowledges our selfishness is the solution to the problem to human selfishness.
He says “whether the passion of self-interest be esteem’d vicious or virtuous, ‘tis all a case, since
itself alone restrains it: So that if it be virtuous, men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their
vice has the same effect.”94 Self-love is both the source of our bonds with others, but also our
indifference and enmity to those more distant individuals who do not directly figure in or obstruct
our pursuit of happiness. Justice is achieved, says Hume, not by “departing from our own interest,
or from that of our nearest friends,” but in being forced to recognize and respect the interests of
others as well as our own.95
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It is in the individual interest of all citizens to uphold a government which correctly
preserves their right to pursue their self-interest by means of the proper administration of justice.
Indeed, “we cannot better consult both these interests” because they are the means by which we
maintain society which are necessary and beneficial to the interests of all.”96 Hume says “the rules
of justice are established merely by interest,” and that the connection between justice and interest
is “singular.”97 Therefore interest is the “requisite to induce” citizens “to perform an act of
justice.”98 Justice involves promise keeping and rule following, that can only be guaranteed by
external sentinels. It is in the individual interest of all citizens to uphold a government which
correctly preserves their individual right to pursue self-interest through the proper external
restraints and administration of justice.
The arguments of The Federalist repeatedly acknowledge the limits of sentiment and the
necessity of depending on man’s self-interested nature. Given the limits of sentiment, government
and society must provide sentinels to restrain the passions. Passions can only be restrained the
equal countervailing force of other passions. In No. 43 Madison recognizes that real constitutional
checks are achieved only when passions are set against themselves. His analysis implicitly admits
that moral sentiments alone are not sufficient to inhibit abuses of the powers granted by the
Constitution. Yet, when destructive passions are properly neutralized, men are able to begin to
pursue their proper interests. With this hard architecture in place, moral sentiments borne of
sympathy can play a secondary role in society and government.
With the correct provisioning of constitutional circumstances, some passions can be
transmuted into sentiments and channeled toward the common interest. Man’s natural and self-
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interested concern for himself and the opinions of others, could ultimately be leveraged toward
good conduct. Human beings seek many rewards which are only obtained through intercourse with
their fellow citizens. Ambition and the desire for recognition make men concerned with the
opinions of others. The “sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation” provide the carrot
and stick, moral pleasures and pains, which guide men’s actions toward the modification and
satisfaction of their desires in a manner which harmonizes with the interests of their fellow
citizens.99 Proper circumstances of action would establish a process of identification where men
would see themselves through the eyes and opinions of others. As Tocqueville acknowledges,
Spartan virtue would not be required for this task. Interest could be coopted by interest. Selfinterest could be leveraged against itself through the natural exploitation of an inward impulse
turned outward by the incentives of a correctly ordered regime.
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IV.

The Science of Human Nature & The Motives of Man

1. The Language of Human Nature

The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the
nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider
men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals,
Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be
acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind. 1
-

Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature

The Federalist is a distinctly American work of modern political science. The attitudes of
its authors regarding human nature were heavily colored by their firsthand experiences of
American colonial society, their life in politics, as well as their readings of history and the Biblical
tradition. They inherited a large repository of well developed ready-made concepts and
frameworks of understanding from the various phases of the European Enlightenment and the
nations which contributed to it. This inheritance of ideas on human nature is centered on the
modern Natural Law tradition and a subdivision of moral philosophy called faculty psychology.
Publius largely adopted the terminology he inherited without nuanced analysis of its precise
meanings. Yet, the Enlightenment legacy on the science of human nature was not unequivocal.
Within this common framework were numerous disputes and disagreements. Despite the
derivative elements of The Federalist’s science of human nature, its originality is to be found in
its decisive judgments and conclusions in unresolved and openly disputed matters within the larger
discourse.
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The Federalist sums up the needs, desires and ambitions of man, or the nature and power
of his psychological faculties with the expression “human nature.” “Human nature” was simply
the term of art used to speak of the common and essential attributes of the human species at the
end of the 18th century in Europe and America. Unlike the contemporary specialization of labor
within the human sciences, this term connoted a broad wholistic approach. It summed up the
totality of features of the human identity, from mind to body, reason to passions. It was understood
as the foundational object of inquiry for the epistemological, moral, social and political sciences.
Hume says it is “evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature.”2
He concludes that the moral and political sciences are “most closely connected with the study of
human nature and human understanding.”3 Today, the main thrust of Publius’ account of human
nature would be considered “political” or “faculty psychology.” Political psychology addresses
the nature and springs of human psychology pertinent to the collective life of human beings in
civil society. In particular, The Federalist is concerned with the enduring psychological features
of human nature which led to the failures of the Articles of Confederation in the past, and attempts
to determine their future effects under the Constitution.
Later terms like “psychology”, “political” or “moral psychology”, or “political
anthropology” connote greater narrowness of scope and a more differentiated specialization within
the human sciences. These 20th century terms cover what was called epistemology, and moral and
political philosophy. All are built on the foundation of human nature as their central object of
study. Howe has noted that their analysis of human psychology linked political theory and rhetoric
because they all came under the same “enormous intellectual structure called moral philosophy,
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the ancestor of all the modern social sciences as well as of ethical theory and epistemology as we
know them.”4 The more wholistic approach of 18th century science reflects a more wholistic and
integrated conception of human nature. While Publius would have understood these modern
disciplines, such language was not available to him. The wholistic nature of 18th century
anthropological science gave Publius permission to speak in boarder terms about the human animal
and on a wider range of topics than these modern counterparts.
The Enlightenment bible of the human sciences was David Hume’s A Treatise on Human
Nature. The fundamental goal of the Treatise was to provide “a new science of human nature.”5
This was an experimental text, no less experimental than the new political science of The
Federalist and its new republicanism.6 Hume described the Treatise as “an attempt to introduce
the experimental philosophy into moral subjects.”7 This text exerted significant influence over
Hamilton and Madison. Their contemporary Adam Smith credits Hobbes and Locke as having
initiated the modern investigation of human nature which culminated in Hume’s Treatise.8 The
Treatise was largely responsible for a significant displacement in nomenclature. The term “man”
was displaced for the expression “human nature” in naming the central object of scientific inquiry
within the discourse of the human sciences.9 There is an analogous substitution in Hume’s Treatise
of the “mind” for what was once called the “soul”. Both former terms were freighted with the
baggage of theology and its immaterial realities, whereas the latter terms spoke to the empiricism
and materialism of the day. In his section of the Treatise entitled “The Immateriality of the Soul”
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Hume calls into question the possibility of the soul being an “immaterial substance.”10 Instead
Hume’s term “mind” represents, less a thing-in-itself, and more a kind of conceptual placeholder
which characterizes the locus of the mental actives of reason and passion. Montesquieu’s The Spirit
of Laws was equally influential on Hume, Hamilton and Madison. This text repeatedly employs
the term “nature humaine”, the French cognate for the English term. When for example
Montesquieu employs the word “l’homme”, invariably he refers to a specific human being and not
the species at large.
As if to reinforce the broad nature of this category Montesquieu writes in The Spirit of
Laws of a broad range of particular peoples with distinct habits across time and space, who despite
their differences, all serve as exemplars of this common human nature. Montesquieu’s repeated
emphasis on the plurality of the conditions, habits and character of the human species
paradoxically reveals the commonalities which cut across this apparent diversity. Krause writes
that despite Montesquieu’s emphasis on human variability he nonetheless identifies “cross-cultural
and ahistorical consistencies.”11 These “consistencies” are the locus classicus of human nature
itself. It is by way of reference to a fixed human nature that Montesquieu is logically able to
condemn categorically as “appalling ills” and “insults to human nature” despotic and tyrannical
forms of government and their central principal of fear.12 Krause describes forms of despotism as
“empirically discernable violations” of human nature in Montesquieu.13
The phrase “human nature” brought in tow a specific set of scientific assumptions,
connotations and allusions distinct from previous epithets used to articulate human identity. The
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word “nature” implied human being was reasonably fixed and universal. Nature is that which
endures and persists under normal circumstances despite extremes, superficial changes or
accidents. Nature implies necessity while accidents are contingent. Publius and others well
understood that human character was changeable and fugitive to circumstance and custom. There
was no doubt a first and a second nature. On the other hand, human nature was the unchanging
underlying cornerstone of the human identity. It was the object on which political order is founded
and must contend. If human nature is fundamentally changeable and transformable it cannot be the
subject of scientific inquiry because it does not abide by laws that are sufficiently fixed. Its effects
cannot reasonably and consistently be traced to regular and reliable, or even observable causes.
Predicting human conduct would involve a trip to the oracle at Delphi rather than observations of
men throughout history.
“Nature” not only suggested that which is permanent but connoted the elimination of any
supernatural causes in the psychology and conduct of men. For example, the prior term which held
currency, “man”, had come to be associated with the supernaturalism of Christian theology and
Cartesianism dualism. Hume’s Treatise and its nomenclature represented an explicit departure
from a still influential dualism, and replaced it with a strictly immanent naturalistic account of
human action. The immaterial and immortal soul would be reduced to the mortal mind, strictly a
special function of the body and its organs.
Human nature was therefore continuous with the natural world at large. If human being
was a material phenomenon, then it was a product of imminent causes. This made it empirically
observable and sufficiently, if not perfectly, knowable. Since man was an immanent phenomenon,
the causes of his conduct could be found in the empirical and observable realm of the natural
world. As such, our second nature was continuous and derivative from the first. This made human
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nature and conduct, to some basic degree, subject to the same types of material and mechanical
causes, laws and explanations as the natural world. Taylor says the French “philosophes were
eminently impressed by the discovery that the world (and perhaps everything in it) obeyed a set of
basic natural laws. The universe was not only intelligible – it was rational; indeed, it was
intelligible for this very reason.” 14 Human nature was then a proper object of scientific inquiry.
Hume’s ambitious work hoped to initiate this investigation. Identifying human nature as a
particular type of being in the order of things then allowed the political philosopher to assess the
immutable laws of that nature. As Montesquieu says in The Spirit of Laws, “the intelligences
superior to man have their laws, those beneath have their laws,” and “man has his laws” too.15
They are called the laws of nature, Montesquieu says, “because they derive solely from the
constitution of our being,” and in order to understand them “we must consider a human being prior
to the establishment of societies” in a “state of nature.”16 Striped of the ornaments of culture and
civilization the primordial impulse of such a being would be to ”give thought to the preservation
of its being.” 17 Prior to any moral meaning given to them, the laws of human nature are the
primordial laws of biology and psychology, ironclad impulses and instincts which determine
fundamental needs and desires. As fundamental drives they are universal and natural drives on
which all human beings can be expected to act. The goal of civil society is then to establish its
positive laws, as much as is possible in light of circumstance, in harmony with the natural laws of
human nature. “Laws,” says Montesquieu, “are the necessary relations deriving from the nature of
things; and in this sense, all beings have their laws.”18 If physical nature has laws, so too does
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human nature.19 Montesquieu says “Man, as a physical being, is governed by invariable laws like
other bodies. As an intelligent being, he constantly violates the laws god has established and
changes those he himself establishes; he must guide himself, and yet he is a limited being; he is
subject to ignorance and error, as are all finite intelligences; he loses even the imperfect knowledge
he has.”20 Where in fact does Montesquieu ground these laws, what is their bedrock? The answer
is, the passions. Like Hume, Montesquieu denies the meaningful efficacy of reason in motivating
and determining human action. “Passions, and the behavior they generate,” says Pangle, “are what
Montesquieu means by the ‘laws of human nature’ in the strictest sense of the term.”21 Passion is
the bedrock which provides the constants for the laws of human nature. In his Dissertation on the
Passions, Hume says, “that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular
mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics,
hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy.”22 The science of human nature would provide
knowledge of the laws of man’s being which would allow him to structure his individual and
collective live in conformity with that nature and live in some degree of happiness.
Publius and the Founders followed this lead. Notwithstanding their respect for the moral
function of Christianity, there was virtually no religious or supernatural element to be found in
either the method or the substance of their deliberations on human nature at the Convention or in
The Federalist Papers. While The Founders repeatedly asserted the practical necessity of religion
to a self-governing society, they made virtually no mention of it in the intellectual calculations
which contributed to crafting that political order. This approach included a keen awareness of the
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psychological and political power of religious belief as well as its pitfalls in the form of the
factionalization of religious sects.23 Their deliberations would be guided by the mortal light of
reason alone. Political order would be crafted on the cornerstone of human nature understood in
naturalistic terms. Human nature was a worldly phenomenon subject to human reason. The springs
of action habitually reiterated in The Federalist such as self-love, vanity and pride, self-interest,
fear, ambition, love of power, party animosity, resentment, jealousy, avarice, venality and the like,
all speak to a distinctly terrestrial conception of human psychology.
In his famous work on the Declaration of Independence, Carl Becker writes Montesquieu
was seeking “that which is common to all peoples.”24 Becker says the Founders’ thinking was
distinctly colored by the determination to discover the grail of the Enlightenment which were the
universal laws of human nature.25 He writes, the Founders “held up the lantern of Enlightenment”
in order “to go up and down the field of history looking for man in general, the universal man,
stripped of the accidents of time and place.”26 This is a rather overstated simplification on two
counts. Like Montesquieu, The Founders were extremely sensitive to the way different forms of
government habituate the dispositions and behaviors of men differently. Each produces its own
distinct human character. They understood the fugitive nature of human identity, but identified a
common thread underlying its variable historical expression. In a sense the Declaration of
Independence was the “easy” part of the American Founding, adapting those principles to an
existent society in practice was the challenge of the Grand Convention and the Constitution it
crafted.
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The variability of the human animal is also a permanent feature. Second, a constant refrain
throughout The Federalist warns of the limits of human reason in our capacity to know, coupled
with the distorting effects of the passions and interests on our opinions. The authors of The
Federalist clearly applied these reservations to their own efforts as much as to the psychological
make-up of the people and their representatives. In No. 37 Madison writes that our imperfect
human faculties are the very “medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed.”27
Thus their claims to depict a universal human nature are acknowledged as tentative, imperfect and
experimental in light of the limitations of the same fallible nature observing itself as its own object.
Rational analysis of the human animal was not simply a matter of seeing facts. It dictated the need
for wise judgment. Human reason must make a prudential acknowledgement of the limits of the
rational faculty itself. The acknowledgement of reason’s limits must then impact the judgments
and conclusions of any science of human nature. The Convention and The Federalist were carried
out, appropriately enough, in the spirit of a great experiment whose effects were not certain
because the causes were not knowable with mathematical certainty.
The Constitution was means to ends established by the Natural Rights doctrine of the
Declaration. This meant the central concern of The Federalist was a science of human conduct and
motivation rooted in empirical observations and not the content or speculative origins of Natural
Rights. The Enlightenment science of man directly relevant to Publius’ account came under the
rubrics of moral and political philosophy. The central theme of the Scottish Enlightenment, which
so influenced Publius, was moral philosophy. John Witherspoon had been the central American
exponent and transmitter of this school to many including Madison and indirectly to Hamilton who
had sought to study with him. The Scottish Enlightenment understood moral philosophy as a
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science of the faculties or powers of the human mind.28 Its central focus was to understand the way
these powers shape and determine human action, and by extension man’s moral, social and
political life. It sought to discern the psychological springs of vice and virtue on the individual
and collective levels. These springs were the causes of harmony and conflict within society at
large.
By the end of the 18th century, the inquiry into human motivation came to be called “faculty
psychology.” Faculty psychology is the analysis of the various powers of mind which determine
human action. The history of faculty psychology starts with the analysis of the soul and its parts
by Plato and Aristotle. This analysis took its modern form in the writings of Descartes, Hobbes,
Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Reid and others. The Moderns starting with Descartes initiated an
emphasis on epistemology. Epistemology, a term coined in the 19th century,29 is primarily
concerned with how men know what they know about the world and the psychological faculties
used to attain this knowledge. The same facilities mankind uses to know the world around them
also turn out to be the ones which drive their opinions and conduct.
In the 18th Century faculty psychology was a central branch of moral philosophy which
sought “to describe those divisions of knowledge concerned with the human subject.”30 Under the
rubric of moral philosophy human psychology was the fulcrum which linked the sciences of
politics, ethics and rhetoric.31 Thomas Reid’s writings contemporaneous to The Federalist, such as
his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man of 1785 and Essays on the Active Powers of the
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Human Mind of 1788 exemplify the predominance of faculty psychology within the disciplines of
moral and political philosophy at that time. The Federalist’s use of faculty psychology places its
arguments well within “the context of Enlightenment behavioral science.”32 Since faculty
psychology had established a “widely shared set of assumptions, it was natural for Publius to
employ it.”33 In a 1792 essay, Madison glosses The Spirit of Laws saying “Montesquieu has
resolved the great operative principles of government into fear, honor, and virtue.”34
Montesquieu’s arch principles of government are nothing other than what he determined to be the
central ruling passions of the soul which cause men to act as they do. A given faculty of the mind,
or “modification of the soul”, was understood by Montesquieu as “the spring that makes a
government act.”35
The wholistic approach of The Federalist’s moral psychology respects the breadth of
potential motivations which drive men to act. It does not engage in simplistic or abstract
reductivism. Obviously it reduces human motivation to self-interest, but self-interest only specifies
a type of object beneficial to oneself without specifying the nature of the object. Such objects are
potentially unlimited. By respecting the natural diversity of human nature, The Federalist respects
the natural diversity of objects of desire it might aim. Publius does not couch self-interest in simple
economic or material terms as is so common today. One popular current account of human
psychology is Rational Choice Theory derived from economics. Rational Choice Theory operates
under the assumption that all behavior is singularly motived by “choosing a course of action which
maximizes expected utility. The theory however tends to treat “utility” in a narrow and reductive
way. It makes utility reducible to maximizing quantities and ignores certain ends of action entirely.
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It describes as rational a “maximin” conception of utility. This is a strategy “employed to maximize
a player's minimum possible gain.”36 The underlying goal is to try and guarantee maximal gains
and minimize losses.37 This is considered, “rational.”
Rational Choice Theory does not take seriously a whole range of motivations which
political thinkers from Plato to Publius took for granted including those of ambition, honor, glory
and fame. The theory is abstract and does not draw on historical examples or the personal
experiences of its progenitors. How much someone wants something, is simply a matter of
counting. This approach fails to consider all those “irrational” desires and endeavors that do not
conform to this quantitative model. It is not equipped to understand self-sacrifice, martyrdom or
the desire for fame or glory. It deems such motives “irrational” and demonstrates just how narrow
its explanatory power is. This is psychological model of risk aversion. Great actors of history rarely
if ever conform to such a model. It does not account for all-or-nothing modes of thinking. It is hard
to imagine a Madison or a Hamilton every making such generalizations about human motivation.
Men want to gain and acquire that which is useful to them, but what do they understand as the
useful, legitimate or truly desirable end of their actions? The political scientist must acquaint
themselves with specific human types starting from the natural divide of humors between the few
and the many. Hamilton and Madison understood men as motivated by particular ends peculiar to
their own natures. What is perceived as useful to one man is not to another. Nor is this a matter of
pure subjectivity, or arbitrary cultural construct. Their reading and experiences led then to identify
as specific set of ends certain types of men seek to satisfy that remain constant even as times
change.
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Within the scientific inheritance The Federalist took from the Enlightenment there were
significant disputes over the precise nature and division of human psychology. There was
particular disagreement over the relative power of its faculties. What was the specific nature of
faculties like reason, passion, interest and moral sentiment? And, what was the relative force of
these motivations under specific circumstances? The nature and urgency of its practical and
rhetorical task meant The Federalist Papers were not intended to address these matters in the
granular or systematic way a philosophical treatise might. Its essays do not have the time, space
or scope to address such matters from first principles. Its faculty psychology is less than systematic.
Madison even acknowledges they are unable to resolve certain ambiguities inherited from others.38
It takes clear stands on some matters, while on others is content to leave loose ends. Often it seems
to simply rely on the common sense of the thing without adding distinct contributions of its own.
Rarely does the text provide precise definitions of key terms, or the philosophical foundations on
which they might rest. This absence is most noticeable in the use of the elusive term “interest”. As
we shall see, this ambiguity is built into the concept itself. Lacking explicit clarification, The
Federalist often relies on context and sense of use as well as the common public meaning of these
words as understood by an educated public.
It has often been said that the focus of the new science on faculty psychology displaced
prior theories of human nature centered on the doctrine of the Law of Nature.39 The new human
sciences were apparently relegated to studying the “is” of human conduct while denying the
possibility of knowing how men “ought” to live. How they ought to live was condemned to the
purgatories of mere opinion or the zeal of blind faith. The emphasis in Hume and Burke on
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experience and history increasingly saw the foundation of human conduct in historical habits over
and above the kernel of a fixed human nature. An exclusively empirical turn may have been
increasingly true of the European context, but not so of the American one. Hamilton’s thought for
example is often seen through the lens of the historical and empirical turn in Hume and Burke. But
the later Hamilton never refuted or rejected the earlier one who had written that the “sacred rights
of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. They are written
with a sun beam in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself; and can
never be erased or obscured by mortal power.”40 This was the man who joined the New York
Manumission Society after it was founded by his future fellow author John Jay in 1785, on the
premise that slavery was a wrong against human nature.41
Instead, Publius’ science of human nature is built on the premise that knowledge of the
human faculties “was knowledge of what it was both possible and right to do.” 42 Publius believed
that human nature itself provided “a standard for good government.”43 This is as true of Locke as
it is of the Scottish Moralists. For example, Louis Hartz presented the famed thesis of the enduring
value of Locke in the American context long after the principles of the Glorious Revolution had
been transcended in English and European politics and political thought.44 Even the skeptic Hume
believed there were universal laws of human conduct which could be discerned from the careful
study of history. The subject of Hume’s Treatise was after all, human nature.
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The two tranches of the human sciences, descriptive and normative, need not contradict,
but instead complement one another. The method of the Natural Law tradition is often said to be
excessively rationalistic, speculative and abstract whereas the science of human nature initiated by
Hume was increasingly empirical, inductive and concrete. No doubt the empirical findings of the
nature of the human mind and the powerful role played by the passions made Humean science
profoundly skeptical of rational speculation. Madison and Hamilton repeatedly express wariness
toward armchair philosophy untethered from the test of experience. Hamilton repeatedly railed
against what he called “dangerous metaphysics” in matters of political.45
Despite this new emphasis, neither Hume nor Publius succumb to the displacement of
human nature by History as the ground of human identity. The empirical turn meant a greater
dependence on and respect for experience and history. History was however understood by Hume
and Publius as the central fount for empirical evidence of a constant human nature and its motives.
This, Hume made no bones about. Furthermore Hamilton himself speaks of a certain type of selfevident truth, like that of the Declaration, which “carries its own evidence along with it; and may
be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning.”46 This type of truth, he writes,
“rests upon axioms, as simple as they are universal.”47 Despite the apparent tensions in method
and substance between the new science and the prior Natural Law tradition their differences are
hardly as absolute or mutually exclusive as often portrayed. We need only mention Montesquieu
as a bridge between these approaches, influential on Madison and Hamilton, who respected both
the general and the specific in human nature.
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Publius science extends beyond political psychology. The Federalist’s arguments on behalf
of the Constitution marry the principles of Modern Natural Law and the empirical observations of
faculty psychology in a complimentary and logically consistent manner. For example, the Natural
Law tradition of Hobbes and Locke find common cause with Hume in their agreement about the
relative fixity and constancy of human nature. Furthermore, Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu all
ground the laws of human nature in empirical observations and realities. The foundation of their
theories of Natural Law starts with core observations of biological impulses. The arch empirical
realties they observed can be summed up as self-preservation, fear of violent death, self-interest,
and the desire for a comfortable or commodious existence. These observed empirical phenomena
dictate normative ends of human conduct as well as the proper ends of political order. Since men
are understood as equal and all have a fundamental drive to self-preservation coupled with a desire
to avoid violent death, then men must have a right to self-preservation and a duty to respect that
right in others. The “self-evident” truths, which form the basis and content of Natural Law, are all
rooted in universal biological drives of the species. Natural Law is the product of rational
inferences from these empirical realities. For example, the natural and powerful inclination to selfpreservation culminates in a law which makes preserving life sacrosanct. Locke’s prohibition on
suicide is the logical ramification of a norm derivative of biological drives.48 Natural Law is
grounded in our first nature, even as our second nature is required to fulfill it. Reason’s role is not
to invent laws but to identify them. Natural Law results from the rational ramifications of these
observations, and in turn provides a normative basis for the ends of law and political order. Like
Locke and Montesquieu, Publius walks a line between the rationalist tradition of Natural Law and
the more empirical science of the later Enlightenment.
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2. The Two Tranches of Human Nature

The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.1
-

Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

In his monumental commentaries on English Common Law of 1628 Sir Edward Coke
writes, “Law…is the perfection of reason.”2 “Reason,” said Coke, “is the life of law, nay the
common law itself is nothing else but reason.”3 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes would later turn
this adage on its head in his 1881 book The Common Law. His rejoinder to Coke and the rationalist
legal tradition was to say, “The life of law has not been logic: it has been experience.”4 Is law a
function of reason or experience? Is not law necessarily a mixture of both? What can be reasoned
about without experience? Put another way is law derivative of logical inferences from a constant
human nature, or is it purely the result of contingency responses to changing historical
circumstances? Experience alone without reasoning cannot alone yield law. History sanctions all
human conduct and demonstrates that on a material level, we are only restricted by the laws of
physics and biology. Thomas Hobbes writes “Prudence is but experience” but some gain much
less wisdom than others because prudence requires both experience and rational reflection on it.
Thus, the development of law is not a willy-nilly process of experience, but of the conscious and
unconscious application of reason to judge the consequences of actions and thereby establish rules
of conduct for the future based on those reflections.
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Even Justice Holmes’ legal pragmatism acknowledge a central role for reason despite its
emphasis on history and experience. Holmes acknowledges that “it is true in the broadest sense
that the law is a logical development” but was determined to refute what he called the “fallacy” of
conceiving it as “purely a process of articulated logic” or that it was “worked out like mathematics
from general axioms of conduct.”5 What are we to learn from experience without reaching
conclusions which are an outgrowth of inferences deduced from experience which necessarily and
inevitably go beyond it? Is not law nothing other than reasoning applied to experience in order to
arrive at statutes which promote the perceived public interest? We need only look at the dire
consequences at the extremes when law is exclusively associated with either reason or experience.
Once the rational is equated with the real, or law with absolute reason, as Hegel did, a monstrosity
can be justified. Likewise, the absolute association of law with experience or the real, is equally
subject to the same justification of monstrosities.
Experience, or history, completely untethered to reason is a cloaked version of might makes
right. What is, is by definition just. In a democratic republic the belief that the life or essence of
law is experience means that the will of the majority is always just regardless of what it wills. If
the majority wills slavery, slavery is just. This was precisely the position taken by Stephen Douglas
in the Lincoln-Douglass debates. The doctrine of popular sovereignty was for Douglas the just
principle in determining whether new states entering the Union would be free or slave. Jaffa writes,
“Douglas’ doctrine of ‘popular sovereignty’ meant no more than that: in a democracy, justice is
the interest of the majority, which is ‘the stronger’.”6 The simple principle of majority rule makes
the will of the majority infallible. This is what experience and history unmoored from reason teach.
Where are the constitutional and legal guard-rails to the democratic will to be found without some
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reference to a rational discernment of human nature which identifies certain practices as naturally
just and others as naturally unjust? On what ground would Martin Luther King Jr. have stood
against the positive laws of his day without reference to a law which finds its source and foundation
in nature or nature’s God, that is, something higher than the democratic will? Were not segregation
and Jim Crow based on nothing other than what Holmes calls the “felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy” and last but not least, “the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men”7 Total deference to history and experience
justifies the tyranny of the status quo. Laws do not always unconsciously emanate from the habits
and practices of the day, they also emerge in opposition to them.
At the heart of this debate over law as a manifest in reason or History, is how human nature
is to be identified and known and the practical consequences of each perspective. Does human
nature have a general and identifiable transhistorical essence? Is it an ever-present reality across
time, space and history whose features can be determined through observed and inferred through
reason? Or is the superficial evidence of human nature only every partial and variable? Is human
nature simply to be identified with the fluctuating currents of the given present? Here, human
nature is only what is observable in experience at that moment and cannot be known through
rational inferences from particular experiences of men to general truths about human nature.
This divide finds its origins in the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions of thought inherited
by Publius and The Founders. The former placed an emphasis on a stable nature, while the other
increasingly emphasized historical experiences as the foundation on which human identity rested.
It is obvious that Rationalists are dependent on experience in the same manner that legal positivists
and Empiricists are dependent on rational inferences, often unacknowledged, which go beyond the

7

Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Common Law. New York: Dover Publications, 1991. p. 1.

312

strict empirical evidence. That the spirit of the times or the majority will be just still demands a
rational justification of that position. The Rationalist and Empiricist positions are not then mutually
exclusive. Publius and the Founders sought to walk a line between an acknowledgement that law,
natural or positive, was the product of reason and also the product of experience. When for example
Coke spoke of the life of law as reason, he did not, as Holmes derisively insinuates, mean
mathematical logic or “syllogism”. Reasoning is a process of prudential judging whereas Holmes’
“logic”, as he himself says, implies “the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.” Coke
meant no such thing. Coke clarified to say his identification of law with reason meant, “an

artificial perfection of reason gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of
every man’s natural reason.”8 By “reason” he meant prudence, or practical reasoning derived
from and applied to experience.
This tension between a Rationalist perspective and an Empiricist, or positivist, pragmatic
or historicist perspective where utility is king sits as the foundation of the provisions of the
Constitution and its account of human nature. This tension manifests itself in two intellectual
tranches of The Federalist’s account of human nature. These tranches represent two frameworks
of understanding its author’s inherited from the Enlightenment. These frameworks can broadly be
described as Rationalist on one hand, and Empiricist or behavioralist on the other. These
frameworks determine both method and substance. Each framework has its own method of
reasoning and distinct thematic concerns as they are linked to the task of explaining the
Constitution. In Locke and Hume, we find the broad outlines of these two frameworks, and in
Montesquieu we find a heady synthesis. Lowenthal writes the American republic is a living
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embodiment of “the modern representative republic first rationally conceived by Locke and then
elaborated by Montesquieu.” 9
The first tranche The Federalist’s science of human nature consists of a Rationalist
understanding of the principles and ends of government. These are principles gleaned from human
nature by reason in the form of the Law of Nature. The second tranche is Empiricist. It consists of
empirical observations of human conduct gleaned from personal experience and history. These
two tranches offer two distinct methods. These two intellectual frameworks of The Federalist
divide along the lines of the principles and ends of government on the one hand, and the structural
means to those ends on the other. The Rationalist component points to how men ought to behave,
while the Empiricist element observes how they do behave. The Rationalist framework of The
Federalist establishes the principles of the regime while the Empiricist framework provides the
evidence of human motivation and action which serve as the basis on which the peculiar
arrangement, or the means, of the Constitution and its powers are devised. Actually, achieving the
ends dictated by reason, the doctrine of Natural Rights, necessitates crafting a political order
sensitive and commensurate to the empirically observed faculties of the human mind. From this
general understanding of motive and conduct, The Federalist is then able to present a hypothetical
assessment of how men would act under the provisions of the Constitution. Taylor says The
Federalist’s “theories were built upon firmly-held political principles, the lessons of experience,
and the parameters of the possible.”10
Publius understood the provisions of the Constitution to be commensurate with human
nature itself. Underlying the logic of its provisions is a presumption about the proper ends of
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government along with conclusions about the predictable motives and conduct of men. Derived
from human nature, these ends dictate how men ought to live. They provide the necessary template
to determine the type of conduct the Constitution should promote and discourage, reward and
punish. The peculiar nature and arrangement of its powers are the means to achieving these ends.
And yet, such ends, however righteous, can only be realized by a prudent assessment of how men
do act rather than how they ought to. To guide society toward the correct actions and relations
meant an assessment of the enduring motives and springs of human action. Once these are
sufficiently known and understood a political order can be devised which induces correct conduct
by appealing to likely motives in a manner that encourages or compels the desired conduct.
While the moral principles of the Republic are enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence, it was left to the Constitutional Convention to fashion the appropriate means to
those ends. Once the ends are established and human conduct known from experience, a political
order can be prudently devised that will anticipate men’s actions in order to guide and constrain
them toward those goals successfully. The Articles of Confederation were based on the same
principles of Natural Right as the Constitution. Yet, they failed to fulfill them precisely because of
their inability to anticipate and cope with how men actually behave. As a result, they failed to
achieve the ends, or successfully secure the rights, laid out by the Declaration.
The dictates of reason are found in the Natural Rights of the Declaration of Independence.
In 1776, the acceptance of the principles of Natural Right meant that the parameters of any future
government were already circumscribed by a popular and limited form with the sole task of
protecting and security those rights. And yet these ends are general and do not articulate the precise
means by which they are to be fulfilled. As Jefferson himself acknowledged in that document, the
form government must take in order to fulfill them is left to the will of the people to decide. The
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people, he says, must “institute new Government,” founded on “such principles” and organize “its
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” The
form of government is not simply the product of adherence to principles derived from reason. It is
made possible only through prudent judgments and conclusions of experience which are the
product of the people’s deliberations. This process rested on the people’s judicious opinion of the
form which might best secure their Natural Rights. Madison reminds us in No. 39 that “no other
form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental
principles of the revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of
freedom” than the republican form established by the Constitution.11
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along
with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon
axioms, as simple as they are universal…
-

Hamilton, No. 23

-

The first tranche The Federalist’s science of human nature is a Rationalist account of the
principles of government. These are principles gleaned from human nature by reason in the form
of the Law of Nature. The Rationalist frame employs a type of speculative reasoning where moral
laws are inferred from empirical evidence of human nature and human conduct. The Rationalist
approach seeks to determine the moral ought from the empirical is. A set of universal moral
principles are deduced from human nature which dictate how human beings should act. The
inability of “men and governments to conform to these truths in no way nullifies their validity.”12
This is like saying that the moral prohibition against murder is nullified by the historical existence
of murderers. Natural Law is not simply observable through the senses or manifest in physical
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laws. It can only be fully gleaned through speculative inferences. Its demonstration is dependent
on rational proofs. Taylor asserts there is “a scale of political knowledge that begins with the
“plainest and simplest truths” and stretches gossamer-like to the most qualified probabilities.”13
Publius clearly maintains the capacity of reason to glean moral laws from the evidence of
human nature. He rejects Hume’s claim that “the rules of morality…are not conclusion of our
reason.”14 Following Jefferson, Natural Law was understood as axiomatic and self-evident. A
method of speculative reasoning is employed which reaches a point at which no further evidence
is applicable. In No. 23 Hamilton says a “self-evident” truth “carries its own evidence along with
it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon
axioms, as simple as they are universal.”15 In No. 31 Hamilton writes, “In disquisitions of every
kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings
must depend. These contain an internal evidence, which, antecedent to all reflection or
combination, commands the assent of the mind.”16
In No. 23 Hamilton clarifies the nature of self-evident truth. He writes, “This is one of
those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it; and
may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms, as
simple as they are universal . . . the means ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons from
whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to
be attained.”17 Employing just such reasoning to the number of the executive, Hamilton says in
No. 70 that by “quitting the dim light of historical research, and attaching ourselves purely to the
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dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject, than to approve,
the idea of plurality in the executive, under any modification whatever.”18 However imperfect
Hamilton’s conclusion may in fact be, we cannot deny that he accepted this type of rationalist
method as necessary to their political science and its analysis of human nature.
Natural Law is the tacit premise on which the constitutional system is based. The principles
of the Law of Nature, from which Modern Natural Rights are derived, establish the ends of
government. Natural Rights were understood as rational inferences deduced from human nature
itself. The essence of Natural Law teaching was that human nature itself dictates an intrinsic moral
law which can be gleaned by rational inference from the evidence of human conduct throughout
history, past and present. The Natural Law tradition was primarily transmitted by the teachings of
John Locke. The Declaration of Independence claims that government is instituted to secure the
rights of “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” This Rationalist, or Natural Law, component is of
course not the focus of The Federalist Papers. Its account of human nature rests on accepted
presuppositions about Natural Law that it does not itself argue for, but assumes. These principles
are the premise on which all the Constitution’s political arrangements are based even as they are
not the priority of Publius’ analysis. It is however their necessary predicate. Taylor says that in
The Federalist Papers, “the existence of natural rights is assumed, as is the Lockean theory of the
origin and role of government.”19
The rights securing nature of the Constitution is manifest in the nature and structure of its
power. Natural Rights are the North Star of the Constitution. They demand the Constitution
establishes a “wholly popular” government based on principles of representation, limited
government, federalism and the separation of powers. A conception of government as popular and
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limited, which functions as rights securing mechanism is dictated by the natural freedom and
equality of men. These structural features are totally unintelligible without reference to the ends
prescribed by the Declaration. The arguments of The Federalist Papers rest on the premise that
the Constitution’s brand of republicanism was the best possible government likely to achieve these
ends. The validity and justice of this form was not predicated on expediency, utility or mere
conformity with the American ethos of the day. The liberty of republican government was
commensurate with the moral law which dictates the intrinsic liberty and dignity of human nature.
Liberty is both commensurate with that nature but also required in order to fulfill it.
Meanwhile the Empiricist or behavioralist facet of The Federalist is built on empirical
observations of human nature and conduct. This second tranche traces it heritage to Machiavelli
and Hobbes, Montesquieu and Hume. Perhaps the greatest exponent of this school was Hume, who
saw history and experience as the central fount of knowledge of human nature. Hume subordinated
the influence of reason to the passions. Given the fallibility of the rational faculty, knowledge or
truth would only reside in hewing to concrete experience as much as is humanly possible. Hume’s
empiricism, his skepticism toward the findings of deductive reasoning pushed him toward the
conclusion that “there can be no knowledge of anything beyond experience.”20 Hume made clear
that passive, weak and slavish reason played no direct role in the establishment of morality. This
attitude taken to the extreme would seem to deny the possibility of knowledge altogether as human
knowledge is always dependent on inferences of reason which themselves necessarily go beyond
experience tout seul. Action, moral or political, demands knowledge. This knowledge is perhaps
more tenuous and based on prudent judgment, not mathematical certitude. Hume condemned
flighty speculations of reason founded in apparent hypotheticals such as the State of Nature and

20

I. Bernard Cohen. Science and the Founding Fathers. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012. p. 253.

319

the social contract. And yet he did not deny that universal laws of human society could be gleaned
from history. The consequences of this method were to be applied to both theory and practice.
This behavioralist facet seeks to clearly grasp men’s conduct and the motives for it. While
the substance of Natural Law cannot be observed by the senses, human conduct can. Evidence of
human conduct is accessible to all men through their own experiences. This knowledge is built on
empirical observations of history and experience and seeks to understand how men act under
particular circumstances including the various relevant forms of political order. It seeks to provide
an account of human conduct as predicated on the causal foundation of all-too-human impulses,
desires and passions which dictate how most men act most of the time. The need for this knowledge
directs the task of The Federalist away from rational speculation and toward the sources of history
and personal experience which provided ample empirical evidence of human conduct.
This second tranche is the focus of the account of human nature in The Federalist. This
account comes primarily in the form of political or moral psychology. This political psychology
sought to assess the durable and likely motives of men in government and society. Not to be
confused with the 20th century Behaviorism, this “behavioralist” approach simply places an
emphasis on how men act under certain historical conditions and arrangements of political power.
The Federalist’s psychological theory “is primarily a theory of motivation.”21 This approach
attempts to something foreign to Skinnerian Behaviorism. It seeks to survey and anticipate the
unseen motives which compel men to act as they do. Such motives can only be inferred from
human action.
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Publius’ interest in moral psychology was guided by pressing political concerns rather than
an abstract interest in ethics. Manzer writes, Publius took a “strictly political view of the matter.”22
He viewed morality from the perspective of the legislator and not that of the minister or preacher.
By becoming “acquainted with the regular springs of human action” Publius could “better
understand the building blocks of social order and prosperity.”23 This component of the political
science of The Federalist involves a description and analysis of the reliable and durable
motivations which determine how people actually do act, despite the moral dictates of reason. This
method identifies the value of taking men as they are, rather than confining itself to how they
should be. Men as they are is the only clay from which civil society is made. During one of his
rare speeches at the Convention Hamilton said: “Take mankind as they are, and what are they
governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may
act from more worthy motives. Our great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they
are.”24
Hamilton’s point was both descriptive and normative. Empirical observation identifies
what men typically do. There is no wisdom in crafting a political order which makes moral
demands that cannot be met by mere mortals. Such an order is destined to fail before it has been
established. Such realism contains within it a normative claim about the wisdom of not expecting
extraordinary feats of virtue from ordinary men. Since men are imperfect, the founder should not
expect perfection from them. The founder must accept basic truths about human limitation rather
than engage in wishful thinking or contriving “imaginary republics”. Mansfield has said this aspect
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of the new science is “based on a kind of behavioralism” which “relies on what can be expected
in human behavior rather than exhorting to deeds that can only be wished for.”25 Therefore we
ought not demand more of man than can reasonably be expected in light of our empirical
observations of his conduct.
The goal of Publius’s political psychology was “to lend support to or to explain
propositions in the science of politics.”26 The Federalist depicts the Constitution as “a marvel of
social engineering, based on a sound psychology, that will use human nature to control human
nature, among both governors and governed, without requiring recourse to tyrannical coercion.”27
The Constitution sets up a kind of Newtonian machine, a law abiding mechanism, operating
according the constant and reliable springs and motives of human action. This was to be achieved
through an explanation and comparison of different motives and their relative strength. The
structure of constitutional powers and institutions must anticipate these motivations and promote
beneficial ones while simultaneously redirecting or thwarting those motives destructive of the
public interest. With this knowledge in hand, Publius sought to illustrate how men will act under
the particular constraints of the Constitution.
In accord with the Newtonian paradigm28 of the day, Publius envisioned the individual soul
and the civil society it produces by means of mechanical metaphors.29 Soul and society were like
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a watch whose movements are caused by sufficiently regular, identifiable and therefore predictable
motivational springs. If the causes of human action were sufficiently regular human nature and
society were sufficiently law abiding. Just as celestial bodies adhere to physical laws of motion,
man and his institutions adhere to psychological laws derivative of the universal needs and desires
rooted in human nature. Scientific analogies which appear in The Federalist are employed as more
than mere literary tropes or persuasive intellectual rhetoric to a literate audience.
Determined to found a regime on human nature, Publius and the Founders hoped to craft a
constitution in conformity with what they believed to be the fixed laws of human conduct. The
very notion of a fixed human nature implied necessity and constancy. Hirschman says,
“Machiavelli had shown that some powerful propositions about politics can be extracted from the
assumption of a uniform human nature.” 30 These assumptions result in the ability to predict
behavior based on nature. Law abidingness meant human conduct was sufficiently predictable.
Predictability meant the possibility of designing institution in advance which could anticipate and
accommodate likely motives and the conduct which springs from them. Perhaps the Framers could
even anticipate and thwart those inclinations in the human soul which had inevitably led to the
decay and corruption in all regimes past.
If the Constitution was to achieve the ends of Natural Liberty, its provisions must be
responsive to how men actually behave in order to encourage them to act as they ought. Knowledge
of the nature and consequences of the true springs of human motivation would allow Publius to
anticipate and describe the likely actions of men under the particular constraints of the
Constitution. Most of The Federalist’s arguments are predicated on general predictions of human
conduct rooted in a psychological analysis of the motives of citizens in society and political actors

30

Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 49.

323

in office operating under the strictures and circumstances of the institutional structure of the
Constitution. The Federalist’s psychological analysis focuses particular attention on, but is not
confined to, those who occupy various offices ordained by the Constitution, with their varying
degrees and types of political power. These predictions were not based on fanciful armchair
speculation, but the observations of men in history and personal experience operating under similar
institutions and procedures.
The overarching rhetorical goal of The Federalist’s advocacy for the Constitution was to
demonstrate just how it would accommodate these likely sources of motivation. Publius attempts
to illustrate how the enumerated powers of the Constitution would respond to the likely
inclinations of human nature. Certain predictable motives are provoked by the particular
constitutional provisions and arrangements. The lesser and likely motivations would be restrained
and channeled through mechanisms such as representation and public accountability, checks and
balances, process of appointment and the specific nature and arrangement of the powers granted.
This analysis of behavior focuses particular attention on, but is not confined to, the motives of
those who occupy various types of offices, with varying types of political power. By anticipating
these motives and their subsequent actions within the proposed structure, Publius could justify and
defend various provisions of the Constitution.
The fixed aspect of human nature manifests itself as both an “is” and an “ought”. This
“ought” and “is” form the two fundamental perspectives of Publius’ account of human nature.
These two dimensions of thought, based on Locke and Hume respectively, manifest the “ought”
and an “is” of the American regime. The Rationalist tradition establishes the “ought” of human
conduct, while the Empiricist tradition observes the “is”. There exists a moral law which is an
expression of our nature, and commands how men ought to act. And yet there is a record of how
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men actually act. The “is” and the “ought” are not mutually exclusive or contradictory; they are
complimentary. Contrary to much contemporary thought since Kant which denies the possibility
of deriving the “ought” from the “is”, these two facets need not be mutually exclusive. Scientific
facts and moral values do not, in The Federalist, stand distinct.
Publius’ new science of politics marries these two traditions. The “is” and the “ought” are
complimentary. This science is built on the premise that knowledge of the psychological faculties
of human nature “was knowledge of what it was both possible and right to do.”31 The Constitution
must have an eye to both aspects of human nature. If the new American regime was to be successful
it must take men as they actually are, but provide a system to shape their actions in the direction
of the moral law. If the moral law is the law of human nature, men will not be happy until they
have devised a government commensurate to their nature. In order to establish a system which
might fulfill the principle of natural liberty however, it is necessary to carefully observe and accept
the hard-boiled facts of human nature in order to devise mechanisms conducive to those moral
ends. Without this “ought” there is no guide, no rhyme or reason to the political order for which
they advocate. Without the “is”, there is no possibility of successfully determining the appropriate
practical means of their desired goals.
The thought of Montesquieu represents a bridge between the Rationalist and Empiricist
strains of thought Publius had inherited from the Enlightenment. These strains identify a
permanent first nature of mankind and a variable human character shaped by history. In The Spirit
of Laws, a concern for Natural Law is married to a heightened sensitivity to the influence of
circumstance. While Montesquieu was the “oracle” of the separation of powers and modern
republicanism, less mentioned is his influential navigation between the Scylla and Charybdis of
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rational theories of liberty rooted in a universal human nature and the application of those
principles in specific historical contexts. The Federalist sought to provide a justification of the
Constitution that was consistent with both the Natural Rights of men and the nation spirit of
American society circa 1787.
Montesquieu remained in the camp of Locke regarding the universality of the Law of
Nature. Locke however never confronts the challenges of applying the Law of Nature to particular
circumstances and customs. Montesquieu’s emphasis on the variability of the human character
actually reinforces the argument for natural equality. The dramatic differences between individuals
and classes, of master and slave, are not the result of profound differences within human nature.
Such differences are the result of the circumstances into which men have been thrown. These
differences are accidents of birth. Circumstance makes one man master and another slave by birth,
not by nature. Yet, Locke did not address the necessary modifications required of the
implementation of the Law of Nature in order for it to remain just. The general Law of Nature
must have respect for specific local conditions. In The Spirit of Laws Montesquieu argues that the
concrete and distinct spirit of a people must be considered when applying the principles of Natural
Law.32 In accommodating historical conditions Natural Law may not be fulfilled in its totality.
This is why we see the variety and disparity of regimes. Montesquieu is sensitive to the way in
which the imposition of the Law of Nature on a society not fitted for it, can actually run counter
to the spirit of the Law of Nature.33 The constitutional order must accommodate the given historical
preexisting society. In fact, some have argued that such a concern, absent in Locke, is less a nod
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to History and instead a deeper respect for natural liberty. Serious consideration for historical
circumstance becomes a vehicle to ensure the fulfillment of man’s natural liberty.
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3. Faculty Psychology

The focus of The Federalist’s account of human nature comes in the form of a political
psychology. This psychological account is couched in an analysis of the relevant faculties of the
human mind. The function of this theory was “to lend support to or to explain propositions in the
science of politics.”1 Faculty psychology provided an explanation and defense of the nature and
structure of the Constitution’s provisions. Sufficient knowledge of the human soul would dictate
the correct political order commensurate to it. Publius’ advocacy for the Constitution is rooted in
the claim of its conformity to an implicit psychological “model of human nature” elaborated
throughout its essays.2 This model is built on the central categories of human motivation. The
Constitution is designed to both contend with and depend on these likely and unchanging
inclinations of man. The Federalist presents the Constitution as a strategic response to the regular
and predictable motives of human nature in order to establish good government and promote
human flourishing. By illustrating how the proposed structure anticipated the motives and actions
of men, Publius could justify and defend the provisions of the Constitution.
The object of this political psychology is to identify and account for the durable and likely
motives of men in government and society. This account of human psychology is “primarily a
theory of motivation.”3 Political or moral psychology was in part the science of the faculties of the
human mind which move men to think and to act. The Constitution sets up a kind of Newtonian
machine, a law-abiding mechanism, operating according the reliable and predictable springs of
action they can expect and anticipate whey they take men as they find them, rather than as they
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should be. Publius sought to address how men actually act and to discern and analyze the
variegated springs of the soul which incite them to these actions.4 Publius’ theory of human
motivation is primarily one “that compares the strength of what Hume called the different motives
or actuating principles of human nature.” 5 The task was “to compare the strength of different
motives in order to support various provisions of the Constitution and to defend those provisions
against hostile criticism; their interest in psychology was therefore guided more directly by their
interest in politics than by their interest in ethics.” 6 Unlike Skinnerian Behaviorism, the political
psychology of The Federalist’s attempts to survey and anticipate the unseen motives which compel
men to act as they do. These invisible forces of the soul can only be inferred from the speeches
and deeds of men. No doubt this science served immediate practical ends. But Publius’ broad
ranging treatment of human motivation and the actions it inspires is a central theme which
transforms The Federalist Papers from a work of political advocacy simply, to one with genuine
philosophic and scientific ambitions.
While theories of Natural Law are predicated on rational inference and self-evident truth,
Publius’ political psychology is rooted in empirical observations of men drawn from experience
and history. If theories of Modern Natural Law defined the proper ends of government, the science
of human motivation would determine how and why men actually behave under the powers and
constraints of various types of political order. The actions of men, past and present, provided a
reservoir of data on human motivation under a wide-ranging set of circumstances. This empirical
evidence provided the necessary knowledge from which to construct the institutional means to
achieve the ends of Natural Law. The nature and structure of the provisions of the Constitution
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would be calibrated to the durable and predictable motives of men in order to achieve the proper
balance of order and liberty. The authors had an embarrassment of riches when it came to
knowledge of human motivation and conduct, whether through books or their vast and varied
practical experiences. The scholarly Madison in particular plumbed works like the Bible, histories,
and moral and political philosophy in search of a broad array of examples which would provide
concrete substance for his reflections.
By the end of the 18th century the scientific inquiry into human motivation came to be
called “faculty psychology”. Faculty psychology was a central branch of moral and political
philosophy which sought “to describe those divisions of knowledge concerned with the human
subject.”7 It was understood as the science of the intrinsic powers and springs of the human soul
which drive men to think and act. It was the hub which linked the sciences of man, from politics
and ethics, to rhetoric.8 The central object of this science was “knowledge of the qualities, powers,
and capacities of humankind’s nature, collectively and individually.”9 It sought to identify the
fundamental springs of human action and to discern how these powers shape and determine man’s
moral, social and political life.10 This science would reveal the psychological springs of vice and
virtue individually and collectively. These springs were the causes of harmony and conflict within
civil society. Knowledge of the true psychological sources of harmony and conflict in society could
then be leveraged to fashion a more harmonious and just civil order.
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The history of faculty psychology commences with the analysis of the soul and its parts by
Plato and Aristotle.11 Plato’s city-soul analogy in the Republic establishes a structural relationship
between the psychology of the individual and the soul of the political community which has
endured in various forms to the present-day. Faculty psychology took its modern form in the
writings of Machiavelli, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Reid
and others. Works such as Hobbes’ Leviathan, Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul and Locke’s
Essay on Human Understanding and Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature are landmarks in the
development of the modern science of the soul. Moderns like Descartes initiated an emphasis on
epistemology, the science concerned with how men know what they know about the world and the
peculiar mental abilities they use to attain this knowledge. The very same faculties used to know
about the world, also drive man’s opinions and conduct. They sit at the foundation of human action.
One half of this epistemological inquiry was dedicated to the source and extent of human
knowledge, the while moral philosophy sought an explanation of the origins of morality, society
and political community as generated out of the inner psychological faculties of man.
Montesquieu was one of the great exponents of the tradition begun by Plato who directly
informed the Founders and Publius in particular. His Spirit of Laws presents a new version of the
city-soul analogy. Madison echoes precisely this analogy when he says government is nothing
other than the greatest reflection on human nature. Montesquieu’s book is a mediation on how
each form of civil society establishes a particular psychic principle, or “spirit,” in the souls of
citizens through its peculiar laws. The distinct form and laws of each regime habituates this distinct
psychic principle into the soul of its citizens. The “espirit” of the laws, shaped the spirit of the
people. In Madison’s 1792 essay, he glosses The Spirit of Laws saying, “Montesquieu has resolved
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the great operative principles of government into fear, honor, and virtue.”12 The psychic principle
of each government is the central ruling passion of the soul which causes its citizens to think and
act as they do. Each “modification of the soul” is “the spring that makes a government act.”13
By the 18th century faculty psychology was a well-developed discipline and a central theme
of moral and political philosophy. Not until the 19th Century was there a distinct scientific disciple
exclusively dedicated to human psychology. Moral philosophy was generally understood as a
science of the faculties of the human mind.14 The Scottish Enlightenment took particular interest
in moral psychology. A dominate theme of the Scottish Enlightenment, faculty psychology
received its most formal treatment in the works of Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and Reid. In 1758,
for example Helvétius published his De L’Esprit, published a year later in English as Essays on
the Mind and its Several Faculties.15 In he would say “As the physical world is ruled by the laws
of movement so is the moral universe ruled by laws of interest.”16 Works like Hutcheson’s A
System of Moral Philosophy and An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and
Affections, Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and the works of Thomas Reid exemplify some of the
major milestones in the Enlightenment analysis of the human faculties. In 1815, for example,
Jeremy Bentham published a book simply called the Table of the Springs of Action.
The Federalist’s use of faculty psychology places its arguments well within “the context
of Enlightenment behavioral science.”17 Thomas Reid’s writings contemporaneous to The
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Federalist, such as the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man of 1785 and Essays on the Powers
of the Human Mind of 1788, illustrate the predominance of the discipline in framing moral and
political questions at the time of its publication. Faculty psychology established a “widely shared
set of assumptions” among the educated public making it “natural for Publius to employ it.”18
Howe asserts that it was sufficiently familiar that it served as a convenient rhetorical device in
framing Publius’ arguments to the public. The educated public for which The Federalist Papers
was written, would have been generally conversant with this scientific paradigm.19 John
Witherspoon, Madison’s mentor at the College of New Jersey and bearer of the Scottish
Enlightenment tradition in the American colonies, had integrated Adam Smith’s theories of faculty
psychology into his own teachings and lectures which influenced the generation of 1776 and
beyond. 20 Tocqueville had said there was “no country in the world in which the boldest political
theories of the eighteenth-century philosophers are put so effectively into practice as in America.”21
Madison and Hamilton are primarily responsible for the analysis of the psychological
faculties in The Federalist. In light of its political function their science of the soul was guided “by
their interest in politics than by their interest in ethics.”22 They took “strictly political view” of this
wide-ranging subject matter.23 Their moral psychology was guided by pressing political concerns,
not moral rectitude. Moral psychology was viewed from the perspective of the legislator, not the
minister or the moralist. The goal was not to save or perfect souls, but devise the appropriate
political order which could properly account for the “true springs” and likely tendencies of human
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nature. Theories of Natural Law had already laid out the proper ends of government. Necessary
was the knowledge needed to devise the appropriate institutional means to those ends.
The Federalist sought to establish a psychological schema built on the central categories
of human motivation. 24 In developing a psychological model on which institutions could be
founded, Madison and Hamilton analyzed those politically germane motives in order to assess
their likely impact. This analysis involved a comparison of motives in order to assess the relative
force and constancy of each in motivating human action. This procedure, consistent with the
Enlightenment psychology on which they drew, sought to compare the relative “strength of what
Hume called the different motives or actuating principles of human nature.”25 This comparison of
“the strength of different motives” was partially employed in “order to support various provisions
of the Constitution and to defend those provisions against hostile criticism.”26 The Federalist’s
arguments attempt to demonstrate how the Constitution structure of powers properly channel
dominate motives in conformity with the common interest. Hume held that the science of man, “in
forming a notion of our species,” should “compare together the different motives or actuating
principles of human nature” to determine which are “predominant.”27 Whether a given spring is
stronger or weaker depends on its relative strength and a given circumstance more or less likely to
stimulate it. It was through these comparisons that the true springs of human conduct might be
found and accounted for.
The faculty psychology of The Federalist is a description and analysis of the reliable and
durable motivations which determine how people actually do act, despite the moral dictates of
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reason. Publius sought to identify the true, rather than hoped for, springs of human conduct. This
required taking men as they are, rather than as they should be. Mansfield says the political science
of the Constitution and The Federalist is based on a kind of behavioralism” which “relies on what
can be expected in human behavior rather than exhorting to deeds that can only be wished for.”28
During one of his rare speeches at the Convention Hamilton said: “Take mankind as they are, and
what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits,
who may act from more worthy motives. Our great error is that we suppose mankind more honest
than they are.”29 In No. 15 Hamilton says the failure of the Articles of Confederation was precisely
attributable to their “ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated.”30
Publius understood the success of political institutions depended on founding them on the
likely and unchanging motives of men, rather than ones merely aspired to. Hamilton acknowledges
that “stern virtue” was “the growth of few soils.”31 Consistent with Modern political philosophy,
Publius lowered the target expected of human conduct from high virtue and duty to a basis in selfinterest. The solution involved narrowing the gap between what is likely and what is right. This
strategy shrank, but hardly obliterated, the distance between political virtue and vice. The common
interest would increasingly be brought in harmony with individual self-interest. A regime founded
on natural self-interest would garner the political virtue of patriotism. Duty to country and
inclination would be increasingly brought in line with one another. Patriotism would be love of a
country which respected the freedom and self-interest of its citizens.
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Lowering the bar of human conduct by bringing the duties of Natural Law more in line
with the freedoms of Natural Right, illustrates the Modern disposition of Publius’ new science of
politics. This science was a direct descendent of a modern tradition which attempted to solve the
problems of the inevitable decay of political institutions. It followed in the foot steeps of a legacy
initiated by Machiavelli, and continued by Hobbes and Locke. They hoped to build more durable
political institutions on the “low but solid” foundation of men as they are rather than as they should
be.32 Durable institutions must be founded on durable motives. They must rest on the solid
cornerstone of motivations more durable than high virtue. The cornerstone of this foundation was
self-interest. Self-interest was “low” but also “solid”. This reliance on less noble motives may have
had less up-side, but also reduced down-side. The new science asserted that this strategy even
created collective benefits the Ancients had condescendingly overlooked. While less exalted in its
aims, such a regime might be more immune to the diseases and decay of those same historical
examples the authors scrutinized so carefully and lived under.
‘Men as they are’ provide the only available clay from which civil society can be made. In
order to establish political institutions which might fulfill the principle of natural liberty it was
necessary to accept the hard-boiled facts of human nature. Only true knowledge of human nature
would make it possible to devise mechanisms conducive to liberty. In order to accommodate the
frailties of human nature institutions must properly anticipate the natural motivations which
compel men to act as they do in public office and private society. From his observations Publius
derived an implicit model of human psychology and conduct on which durable political institutions
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might be founded.33 By identifying the true springs of human conduct Publius was able to “better
understand the building blocks of social order and prosperity.”34
Faculty psychology is the science of the soul. The object of this science was to identify the
various innate powers of mind which determine human thought and action. But what is a “faculty”?
The term “faculty” is derived from the Latin word for “power”.35 Faculties are powers of the human
soul. More precisely they are its native powers. This means that the faculties of the soul are coeval
with human nature itself. In his Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, Thomas Reid says “the
faculties of the mind, and its powers, are often used as synonymous expressions.” 36 He qualifies
this by saying the “word faculty is most properly applied to those powers of mind which are
original and natural, and which make a part of the constitution of the mind. There are other powers
which are acquired by use, exercise or study, which are not called faculties, but habits.”37 Man’s
faculties were understood as a product of his nature, not his variable character. This is why faculty
psychology was so closely associated with the science of human nature itself. The Federalist
Papers treat faculties as the native powers of the human soul “which can determine action.”38 They
are the “true springs” of the soul. In No. 33 Madison asks rhetorically "What is a power but the
ability or faculty of doing a thing?" Faculties of the soul the causes which compel men to think
and act in a certain way in a given circumstance. They are internal sources which motivate or fail
to motivate human beings to certain courses of action. Faculty psychology ultimately sought to
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fashion a theory of action by identifying and analyzing these core powers which motivate men to
act under particular circumstances. The identification of these powers provided the foundation for
moral and political theories of human action and collective organization.
Publius identifies the three primary categories of motivation which cause human action as
reason, the passions and the interests. This triad had, by 1787, a well-established provenance and
currency within the moral and political philosophy of the day. Yet, in surveying the influential
works of the Enlightenment, faculty psychology is revealed as “a discipline in flux”. 39 The precise
meaning and impact of these faculties where hotly contested. The Federalist piggy backed on a
contemporaneous discourse which itself had failed to resolve their precise meanings. Publius
himself readily attests to the untidy nature of the discipline in No. 37.
Complications over the nature of the faculties was a product of the historical state of the
discipline and the nature of its object of inquiry. The motives of reason, passion and the interest
were much disputed then, as now. Faculty psychology was preoccupied with taxonomy, seeking
to distinguish, identify and name the native powers of the human soul.40 While there was consensus
over general answers to these three tasks, disagreement emerged as theories became more granular.
Ambiguities abound over the precise divisions of the mind. Practitioners “struggled toward greater
precision and debated definitions” of the faculties.41 There was significant disagreement over the
precise meaning and nature each faculty and their relative powers. Fundamental disputes existed
over the dominate spring of human conduct.
Sometimes, for example, these terms were used in contradictory ways within the discourse.
Was “interest”, as a category of motivation, genuinely distinct from those of reason and passion?
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Was for example “moral sentiment” a more a produce of passion or reason? Moral sentiment was
often associated with the concept of “sympathy”, but the technical meaning of this term varied
widely from one theorist to the next. Self-interest was perhaps the most elusive spring of all, even
as it was often considered the cornerstone on which government could be founded. Self-interest is
a hybrid term combining reason and passion. Howe acknowledges that faculty psychology
attributed varying degrees of rationality to self-interest.42 Was the dominate spring of interest
reason, or was it the passions?
Independent of the historical discourse, there is a fundamental obscurity in the nature of
the human soul itself. The faculties are evanescent because the human soul is an invisible enigma.
In contradistinction to the visible and material body, the soul is the great unseen mover of human
action. The intangible nature of the soul and its powers make it intrinsically obscure. The soul is
an invisible force which can only be inferred from visible actions. The speeches and deeds of men
provide only circumstantial evidence for the nature of the soul and its faculties. The soul is only
to be inferred, not seen directly. Disagreements which arose over the specific nature and
boundaries of its powers were a result of the natural opacity of the soul itself. Another challenge
was to determine which motives were given by nature, and therefore fixed and durable, and which
were merely products of history. Hume had said “man is a very variable being.”43 Hume wrote of
the human animal that “what may be true, while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found
false, when he has embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.”44 Circumstance conspires
with nature to blur Reid’s tidy distinction between native powers and those acquired by custom
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and habit. These difficulties only raised more questions over how the faculties were to be identified
and understood.
The enhanced empiricism and skepticism of this new political science made it more willing
to call into question its own findings. It stressed the limits of what it can know and
predict.45Mansfield says that the “most interesting difficulty of constitutional order is a “question
of epistemology” or the nature of the faculties of mind.46 Madison takes up these epistemological
questions in No. 37. The faculties of mind raise three related problems. The problem is that these
faculties are both an instrument of knowledge and understanding, as well as an object of their own
inquiry. The challenge to political knowledge and science is that same obscure instrument is also
the obscure object of its inquiry. Furthermore, natural human language, as the medium by which
knowledge and ideas are expressed, is also obscure and equivocal. The “ideas expressed in
language are inadequate.”47 Rather than invoking skepticism to demonstrate the futility of moral
or political science, Madison raises these ambiguities to demonstrate “the necessity of moderating
. . . our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity.”48 Thus the skepticism of the
new political science culminates in two conclusions. One is the demand for a “spirit of moderation”
on the theorist’s behalf, which abandons radical extremes and the pursuit of perfection. The other
is the advocacy for popular sovereignty and freedom of the people on the basis that the scientist is
and never can be sufficiently wise about what is best for citizens.49 The citizen knows best the
texture and realities of his own existence.
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Hamilton and Madison appreciated the experimental nature of their political project and
the faculty psychology on which it is based. Their new republicanism was largely founded on a
relatively new approach to and solutions for the likely motives of men. They acknowledge the
obscurities and disputes within the sciences of the faculties they drew on. In No. 37 Madison
admits that efforts to establish precise definitions of these faculties had been “plagued by
obscurity.”50 He says the “faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and
defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical
philosophers.”51 He says of this inherited science, that such faculties as “sense, perception,
judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated, by such delicate shades
and minute gradations, that their boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain
a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and controversy.”52
A constant refrain throughout The Federalist warns of the frailty of reason and the limit
this frailty imposes on our capacity to know. This weakness is coupled with the distorting effects
of our passions and interests on our opinions of the truth. Publius applied these reservations to his
own efforts as much as to the psychological make-up men in general. This admonition of the limits
of man’s reason is typically presented as a reminder of the mentality of the many, and its practical
consequences for social order. In Nos. 31 and 37 however, this warning applies to the few reputed
wise and their efforts to obtain theoretical knowledge of human nature. In No. 37 Madison writes
that our imperfect human faculties are the very “medium through which the conceptions of men
are conveyed.”53 Thus Publius’ claim to depict a universal human nature is acknowledged as
tentative, experimental and imperfect in light of the limitations of the same fallible nature
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observing itself as its own object. In No. 31 Hamilton says that the “sciences of morals and
politics” find human nature less “tractable” than “figures of pure geometry.”54 As such he says,
“Caution and investigation are a necessary armour against error and imposition.”55 The problem
of discriminating the faculties was that they perform double duty. They are both the means of
understanding and the object inquiry. The same distorting lens which observes is also the elusive
phenomenon under scrutiny.
If human nature in general exhibits limitations of its rational faculty this is no less true of
nature of the political scientist observing it. As Banefield says, “the contribution of reason, in short,
was to recognize its own limitations.”56 Publius and the Founders would have to recognize the
limits of their own powers of reasoning, the precipice where reasoning stopped and opinion,
passion and interest began. The scientist is forced to acknowledge the limits of their reason and
the science which is its product. Francis Bacon perspicuously observed that “human understanding
is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature of things
by mingling its own nature with it.”57 This statement could stand as the motto and warning for any
scientist inquiring into the human soul. Echoing Bacon, Hamilton says in No. 31 that “the obscurity
is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner, than in the subject. Men, upon too
many occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but yielding to some untoward
bias, they entangle themselves in words, and confound themselves in subtleties.”58
If reason and self-love are confounded in our opinions, as Madison asserts in No. 10, then
it is never completely clear if the observer has fully distinguished them and their “reciprocal
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influence” on their observations of human nature. The scientist must prudently differentiate the
distinct contributions of each. These epistemological conundrums make a science of the soul more
than a simple matter of observing empirical facts or employing mathematical logic. They dictate
the need for wise judgment. Such a science requires the espirit de finesse, more than the espirit de
géométrie. Human reason must make a prudential acknowledgement of the limits of the rational
faculty itself. The acknowledgement of reason’s limits must then impact the judgments and
conclusions of any political science of human nature. The Convention and The Federalist were
carried out, appropriately enough, in the spirit of a great experiment whose effects were not certain
because the causes were not simply knowable with mathematical certainty. It is for these reasons
that the provisions of the Constitution are described by Publius as “inventions of prudence” and
not dictates of pure or practical reason.59
The three central springs of action identified by Publius are reason, passion and selfinterest. These terms represent three broad genuses of motivation within which we discover a
variety of species throughout The Federalist Papers. Within each category exists a variety of
motives either beneficial or harmful to liberty, order and human happiness. The Classical and
Premodern Christian worlds, had divided the human soul and its motivational sources in two,
between reason and the passion. With the emergence of Modern secular philosophy, a third term
intervened, “the interests”.60 The Ancients had depicted both the soul and society, microcosm and
macrocosm, as the stage of an agonistic war between reason and the passions. For medieval
Christianity, the soul of man was a battleground in which virtue and vice motivated by reason and
passion respectively fought.61 Happiness was only possible when reason was able to restrain and
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moderate the passions. To achieve the common good, government had to establish institutions in
such a way to facilitate reason to rule the passions. The political rule of reason was typically
represented in the rule of the few wise over the passionate many regardless of the specific nature
of the regime. Publius’ new science of politics was an attempt to devise wise institutions to guard
against abuses of power, precisely when wise men did not rule.
The main challenge to assessing the precise meaning of these three categories is a product
of The Federalist’s practical function. As a work of political advocacy, it does not invest space
providing technical detail in the service of purely theoretical ends. Publius takes his central terms
for granted and rarely defines them. The precise meaning of these central faculties is often left
implicit. The reader is left to rely on common sense understandings of terms, their historical
provenance, and context of use. Yet, this usage lacks the system, clarity and technical detail found
in a philosophic treatise. At times it even appears the meanings of these terms shifts with use.
Semantic slippage exists between terms and within the use of a single one. Such slippage is not
surprising in light of the piecemeal and collective nature of authorship from one number and author
to the next. When context fails to yield fine grained meanings the interpreter is forced to rely on
those established by the general intellectual climate and the sources on which the authors drew,
without complete certainty about that dependence. Howe says that “only by examining the theory
of eighteenth-century faculty psychology can we discover the original meaning and context of
such crucial terms as “interest,” “balance,” “reason,” “passion,” and “virtue.” 62
Disputes over the precise meaning of the faculties are hardly academic for Publius and the
Founders. Clear and accurate understanding of the faculties was essential if secure foundations of
government were to be laid on them. The meaning of the faculties has direct implications for the
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scholarly and political understanding of the provisions of the Constitution in the ongoing dispute
over the precise meaning of the Founding itself. This is no less true of its implications for American
history itself. This question will remain somewhat open. Were Publius and the Founders
pessimistic adherents of Calvin and Hobbes? Or Lockean liberals focused on individual liberties,
commerce and property? Or, were they Classical republicans practicing virtue politics? The answer
to this question is dependent on the meaning and emphasis they gave to the central faculties of
mind and their political consequences. In many ways the adopted elements of all these traditions
depending on the problem at hand. Howe says these disparate traditions are “synthesized within
the paradigm of the faculty psychology Publius employed, which found places in human nature
for passion, interest, and virtue.”63
One thing is certain, the wholistic approach of The Federalist’s moral psychology respects
the breadth of potential motivations which drive men to act. Its assessment of the faculties avoids
simplistic or abstract reductivism. It does reduce all human motivation to some form of selfinterest. But self-interest is an underdetermined category lacking specificity beyond identifying
desire for an object perceived as beneficial to oneself. It does not establish the specific identity of
that object. Such objects are potentially unlimited. Nor does Publius couch self-interest in simple
economic or material terms as is so common today. They agreed with Cardinal de Retz, a man
whose writings Madison admired, who wrote: “You have heard it… as a common saying that
Interest governs the World, But, I believe, whoever looks narrowly into the affairs of it, will find
that passion, humour, caprice, seal, faction, and a thousand other springs, which are counter to
self-interest, have as considerable a part in the movements of this machine.”64 By respecting the

63
64

Ibid., p. 487.
Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 46.

345

natural diversity of human nature, The Federalist respects the natural diversity of objects at which
human desire aims.
There was nothing controversial or particularly innovative in identifying these three
faculties as the prime movers of the human soul. This triad was a common motif of Enlightenment
moral philosophy, a fact well-documented by Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests.65 In
this Publius merely followed the current intellectual climate of the time. In his assessment of the
powers of the soul we see evidence of Milton, Pope, Mandeville, Hutcheson, Locke, Hume,
Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, but also the older traditions of Pagan and Biblical antiquity. While
Publius depended on this general orbit of ideas, he depends on no single thinker in order to fashion
his image of the human soul. Publius’ arguments do not simply parrot the beliefs of the time, but
follow conclusions consistent with his own experiences.
Publius’s new science and his new republicanism were built on its own peculiar assessment
of these three motivational sources. This novel republicanism is founded on a revised assessment
of the peculiar nature and power of these faculties. Despite his dependence on the Scottish
Enlightenment and its systemization of faculty psychology, Publius rejected some of its central
conclusions regarding the nature and relative efficacy of the faculties. Rather, the Scottish
Enlightenment provided a convenient and common framework of thinking in the analysis of human
motivation and conduct. Publius for example exhibits a heavy reliance on Hume in numerous
matters, yet some of the Scot’s most famous dictums are explicitly rejected. This is particularly
notable in Publius’ vital role for reason, his demotion of the efficacy of moral sentiment, and
explicit suspicion of the softening effects of commerce on the conflict prone nature of men.
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Despite the acceptance of men as they are and a new theory of human motivation focused
on self-interest, Publius does not alter the Ancient characterization of human life as a conflict
between reason and passion. The acceptance of “interest” as a category of motivation is more a
reformulation than a rejection of this conflict. The modern approach saw the reason-passion
relationship less as all-out war, as one where the passions could often be coopted and redirected
rather than their simply opposed by circumstance, reason and moral sentiment. Passions which
could be leveraged to public benefit would be tolerated as the ends of political community would
be lowered. Some passions which had been seen by the Ancients as the source of vice, perhaps
could be leveraged as contributors to modern virtues. Passions properly tinctured with reason
would become interests. Meanwhile passions that cannot be coopted in service to the public
interest would be set against one another in countervailing fashion. Instead of reason checking
passion directly, reason would set up a system in which passions would check each other by being
pitted against themselves.
The faculty psychology Publius and the Moderns inherited from the Ancients was
hierarchical. Man was the middle being within The Great Chain of Being of the cosmos. The
constitution of the human soul mirrored the cosmic order. Thomas Reid says of the Pythagorean
school that in “the mind of man” like that state “there are various powers, some that ought to
govern, and others that ought to be subordinate.”66 Within the soul was a hierarchical tincture of
heavenly and earthly components. Publius does not abandon this hierarchy, but reassesses certain
judgements made by the Ancients. In the Nicomachean Ethic Aristotle categorizes those beings
with souls, plants, animals and human beings. The rational soul which distinguished human nature
made it superior to the animal and the plant. Reflecting the scala natura, Aristotle says “the soul
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rules the body with the rule of a master, while intellect rules appetite with political and kingly
rule.”67 Human conduct was the product of a perennial struggle between reason and the passions.
This conflict raged within the soul and within society. Man’s reason was his god-like endowment,
it gave him the power to know but at the same time did not grant full knowledge. The celebration
of the rational faculty which makes men capable of a free self-governing life was combined with
a recognition of the limits of reason to effectively regulate the passions. Human nature lacked the
genuine self-sufficiency and true wisdom which defined the nature of the gods.68 Tallied together,
the sum total of these assets and liabilities placed man in the middle of things.69
Mankind’s excellence and power were not absolute, but had definable limits. The limits of
man’s reason places him beneath the gods. When Madison says “men are not angels” he is
acknowledging the limits of human nature in both its wisdom and conduct. While some might
dismiss this statement as rhetorical ornament designed to captivate the sensibilities of a religiously
oriented audience, it appears to be a frank acknowledgement of the unchanging permanence of
man’s middle status by juxtaposing him to a superior being of a fundamentally different order. We
are as different from angels, as the horse we ride is from us. With God superior and the natural
world inferior, mankind occupies the middle.
In the Republic, Plato’s divides the soul into reason and the passions. In all the soul consists
of three irreducible parts, reason, spiritedness and appetite. In a sense all three parts of the soul are
appetites, motivational sources which differ in their nature and object of desire. Each has a specific
object of desire which motives action toward that end. These motivational components exist in a
hierarchy of worth and dignity with reason atop and appetite below. For Plato reason was the
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rightful ruler of the soul. Reason should rule, and its rule consists of regulating the passions. The
rule of reason produced harmony and order in the soul and was synonymous with human
happiness. Plato asserts that “the harmonious and just soul is the soul ruled by reason.”70 Just as
reason must rule in the soul to produce order and harmony, reason must also rule the soul of the
city if it is to achieve order and harmony and establish justice.
The Ancients placed a premium on reason and virtue because they saw human excellence
as the end of political community. The polis was the self-sufficient and authoritative community
precisely because its division of labor included all the prerequisites necessary for complete human
flourishing. Human excellence was conceived as the most complete use of man’s endowment of
reason. Reason was the highest guide to life, whether practical or theoretical. The rational mastery
of the passions was the means by which human flourishing would be achieved on the individual
or collective levels. Living well did not merely mean living comfortably in an ever-expanding
economy which conquered natural scarcity. The goal of human excellence placed an emphasis on
civic duties and responsibilities over individual rights and freedoms. For the Ancients there was a
realm of human happiness above both economics and politics which utilized reason in its highest
form. This was the life of philosophy. Short of that goal, the end of political community was to
cultivate moral virtue in the form of patriotism or political virtue, not mere security and material
well-being. Publius’ historical analysis in Volume I of The Federalist Papers shows that this idea,
however noble, was rarely achieved in practice in the ancient world. Ancient and premodern
republics were fraught with factional turbulence precisely because the political liberty they granted
citizens to realize virtue, also gave excessive free reign to the passions. Despite their angelic aims
ancient republics ironically gave expression to vices which lead to their demise.
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Stripped of metaphysical trappings, Publius maintains the hierarchy of the soul. The worth
of the central faculties of the human mind had, what has been called, a “definite sequence of fitful
precedence.”71 Reason was first, followed by interest and the passions in a manner that would have
been intelligible to Plato and Aristotle.72 Each motive existed within a hierarchy of worth, but also
a hierarchy of relative efficacy. Reason as the most prized faculty, was also the weakest. It was the
necessary ingredient as the proper guide to life in determining means and ends. As we shall see,
Publius repeatedly asserts that collective reasoning is necessary to achieve the common interest
and that proper political order is generally capable of channeling political actors toward courses of
actions consistent with reason and the public good. Meanwhile the passions were the greatest threat
to collective well-being but were naturally strongest. Meanwhile, “interest” occupied a middle
place representing a synthesis and compromise of reason and passion.
Publius does not condemn man for his fallen nature and implicitly denies that the end of
government is to save or perfect men’s souls. Nonetheless, Howe says that “the idea of inevitable
evil in human nature did not surprise men who were well acquainted with the Christian doctrine
of original sin and its secularized versions in eighteenth-century faculty psychology.”73 Most, if
not all, passions were understood as a potential threat to civil order.74 That the passions pose a
direct threat to others, the common good, and even to ourselves is an acknowledgement of the
permanent existence of evil and injustice within human nature. It is a frank admission that the soul
generates desires which, if satisfied, can and do harm others. In No. 34 Madison illuminates the
crux of the problem. He says, judging “from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to
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conclude, that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more
powerful sway, than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political
systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, would be to calculate on the weaker springs of
the human character.”75 In No. 42 Madison says that “the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause
of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned before public bodies as well as
individuals, by the clamours of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain.”76 In No.
6 Hamilton says: “Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found, that momentary passions, and
immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct, than general
or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice?”77
The crux of the political problem created by human psychology is how to properly
compensate for the “defect of better motives” that exists within the human soul. When Madison
tells us that men are not angels he is asserting that human nature exhibits a “defect of better
motives” which necessitates they be constrained externally in their actions precisely because they
lack the internal strength of motive to curb their desires. This defect of human nature demands
government commensurate to it. Human nature lacks the resources for self-sufficient self-restraint.
The source of this defect of motives is precisely that the powers of the soul vary inversely to the
needs of the happiness of the individual and civil society: the passions are strongest, reason
weakest.78 The motive most needful is weakest and those most destructive, strongest. Howe says
Publius identifies this problem as the “the tragedy inherent in the human condition.”79 This
permanent defect makes government and its justice necessary. Government must restraint the
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governed and then restraint itself. In No. 55 Madison points to the political problem of the faculties.
Republican self-government requires a sufficient supply of reason and the proper restraint of the
passions. Yet the need does not guarantee the supply. The challenge of the Founders new science
of politics was to solve the problem created by the conflict between the demands of a free political
order and what can be expected of the human faculties. Faculties most necessary to justice are in
least abundance.
Political order cannot rely on a foundation of motives men ought to have, such as reason,
virtue and a sense of duty, but only ones they are likely to act on when granted power such as
passions and interests. The defect of the human soul is the inverse relationship between the relative
worth and strength of these motives. Reason is most beneficial but least powerful, while the
passions and the interests are strongest, yet represent a clear and present danger to political
prosperity. A free and stable order can only be founded on the reliable, and therefore lesser,
motivations of human nature. In light of the nature and limits of the faculties it is not wise to
attempt to found political order on an ethic of self-sacrifice or Spartan restraint since such virtue
is virtually impossible to maintain in a free society, or any other kind. One cannot demand of the
faculties what they are not consistently capable of. A Constitutional order will not persist if
founded on motives that are not in sufficient supply.
The central problem the Constitution was designed to solve, and The Federalist Papers to
explain, was how durable institutions could be founded on lesser motives and ordered in
conformity with them? Maynard Smith writes The Federalist sought “to so organize a republic
that, insofar as possible, all manner of passions either can be used or rendered fairly harmless.”80
Government founded on fragile faculties makes for fragile institutions. The new republicanism
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proposed by Publius, which marks its genuine contribution to political science, asserts that
institutions need to be fashioned in a novel way and that the role played by the faculties within
them would be equally novel. The commercial spirit would be promoted as consistent with the
natural liberties of human nature despite their lack of true nobility. Meanwhile the lowly passions
would be channeled by institutions so that they could be deployed against themselves and
neutralized. Passion would be given a degree of free play, but set against itself under a system of
separation of powers in order that it might check itself. This permitted a certain encouragement
of lesser faculties and promoted passions which had the potential to be constructive.
Once identified, the deliberations of the Convention and The Federalist sought to
determine how those faculties would operate within the machine of the Constitution so as to
promote and orchestrate actions in a manner conducive to both liberty and the public good. Fiering
describes the eighteenth century “as a the time of an intellectual revolution” in which reason and
virtue were “displaced from supremacy by ‘the lowly and dangerous passions’.”81 This is an
overstatement. Certain ancient vices would become modern virtues, yet there remained a set of
passions Publius considered dangerous to all forms of political order. Nor was the belief that
certain passions could be considered virtuous synonymous with the believe that an Invisible Hand
might create spontaneous order through the raw unleashing of certain passions and interests where
private vices would produce public benefits. Publius and the Founders where not libertarians; the
Federalists asserted the primacy of the political and the vital role of a strong central government.
Nor did they ignore what they believed was the absolute necessity of reason, virtue and a morality
underwritten by religious belief and habits for the proper functioning of society. The authors of
The Federalist make clear that reason played a necessary and permanent role in fashioning of
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institutions and the ongoing functioning of government and society. As demonstrated, Publius does
not found government on the passions, but rather on self-interest, and in particular self-interest
rightly understood. As hybrid of reason and passion, this meant reason was the inextricable
ingredient of good government. The Founding, if not the operation of the regime, must rely on
than mere interest.
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V.

A Theory of Human Motivation

1. Reason

Reason in man obscured, or not obeyed,
Immediately inordinate desires
And up start passions catch the government
From reason, and to servitude reduce
Man till then free…”1
-

Milton, Paradise Lost

The story of reason in The Federalist Papers is one of its necessity for political prosperity,
coupled with its limited supply in human nature. Plato’s depiction of the human soul as a puppet
pulled in conflicting directions by its faculties is a poetic depiction illustrating how “faction is
sown in the nature of man.” The myth of the puppet of the gods illustrates how the soul is not in
harmony with itself without the pull of reason dominating the soul’s other chords. When human
nature is guided by its reason, its motivations work in unison coherently toward the same ends of
action. Reason was master by right, yet lacked a master’s might in man’s nature. Therefore, reason
needs to be augmented by external incentives and deterrents, rewards and punishments. Most
political actors will only conform to the dictates of reason under the external threat of compulsion.
With the proper accommodations, raw passion could be tamed to conform to the common good.
Or, put in the modern idiom, self-interest can be made to align with the common one.
Publius certainly did not believe in the Enlightenment myth of a society entirely remade
by an all-too-certain reason in the manner of Robespierre’s Republic of Virtue. There would be no
Cult of Reason. Publius vehemently denied this was either feasible or desirable. It was a recipe for
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tyranny. Despite Publius’ recognition of reason’s limits and the power of the passions, he
nonetheless recognized the same necessity of reason as the Ancients. Despite some crucial nods to
modern moral psychology which placed the seat of judgment in the passions and sentiments of the
human soul, Publius does not depart from the Ancient’s belief in the necessity and sufficient
efficacy of reason. Rather he sought to order a regime that would not make demands of reason
which reason could not meet. Despite innovations in thinking about the efficacy of the moral
sentiments for civic order and a growing acceptance of commercial passions as relative virtues
rather than vices, reason remained the guide to correct action individually and collectively. Siding
with the Ancients and departing from Hume, Publius accepted the necessity and supremacy of
reason as the ultimate guide to human life. This does not mean man’s capacity for reason easily
meets his needs, or that other motivations did not need to be correctly employed in order for him
to heed its sedate and mild voice.
Reason is the crown jewel of human nature. Logos, speech and reason, is the medium which
allows human beings to represent the world and our own situation to ourselves. This representation
is achieved through the tools of speech and thought and the notions they make possible such as
past, present and future. These notions allow us to conceptualize and frame our experiences to
ourselves, to reflect on past actions and foresee future consequences of present choices. The faculty
of reason is simply the act of reasoning and thinking through the medium of language. By allow
us to represent our situation, reason allows us to conceive of alternative courses of actions,
including the rejection of following mere impulse, or being blindly hidebound to tradition. These
powers make reason capable of serving as the rudder and guide of our actions. The capacity to
choose between motivations and the courses of action they represent, gives the human animal
relative freedom from the imperiousness of the passions, hard-wired instincts. and the ironclad
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laws of matter and motion. Reason does not merely allow us to choose, but to reflect and deliberate
on the correct course of action and the correct way of life. All forms of political deliberation are
merely collective manifestations of the reflective capacity make possible by our rational faculty.
In the Politics, Aristotle says the essence of citizenship is to participate in collective reasoning and
deliberation about laws which will determine the city’s way of life.2 The fundamental power of
reason as a guide to human life is invoked by Hamilton when he tells us that it is left to the United
States to determine whether it is possible for any people on the globe to found government on the
basis of “reflection” and “choice” rather than being forever in thrall to “force” and “accident”.
As the rational animal, human beings are capable of discerning the law of their own nature.3
Reason is the compass of human action. It discerns general rules of human conduct in light of
human nature. It adjudicates between the passions and can help moderates their excesses. The
problem with the passions is that they are blind. They lack foresight and cannot discern the
consequences of their own fulfillment. Reason is the one and only facility of the soul with the
ability to foresee the potential consequences of actions and calibrate conduct accordingly. It
adjudicates between various desired means and ends in light of consequences foreseen by
reflection on past experience applied to present circumstance. Rational reflection and deliberation
place a pause between a desire and its fulfillment. In No. 71 Hamilton implies reasoning involves
“time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.”4 In this pause it is potentially able to
determine both the appropriate means and ends of a given action. There is of course no guarantee
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of the infallibility of human reasoning in practical matters. Rather, if there is any best available
guide to action, it is reason.
In scouring The Federalist Papers for its concept of reason, we see that it divides into two
types not fundamentally different from those identified by Aristotle and the tradition. For Aristotle
the rational part of the soul, the intellect or nous, was divided in two. There was a “scientific part,
which enables us to study or engage in theoretical activity or contemplation (theoria), and the
deliberative part, which enables us to engage in practical activity.” 5 Throughout the Politics and
Ethics Aristotle speaks of theoretical reason and practical reason. Theoretical reason produces
knowledge and science while practical reason produces wisdom which culminates in right action.
This division persisted historically and was still quite evident, with important modifications, in the
moral and political philosophy of the Enlightenment. It remained the basis of the divisions of the
faculty of reason in Hume’ Treatise. Hume speaks of “the understanding” as the rational faculty
of the mind which is divided into “speculative” and “practical” reasoning.6
Theoretical reason is employed toward knowledge of the general and universal truths of
nature. Theoria or contemplation literally involves looking on the phenomena of the world at a
distance as a passive spectator in an attempt to gain critical distance. Critical distance is gained by
removing oneself from direct involvement in what is being observed. The verb, theorein from
which theoria is derived, means “to consider; to look at; to speculate as a spectator.”7 A theoros is
literally a “spectator” or “one who looks.”8 The word “theater” is derived from the same verb and
refers to the place where an audience acts as a nonparticipant spectator, and looks at and reflect on
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the action of the stage. This type of knowledge aspires to be disinterested and independent of
practical influences such as the needs, demands and desires of life.
Meanwhile, practical reasoning pertains to deliberations which produce choices related to
specific actions. Practical reason is derived from praxis which means “practice, action, doing” or
simply, living.9 Praxis is derived from the verb prattein which literally means “to do” or “to act”.10
Practical reasoning, by definition, culminates in action. Practical reason is addressed to identifying
and solving the problems produced by the needs, desires and demands of life. Practical reasoning
involves understanding and judging the meaning and consequence of actions. It attempts to foresee
consequences and calibrate means and ends accordingly. Practical reason pertains to knowledge
of what is right, or what is best to do under the pressure of circumstances. Aristotle calls correct
judgement in practical matters, “right reason.” Practical reason acknowledges that the thinker
operates within a specific context which influences their thinking. It recognizes they are committed
to various life purposes and are directly involved in the matters which they consider and judge.
The practical thinker is also an actor in the play, they are situated and not detached from the
consequences of their own judgments.
Practical reasoning about matters of action stands in contradistinction to theoretical
reasoning which produces knowledge for its own sake. Theoretical reasoning may be a prerequisite
for sound practical reasoning, but it is not a substitute for it. Aristotle compares these two types of
reasoning to geometry and carpentry. Theoretical reason deals in abstractions, operates by
mathematical precision and ironclad logic, and is founded on certain self-evident axioms which
cannot be conclusively proved by simple reference to empirical facts. It obtains knowledge for its
own sake. One mode is primarily based on inferences and deduction and the other from evidence
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and induction. One is an exercise in pure logic. The other is an exercise in phronesis, or prudence
and wisdom. Prudence is sound judgement in practical matters. Prudence is knowledge gained
from reflection on extended experience. It is particularly necessary in those circumstances in
which the general rules of human conduct do not spell out clear or conclusive courses of correct
action. Carpentry is practical; it seeks to build, not merely understand, actual structures. While it
depends on geometrical knowledge and mathematics, it is only a practical approximation of the
perfect precision and logic of geometry. Its measurements must accommodate themselves to real,
not ideal, conditions. The success of carpentry is demonstrated by empirical evidence found in the
structural integrity and functionality of what it makes. The “proof” of carpentry is that it works as
intended, not that it conforms to pure logic or abstract truths.
The Federalist demonstrates an obvious synergy between these two forms of knowledge.
Publius and the Founders were builders attempting to craft a political edifice on the blueprint of
the self-evident truths of human nature. Sufficiently accurate theoretical knowledge of human
nature could serve as a guide to the practical construction of the constitutional architecture
necessary to achieve ends dictated by that same knowledge. Despite the emphasis on experience
and practical judgement throughout The Federalist, both of these forms of reasoning, intellectual
and practical, are necessary to Publius’ arguments. In No. 23 Hamilton speaks of “self-evident” or
“primary” truth which “carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be
made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms, as simple as they are universal.”11
He says there are “those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence
along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests
upon axioms, as simple as they are universal . . . the means ought to be proportioned to the end;
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the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means
by which it is to be attained.”12 This passage calls to mind the “self-evident” truths of the
Declaration of Independence which the architecture of the Constitution is dedicated to fulfilling.
Theoretical reason and knowledge, Publius asserts, is relevant to the science of ethics and
politics. Publius makes certain claims that are simply axiomatic, not subject to simple empirical
proofs. The basis of Natural Law and the self-evident truths of Natural Right on which the
Constitution rests, are drawn from this kind of reasoning. In a rather stunning claim for Publius,
who calls experience the “oracle of truth,” and the “oracle of wisdom” he says in No. 70 that “by
quitting the dim light of historical research, and attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason
and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject, than to approve, the idea of
plurality in the executive, under any modification whatever.”13
In No. 31 Hamilton say that “In disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary truths,
or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal
evidence, which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the
mind…Of this nature are the maxims in geometry… Of the same nature, are these other maxims
in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be
proportioned to the end.”14 He concludes by saying that “in the sciences of morals and politics,
men are found far less tractable” but that “this untractableness may be carried too far” and that
“though it cannot be pretended, that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in
general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics; yet they have much better
claims in this respect, than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should
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be disposed to allow them.”15 In short reason is capable of sufficient enough knowledge of
fundamental moral and political truths to found just political institutions rather than one merely
reflective of the times.16
In Hamlet, Shakespeare, the faculty psychologist, has his Player Duke say, “Our thoughts
are ours, their ends none of our own.”17 Shakespeare’s modern psychology suggested that men’s
goals and purpose were not shaped by their conscious thoughts or reason. Pascal had said that “the
heart has its reasons, which reason knows not.”18 Such ends were given naturally by inchoate
speechless emotional impetuses not fully grasped by the thinking part of ourselves. In his Essay
on Man, Alexander Pope characterizes the relationship of reason and the tempestuous forces within
human nature with a nautical metaphor. The human soul was a ship on the sea of life. The passions
were the “gale” driving the ship forward while reason was the “card”, or rudder, guiding it toward
its destination.19 The passions were an active motor propelling man to action. Reason was guide,
but a passive one with no independent power of propulsion. The passions were the true impetus to
action as they pursued their desired objects. Meanwhile, reason only modified the course.
In his Treatise Hume rejected the efficacy and existence of practical reason. Practical
reason, Aristotle believed, could determine ends and motivate action. The modern revolution of
moral psychology beginning with Descartes and Hobbes which culminated in the thought of
Locke, Hume and the Enlightenment, largely inverted the relationship of reason to passion. Passion
was the ruler and reason the slave. Ancient moral psychology asserted reason was an active
constituent of the soul and passion passive impulse generated by the soul with need of the
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permission of the will. Hume asserts the opposite; reason is passive, and passion becomes the
active generator of human conduct. Reason, a slave to passion was its instrument. Reason was only
instrumental, capable of calculating the best means of achieving passion’s end.
Reason was, for Hume, in no way the motivator or ruler of our actions as Plato, Aristotle
and Descartes suggested. It was neither strong enough, nor independent enough to motive action.
Speculative or theoretical reason could obtain some degree of knowledge, but reason lacked a
proper object of desire for Hume which might motivate social, moral or political action. Descartes’
dualism permitted reason, practically speaking, to stand apart independently from the passions and
be their judge and adjudicator. The mind or soul was “independent of the passions, and so can
exercise control over them.” 20 Since the mind and its reasoning powers were independent it was
“free to judge the meaning of the feeling, and what to do about it.” 21 But Hume had collapsed
Cartesian dualism, by collapsing the soul into a special feature and function of the body. Man was
just a special instance of matter, subject to physical, chemical and biological laws. Mental states
were merely a special class of physical states. This in turn collapsed the critical distance reason
might have over the sensations and passions of the body.
“Reason,” writes Hume, is “of itself is utterly impotent” in its ability to “produce or prevent
actions.”22 Therefore “reason has no original influence” on our actions.23 In the Treatise Hume
states that reason “can never be a motive to an action of the will or oppose passion in the direction
of the will.”24 Reason was then, in no way, the cause of human motivation.25 For Hume it “is the
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passions and the passions alone” which motive human beings.26 Nothing, says Hume, can oppose
passion, but passion.27 Reason has no motivational power of its own, and it was too intermingled
with the pleasures and pains of the body to gain any kind of critical distance from its needs and
desires. Reason was passive because it was “purely speculative,” an “observational” faculty that
discerns or discovers relationship among ideas or matters of fact.”28
Departing from the Classics, Hume held that reason is a good servant, but a poor master.
Hume famously asserted the impotence of reason in practical matters.29 The passions are
impervious to the powers of reason.30 Reason is,” writes Hume, “and ought only to be the slave of
the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”31 The
impotence of reason reduces the faculty to a tool where passions are the ultimate arbiter of our
ends. By denying the motivational efficacy of reason, Hume relocated all motivation within the
passions. This relegated reason to the status of a servant and instrument of calculation for the
passions. Reason is re-employed as a consigliere which the passions consult with and abets them
in their most effective satisfaction. Reason ministers to the passions as their instrument. It colludes
with passion, plotting and designed how best to achieve their ends. Instrumental reason aids and
abets the passions. Hobbes wrote, “the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to range
abroad and find the way to the things desired.”32
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Hume’s entire oeuvre calls into question whether reason can gain any meaningful critical
distance in moral matters, situated as it is within the flux of history and habit, operating within a
being who by its very nature, must constantly address the interested needs of life. In denying
efficacy to reason, Hume denied reason as “the source of our moral ideas.”33 “The rules of
morality,” he concluded, “are not conclusion of our reason.”34 “Since vice and virtue are not
discoverable by reason or the comparison of ideas,” Hume wrote, “it must be by means of some
impression or sentiment that they occasion…Morality therefore is more properly felt than
judged.”35 In denying its efficacy Hume also establishes a fundamental realignment between
reason and passion. The great war in the soul of man between reason and passion Plato, Aristotle
and the tradition identified, was illusory. Reason and passion were really not at war. There is, says
Hume, “no direct combat between reason and the passions.”36 Therefore the “principle, which
opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense.
We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of and
reason.”37

Instead the soul is an arena where various passions compete and war amongst

themselves for our attention, impetuously demanding to be the spring of our conduct. What man
called the conflict of reason and passion, was in fact a war between calm and sedate passions on
the one hand, and more violent and tempestuous ones. Man’s internal existence and external social
life is nothing other than the play and conflict of various passions.
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It is precisely because reason is weak that it does not enter in conflict with the passion, but
it is passively employed in meeting their demands. Only passion is capable of thwarting passion.38
Despite his acceptance of reason’s limitations and the partial reshuffling of certain ancient vices
as modern virtues, Publius does not simply relegate reason to passion’s slave. Like Aristotle,
Publius implies reason is both instrumental in achieving ends, but is also capable of defining them.
Departing from Hume he does not deny the necessary role and efficacy of reason as master in its
capacity to determine ends. This is most obvious in their adherence to Natural Law theory where
unaided reason could determine a universal moral code from the evidence of human nature. Publius
acknowledges that in order to achieve the most just society possible, reason had to rule over men
in the manner of which it is capable. This meant the rational and prudent decision to lower
expectations of human conduct and a strategic embrace of passions and interests. True wisdom
knows its limits.
Nonetheless, Publius harbors many of the Hume’s suspicions regarding the efficacy of
reason whether in founding political order or its regular operations. Therefore many of Hume’s
observations about the interested and passionate nature of men serve as fundamental signposts in
Publius’ considerations in crafting and maintaining civil society. The Constitution is rather
Humean in its acceptance of the timidity and weakness of reason to cause or oppose action most
of the time. While rejecting Hume’s larger theoretical claims about the precise role of reason,
Publius and the Founders embraced their inevitable practical consequences.
While some few might have wisdom and practical reason, the generality of mankind must
be considered as knaves. Intuitions must be contrived in a manner to expect reason’s impotence.
Like the Ancients, Publius denied that reason was merely instrumental or passive but could move
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one to act. Reason was not merely the henchmen of the passions but uses their gale and directs the
ship based on foresight of consequences. In the matter of reason, Publius “stood by the more
conventional” position of Reid and Ancients like Plato and Aristotle. He rejected “Hume’s view
of human motivation as entirely passionate.”39 Publius maintains the power and possibility of
reason to guide political life and provide a cornerstone on which to found it. Reason can infer the
moral ought of Natural Law, and can reach conclusions about human nature based on experience
and history. Practical reason pertains both to the ends of political action and the appropriate means
by which they might be achieved. It is clear that Publius believes reason capable of establishing
the broad ends of human action, not merely the means of achieving them. Reason is not solely
merely an instrument of the passions. Practical reason must determine how the ends dictated by
the Law of Nature can be achieved in particular circumstances. It must devise the concrete
infrastructure to realize the general principles established by Natural Law.
Publius’ assessment of human nature involves prudential judgments of how the
Constitution will regulate human nature. Practical reason is necessary to devise the provisions of
the Constitution and imagining just how men will act under their constraints. As an invention of
prudence, the Constitution is a product of practical reasoning calculated to restrain passion and
fortify the weak but vital rational element in human nature. The design of the Constitution must
fortify the rational faculty in both the rulers and the ruled. Publius readily concedes that these
inventions designed to “control the caprice and wickedness of men” may be “all that government
will admit, and that human prudence can devise”40
Moreover, as regards a city and a private individual, it'll be clearer that the latter should acquire
within himself true reasoning about these cords and live according to it, while a city should take
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over a reasoning either from one of the gods or from this knower of these, things, and then set up
the reasoning as the law for itself and for its relations with other cities. Thus, certainly, vice and
virtue would be more clearly distinguished for us.41
-

Plato, The Laws

Publius repeatedly alludes to the Classical assertion that reason should rule in some form
through the institutions of society, if not in the same manner as Ancient republics. Reason should
rule because it is capable of determining the ends of civil society and the public good. In No. 15
Hamilton asserts the original function of government is to make human nature “conform to the
dictates of reason and justice.”42 There was significant agreement with the Anti-Federalists
regarding reason. It was precisely the belief of the Anti-Federalists that officers of the government
would be ruled by their passions that they feared the power the Federalist party sought to grant it.
Likewise, the Federalists saw the necessity of regulating the passions of the people and the states
with a sufficiently robust government, predicated on the belief that properly ordered institution
could check the lesser tendencies of officeholders as well.
A central message of The Federalist echoes the ancient wisdom: passion should not “wrest
the sceptre” of political power “from reason.”43 In No. 49 Madison say “it is the reason, alone, of
the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled
and regulated by the government.”44 In No. 63 Hamilton says “the cool and deliberate sense of the
community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail
over the views of its rulers.”45 He says that “the republican principle demands, that the deliberate
sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust the management
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of their affairs.” 46 In No. 57 Hamilton says that “the aim of every political constitution is, or ought
to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue,
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for
keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust.47 In No. 48 Publius speaks
of how “passion, not reason, must have presided over” the decisions of men who have erred in
their understanding of the public good.48
This “cool and deliberate sense of the community” is nothing other than its rational sense.
Collective reasoning and deliberation as manifest through the constitutional edifice and its
processes should be master of the collective passions. In No. 63 Publius says “how salutary will
be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the
misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until
reason, justice, and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind?”49 In No. 48 Madison
asserts that a legislature of the correct size is “incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by
means which reason prescribes.”50 When in No. 15 Hamilton juxtaposes “general considerations
of peace and justice, to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion” he implies that peace
and justice are achieved through rational deliberation and considerations of long-term interest.51
In his Laws, Plato associates law with reason.52 True law is synonymous with reason. Law
is discerned by reason. It is a dictate of reason. The Law of Nature was for Locke nothing other
than the “Law of Reason”.53 The dictates of law and justice were merely the dictates of practical
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reason writ large in civil society. In No. 48 Madison says, “A reverence for the laws would be
sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason.”54 In No. 81 Hamilton conflates “the
general principles of law and reason.”55 In No. 78 Hamilton says “reason and law conspire to
dictate” what ought to be done. The law of reason is synonymous with justice. In No. 48 Madison
associates reason with “the public good.”56 Like Locke, Publius “identifies reason with justice.”57
When Hamilton says “the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice,
without constraint,” the dictates of reason and justice are synonymous with each other and the
public good. Justice is merely the “dictates of reason” made law.58
In No. 13 Hamilton says that the ultimate function of government is to establish “the degree
of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good.”59 Presumably
justice is achieved by educating the passions through external structures and forces devised by
reason in order to encourage them to conclude that adherence to law is of greater benefit than the
spoils of injustice. Justice administered by government is necessary to compensate for the
deficiencies of human nature which create discrepancies between the individual and public
interest. The “original motive for the establishment of justice is self-interest.”60 The common
guarantee of justice to all, is to the benefit of the self-interest of all. The raw interest of the
individual does not simply align with the public interest. Hamilton tells us that “momentary
passions and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct
than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice.”61 However rational and capable
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of self-government, human nature is in need of the external constraint of government and its laws
grounded in practical reasoning.
To acknowledge the necessity of reason for civil society, is to acknowledge the necessity
of virtue. The consequence of practical reason employed by actors in office or in society is virtuous
conduct. Civic virtue is a product of practical reason. Virtuous conduct in office is synonymous
with the fulfillment of one’s duties and obligations to the people and the public good. For the
Ancients reason was inextricably linked to duty and virtue. For Plato and Aristotle, the essential
virtues or excellences of human nature were virtues of the soul. In light of man’s rational nature
all of the soul’s excellences involved the proper employment of reason. All virtues of the soul
exhibited commensurate types of reasoning which made the expression of virtue possible. The
proper use of one’s practical reason resulted in virtuous actions. Duty and its fulfillment were the
product of correct reasoning. The dictates of duty and justice were merely the dictates of practical
reason writ large.
Political scientist Paul Rahe correctly asserts that the new American Republic “certainly
was not a republic of virtue.”62 Reason and virtue however remained an essential ingredient to this
novel form of government. Despite the acceptance and exploitation of the passions and the interests
The Federalist acknowledges the need for reason in a manner intelligible to Plato and Aristotle.
To the extent Ancient vices might be leveraged as a Modern virtues, good men would still be
necessary. Support for this conclusion could have been provided by their observations of history
and their own experiences, as well as the ample literature of the period exalting classical
republicanism. The need for virtue was reinforced by Christian morality and the teachings of the
Classics. Just because they sought to modify failures of Ancient political science, did not mean the
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believed they could simply transcend or eliminate the problems of political order they faced. The
lowered expectations of Publius’ new science in terms of reason, virtue and duty still
acknowledged them as instrumental.
The Federalist Papers seem to suggest that good government “does not require enlightened
statesmen, unless perhaps to institute it.”63 To completely depend on virtue is to wish like Plato
that “a philosopher can be a king, or like republican theorists that a citizen can be a statesman.”64
Meanwhile to believe one can do without virtue altogether is to “suppose that cunning and stupidity
will rule the world; in the manner prescribed by Machiavelli, through ‘accident and force’.”65
While government was no longer in the business of perfecting souls, both virtuous men and
virtuous institutions were necessary for good government. No Founder said otherwise. Only
virtuous citizens, as Adams, Jefferson and Madison agreed, “were capable of exercising freedom
responsibly.”66 Bad men do not make good citizens and statesmen. Power and virtue must then
have sufficient overlap however virtuous conduct might be attained. Together Madison and
Hamilton helped author Washington’s Farewell Address which stated: “It is substantially true that
virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with
more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look
with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?” In No. 37 Madison says,
“Happy will it be for ourselves, and most honourable for human nature, if we have wisdom and
virtue enough, to set so glorious an example to mankind.”67 If virtue and duty were not ends in
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themselves of the modern republic, they certainly remained a necessary means to good
government.
In light of the deficiencies of reason The Federalist alters the relation of reason to virtue.
Reason’s frailty necessitated this alteration. Reason is weak and scarce, and men are primarily
passionate and interested. Echoing the tone and substance of Hume, in 1802 Hamilton wrote, “Men
are rather reasoning than reasonable animals for the most part governed by the impulse of
passion.”68 Hamilton writes there are “a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy
motives” in every government, but taken as they are, men are governed by their passions.69 In No.
6 Hamilton tells us “momentary passions and immediate interests have a more active and
imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or
justice.”70 The despotism of the passions all too often wins the day over reason.
When Hamilton asserts that experience is the “least fallible guide” in politics, he tacitly
admits there are no infallible ones. Hume says “man falls much more short of perfect wisdom, and
even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than animals do of man, the latter difference is so
considerable, that nothing but a comparison with the former can make it appear of little moment.”71
Publius recognized that wisdom was necessary for the founding and perpetuation of a just regime,
but that it was scarce and limited even amongst the so-called wise. This sobriety tempered his
outlook about what could be hoped for in a new civil society and extended to those shaping it.
Hamilton asserts that it is unwise to “expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man.”72 Hume
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acknowledged his “deep misgivings about the possibility of establishing a viable political system
that deviated too far from established practices.”73 Given reason’s impotence, Hume was oft
inclined to fall back on tried-and-true customs rooted in the wisdom of the ages. The American
Founders were rather more brash, yet they recognized that there was no proper rational justification
for the hope of a wholesale remaking of society by bringing all tradition and custom before the
tribunal of so imperfect a judge. Fatovic concludes that Hamilton’s No. 85 “contains more
references to the impossibility of perfection than any other contribution,” including an extended
critique of the “chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan” of government.74 In it Hamilton quotes Hume
approvingly, saying that “to balance a large state or society…is a work of so great difficulty, that
no human genius, however comprehensive, is able by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to
effect it.”75 Fatovic concludes that Hamilton’s defense of the proposed Constitution rested instead
on a “rather prosaic and straightforwardly pragmatic claim”76 that the Constitution was “the best
which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit.”77
Publius’ weary attitude toward man’s reason made him a great skeptic of abstract armchair speculation and the utopianism typically associated with it. This rejection of utopianism
included a parallel rejection of its method of reasoning. Hume speaks of the “absurdity of abstract
reasonings in politics.”78 In matters of political science, Hamilton repeatedly railed against what
he called “dangerous metaphysics.”79 The speculative flights of fancy of the Ancients which
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produced merely “imagined republics” were exchanged for hard-boiled empirical observations.
Observations from experience and history were the only oracle of truth. The mind of the founder
and statesman should never stray too far from the concrete facts of experience.
In his “Vindication of the Funding System,” Hamilton refers to “the difference between
the true politician and the political-empyric.”80 He says the “true politician...takes human nature as
he finds it, a compound of good and ill qualities.”81 This distinction separates the prudent man of
action with realistic expectations from the theorist who harbors visionary hopes of the perfection
of human nature and civil society. The true statesman and political scientist, said Hamilton, will
take human nature as it is, and “will not attempt to warp or distort it from its natural direction.”82
Lacking true knowledge on such matters, government has no legitimate basis for attempting to
alter human nature or entirely defining the happiness of the people. The limits of reason relegate
government to a matter of political opinion, not technocratic expertise. Limits on rational
understanding translated to procedural and substantive limits on government. Such limits
demonstrate that centralized social engineering was neither possible, nor wise, given the tyrannical
consequences of concentrated power in the hands of a human nature, more self-interested than
wise or knowing.
The inefficacy of reason justifies the authority of opinion as the true basis of government.
A wholly popular government was to be ruled by the opinion of the people. Popular government
and the principle of majority rule respect the consent and opinion of the people because there is no
justification for the rule of experts. In his Essay “Of the Coalitions of Parties” Hume says, “Reason
is so uncertain a guide that it will always be exposed to doubt and controversy: Could it ever render
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itself prevalent over the people, men had always retained it as their sole rule of conduct.”83 Reason
is an uncertain guide because of its weaknesses and its admixture with the passions within the soul
of mankind. In No. 10 Madison sounds this same tune saying “As long as the reason of man
continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as
the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will
have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will
attach themselves.”84 In No. 49 Madison goes so far as to say even the “the wisest and freest
governments” depend on “prejudice.”85
Madison followed Hume who held that even in the few who rule, the voice of reason is
weak. Those in power are no more, but perhaps less, immune to the charms of self-interest.
Hamilton says a “further reason for caution” is to be “drawn from the reflection, that we are not
always sure, that those who advocate the truth are actuated by purer principles than their
antagonists.”86 They too are governed by their passions and opinions. Hume says that “the
governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore on opinion only that
government is founded.”87
In No. 49 Madison follows Hume asserting that “all governments rest on opinion” because
only a nation of philosophers would listen to “the voice of an enlightened reason” alone.88 “But a
nation of philosophers,” says Madison, “is as little to be expected, as the philosophical race of
kings wished for by Plato.” 89 Since “no human genius” by their individual reason alone is able
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either to found or maintain a regime, Hamilton says that “the judgments of many must unite in the
work: experience must guide their labour: time must bring it to perfection: and the feeling of
inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into, in their first trials and
experiments.”90 If reason cannot autonomously devise and perpetuate institutions, the diversity of
opinion which reflects the natural diversity of individuals and groups, must be given free play in
society.
Thus, a central contribution of reason to the Founding “was to recognize its own
limitations.”91 Publius and the Founders would have to recognize the limits of their own powers of
reasoning, the precipice where reasoning stopped and opinion, passion and interest began.
Certainly, they “did not believe that in the future men would [simply] subordinate passion to reason
or self-interest to the public good.”92 It is reason’s own observation of its limits which dictates the
rule of opinion. Thus, the supremacy of opinion turns out to be an insight of reason. Reason rules
indirectly. Since man’s reason is fallible, government is not founded on expertise or a universal
grasp of the truth. Since reason does not rule in society, the opinions of the rulers rule. Jefferson’s
Declaration reminds us that the fundamental principles it asserts hold the status of opinion. It
presents the ruling opinions of American society as self-evident truths. He writes, “We hold these
truths to be self-evident.” The people of the United States hold an opinion about the truth, they do
not assert knowledge of it. And, despite the universality of its claim, that “all men are created
equal,” this opinion is self-consciously asserted only on behalf of the American people, not all
mankind.
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In light of these limitations, The Federalist gives a new meaning to virtue. Aristotle had
defined virtue as the result of free choice.93 The virtues, he says, are voluntary.”94 Being compelled
to do the right thing could not be considered true virtue. This is precisely because, as Aristotle
explains, voluntary action is the result of internal self-governance whereas involuntary conduct is
the product of “external constraint.”95 Aristotle asserts that true virtue is only achieved by
voluntary choice. Their actions are not naturally in conformity with the common interest. In No.
75 Hamilton voices skepticism regarding the efficacy of reason and the reach of virtue. He says,
“The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue, which would
vest all the authority of a nation in its intercourse with the rest of the world in one man.”96 In a
letter to James Bayard Hamilton writes, “Nothing is more fallacious than to expect to produce any
valuable or permanent results, in political projects, by relying merely on the reason of men.”97 This
means that most men will only conform to the dictates of reason when they have sufficient motive
to align their self-interest with its demands as expressed through law. Reason in the form of virtue
might need to rule, but its limitations do not allow it to rule simply. It must be externally fortified.
One must depend on wise institutions and not hope for rational men to occupy them. Perhaps
rational institutions could produce sufficiently virtuous men.
Man’s reason alone does not provide sufficient impetus for him to act in accord with law.
The “defect of better motives” is that his internal means of self-restraint like reason or moral
sentiment, are not in sufficient supply. This deficiency of human nature necessitates the use of
external compulsion. Hamilton says that the “passions of men will not conform to the dictates of
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reason and justice, without constraint.”98 Hobbes explains solution. There must be a “coercive
power to compel men” to abide by the social contract.99 But, promises are only kept, by the external
means of the “terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach” of
their covenants.”100 In No. 73 Hamilton says that while there are a few virtuous men who can
“neither be distressed, nor won, into a sacrifice of their duty,” on the whole “it will be found, that
a power over a man’s support, is a power over his will.”101 To the extent Publius embraces virtue
politics as necessary to good government, he nonetheless accepts that good conduct is rarely
voluntary. The extended commercial republic and the checks and balances of the Constitution will
either encourage or compel virtuous behavior. Evident in The Federalist’s usage, what Publius
often calls “virtue”, is good conduct achieved under circumstances which provide virtually no
alternative to good conduct. For Aristotle acts performed under such conditions of necessity are
not called “virtue” properly speaking.
Nor is collective harmony and virtue spontaneously generated. Machiavelli says that it is
necessary in establishing a republic and its laws to “presuppose that all men are bad.”102 We must
consider every man a knave in order to craft political institutions sufficiently resilient and immune
to the defect of motives in human nature. But actual knaves will not produce good government.
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees asserts the premise that civil order can be generated from nothing
more than “an aggregation of self-interested individuals necessarily bound to one another neither
by their shared civic commitments nor their moral rectitude, but, paradoxically, by the tenuous
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bonds of envy, competition and exploitation.”103 Mandeville’s premise is that from selfish interests
alone, civil order could be spontaneously self-generating from the bottom-up. The law of
unintended consequences by itself will not produce order, harmony or virtue. An invisible hand
which promotes “an end which was not part” of a man’s intention is an insufficient guard against
political vice.104 Smith’s invisible hand “is not understandable independently of his theory of moral
sentiment.”105 He believed God had “designed human nature that people, on adequate reflection,
can and do share the feelings of others.”106 Thus, Smith’s thesis of the spontaneous harmonization
of interests in society was predicated on a theory of moral sentiment made possible by sympathy.
Publius explicitly rejected such a theory, especially on the political level. For Publius, “private
vices” cannot become “publick benefits” without the assistance of a properly constructed civic
order.
For Publius civic order was still the bailiwick of the statesman, not the social scientist.
Priestly and Godwin for example thought social harmony “develops naturally from self-interest
and that the business of politics is to dismantle government.”107 While Hamilton sought to promote
financial, commercial and industrial activity, and the economic liberty provided by property
protections, he believed in a strong role for the national government. Smith for example explains
how the division of labor and its origins were “not originally the effect of any human wisdom” but
rather the spontaneous product of a “very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in
human nature.”108 Hamilton was not an admirer of laissez-faire capitalism precisely because
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human nature left to itself did not have the natural motivations which gave rise to both order and
prosperity. The defect of motives in these matters made government indispensable. Instead, he
favored economic nationalism which, in the 19th century, came to be known as the American
School of economics or the “National System.”
No doubt Hamilton and Madison hoped that property protections and appropriate
regulations would facilitate a free market, which made its own parochial decisions regarding the
division of labor and the allocation of resources based on local knowledge. This is however a far
cry from saying that such markets and division of labor can flourish without the playing field set
by limited government and its rule of law. The Federalist explicitly rejects a model where selfinterest unguided by institutions flourishes and foments civic harmony spontaneously. In the
context of the Founding the Federalist party was obviously arguing for a relatively powerful central
government. The Federalist Papers implicitly reject the spontaneous generation of order through
the free play of interests. Liberty, order, and free markets still presuppose a relatively powerful
top-down political order. This was precisely because there were not sufficient resources within
human nature to generate such order without the arch external support of government. They make
clear that there is no good government without some modicum of reason and virtue, and that there
will not be sufficient virtue without good government. The question is not whether virtue is
necessary, but how it might be generated.
In Publius’ explanation of the motivational impact of the Constitution on officeholders, we
see his alteration of the meaning of virtue. Voluntary virtue will not be expected, precisely because
it is too unlikely, especially when men hold the reins of power. The correct constitutional
circumstances will compel virtue by overcoming the “defect of better motive.” Publius separates
right reasoning from correct conduct. The Constitution must be concerned to produce good
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conduct, but does not expect or desire to reach into men’s souls and compel them to have the
correct intentions and reasonings. While men are more or less defective in their virtue, the great
innovation of the Constitution is to depend on virtuous motives as little as possible. Good
institution must make men sufficiently good in their conduct if not their motives. Institutions must
be structured in a manner to bend the motive of self-interest into conduct which sufficiently
conforms with the public interest. The Founders well understood why this was necessary. With
characteristic pith, Franklin said at the Convention that, “The first man put at the helm will be a
good one. Nobody knows what sort may come afterwards. The executive will be always increasing
here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a monarchy.”109 In No. 10 Madison writes, “It is in vain to say,
that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all
subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”110 The
Constitution was designed to establish the conditions which generate incentives to this type of
virtuous conduct. Institutions must be designed to cultivate and select the best men as they are
necessary. Hamilton went so far as to say the Constitution will create the “constant probability of
seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue.”111 If this is so, the
parameters of office must be designed to perpetuate good conduct.
Despite their sober views, in No. 51 and 76, Madison and Hamilton assert that ordinary
human nature has a sufficient “portion of virtue and honor” which should garner “a certain portion
of esteem” and justify the experiment in self-government.112 The frail springs of reason and moral
sentiment are in need of fortification. The Constitution depends on virtue and “attempts to call it
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forth both from the people at large and from the more virtuous among the people.”113 At the
Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison said “that the people will have virtue and intelligence to
select men of virtue and wisdom…If there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community,
it will be exercised in the selection of these men. So that we do not depend on their virtue, or put
confidence in our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them.”114
Institutions will be devised in a manner to make men virtuous. No. 57 Hamilton says “The
aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the
next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue
to hold their public trust.”115 Thus, “effectual precautions” are designed into the Constitution “for
keeping them virtuous.” These men do not choice virtue freely, but are made virtuous by
circumstances generated by institutions. Meanwhile representative institutions would “refine and
enlarge” public sentiment by providing a mechanism to winnow candidates to those of “fit
characters.”116 This process will keep the window of public opinion within the realm of the
respectable. A cautious Hamilton concludes that all these inducements to good conduct “may all
be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of men. But are they not all the government
will admit, and that human prudence can devise?”117
The Federalist’s acknowledgement of the necessity of virtue is an admission that even the
most ingeniously devised institutions are not sufficient for the perpetuation of a just regime. A free
nation and its institutions cannot simply compel the virtue necessary for good government. A free,
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self-governing, nation is in most need of virtue if it is to remain so. Despite Publius’ of compelled
or involuntary virtue, the common interest of any form of government still demands voluntary
virtue. This makes virtuous men indispensable to good government. Publius understood the
necessity of public spiritedness despite the ingenuity and prudence of institutions. Cicero had said
great men make good institutions and good institutions will produce good men. If this were simply
true, we must then explain why and how the best institutions mortal wisdom “will admit” still
decay. Where is the Roman Republic? No amount of institutional tinkering can take bad men and
make them into a good republic. Patrick Henry said, “Bad men cannot make good citizens. It is
impossible that a nation of infidels or idolaters should be a nation of freemen. It is when a people
forget God, that tyrants forge their chains. A vitiated state of morals, a corrupted public conscience,
is incompatible with freedom.”118 George Mason tells us, “No free government, or the blessings of
liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance,
frugality, and virtue; and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.”119 At the Virginia
Ratifying Convention Madison said “No theoretical checks--no form of government can render us
secure. To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue
in the people, is a chimerical idea.”120
Even if Publius’ exhortations to virtue are both rhetoric and science, they indicate the
necessity of the rhetoric of virtue, and hence the necessity of virtue itself. This rhetoric is an
admission that free government demands it, and that they believed human nature sufficiently
capable of meeting the demand. In No. 55 he says “Were the pictures which have been drawn by
the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference
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would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less
than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.”121
There will be enough reason and virtue among elected officials “to withstand whatever temptations
are offered by whatever power they have.”122 Epstein says, “If men are utterly depraved, there
would be no one worthy of being elected to any office, that is, trusted with any power however
widely shared, closely watched, or limited in time.”123 What must be true of their representatives
must also be true of the people. A completely “depraved people is incapable of selfgovernment.”124 Federici says Hamilton “judged men by their ability to subordinate self-interest
and ideological passion to the common good and to conduct public affairs with energy and
prudence,” in short, “he expected leaders to have a sufficient degree of virtue.”125 In No. 2
Hamilton says “This convention, composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people,
and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, and wisdom, in
times which tried the souls of men, undertook the arduous task.”126
While decisively influenced by the Modern science of politics, Hamilton especially,
maintained the Ancient concern for duty, ambition, glory and fame. He no doubt harbored a taste
for human greatness. Neither Hamilton nor Madison accepted the Hobbesian hatred of glory or his
near obsession with a security as the expense of liberty, the central tenant of Classical
republicanism. Of these virtues Hamilton asks: “Are they not the genuine, and the characteristic
means, by which republican government provides for the liberty and happiness of the people?”127
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Thus men’s ambitious quest for honor, fame and glory is capable of raising their sights beyond
themselves and toward their public duties. Under the correct constitutional edifice such passions
and interests can be made to coincide with the public good. If talk of virtue were mere rhetoric,
the supposed virtue of the people, their representatives and their labors were exposed to public
scrutiny if they fell short of such claims
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2. The Passions

The Founders understood their experiment in republican self-government demanded virtue.
They had a certain admiration for the principles, if not the practice, of Classical Republicanism.
They retained some sense of the great dignity and fulfillment possible through public life. They
understood that reason and virtue are not merely ornaments of the good life, but necessities of a
free and orderly one. These men were after all founders and statesmen whose characters are
inscribed in the nation they created. Yet, as we have seen, they harbored no illusions about the
dominance of the passions within human nature. The passions exhibited a despotic control over
men’s actions. Hamilton admitted that men are “for the most part governed by the impulse of
passion.”1 He and Madison had little doubt that “momentary passions and immediate interests have
a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of
policy, utility, or justice.”2 While some passions the Ancients had deemed vices might be leveraged
as modern virtues, the Founder’s all recognized that many passions were not benign. Man’s
passionate nature, its “defect of better motives,” itself represented the original inducement to civil
authority. Before all else, government is the arch mechanism for the collective regulation of those
passions destructive of order and liberty. This regulation makes possible the pursuit of comfortable
self-preservation, and for some, virtue. Self-government is only possible through proper regulation
of the passions of the people and their rulers. A free people must be a self-restraining people. And
so, it is to the passions we now turn.
When Aristotle called man the rational animal he did not mean most human beings were
mostly guided by reason most of the time. He had no illusions about the extent to which men were
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creatures of passion. Hamilton perfectly paraphrased this predicament when he wrote, “Men are
rather reasoning than reasonable animals for the most part governed by the impulse of passion.”3
Aristotle argues that reason is the distinctly human ingredient in man’s nature in contradistinction
to the nature of plants and other animals. That men have reason hardly guarantees its proper use.
For Aristotle a fully human existence is only realized when life and action are actually guided by
right reason. Nor were the passions lacking in some degree of dignity if properly guided by and in
harmony with right reason. Therefore it is possible, even likely, for man to remain largely a being
of passionate impulse despite his rational endowment. The problem, as Hamilton states in No. 6,
is that the passions and immediate interests “have a more active and imperious control over human
conduct” than those of reason and the common interest.4 Hume says “our primary instincts lead
us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited liberty, or to seek dominion over others: And it is
reflection only, which engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests of peace and
public order.”5
Much Ancient and Medieval Christian moral thought “characterized the passions as
fundamentally negative and at odds with our better selves as represented by reason.”6 This was a
model of simple and stark opposition between reason and the passions. Human psychology was an
agonistic battlefield where reason warred with the passions. Passions were “lawless or untamed
forces ready to overpower reason, the rightful master of the soul.”7 The Stoics for example
“represented the passions as diseases that take illicit control of the mind or soul,” which are “cured
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only by being eliminated.”8 The goals was to cultivate a “person devoid of passion.”9 The Calvinist
tradition Hamilton and Madison were immersed in associated the passions with the body and hence
the fallen nature of mankind. The passions were the primary source of evil individual and
collectively. Therefore, they must be restrained by religion, morality and the laws of civil society.
This psychological model of simple opposition between reason and the passions gave way
to a new framework in Early Modern philosophy and the emerging liberal tradition of political
thought. A new attitude was taken toward the passions and a revaluation of the Ancient perspective
was underway. The passions might not be simply bad, they may even partake in the promotion of
some or all virtues. Modern philosophy began to treat “the passions as integral and positive features
of human nature and conduct in need of a new explanation by the emerging human sciences.”10
This transformation of the stance taken by moral and political thought toward the passions is a
story famously told in Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests. Machiavelli’s realistic
depiction in The Prince of a self-interested world driven by ambition, the love of power and
domination, and the spirit of material acquisition, marks the opening salvo in the increasing
acceptance of the passions. Given that they are a core fact and force of nature means that to
denigrate the passion is simply to denigrate human nature itself.
For Machiavelli if the passions were not in themselves good, they were at least natural, an
ironclad reality that the Ancients in their sedate imagined republics failed to sufficiently account
for or respect as a force of nature. By looking above, they were self-consciously ignoring what
was lurking below at their own peril. Descartes’ essay On the Passions of the Soul marks an
inflection point in this history. In it, he claims “the passions have an essential and beneficial effect,
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that of moving us to want things and to act on these wants.”11 Hume, who decisively influence
Madison and Hamilton, followed the lead of Spinoza, a Cartesian who dropped Descartes’ dualism
by collapsing the psychological into the physiological. The embrace of the passions was the natural
consequence of an emerging political science rooted in a material and empirical epistemology
derived from a maturing Modern natural science. This empirical political science was determined
to reject “imagined republics” and to “take men as they are.” Men as they are, are beings of passion.
Hume says such an outlook does not seek “a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would
endow them with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice.”12 This is the
province of the priest. Meanwhile, the magistrate “aims only at possibilities.”13
The passions appear more central to human nature and conduct as it actually is, whereas
the Ancients only sought to conceive of men as they should be, guided by reason. Aristotle’s model
of reason as master of the ship was decisively overturned when Hume asserted reason ought to be
slave to the passions.14 If reason is but a slave, then all human conduct is motivated by various
passions where reason is an instrument, merely playing a passive and subordinate role. Alexander
Pope would say that passions are the gale, the driving force of human action, whereas reason
merely guides the direction of the ship without moving it toward its end. If man was merely an
embodied animal and the mind did not and could not stand distinct from the passions of the body,
then the passions were the source of all motivation and therefore all human action.
The revaluation and rehabilitation of the passions involved a denial of their total depravity.
This revaluation hinged on the assertion that the passions were so integral to human nature that to
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condemn them is to condemn human nature itself. Passions, says Hume, are innate as they “arise
immediately from nature.”15 They are instinctual forces “implanted in human nature.”16 “All our
passions,” say Hume “are a kind of natural instinct, derived from nothing but the original
constitution of the human mind.”17 They arise “from a natural impulse or instinct, which is
perfectly unaccountable.”18 Hume says the precise origin of our particular passions and instincts is
not understood because they are given by nature. The passions are “inseparable from human
nature” and “cannot be explained by reference to other, more basic qualities.”19 Hume and Publius
clearly acknowledge how custom, habit, history and circumstance shape and affect the passions,
but despite their shaping powers, the passions remain at their core unadulterated impetuses given
by nature.
The elevation of the passions was also rooted in a simple observation that many of their
objects are salutary both for mere life and the good life. If the passions were the prime mover of
the soul and the ultimate cause of men’s motive and conduct, they must be the source of both vice
and virtue. Passions as desires, Descartes suggested, motivate us to act in order to obtain the
necessities of life which humans identify as unmitigated goods. Descartes went further, asserting
the passions also represent “the crepuscular beginning of virtue.”20 For Rousseau, Hume and others
of the Scottish Enlightenment, the passions were not only the source of vice or mere selfpreservation, but of virtue as well. Moral sentiments, which encouraged benevolence and social
harmony, were the source of moral virtue. These factors considered, it would be irrational to
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condemn the passions in toto. From the Modern perspective, moral and political philosophy had a
renewed obligation to confront the passions as a serious and righteous source of human action, and
not merely dismiss them as negative defects to be purged from soul and society alike. The passions
were potentially as much responsible for anarchy and injustice, and they were for civil order and
harmony.
Hume’s celebration of the passions is not merely a disagreement with the Ancients over
matters of human psychology, but a moral and political dispute over the nature and ends of civil
society itself. Ancient moral psychology asserted reason is and should be the active ruling element
of city and soul. The end of political life was virtue achieve by reason, and classical republicanism
was the political form in conformity with this end. To the extent Ancient political practice
celebrated the passions, it was confined to the public political virtue of patriotism, or love of
country. The modern revolution of moral psychology largely inverted the relationship of reason to
passion. Hume asserts reason is passive and impotent, whereas passion is the active generator of
human conduct. The passions not only provided the gale, but also much of the soul’s card or rudder
as well. Reason as passive slave was calculating instrumentally how best the passions might be
satisfied.
It was because Hume situated passion as the spring of all action that he rejected the efficacy
or existence of practical reason. Practical reason, Aristotle believed, could determine ends and
therefore motivate action. Meanwhile Hume’s assertion of reason as passive meant that virtue must
be primarily a product of the passions. Therefore, a central role of civil order is to promote
beneficent passions through laws, custom and habit. Certain Ancient vices, could be considered
Modern virtues precisely because the passions on which those “vices” rested were re-evaluated as
beneficial to society. These emotions were increasingly private and self-interested passions in
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contrast to love of country. Others were sentiments that bonded citizens and neighbors into
communities of shared feeling. The end of the just society was no longer a patriotic republic of
virtue, but a commercial society which produced comfortable self-preservation for the many,
primed by the acquisitive passions of human nature. Patriotism would be a by-product of loyalty
to and affection for a society whose liberties permitted men to indulged in collectively beneficial
passions and interests. Men love a nation which allows them the liberty to pursue their own
understanding of happiness, and protects them from others who pursue theirs with excessive zeal
or disregard for the rights of others.
There were numerous Enlightenment thinkers, like Hutcheson and Reid, who were not
inclined to follow this train of thought to its conclusion. They remained steadfast in their belief
that the passions were primarily a source of vice and depravity rather than virtue. Publius walks a
line between the Ancient and Modern orientations to the passions and their relationship with
reason. Steeped in Calvin’s image of fallen man, Publius rejects the natural and simply goodness
of mankind and his passions. He rejected the more salubrious image of Rousseau and Hume and
hedged toward their depravity. Yet, Publius views the passion as hard facts that must be wrestled
with and respected, not wished away. He identifies a series of emotions as moral or social
sentiments as having beneficial if limited powers. Nevertheless, he clearly identifies the source of
man’s frailty, depravity and wickedness in the passions. He does not denigrate them, but identifies
them as the source of civil strife which threaten both order and liberty if not properly restrained or
channeled. They are facts of human nature to confronted, not sinful failings to be moralistically
condemned.
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Publius clearly acknowledges the passionate nature of human psychology and motivation,
but denied “Hume’s view of human motivation as entirely passionate.”21 Reason was not merely a
passive and instrumental slave but could also determine the ends of action. The Federalist
repeatedly illustrates the belief in reason’s efficacy to regulate the passions and that it must be
relied upon if a just society is to be established and maintained. Yet, in No. 10 Madison makes
clear that the passions are to be given liberty and are not to be educated out of human nature, or
purged from society altogether as the Stoics would have them purified from the soul of the
individual. An expanded role would be given to certain passions which produced Ancient vices
that could be leveraged as Modern virtues. Acquisitive passions like avarice, industry and
enterprise, which motivate economic activity could be leveraged for the common interest through
wealth creation and the comfortable self-preservation which follows in train. If reason could not
oppose the passions directly, it must oppose it indirectly and rely on its foresight to devise
constitutional mechanisms to properly regulate them. Benign and salutary passions are to be given
relatively free play, while the most intractable and destructive passions must be neutralized
through counterposing them, one passion against another.
Even Hume, who celebrated various moral sentiments which he thought provided a basis
for the natural sociability of mankind, clearly acknowledged the limits of such sentiments in
establishing political order and the administration of justice. If private society could maintain itself
on benevolent sentiment alone, politics and the public sphere remained the hardboiled domain of
self-interest. In fact, the moral sentiments of society could only achieve social harmony if fortified
by a political superstructure encouraging them under conditions of ordered liberty. From the
perspective of political order, Hume was in agreement with the school of the selfish system of
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morals. There would be no peace in society if politics was not founded on a more certain bedrock
than moral sentiments. Moral sentiment was not enough to regulate destructive passions when
conjoined with the powers of government. Publius agreed. Madison speaks of the ability of moral
sentiments such as “humanity” and “sympathy” to produce harmony between the people and their
representatives, but such sentiments only function effectively when the sword of Damocles hangs
over the heads of public officeholders and private citizens alike.
A passion is a specific type of feeling, emotion, or impulse. It is a “kind of motion,”22 a
“moving, stirring,” or “agitation” of the soul.23 Passions consist of internal sensations connected
with a corresponding amount of pleasure or pain. Passions are feelings, emotional states which
“one suffers or undergoes”24 They are experienced passively by the soul without full voluntary
control.25 In the Ancient and Medieval worlds the passions were a “suffering or enduring.”26 In
Latin, “passion” is connected with a verb meaning “to endure, undergo” or “experience”.27 A
passion is “that which must be endured.”28 The passion of Christ consisted of the stations of
suffering he was compelled to endure. The Ancients tended to treat passions only as passively
experienced emotional states. Meanwhile, the Modern conception of a passion is a motion of the
soul which is also the cause of human action. While they are experienced without voluntary
control, this does not mean they inspire passivity. Descartes, for example, treated passions as
something more than passive feeling undergone, but instead as an impulse and source of
motivation which compels action. Hume concluded that the passions are “deep-seated and
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apparently universal motivations for human actions.”29 The Federalist treats the passions as the
most primordial and powerful instigators of action within the human soul.
In the Treatise Hume says, human nature is composed of “two principles parts, which are
requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding.”30 The central faculties of human
psychology are feeling and thinking. They are analogous, but not identical, to Aristotle’s
distinction between passion and reason. He says it is “certain that the blind motions of the former
without the direction of the latter incapacitate men for society.”31 Hume differentiates all the
perceptions of the human mind into two categories, “impressions” and “ideas”.32 Hume says,
“Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence” are called “impressions”.33
Impressions include “all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance
in the soul.”34 Meanwhile, “ideas” are “faint images” of impressions which find their way into our
“thinking and reasoning.”35 Hume makes no fundamental qualitative distinction between feeling
and reasoning, rather they exist on a continuum. Since ideas themselves are the product of a train
of impressions there is no absolute dividing line between emotion, on the one hand, and reason on
the other. Hume indicates that passions are often an extreme or particularly intense form of
emotion.36

He makes a subsequent distinction between “passions” on the one hand, and

29

David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. I49.
Ibid., p. 317.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid., p. 8.
33
Ibid., p. 7.
34
Ibid.
35
David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 7.
36
Ibid.
30

396

“sentiments” on the other.37 This distinction is vital to the analysis of the emotional springs in The
Federalist.38
Hume offers notoriously blurry distinctions between many of his key concepts in light of
the confessedly experimental and essayistic nature of his Treatise. Nonetheless numerous salient
points can be gleaned which contribute to our understanding of The Federalist’s account of the
passions. First, not all feelings are passions. Hume distinguishes between “sensations” on the one
hand, and “passions” on the other. For Hume, the passions were a subset of “impressions”, feelings
of pleasure and pain, which he divided into “original” or “direct” and “secondary” or “indirect”
impressions. “Original impressions” are caused “without any antecedent perception” in the soul,
“from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to
the external organs.”39 Original impressions include “all the bodily pains and pleasures,” while the
secondary impressions include “the passions, and other emotions resembling them.”40 An original
impression caused by external stimuli is a “sensation”.41 Meanwhile a “passion” is a “secondary”
or “reflective” impression. Passions are generated internally.
Passions and other emotions are secondary or derivative effects which arise from primary
ones.42 They are impressions caused indirectly by external stimuli. They are internal reflections
and responses to them. As “reflective impressions” they “proceed from some of these original
ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea.”43 A passion is an internal sensation
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often tinctured with ideas.44 Central passions identified by Hume include love, hate, pride,
humility, hope fear, desire, aversion, ambition and love of fame.45 Passions either originate from
original impressions or their ideas, or arise “from certain natural instincts.”46 Hume divides
passions into two categories, “responsive” and “productive.”47 Responsive passions are those
which are the product, or response, to external stimuli which produce pleasure and pain.48 Pride,
humility, love and hatred are internal responses to external events which Hume claims, by
themselves, do not produce action.49 Meanwhile productive passions are those which produce
actions which result in pleasure or pain.50 For example hunger, thirst, sexual appetite or the desire
to see friends benefited and enemies punished, are passions which all produce actions.51 Despite
this distinction, the boundary between responsive and productive passions is ambiguous. Moral
and political philosophy are obliged to account for any passion which might be the cause of men’s
action.
Spinoza among others had characterized the passions as passive responses to external
stimuli which produced affective internal states, but not action.52 With the emergence of Modern
epistemology in Descartes, Hobbes and later Hume, passions were no longer mere feelings one
underwent passively, but impulses with the ability to motivate action. Descartes understood the
passions as “the source of all motivation.”53 He was instrumental in redescribing “the passions as
motivating forces directed to those things “which may harm or benefit us, or generally be
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important.”54 In Hume’s analysis the passions were no longer “reactions to exogenous causes,” but
“became internal sources of motion and action.”55 Passions could also be generated spontaneously.
As secondary impressions they did not require external stimuli. They could also be generated by
the body and soul in concert with external stimuli, indifferent to our hopes and wishes. As drives,
appetites or desires, passions could motivate action blindly without regard to foreseen
consequences. These factors make them universal.
In Hume the passions become the arch spring of human conduct. Passions are distinguished
in Hume from other feelings precisely because “they have effects”56 No longer were they mere
feelings to be savored or detested. Instead, passions are “the feeling of an impulse,” that
“corresponds to the cause of the action.”57 They are the cause of “volition because volition is
simply the feeling of such an impulse.”58 In light of reason’s impotence, all actions for Hume are
motivated by the passions. This ability to motivate and cause action is what makes them faculties.
Faculties are powers, causes in the soul whose effects are human conduct. In Hume’s account
“there is nothing outside of the impulses of the passions, and so nothing capable of opposing
them.”59 This is why as forces, only passion is of sufficient magnitude to counteract passion. Since
not all passions can be educated away, the magnitude of the passions relative to other faculties will
become an integral consideration in Publius’ analysis of the arrangement of powers.
Hobbes’ materialism which influenced Hume, and Publius by way of Hume, saw emotional
states of the body as material facts with mechanically causal relationships.60 Hobbes language of
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“feeling” captured the tangibility of an emotion. A word originally referring to tactile experience
came to mean a slightly less tangible emotional movement of the soul.61 Buckle says Hume defines
passions as “feelings” precisely “because they are internal motions in a material being.”62 Pathē,
or passions, were now “emotions”.63 “Emotion” captures the way internal states compel men to
move and to act. With the active power to motivate conduct, the concept of the passions shifts
from a purely psychological phenomenon to a “mechanical physiological meaning, an impulse
which is a cause of volition and action.”64 Passions were now “mechanical forces” and the primary
cause of human behavior.65 This line of thought, so influential in the arguments of The Federalist,
shifts the focus of emotion from passive responses to a “motivating condition” which propels
human action.66
Redescribing the passions as active emotions allowed them to sit at the foundation of a
mechanistic account of human psychology and action. In Hobbes, a passion is a “special kind of
effect of the body’s interaction with an external body; but when that same condition is the cause
of motion and action, it is a desire.”67 Rejecting mind-body dualism, and identifying mental states
with physical ones, mechanistic psychology becomes the effect of a mechanical physiology. The
distinction between passion and desire, in Hobbes ironclad chain of psychological causes and
effects are “as stages in a continuous causal sequence.”68 Emotion produces action “because it is
bodily motion, and bodily motion brought into contact with other bodily parts imparts an impulse
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to those parts.”69 “The human being is a machine,” says Buckle, “set into motion by external
impulses which set up internal motions within it.”70 These motions include thoughts and feelings.
Buckle says, “In so far as they are thoughts, they belong to the imagination. In so far as they are
feelings, they are passions, and these are the beginnings of what we call voluntary acts.”71 Internal
passion and external action were now part of an orderly mechanical system of cause and effect
which could be observed and the subject of a science. Its regular tendencies could be understood
by general laws of human action. If founders and statemen where able to master those laws they
might be able to correctly establish, order and maintain civil society.
Passions which produce action sit then at the root of social and political order. If they are
the sole motor of human conduct their comprehension and regulation becomes a primary task of
the founder and statesman. Since Hume rejected the efficacy of practical reason, the passions were
“the cause of human action.”72 Despite Publius’ clear assertion of reason’s motivational efficacy,
he held no illusions over the extent to which passions are the primary if not sole instigators which
incline or retard men’s actions. Objects of desire or aversion inspire a given passion in human
beings which impulsively motivates them to pursue or avoid them accordingly. Unlike reason or
interest which require the fortification of habit and education, the passions need no training in
order to establish their imperium over human conduct. As inborn instincts and impulses of first
nature, they are not objects of our own choosing and compel conduct independent of, even despite,
conscious deliberation and rational reflection. This is why the passions are the dominate
motivational source. Unlike the dilatory and sedate nature of rational reflection or the calculation
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of interest, passions are “sudden, tempestuous” and “violent.”73 In No. 10 Madison acknowledges
the reciprocal influence of reason on passion and vice versa. While human passion is no doubt
modified by education and habit, the premise of The Federalist’s account acknowledges the limits
of historical shaping. The passions are innate impulses which always remain sufficiently feral and
untamed by external circumstances and history. Reid tells us a faculty such as passion is the
product of nature, not habit. In light of their relative force and constancy they require ongoing
habituation or outright constraint if they are to be counteracted.
Civil society is founded upon two masters, pleasure and pain. Aristotle say “pleasure and
pain accompany every passion.”74 If passion compels us to act, the pleasures and pains which
accompany it compel us to pursue or avoid conduct in response to them.”75 Hume says, “The chief
spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain; and when these sensations are
removed, both from our thought and feeling, we are, in great measure, incapable of passion or
action, of desire or volition.”76 The strongest pleasures and pains produce the strongest passions,
love and hatred. If love and hatred are the primary emotional responses to pleasure and pains then
they are the primary motivators in all human conduct. Love is associated with objects of desire
which produce feelings of intense pleasure and encourages us to continually pursue them. Hatred
is associated with objects which produce intense feelings of displeasure and therefore leads to
aversion and avoidance. Love drives human being toward certain objects, while hatred drives them
away from others. If passions are the strongest impressions of the soul then they are the most
powerful motivators of action in response to the incentive and deterrence of the pleasures and pains
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they produce. Passions appear to be the strongest incentives or deterrents to action precisely
because of the magnitude of the pleasures and pains associated with them.
The proper administration of pleasures and pains is the very definition of justice. Bentham
says, “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we
shall do… They govern us in all we do. …In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but
in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.”77 Government is the system of rewards and
punishments which induces the appropriate pleasures and pains in order to provide incentive to
promote conduct conducive of civil order and deterrents to actions contrary to it. Government must
act as a coercive power to encourage men, through the proper distribution of pleasures and pains,
rewards and punishments, to conform to its established social contract. The fear of potential pain
from punishment must be greater than the prospective pleasure which comes from the satisfaction
of desires prohibited by the social contract. Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries so
influenced legal theory in the United States, wrote: “The only true and natural foundations of
society are the wants and fears of individuals.”78 Wants are objects of perceived pleasure which
motivate individuals, while fears are inspired by objects of suspected pain which act as a deterrent.
In No. 72 Hamilton says “the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human
conduct.”79 Hamilton’s analysis of the executive’s desire to maintain office through good conduct
exemplifies this maxim. Furthermore, Hamilton well knew that a “reward” was as much the
acquisition of some positive good or pleasure, as the negative avoidance of pain or punishment.
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While his remedies differ, Publius’ general diagnosis of the passions does not entirely
depart from the Ancients. There was no natural goodness of mankind and reason was an
inextricable component of virtue and civic order. Publius’ realism and anti-utopianism recognizes
there exists in human nature passions destructive of common interest, yet which are also
pleasurable for the individual to satisfy. Man is not naturally good. Thus, the individual pursuit of
pleasure is always potentially at odds with the common interest. This is precisely why men are not
angels. The passions are blind and do not see the worth or correctness of their objects of desire,
nor the consequences of their satisfaction. They are often oblivious to actual, rather than merely
perceived, rewards or punishments which might obtain from their satisfaction. In succumbing to
their immediate passions, men tend to damage their interests. Publius does not believe that the
unassisted oversight of reason will override the passions in light of their magnitude. Reason in
most men is relatively weak and loses the battle. It often fails when it might actually assist in a less
detrimental and ongoing fulfilment of passion moderated and modified. Men fail to act with
sufficient foresight which might guarantee a greater satisfaction of their desires. Government must
mitigate the negative effects of passion and fortify reason where possible.
The Federalist seeks to name the central passions and sentiments with which civil society
must contend. An analysis of these emotions can be achieved by turning to the sources of moral
philosophy on which its authors drew. The rich variety of human emotion is a product of the fact
that passions and sentiments are “the result of complex associations between ideas, pleasure and
pain and the natural impulses.”80 Hume divided the passions into those which are “calm and
violent”, and those which are more pleasurable or painful.81 Hume cites love and hatred as what
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he calls “primary passions”. 82 Under these can be found all others. Hume also divides passions
between categories of “direct” and “indirect”. “Direct passions arise immediately from good and
evil” while “indirect passions” proceed from the same sources but are mingled with “other
qualities.”83 Hume acknowledges his inability to give a less ambiguous explanation of this
distinction.84 Indirect passions it seems are secondary and derivative of direct passions. Hume
identifies a variety of passions many of which appear in The Federalist including “direct” passions
such as “desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security”, and “indirect” passions such
as “pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, along with
passions that depend on those.”85
In The Federalist the term “passion” represents a broad genus of motivation within which
exists a variety of species. The various numbers of The Federalist acknowledge a kaleidoscopic
array of passions as rich as one might find in Shakespeare’s political plays. The constitutional
project forced Publius to sift through the dark and wide cavern of the psyche and attempt to discern
the regular and dominant passions on which reliable predictions of human conduct might be made.
Despite its emphasis on self-interest, The Federalist conceives of the passions and sentiments of
the human soul in expansive terms. Such a broad view of human motivation was no doubt the
product of their worldly political existence, an intellectual life steeped in history, the Bible and
political philosophy. No doubt they speak of commercial passions like “enterprise”, “industry”,
“venality” and “avarice” and “greed.” But they often speak of other passions, particularly of men
who pursue office, which are not pecuniary such as “self-love,” “ambition,” “the love of power”,
“the desire of pre-eminence and dominion,” “the jealousy of power”, “pride”, “vanity”, “fear”,
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“love of fame,” fear of infamy, obscurity or humiliation, “revenge”, “hatred”, “party animosities,”
“honor”, “nobility” and “philanthropy”, to name just a few.
Underlying The Federalist’s analysis of human motivation is the passion of self-love. Selflove is the ur-passion which underwrites all others. In his “Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity,”
Benjamin Franklin writes how “the natural principle of self-love is the only and the irresistible
motive” of all our actions.86 It is perhaps the arch passion from which all the others are generated
and cannot be entirely extricated and distinguished from other motivations. Self-love is a form of
egoism and the new science of man which oriented Publius conceded that human beings are
primarily, if not exclusively, egoistic. Egoism is the flywheel of their actions. This arch passion
directs individuals toward a concern for themselves and their own desires, pleasures, and pains
above all else. It is only natural for human beings to be primarily concerned with how any action
might benefit or harm them first before all others. Such self-regard stems from the fact that they
themselves are the primary recipients of their own pleasures and pains prior to anyone else. We
can only experience our own pleasures and pains directly, compared to our secondary experience
of other people’s feelings. In No. 76 Hamilton says, “There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions
of mankind as personal considerations, whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be
the objects of our choice or preference.”87 Self-love prioritizes our own interests to another’s and
sets up the perennial problem of political theory and practice between the interest of the individual
and the common interest. This conflict created by self-love demonstrates the need for justice and
the question of its precise nature.
The centrality of self-love is found in the earliest moral and political philosophy. Both
Pagan and Christian thought appreciate its domineering role in human conduct even if they
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disagree on its meaning and worth. Self-love is a central theme of Plato and Aristotle and figures
prominently in virtually all subsequent political and social thought. Self-love is a passion which
sits at the foundation between the tension of the individual good and that of the political
community. The Greeks capture self-love in the term idion, which refers to that which is “one’s
own.” or that which pertains to oneself.88 It connotes what is “individual”, “particular” or “public”
in contradistinction to that which is a “common”, “general” or “public”.89 What is idion is the
realm of self-interest in contradistinction to the public interest. Aristotle makes clear that because
the city is the “most authoritative community”90 which provides all that is necessary for the
possibility of the good life, it is then prior to both the private household and individual the whole
is superior to its parts.91 The Ancient city deemed a sense of civic duty, public spiritedness and
patriotism the highest virtue and accorded it the highest honors.92 To be exclusively concerned
with one’s own economic or private self-interest was literally to be an “idiot”.93 This was the name
given to those who “retreated from the life of the city” into the private sphere alone to the exclusion
of active participation in one’s own political life as a citizen.94 Patriotism was an outgrowth of selflove made possible by the fusion of the individual and the city in the form of citizenship. Patriotism
therefore was “an energetic sentiment” which was “the supreme virtue to which all other virtues
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tended.”95 Patriotism habituated citizens to identify with their political community, transforming
love of self into love of country.
Self-love stipulates men love themselves most before all others and all else. Hume says “it
is evident, that every man loves himself better than any other person.”96 Self-love is a passion
which compels men to attend to their own needs and desires first. Not only do we love ourselves,
but we love our passions and interests, because they are ours. This is because we are the
beneficiaries of our own pleasures. The rewards of satisfying our desires directly benefits us. Each
man, as Cain understood, is naturally inclined toward being his own keeper only. Satan, as depicted
in The Book of Job, sums up the primordial pull of self-love when he says: “Skin for skin, yea, all
that a man hath will he give for his life.”97 Man will forsake all else including God, if it means he
can save his own skin.
Self-love also suggests we love that which is most like us. We love things like ourselves
because we love ourselves preeminently. Aristotle cites the origin of procreation in the “natural
striving to leave behind another which is like oneself.”98 What is similar, is in a sense an extension
of oneself. In the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib and Aristophanes myth of love in Plato’s
Symposium are two stories whose allegorical meaning illustrates our natural affinity for things like
ourselves. Self-love inspires individuals to be concerned for others to the extent others are
perceived as an extension and reflection of themselves. This is why mothers love their children
and families naturally tend to form tight bonds. Aristotle asserts that family and friends “are
another self.”99 People do things for the sake of family and friends because their good is merely an
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extension of the good of the self. Sacrifice for family is in reality doing benefit to an external part
of oneself. It is no sacrifice at all. If self-love stipulates that each human being loves more what is
more like them, it also suggests they love less things less and less like themselves. The Book of
Genesis illustrates the power of self-love when it is not extended to others through identification.
Cain murders his brother out of jealousy and denies that he is his brother’s keeper. Cain does not
have to concern himself with his brother because he denies the significance of the familiar relation
which might entail such an obligation.
At the foundation of love of self is the “powerful sentiment of self-preservation.”100 In No.
43 Madison speaks of “the great principle of self-preservation” which is a matter of “absolute
necessity” and the foundation of “the law of nature and of nature’s God, which declares that the
safety and happiness of society, are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which
all such institutions must be sacrificed.”101 One cannot make law contrary to the most powerful
law of the human soul. This impulse provides the first and fundamental object of government. It
gives rise to laws which protect life and property. Self-preservation is the most powerful passion
precisely because it is the most deeply rooted in necessity. In No. 41 Madison writes it is “in vain
to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.”102
Property is necessary to self-preservation. Men love themselves most and all property
which most immediately figures in their self-preservation and the satisfaction of their desires. We
love most that which is ours because our possession benefits us. This means there is no absolute
distinction between self-love and the love of what we possess. William James says that “a man’s
Self is the sum total of all that he can call his.”103 The distinction “between what a man calls me
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and what he simply calls mine,” James writes, is a line, “difficult to draw.”104 Hamilton, speaking
of an occupant’s desire to keep his office through reelection, emphasizes that “it is a principle of
human nature that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses.”105
Self-preservation is achieved through constant striving and acquisition by which
individuals hope to insulate themselves from external threats to or deficiencies of equipment
necessary to their general well-being. Self-love is therefore connected to the acquisitive passion
which Machiavelli saw as the driving passion of ambitious men. Hume says that since “every man
loves himself better than any other person, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquisitions as
much as possible; and another can restrain him in this propensity…by which he learns the
pernicious effects of that license.”106 Publius refers to the drive to acquire under the related names
of “acquisition,” “avarice,” “industry” and “the spirit of enterprise.”107 The acquisitive passion can
be either beneficial or harmful to civil society depending on whether it is expressed through labor
and industry on the one hand, or theft and deceit on the other. These passions represent a nearly
unquenchable spirit which drives men to acquire more than they have and more than the necessities
of self-preservation dictate. The extended composite and commercial republic advanced by
Publius gives explicit sanction to self-interested passions which originate in the instinct of selfpreservation and motivate economic accumulation.
Physical proximity and distance directly impact the degree to which self-love is extended
to others through identification. If self-love stipulates that each human being loves more what is
more like them, it also suggests they love less things less and less like themselves. What we
perceive as more or less like ourselves is partially determined by relative proximity. Proximity and
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distance affect the degree of our ability to identify with others. Human nature dictates that greater
proximity leads to greater identification. Men are increasingly indifferent to things and people
sufficiently remote to their own immediate sphere of existence.108 Distance discourages men from
seeing others as part of their own personal sphere and shared destiny. The sphere of self-love
extends only so far as we can perceive how our fate is connected to the fate of others. The greater
the distance between people, the less and less they are likely or able identify as extensions of one
another’s own sphere of self. There is a “diminution of the social passions or affections with
physical distance or infrequent interaction.”109 Meanwhile, the greater the physical proximity the
more invested they are likely to be in each other’s fate. The closer people are the more they will
be beneficiaries of the self-love of others.
In No. 17 Hamilton observes that there is a “strong propensity of the human heart” which
is “a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the
distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his
family than to his neighbourhood, to his neighbourhood than to the community at large, the people
of each state would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments, than towards the
government of the union, unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better
administration of the latter.”110 Hamilton later echoed this observation at the New York ratifying
convention saying, “There are certain social principles in human nature, from which we may draw
the most solid conclusions with respect to the conduct of individuals, and of communities. We love
our families, more than our neighbours. We love our neighbours, more than our countrymen in
general. The human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity, as they depart from the
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center; and become languid, in proportion to the expansion of the circle, on which they act. On
these principles, the attachment of the individual will be first and forever secured by the states
governments.”111
Consistent with The Federalist’s account of human nature, Hamilton’s remarks shift from
a principal observation of the soul to conclusions of political science and statesmanship. They
demonstrate the relationship between proximity, identification and political authority. This
relationship raises the specter of the problem of the closeness or distance of government to the
people. If government is truly to be “theirs” it must be sufficiently close to the people. Proximity
encourages government to be responsible and accountable to the people. Increasing distance
permits government to ignore and eventually tyrannize over the people without qualm. Republican
self-government demands that those in the centers of power must have geographical proximity to
those they represent. Geographical proximity manifests as psychological proximity to and
identification the people and their representatives. We can see how the relationship between selflove and proximity plays into the central constitutional question of the effects of more centralized
or more diffused and localized political power. Republican government necessitates government
sufficiently close to the people if officeholders are to be compelled to genuinely represent the
interests of their constituents. The principle and effects of proximity on self-love helps provide the
philosophical underpinnings of the principle of federalism. The effect of proximity on collective
identification explains the logic behind a composite federal, state and local government.
Self-love has great affinities with self-interest, but Publius does not treat them as identical.
Self-love underwrites man’s universal pursuit of self-interest. It is because self-love is the urpassion of human nature that The Federalist identifies self-interest as the vera causa of human
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motivation and action. Throughout the numbers of The Federalist Publius makes a clear, but not
obvious, distinction between passions and interests. Like all other passions self-love is unreflective
and blind to the consequences of its fulfillment. While it may often turn out to be reasonable to
listen to the call of self-love, reason is not operative in any passion. An interest in contradistinction
to a passion is achieved through some modicum of reflection on and modification of natural
impulse. Self-interest is a more or less prudent satisfaction of self-love where reason and other
sentiments dictate which manifestations are appropriate to satisfy and which are not. Selfpreservation is the first principle of self-love. By placing comfortable self-preservation at the
foundation of moral action, Locke shortened the distance between self-love and self-interest. As
the most powerful and natural passion it is the most reliable and predictable motive of men.
As Plato does in the Republic, and Hume in the Treatise, Publius identifies self-love as the
ur-passion at the root of the political problem. Starting with the desire for self-preservation and
self-perpetuation all the other passions Publius mentions such as avarice, ambition, the desire for
honors or the love of power all redound back to the benefit of oneself. They are all species of selflove. Self-love is the perennial source of the tension between the good of the individual and the
common good. Self-love has the positive effect of making men increasingly self-sufficient and
responsible for themselves and loved ones such as family and friends. Nonetheless self-love can
devolve into selfishness, egoism, vanity, avarice, jealousy and hatred. The acquisitive impulse is
merely an extension of our self-love. Hume says that the avidity “of acquiring goods and
possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly
destructive of society.”112 “Self-love”, says Hume, “when it acts at its liberty,… is the source of
all injustice and violence.”113 Hume says “each person loves himself better than any other single
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person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintance, this
must necessarily produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions; which
cannot but be dangerous” to civil society.114
Self-love breeds injustice because it is always confused and conflated with our opinions of
our self-interest. In No. 10 Madison says, “As long as the connection subsists between his reason
and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and
the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.”115 This reciprocal influence
means men will always consider their own interest first, and when considering themselves, their
immediate over remote interest. Self-love conspires with reason to distort our understanding of our
genuine interests. Our interest comes in a form as it “appears” to us, rather than in its “real and
intrinsic value.”116 This is why no man can be a judge in his own case and government becomes
necessary to the administration of justice. This is why self-love needs to be transmuted by good
government into self-interest properly understood.
The justice of government must be administered to navigate the gap between self-love and
the needs of the political community. “Men,” says Hume, are always “inclined to prefer present
interest to distant and remote.”117 They are unable “to resist the temptation of any advantage, that
they may immediately enjoy, in the apprehension of an evil, that lies at a distance from them.” 118
Since our affections and understanding diminish as things become increasingly remote to us in
space or time, committing injustice against those who are anonymous becomes permissible. At
such a distance we cannot see the harm or how it might harm our own interest. Distance

114

Ibid., p. 312.
No. 10
116
David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 343.
117
Ibid., p. 345.
118
Ibid.
115

414

anaesthetizes us to things and people sufficiently remote to ourselves. Distance neutralizes nature
identification, muting the call of pity and the pangs of conscience, guilt or shame. At such a
distance we lack the ability to sympathize; we can no longer see others as an extension of our own
sphere of self-love. Hume says, “There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal
errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and
remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value.”119
Hume says that nothing can restrain human nature from the negative effects of self-love “but
reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that license, and the total
dissolution of society, which must ensure form it.”120 He concludes that man’s “original
inclination…or instinct, is here checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or
observation.”121
Of the various passions some are social and others asocial. Because passions generate
actions either beneficial or harmful to us and others, all inevitably involve us with our fellow
human beings. Even asocial passions are in a fundamental sense, social. They impact our conduct
toward and relationships with others. The primary concern of moral and political philosophy with
regard to the passions is to assess their social and political consequences and fashion civil order,
what Hume called our “circumstances and situations,” in such a way as to accommodate, channel,
restraint or perfect them.
Central to the moral and political problem is that certain passions are more or less
conducive to collective existence. Some incline human beings toward harmony and peace, others
toward faction and conflict. Some are more powerful, others weaker. Publius’ political science
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must first determine the extent to which each passion produces either harmony or conflict in civil
society. Tracing this divide, Publius establishes a distinction between “amicable and antagonistic
passions.”122 He itemizes those passions “which promote harmony” and those “which promote
hostility among men.”123 For example, in No. 5 Jay contrasts the passions of “confidence and
affection” on one hand, to “envy and jealousy”.124 In the context of his argument in No. 5, the
former motives “support international peace, and the latter motives which lead to war.”125 The
function of the Constitution is, within the bounds of liberty and the substantive rights it entails, to
encourage social passions and discourage asocial ones.
Belief in the existence of social or political passions which are natural constituents of the
human soul goes back at least to the Greeks. Even self-love properly understood carries men
outside of themselves when they realize their own identity and interests are permanently tethered
to their families, friends, and those of their fellow citizens. In the Republic, Plato identifies thumos,
or “spiritedness,” as a moral or social sentiment which draws men out into the public square into
a concern for others’ opinions of themselves. Thumos is the “principle or seat of anger or rage” in
the soul.126 It is the source of “natural courage”.127 It is this passion of self-assertiveness which
motives men to demands honor and recognition from the world. It demands their will be realized
and others respect its force and worth. Anger is universally caused in men by the failure of the
world or others to recognize their will. Spiritedness drives men to acts of self-assertion in order to
achieve the satisfaction of their will in the face of obstacles that would thwart it. It is the source of
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man’s quest for honor and glory and therefore intimately connected with ambition. Spiritedness
then, drives men to seek recognition from their fellow human beings. Often recognition is achieved
by conforming to the expectations of others, society’s laws or the established norms of right and
wrong. Such concern for the public opinion can shape men’s actions in conformity with the moral
principles of the community. Thus, thumos can be a moral or social sentiment. Plato says
spiritedness, acting in coordination with reason, is the source of moral virtue. Yet, the ambition
inspired by thumos can equally compel a man to confirm to society, as to drive him to compel his
fellow citizens to meet his own expectations of them. Spiritedness can therefore be the source of
harmonious social sentiments or those which produce conflict.
If human nature harbored a reserve of natural moral sentiments political science needed to
identify and leverage them in the service of political order. As Enlightenment thinkers of various
stripes gradually viewed human nature more naturalistically as an animal being or biological
machine, they increasingly viewed human action as mechanically driven by impulse and instinct
over the more elevated forces of reason, will or conscious choice. The passions were “natural
products of the normal workings of the human being.”128 They were increasingly viewed as good
precisely by virtue of their natural status. Hume says that “a remedy” for the ills of human nature,
“can never be effectual” without abiding by its propensities.129 Following Bacon it was necessary
to first obey nature in order to control it. It was a fool’s errand to oppose nature and its regular
laws.
This changing attitude toward the status and role of the passions in human motivation led
to attempts to envision how social order and even political justice might emerge solely on the basis
of the cultivation of natural moral sentiments alone rather than rational calculations which tallied
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foreseen rewards and punishments. If men were never that reasonable to begin with, the historical
existence of social and political harmony cannot be primarily attributed to the workings of reason
alone. Some type of social or moral sentiment must then be the glue which holds civil society
together. Smith criticized Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees saying: “It is the great fallacy of Dr.
Mandeville’s book to represent every passion as wholly vicious which is so in any degree and in
any direction.”130
By this view reason was an instrument whose logic only retroactively validated what had
been motivated and achieved in practice by sentiment. The golden rule was motivated by moral
sentiment and justified as correct in principle by reason after the fact. Hume says men are
compelled to moral duties by two sources. First, through the natural instinct of self-love and
second, by a sense of obligation realized only through restraints on self-love achieved by
“reflection and experience.”131 For Hume the existence of moral sentiments meant that “men are
impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all
ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility.”132 Hume identified “love
of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate” as central examples of natural moral
sentiment.133 These Hume called the “humane instincts.”134
While many Moderns denied that man was by nature a political animal or that political
community was natural, they certainly never denied his sociability. John Donne famously
ruminated, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of
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the main.”135 As a social animal the existence and identity of the human individual is always
tethered as a part to others through some form of community which represents the whole. Human
beings are tethered to each other through common natural needs, desires and opinions. A reviewer
of Adam Smith’s 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments wrote “the principle of Sympathy, on which
he founds his system, is an unquestionable principle in human nature.”136 “However selfish soever
man may be supposed,” wrote Smith in this book, “there are evidently some principles in his
nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”137 Smith asserted even the
“greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of the society, is not altogether without”
moral sentiments.138
Rousseau is often credited as the first Modern who sought to overturn assertions by the
previous social contract theorists that civil society was primarily knitted together by rational
calculations of self-interest and fear of violent death. Civil society was not the product of reason
and interest, Rousseau thought, but of man’s primordial sentiments. Conflict arose not because of
the imperfections of human nature - mankind was naturally good - but rather a concatenation of
fortuitous circumstances conspiring to create an unjust system which, over time, corrupted man’s
natural goodness.139 In the Second Discourse Rousseau went so far as to accuse reason itself as one
of the central co-conspirators in man’s historical self-subjugation. Through its moral sense,
mankind was given by nature an “innate knowledge” in the form of an unconscious instinct “of
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right and wrong.”140 In attempting to refute both Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau asserted that the
passions alone could provide “the basis for social solidarity”141 For Rousseau, feeling was “the
cause of social relations” and the basis of social harmony.142 Rousseau contrasts justice based on
sentiment to what he calls “rational justice.” Men like Socrates, he writes, might “acquire virtue
through reason,” but “the human race would long since have ceased to be, if its preservation had
depended solely on the reasonings of the individuals who make it up.”143 Likewise Hume
concluded, “Morality rests on the passions and the sentiments rather than on rationality.”144 Hume
asserted that human understanding could only grasp concrete empirical facts and was therefore
unable to discern general rules of moral obligation through rational inference. He concluded “no
moral obligation can be derived from observations about matters of fact; justice is an artificial
virtue, its principles are conventional.”145
The school of moral sense asserted that shared natural sentiments make community
possible.146 A central presumption of the school was that man’s innate sentiments and passions
were sufficiently benign or even salutary to civil order. In contrast to Publius, Rousseau said man’s
sentiments are more “wild than wicked.”147 The implication was, if “wild” they merely require
proper training, if “wicked” restraint. Only if the passions are predominately social can one found
morality and civic order largely or exclusively on them. Hume argued “the passions are not threats
to morality, but virtuous or vicious according to their pleasurable or painful nature.”148 Rousseau’s

140

Roger Smith. The Norton History of the Human Sciences. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997. p. 282.
Ibid.
142
Ibid.
143
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Discourses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. p. 158.
144
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty “From Passions to Sentiments: The Structure of Hume's Treatise.” History of
Philosophy Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1993). p. 170.
145
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty “From Passions to Sentiments: The Structure of Hume's Treatise.” History of
Philosophy Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 2 (April, 1993). p. 170.
146
Roger Smith. The Norton History of the Human Sciences. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997. p. 282.
147
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Discourses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. p.154.
148
Stephen Buckle. “Hume on the Passions.” Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 340 (April 2012). p. 189.
141

420

assertion of natural goodness suggested that when mankind was finally unburdened of the
historical yolk of oppressive regimes and their laws it would spontaneously flourish in accord with
its own inborn moral sentiments. Student of Rousseau, the German Romantic Herder, said “all
passions of man’s breast are wild drives of a force which does not know itself yet, but which, in
accordance with its nature, can only conspire toward a better order of things.”149 In the unconscious
workings of passion which do good without conscious intent were the seeds of Hegel’s cunning of
reason.
Hume was similarly intent to demonstrate man’s basic sociability. Man was not, for Hume,
solely egoistic or self-interested, only compacting and harmonizing with others out of rational
calculations of gain. In Hobbes and Mandeville, we see a near complete absence of such social
sentiments in their portraits of human nature and conduct. Against Hobbes, Mandeville, Locke and
their “selfish system of morals” Hume proposed certain moral sentiments that lead men into
community and comradeship with one another. 150 He writes, “Were our selfish and vicious
principles so much predominant above our social and virtuous, as is asserted by some philosophers,
we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible notion of human nature.”151 Hume says that
while “self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice… sympathy with public
interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.”152 Hume acknowledges
that the “principle of sympathy is too weak to control our passions; but has sufficient force to
influence our taste, and give us sentiments of approbation and blame.”153
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One of this school’s primary innovations is the claim that virtue is the offspring of
sentiment. In “subordinating reason to passion,” Hume “denies the possibility of rational
government of the passions.”154 Reason’s subordination to passion’s mastery is not merely an
empirical observation, but a moral principle. The denial of reason’s mastery led to a normative
claim which rejects the desirability of rational government altogether. The passions “are not, and
ought not to be, governed by reason.”155 Hume does not deny that certain passions may well be
dangerous, “but reason is not the cure: it is not a higher faculty capable of ordering any other
faculty, and so cannot do the job.”156 Hume denied the central role of reason and rational
calculation, attributed to it by Hobbes and Locke in establishing justice. The first inklings of justice
emerge not from “any relation of ideas”, but from “our impressions and sentiments, without which
everything in nature is perfectly indifferent to us.”157 The “sense of justice, therefore, is not founded
on our ideas, but on our impressions.”158
Hume’s account of the moral sense rests on an important distinction between passions and
sentiments. These two forms of emotion are distinguished by their origin and intensity. Hume
defines moral sense as a sentiment. Sentiment is a mediating term, a synthesis of reason and
passion.159 It is passion modified by experience and understanding. As a faculty of the soul it
“combines some of the functions of the passions with those of reason and the understanding.”160
Moral sentiments involve an important passive element of judgment akin to reason, but are also
able to motivate action like the passions.161 They “are calm affective states, susceptible to
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cultivation, subject to standards and capable of reining in the excesses of violent, passions.”162
Hume distinguishes between “higher and more refined taste,” associated with sentiments, and the
violent passions that disturb susceptible souls.”163 If self-preservation and self-love are fixed
passions of first nature, moral sentiments are historically cultivated sensibilities. Sentiments are
emotions refined by the “influence of custom” and habit and are therefore tinctured with ideas and
experience.164 History and national character increasingly shape moral sense. If sentiment is not
consciously reflective or deliberative in the manner of reason, it can spontaneously respond to
habituation.
Was it the case as Aristotle and the Ancients had argued, that virtue is only produced when
action is guided by right reason? Or, did virtue find its true spring in certain social sentiments?
Hume breaks with Aristotle’s strict association of reason and virtue. He did not “reject the ideal of
the virtuous life,” but sought “a new account of how such a life is possible.”165 At the root of this
debate was the question over the true origin of moral virtue. Like Rousseau, the Scottish
Enlightenment identified the moral sense, as the innate if mild sense of right and wrong rooted in
human emotion. Hume stated that morality “is more properly felt than judged of by reason.”166
They believed this sense could provide a natural moral compass for human action. Moral sense
was capable of guiding actions toward moral ends and was the primary source of moral virtue.
Moral sentiments were social emotions which motivate altruistic behavior. They produce “natural
benevolence” which incline human beings to act on behalf of others rather than on self-interest
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alone.167 Moral virtue then is the product of “natural impulses which direct people toward proper
action.”168
Emotions which produce virtue might properly be called “virtuous sentiment.” Virtuous
sentiment is a non-rational impulse and the “natural” source of virtue.169 They act much as reason
does in the rationalist account by serving as the primary rudder of action. Scanlan says The
Federalist identifies virtues as “natural impulses that direct people toward proper action but are
not themselves strong enough to cause action, while ambition provides the motor of action but
cannot direct action to proper ends. Thus virtue and ambition must be conjoined.”170 Mansfield
points out that Publius departs from Aristotle by “connecting ambition to interest rather than
calling it virtue.”171 This reappraisal of ambition is consistent with the reappraisal of human nature
the ends of governments by Modern political science. Taking men as they are, ambition is as much
a threat, as an asset to governance. This is not the moral virtue of Aristotle or exponents of the
Classical tradition. They rooted virtue in the use of reason by an animal whose nature was fulfilled
precisely by this use. Since virtuous sentiments are part of man’s first nature they produce natural
virtue which is not learned, but requires the amplification of training and habit. Some moral
philosophers considered virtuous sentiments as the source of both morality and justice. Civic order
could be increasingly built on the foundation of the right kinds of passions properly cultivated in
society. As we shall see however, despite his appreciation of the power and role of the moral
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sentiments, Publius as did Hume, denies that virtuous sentiments alone are capable of producing
civic order. The foundation of justice is not to be found in the more sense alone.
Enlightenment thinkers sought to identify the central sentiments which might provide the
natural glue of society. The Federalist Papers refer to a variety of related moral sentiments which
assist in binding society without providing any systematic definitions of these terms. These terms
had a well-established provenance. The works of Rousseau, Hume and Smith provide ample
insight into their general meanings. Rousseau had identified the moral sentiment of “pity” as the
central psychological mechanism of civic harmony. Rousseau writes, “It is then certain that pity
is a natural feeling, which, by moderating the violence of self-love in each individual, contributes
to the preservation of the whole species.”172 Pity was the true and natural source of morals and
virtues. Likewise, Adam Smith identified pity and compassion as “original passions of human
nature,” and principles which allow us to “feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.”173 The emotion of pity allows us to feel the pain
and suffering of beings like ourselves. Pity inclines men to come to the aid of others “without
reflection,” or the external sentinels of government and its laws.174 Hume speaks of “sympathy” as
the central psychological process connected to the moral sense. Sympathy is a “capacity to share
the feelings of others.”175 It was “a proof, that our approbation has, in those cases, an origin
different from the prospect of utility and advantage, either to ourselves or others.”176 Sympathy
was “the binding force of civil society.”177 Adam Smith, following the lead of Hume and
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Hutcheson attributed to sympathy the same power to knit civil society together. For Smith,
however “sympathy” was “our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.”178 The existence and
role of sympathy implied society was gemeinschaft, not merely gesellschaft; it was more than an
aggregation of knaves and scoundrels bound together by mere self-interest.179
Since emotions cannot be directly transferred from the bosom of one citizen to that of
another, Hume says sympathy involves the indirect communication and translation of emotions
between human beings. Sympathy, for Hume, “is not itself a passion” like Rousseau’s pity.180
Instead it is causal mechanism, a psychological process by which emotions are communicated
between human beings through which we come “to feel the passions we suppose others feel.”181
This process involves identification where the passions and sentiments of one person are
perceived, internalized and felt in another. The process involves elements of both feeling and
understanding. “When any affection is infused by sympathy,” writes Hume, “it is at first known
only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey
an idea of it.”182 These emotions first appear “in our mind as mere ideas.”183 These ideas are
subsequently converted into an emotional impression in the observer.184
More so than Smith, Hume claims sympathy inspires a “very remarkable resemblance” of
feelings shared by individuals.185 Hume seems to have believed that under the right circumstances,
the feelings of one person could be communicated to another with a high degree of fidelity. He
claims that our ideas of others’ emotional states “are converted into the very impressions they
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represent.”186 The communicated emotion “acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to
become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection.”187 The
reason sympathy is able to produce such a resemblance is due to the denominator of our common
human nature. And the more resemblance between individuals, the greater the sympathetic bond
felt between them. If we are members of a shared community of habit and custom the identity of
our emotions will be even stronger. Beside the general resemblance of our natures,” Hume writes,
“if there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates
the sympathy. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does
the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with
which we always form the idea of our own person.”188 Likewise, the “sentiments of others have
little influence, when far removed from us, and require the relation of contiguity, to make them
communicate themselves entirely.”189 Just as the power of self-love diminishes as distances
increase, so too does the efficacy of sympathy.
Adam Smith confronted Hume’s account of sympathy in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Like Hume, Smith acknowledged both a reasoning and feeling component to sympathy. For Smith
sympathy produces moral sentiments provoked by an imaginative process of identification
achieved through reflection. Our “fellow-feeling” for the suffering of others is achieved “by
changing places in fancy with the sufferer.”190 This allows us “to conceive or to be affected by
what he feels.”191 Emotional identification through imagination is necessary because we do “not
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immediately experience of what other men feel.”192 We are unable to have any direct idea of how
others are “affected, but by conceiving what we are ourselves should feel in the like situation.”193
For Smith, as opposed to Hume, emotion is not communicated and translated, but rather
imaginatively reconstructed through a process of observation and reflection. Smith stresses our
impressions are limited to our own senses, and of others’ only indirectly through our own.194
“Though our brother is upon the rack,” Smith writes, “as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our
senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our
own person.”195 Therefore, “it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what
are his sensations.”196 Through the imagination “we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some
measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel
something which, though weaker in degree is not altogether unlike them.”197
Imagination is a central component of Smith’s theory of sympathy. It allows us to conceive
what others feel by representing our own response “if we were in his case.”198 Sympathy depends
on our own experiences and ability to imagine “the sentiments of the sufferer.”199 This involves an
imaginative recreation of another’s circumstances and the ability identifying the analogous
emotions we assume those condition might inspire. Registering another’s feelings through
sympathy does not guarantee the accuracy or similitude of our own. Smith denied sympathy was
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a process of direct or indirect emotional transference. The emotions felt through sympathy are our
own. Instead sympathy allows “us to imagine what it would be like to be in their place.”200
Moral sentiments are “moral” precisely because of their ability to establish a common
standard of judgment and instill the proper motives for correct action.201 It is through sympathy
that sentiments which motivate our notions of right and wrong are felt collectively and socialized.
All accounts of sympathy allow the human race to have a greater or lesser ability for emotional
identification. It allows human beings to share in the nature and magnitude of each other’s pains
and pleasures and grasp each other’s motives for action. “No quality of human nature is more
remarkable,” writes Hume, “both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to
sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments,
however different from, or even contrary to our own.”202 Hume writes that sympathy has the
capacity “to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together.”203
Virtually all feelings we might experience have some social dimension to them shaped by
our reciprocal sympathetic responses to each other. All feelings are tinctured with fellow-feeling.
Through sympathy our emotions become freighted with the rules and moral judgements of the
community. By rendering the sentiments of others “present to us” sympathy makes us naturally
interested in the judgments of others, particularly those opinions pertaining to ourselves.204 It
encourages us to unite through compelling us to conform to the opinions and standards of the
community. Even “men of the greatest judgment and understanding,” find it “very difficult to
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follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily
companions.”205
Sympathy, says Hume, is the primordial cause of “the great uniformity… in the humours
and turn of thinking of those of the same nation” more than “any influence of the soil and
climate.”206 Extended proximity to one’s fellow citizens, breeds unity. Feelings like good humor,
pride, anger, sorrow, hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy are
produced more by communication between one another than from one’s “own natural temper and
disposition.”207 Hume acknowledges that there are more primary emotions than those obtained
through sympathy such as the drives to power or wealth. Yet he says, “Our reputation, our
character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes
of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and
sentiments of others.”208 Sympathy is intimately bound up with our desire for honor and
recognition and therefore central dimension of the passion of ambition.
Here, the role of sympathy extends beyond its harmonizing social effects as a moral
sentiment. Any desire a human being might have, is also mingled, through sympathy, with the
perceptions and opinions of others. All desire is a double desire. Every desire is freighted with
two dimensions which often cannot be distinguished. There is a primary desire for some perceived
good and our derivative appreciation of that good in light of how we believe others perceive it.
Each desire is a combination of this primary end with the public perception of that good. An
ambitious politician seeks power, office or wealth, but is also keenly aware of how she is perceived
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by the public in the pursuit of such ambitions. Such awareness is felt through sympathy and
modifies the initial object of desire.
Identification allows us to see ourselves through the eyes of our fellow citizens and has a
profound influence on our self-worth which impacts our senses of pride and humility. By
internalizing the judgements of others sympathy becomes the vehicle of reward and punishments,
pleasures and pains which guide and shape our conduct in response to or in anticipation of them.
By influencing the two masters of human action, sympathy is the vehicle through which the
feelings of others hold a powerful imperium over our conduct. Moral sentiment allows us to rise
above concern for narrow and immediate self-interest and heed the call of the common interest.
Hume says “sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends
that virtue.”209 Thus we have a natural emotional inclination to abide by the common interest
because of the pleasure we receive by conforming to the aggregate opinions of our community.
Moral sentiment plays a noticeable but subordinate role in The Federalist’s account of
human nature, American society and the constitutional arrangement of power. In No. 10 Madison
speaks of the “virtuous sentiments”210 and in No. 62 Hamilton uses a synonym referring to them
as “benevolent emotions”.211 The central moral sentiments described by Madison and Hamilton,
which track Hume’s Treatise, are “sympathy” and “humanity.” 212 Scanlan identifies the moral
sentiments with which Publius is concerned as built on “family affection, patriotism, and
philanthropy,” that is to say love of family, nation and humanity respectively.213 All these
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sentiments are a product of self-love coupled with degrees of identification with others perceived
as part of our sphere.
Humanity is a generic sentiment connoting decency and general concern for one’s fellow
man in light of their common human nature. It is a “kindness, graciousness, politeness” and
“consideration for others.” 214 “Humanity,” says Hume, is a natural sentiment motivating men to
“relieve persons in distress” and promote “the happiness of fellow-creatures.”215 Diderot and
D’Alembert’s French Encyclopedia defines humanité as “a feeling of good will toward all men”
which inspires mankind “to do away with slavery, superstition, vice and misfortune.”216 They write
this sentiment is capable of wresting “from the hands of the criminal the deadly weapon with which
he intended to strike the good man.”217 They say, “It does not impel us to break the bonds that tie
us to other individuals, but on the contrary turns us into better friends, better citizens, and better
spouses; it delights in doing good deeds and thus pours out its benefits over those whom nature
has placed next to us.”218 Publius hardly maintains such an effusive vision of the power and effects
of natural human decency, yet keenly understands how civil bounds underwritten by force and law
can be strengthened by such sentiments.
Madison also speaks of asocial impulses he calls “unfriendly passions”219 while Hamilton
speaks of the “angry and malignant passions.”220 In No. 1 Hamilton immediately sets in on those
asocial passions with which government must contend and represent genuine threats to civil order
such as “ambition, avarice, personal animosity,” and “party opposition”221 In No. 6 Hamilton
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speaks of "the impulses of rage, resentment, avarice” and “other irregular and violent
propensities.”222 These asocial passions are the “latent causes of faction” Madison speaks of, which
are “sown in the nature of man.”223 It does not go unnoticed that Publius’ ongoing itemization of
the passions relevant to political order focuses primarily on the asocial and antagonistic variety.
Publius forcefully recognizes that the existence of asocial passions in the soul of man is an
acknowledgement that men harbor natural desires whose satisfaction results in harm to others and
to the public interest. What we see in the tension between social and asocial passions is merely a
reiteration of the balance between the potential for vice and virtue Publius repeatedly identifies in
human nature. On the one hand asocial traits necessitate government, and on the other benevolent
ones makes republican self-government possible. Like Hobbes, Publius dwells on asocial passions
which incline human nature to self-interest at others’ expense precisely because these are the
passions constitutional order must confront if free self-government is to be truly possible. Neither
reason nor moral sentiment appear to hold sufficient sway to restrain them. The observation that
human nature harbors an equilibrium between social and asocial sentiments illustrates why
sentiment alone is not sufficient to achieve ordered liberty.
Publius identifies two main roles for moral sentiment. Like Hume, Publius assumes
sympathy is a product of the natural ability to identify with individual and groups like oneself
brought about by exogenous factors such as “geographical and commercial considerations,” in
conjunction with “habits and prejudices.”224 The first role is the common sense of Union created
by the sympathy felt by American society as a whole, when bound together by the common
national project and its common principles of liberty and republican self-government. This sense
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of national unity is part of The Federalist’s argument for the necessity of the Union. Common
“circumstances and situations” of American society created by the Constitution will create
“national sympathy and connection.”225 In No. 16 Hamilton speaks of how fear of foreign threats
would provide a common “motive of sympathy” binding states together into common cause and
encouraging them to “unite for common defense.”226
Publius is sensitive to the balance between national cohesion and localism. This is a
juggling act of loyalties, between those to the nation which binds the Union, and loyalty to
sectional factions and the states which differentiate the nation into regional constituencies. In No.
10 we learn that liberty will produce factions which will divide sympathies and pit them against
one another. Madison recognizes that in an extended commercial republic that economic factions
will coalesce around the nature and amount of property each has. Hamilton says, “Every landholder
will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common
interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy.”227
The other vital role played moral sentiment is manifest in the relationship between the
people and their representatives. In No. 52 Hamilton says it is essential to liberty that the
government “should have a common interest with the people.”228 In No. 57 Hamilton says without
a “communion of interest, and sympathy of sentiments” between the people and their
representatives “every government degenerated into tyranny.”229 This is only possible when
elected officials have an “immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the
people.”230 The varying degrees of proximity and distance of each constitutional office between
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them creates varying degrees and types of sympathy. The pull of sympathy will be one ingredient
keeping elected officials responsible to the will of the people. Sympathy with the people translates
into “responsibility to the people.”231
Moral sentiments figure prominently in discussion over the role of commerce to the
American nation. The feud between Hamilton and Jefferson over a commercial industrial nation
versus an agrarian republic of yeoman farmers was in fact a dispute over the central psychological
type of the common citizen in American society. In fact, it was a dispute over the central passions
and sentiments which would rule American life. Twice in The Federalist Hamilton declares
America will be a “commercial people.”232 Hamilton speaks of the “adventurous spirit” which
“distinguishes the commercial character of America.”233 The American people will be an
enterprising and entrepreneurial people. The Constitution will perpetuate a “commercial republic”
motivated by the passions of industry and economic self-interest in the service of wealth creation
and the comfortable self-preservation it produces.234 A major theme of Montesquieu, Hume and
Adam Smith was the psychological role of commerce and industry on the mores and habits of civil
society. Despite Madison’s brilliant description in No. 10 of the vying economic factions produced
by liberty and property rights, Hamilton is the primary explicator of the role and significance of
commerce in The Federalist. Much of Hamilton’s economic analysis is directed to issues of power
and wealth on the international stage more than these psychological factors. Nonetheless as they
themselves admit, in promoting commerce, Madison and Hamilton were promoting a certain set
of passions as national virtues.
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Commerce was in conformity with the Modern vision of republicanism. If a republic was
most suitable to the needs and demands of human nature it was compelled to consider them
properly. This involved the acceptance of man’s desire to acquire and for its potential benefits to
be appreciated, even celebrated. Machiavelli spoke of the “very natural and ordinary desire to
acquire.”235

Acquisition, for Machiavelli, was a matter of “necessity.”236 Following in

Machiavelli’s footsteps, Montesquieu believed commerce was a central component of a free
republic. Montesquieu gave acquisition a distinctly more commercial dimension to man’s
acquisitive impulses in contrast to Machiavelli’s accumulation through conquest. The modern
republic would “be based on liberty and commerce rather than virtue, and was to emphasize the
private life rather than communal solidarity.”237 He observed that there is “a hardiness in states
which subsist by the commerce of economy not found in monarchies.”238 A commercial regime
was “the only one which allows man’s natural humanity to fully assert itself.”239 If the American
republic was to be erected on the principles of human nature, this would be partially achieved by
orienting its society toward commerce. The commercial way of life was understood as “the most
adequate response to the needs of human nature.”240 Adam Smith says the desire to accumulate
“though calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into
the grave.”241
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Acquisition is a fundamental passion of human nature. Hume wrote man “is naturally
impelled to extend his acquisitions as much as possible.”242 This is because this passion is directly
connected to our self-preservation. “Every person,” says Hume, “ought to enjoy the fruits of his
labour, in full possession of all the necessaries, and many of the conveniences of life. No one can
doubt, but such an equality is most suitable to human nature, and diminishes much less from the
happiness of the rich than it adds to that of the poor.” 243 So central was commercial development
and trade, Montesquieu asserted that in these matters political interest should give way to economic
interest.244 Locke believed the promotion of work and commerce would provide the “real
necessities and conveniency of life,” facilitate the “happiness of the people” and the “peace and
security” of the nation.245 Governments which ignored labor and commerce were ignorant of their
benefits and neglected the well-being of their citizens.246 Having absorbed these lessons first-hand,
Hamilton acknowledges that economic matters such as “national wealth” are “a primary object”
of a commercial republic’s “political cares.”247
In 1819 Benjamin Constant recognized the transformative nature of the commercial
approach to civil society and its psychology. The Ancient and Medieval worlds had despised
commerce, labor and the psychological effects of luxury. They achieved economic advancement
not through commerce, but war. “Conquest, theft and looting” were the accepted modes of
acquisition in the Ancient world.248 Constant wrote, “War and commerce are only two different
means of achieving the same end, that of getting what one wants.”249 “War is all impulse,” wrote
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Constant, “commerce, calculation. Hence it follows that an age must come in which commerce
replaces war. We have reached this age.”250 Western society had seemingly reached an historical
precipice, shifting from a bellicose age rooted in the passions to a commercial one rooted in
rational calculations of national economic self-interest. Commerce and industry would replace war
as the primary mode of wealth creation and competition between nations. In the late 19th Century
Bismarck summed up this distinction when he contrasted Interessenpolitik to Machtpolitik:
interest-politics on the one hand, and war-politics as the primary driver of statecraft.251
Montesquieu believed commerce promoted “a levelling of the differences among nations”
which allowed them to coexist more peaceably through recognizing their economic
interdependency.252 Locke says that if “the labor of the world were rightly directed and distributed
there would be more knowledge, peace, health and plenty in it than now there is” and “mankind
would be much more happy.”253 “The natural effect of commerce,” says Montesquieu, “ is to lead
to peace.”254 In No. 6 Hamilton rehearses this thesis saying commercial republics, are by their very
nature, disinclined to military conflict, strictly governed by recognition of mutual self-interest, and
naturally inclined to “mutual amity and concord.”255 War, of course did not abate, but modern
society is a commercial one. Commerce in this sense has been historically vindicated.
Montesquieu, Hume and Smith keenly recognized the psychological consequences of this
new attitude toward commerce. Ancient republics promoted martial virtues and patriotism, a
zealous love of one’s fatherland. The celebration of these virtues was not entirely a choice. It was
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by- product of the necessity of small Greek republics to protect themselves by means of war. Such
mores established an intense fraternity within the Ancient city and an equally powerful antipathy
to those without. To achieve such virtues, Ancient republics had to be “small, strict, and
homogenous,” precisely those attributes rejected by Madison in No. 10.256 These were closed
societies typically hostile to outsiders. Montesquieu and Hume were both critical of the Spartan
virtues which brought nations into conflict and were incompatible with the spirit of commerce.
Compulsory and demanding virtues would be replaced by “voluntary acts of exchange” in greater
harmony with the natural proclivities of mankind.257 The “ephemeral nature of riches acquired
through pillage” would be replaced by “more solid and permanent sources of wealth” found in
economic growth and development.258 Economic competition would be a win-win “war”
benefitting all nations. The rising tide of wealth produced by commerce would raise all ships.
Montesquieu concluded “men who pursue private acquisition of property through trade are much
less moved by motives of glory and conquest.”259 Competitive passions which placed individuals
and factions into conflict and lead to war, would be channeled into economic activities which
would produce mutually beneficial material well-being. Calculating Connecticut Yankees would
replace the noble knights of King Arthur’s court.
The Modern commercial republic would promote cosmopolitan habits displacing the
military virtues and the patriotic zeal of the insular Ancient republic. Its emphasis on civil liberties
and comfortable self-preservation would create a more open, diverse and tolerant society. Ancient
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vices became Modern virtues and vice versa. Luxury and vanity would replace pride and glory.
Montesquieu recognized how commerce brought with it virtues of its own such as “frugality,
economy, moderation, work, prudence, tranquility, order, and rule.”260 New virtues would be
cultivated from old vices. Vices condemned by Ancient Pagans and the Christian religion, such as
cupidity and the desire for lucre would be celebrated, not censured. Vanity, says Montesquieu,
would be “as good a spring for a government as pride is dangerous.”261 From vanity, says
Montesquieu, come the Modern virtues of “luxury, industry, the arts, fashions, politeness,” and
“taste.”262 Luxury and vanity would “stimulate work and economic vigor.” 263 While the “spirit of
luxury weakens the ascetic spirit of hard work, it vastly increases the number of objects desired
and thereby stimulates a broader commerce.”264 Montesquieu asserts “work is a consequence of
vanity.”265 Hume says “Everything in the world is purchased by labour; and our passions are the
only causes of labour.”266 Unleashing mankind’s avarice, channeled through commerce, would
provide the motor to the creation of wealth.
Labor gained a new sense of dignity. The Ancient republic and Modern aristocrats
characterized work and its related virtues as ignoble. Locke says they “brought honest labour in
useful and mechanical arts wholly into disgrace.”267 The spirit of commerce celebrated the creation
of wealth through labor as much as the consumption which motivated it. Locke preaches the
benefits of “honest labor” to body and soul for all human beings.268 Locke remarks that it is “a
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mark of the goodness in God that he has put us in this life under a necessity of labour” in order “to
keep mankind from mischiefs that ill men at leisure are very apt to do.”269 Labor is a “benefit even
to the good and the virtuous which are thereby preserved from the ills of idleness or the diseases
that attend constant study in the sedentary life.”270
Philosophers and saints in their leisure were no longer welcome. The vita activa would
displace the life of piety or contemplation as the prized mode of existence, but the active life would
be characterized more by work and exchange than public engagement and civic duty.271 The
enterprising bourgeois would replace the idle aristocratic voluptuary as the ideal social type.272
This logic set the path for the replacement of the master-slave relation by the employer and wageearner who would be commensurately remunerated for their time and faculties.273 Locke says, “a
Free-man makes himself a Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service he
undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive.”274 No different than Genesis or Lincoln,
a man’s brow sweat would be equitably exchanged for bread. In 1843 Thomas Carlyle spoke of
the forever-enduring Gospel: “Work, and therein have well-being.”275 The gospel of work preached
that the industrious would inherit the earth.
Machiavelli had set in motion the condemnation of the life of contemplation in favor of the
active life of the interested and acquisitive patriot. Work and its virtues were celebrated while
idleness and prodigality were condemned.276 Mandeville suggested that luxury was a lesser evil
that “sloth.”277 Consumption stoked by luxury would motivate labor and produce wealth, while
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sloth would guarantee a lack of industry and material well-being. Such a logic would encourage
moral philosophers to choose in favor of the lesser vice. The new ethic was the work ethic. Max
Weber keenly recognized how the spirit of capitalism was less about decadent consumption, and
instead an ascetic and industrious ethic postponing the satisfaction of present desires in the service
of greater material rewards in the future.278 “Capitalism,” writes Weber, “may even be identical
with the restraint, or at least a rational tempering,” of the “irrational impulse” to unlimited
acquisition.279 Locke eulogizes work, saying “half the day employed in useful labour would supply
the inhabitants of the Earth with the necessaries and conveniences of life, in a full plenty.”280 Given
the new centrality of labor in wealth creation, Locke recognized that the central role of government
was to “establish laws of liberty to protection and encouragement to the honest industry of
mankind.”281 If Modern society could unchain commercial passions, it would provide the necessary
incentives to labor and industry. This logic illuminates the connection between Natural Rights,
such as the right to property, and the spirit of commerce. Property rights are essential to the
possibility of comfortable self-preservation. They promote the common good through wealth
creation. Wealth is created when labor is incentivized through a right to property. Men are inclined
to labor more when the acquisition and possession of its fruits are legally secured. Acquisitive
passions propel individuals to accumulate only if they know they can keep what the work for.
Since labor is painful and provokes natural aversion, the prospect of securing its rewards outweighs
the discomfort and inspires men to work.
Commerce would be mildly corrupting. Increasingly, as work gained a newly found
dignity, so did the pursuit of material well-being. As the desire to acquire became associated with
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the wise pursuit of one’s self-interest, it lost the taint given it the Ancient Pagans and Christians
alike. The spirit of commerce does not aim at human excellence. It acquiesces to mankind’s natural
venality, but also produces the spirit of sympathy. Commercial virtues are not noble, but they are
peaceful and practical. Montesquieu says commerce “produces in men a certain spirit of exact
justice, opposed on the one hand to banditry, and on the other hand to those moral virtues which
both restrain one from always pressing one’s interest rigidly, and allow one to neglect one’s own
interests for the sake of the interests of others.”282 Montesquieu writes: “The laws of commerce
prefect the manners and morals, exactly as they destroy the manners and morals. Commerce
corrupts pure manners and morals: this was the subject of Plato’s complaints; it polishes and
softens barbaric manners and morals, as we see it doing every day.”283 Impure virtues like vanity,
cupidity and avarice would make men more sociable by slaking material desires and neutralizing
more contentious one. The virtues of self-restraint and self-abnegation were replaced by the virtue
of pursuing and unleashing acquisitive desires. Passions like “greed, avarice, or love of lucre, could
be usefully employed to oppose and bridle such other passions as ambition, lust for power, or
sexual lust.”284 Montesquieu dubbed this “doux commerce.” Doux Commerce would soften the
manners and morals of men. Part of the logic of the softening effects of commerce was that the
spurring acquisitive passions could temper more destructive ones. Commerce would remove the
hard edges produced by those combative asocial passions, like pride and glory, which lead to
conflict and war. Montesquieu writes, “it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle
mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores.”285 The
theory, drawn from his reading of history, was that men became more civilized and genteel through
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commercial exchange as it compels them to recognize the intwined nature of their interests, and
more cosmopolitan as trade increasingly brought them in contact with peoples of differing ways
of life. Smith writes, “Society may subsist among different men, as among merchants, from a sense
of its utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it should owe any
obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary exchange
of good offices according to an agreed valuation.”286
Montesquieu, Hume and Smith understood commercial passions as fundamentally social
ones. Commerce would displace martial virtues with moral sentiments like sympathy and
humanity. Economic exchange brings diverse peoples together in proximity to one another. It
encourages social intercourse between different nations and between factions and classes within a
single society. Unlike war, it permits the existence of enduring mutual projects between various
peoples. The ongoing proximity of social intercourse brought about by exchange, leads to degrees
of identification and sympathy. Montesquieu, Hume and Smith all believed the intensification and
multiplication of social interactions created by exchange would allow sympathy and social
sentiments to work their course. Such sentiments could affect relations, both domestically and
internationally. Social intercourse would foster good will, trust and encourage identification
through the recognition of the common and intertwined nature of their material interests.
Above all, Montesquieu says, commerce encourages the new virtue of “humanity.”287
Humanity is the moral sentiment of “gentleness and compassion” generated between human being
through a mutual recognition of their common nature.288 It is that “mutual feeling of pleasure
experienced” in the State of Nature, “when one of the lonely, fearful beasts encountered and
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recognized another frightened being akin to him.”289 Humanity is brought “to the surface” through
human intercourse.290 Through commercial exchange “man’s humanity toward his neighbor
extends also to foreigners.”291 Nations which “trade with each other become reciprocally
dependent.”292 Exchange makes men realize their collective interdependency on one another for
the satisfaction of their individual needs and desires. The spirit of commerce “unites nations” as
they recognize their common humanity through trade.293
Sympathy produced through exchange would enlighten men, soften habits and diffuse
strife. Montesquieu asserts that “the more communicative peoples are,” the more readily they
change and adapt their manners to one another.294 In exchange “mankind discovers a sense of
compassionate humanity that blurs previous religious, ethnic, national, and party sectarianisms.”295
The enlightenment produced by exchange would neutralize contentious differences such as
religious and factional affiliations. Montesquieu writes, “Commerce cures destructive
prejudices.”296 “Knowledge” gained through social intercourse, “makes men genteel, and reason
inclines them toward humanity; only prejudices cause these to be renounced.”297 Zealotry and
prejudice would fade, and opinions soften, as diverse peoples brought together by commerce
would recognize their common humanity, in the mutual satisfaction of their common material
needs.
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Publius certainly advances the moral transformation suggested by the commercial nature
of the American character. He speaks of the centrality of passions like “enterprise”, “industry”,
“venality” and “avarice” to commercial society. He asserts that “human avarice and enterprise”
will “vivify and invigorate all the channels of industry.”298 Modern virtues would displace Ancient
ones. Hamilton says the “industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the
pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible
with a nation of citizen soldiers which was the condition of the people of ancient republics.”299
Hamilton asserts that “the spirit of enterprise” is the genius of the commercial element of American
society .300 Hamilton celebrates labor and the laborer as the model character-type of American
society. He says, “The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and
the industrious manufacturer” and “all orders of men,” will “look forward with eager expectation,
and growing alacrity, to this pleasing reward of their toils.”301 Madison illustrates in No. 10 how
the freedom of industry and commerce, coupled with robust protections of property, will incentive
the pursuit of material self-interest.
Hamilton’s advocacy of an “active commerce” however rests on the “commercial
prosperity” produced from trade between states and between their Union and the world.302 He says
“prosperous commerce” is “the most useful, as well as the most productive, source of national
wealth.” 303 But, did either Hamilton or Madison think commerce would actually soften and subdue
the contentious impulses of men? Hamilton celebrates the salubrious economic effects of
commerce on society, but rejects the psychological thesis of “doux commerce.” He denies
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commerce would produce more harmony and less faction through softening mores and manners.
This is precisely because he rejected the theory of moral sentiments on which this hypothesis is
founded.
In No. 6 Hamilton provides his rebuttal of “doux commerce.” This refutation hinges on the
enduring frailty of the human character as well as the denial that the acquisitive passions which
motivate commerce are less potentially bellicose than those which motivate war. Turning
Constant’s argument on its head, if war and commerce are merely two means of acquisition, they
remain bound together by a common passion and end. For Hamilton these two perennial activities
of mankind are more akin than different, merely two sides of the same coin. He begins by
paraphrasing the doux commerce thesis: “The genius of republics,” they say “is pacific; the spirit
of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable
humours which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be
disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by
mutual interest and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.”304
He dismisses the notion that commercial republics, such as the United States, will be
immune from factional conflict, either internal or external, because of the softening effects of
trade.305 He castigates “idle theories” which promise exemptions from the intrinsic
“imperfections,” “weaknesses,” and “evils” of human nature.306 With tongue in cheek he says
there remain “visionary, or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual
peace between the states.”307 Hamilton rhetorically demands empirical evidence for “those
reveries, which would seduce us into the expectation of peace and cordiality between the members
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of the present confederacy, in a state of separation.”308 For Hamilton history conclusively illustrates
that “momentary passions, and immediate interests” forever maintain “a more active and imperious
control over human conduct” than reason or supposed moral sentiments produced by commerce.309
Hamilton’s rejection of doux commerce is based on what he calls the “concurring testimony
of experience.”310 He need only look as far the “present confederacy” and to imperial England for
his refutation. His argument focuses on an historical summary of the conduct of the great
commercial republics, Ancient and Modern. Hamilton prefaces this summary with a litany of
rhetorical questions: “Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are
not the former administered by men as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections,
rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisition, that affect nations, as well as kings?... Has commerce
hitherto done any thing more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as
domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many
wars founded upon commercial motives, since that has become the prevailing system of nations,
as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce,
in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite both for the one and for the
other?”311 Hamilton concludes that two exemplars of a commercial republic, Athens and Carthage,
were “as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighbouring monarchies of the
same times.”312 Of England he says, “Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that
country” and “yet few nations have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars, in which
that kingdom has been engaged, have in numerous instances proceeded from the people.”313 He
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concludes that many of these wars in fact grew out of “commercial considerations” and the
competition they produce.314
In fact, contrary to peace, Hamilton says that the modern commercial republic has produced
an entirely new division of labor with its “arts of industry” and “sciences of finance.”315 Precisely
these arts and sciences have shaped the habits of modern nations and “produced an entire
revolution in the system of war,” which “have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body
of the citizens, the inseparable companion of frequent hostility.”316 The wealth produced by
modern commerce and finance has in fact created great standing armies including a great game of
trade competition which provided a pretext for them to be deployed. Hamilton identifies one
bellicose benefit of international trade, it will encourage a robust navy with a global presence
which will help keep economic rivals like England at bay.317 Meanwhile in No. 7 Hamilton shifts
from international relations, to those between the states under the Articles of Confederation. He
proceeds to itemizes a series of abuses between them, each attempting to get the upper in interstate
trade competition. The reader of The Federalist can see how Publius’ sober vision of an
unchanging human nature is applied with consistency. Whether they are engaged in political
matters or economic exchange, men remain the same.
As we have seen, the ur-passion of the soul, self-love gives rise to a series of related and
powerful passions which neither reason nor moral sentiment alone can constrain. As an outgrowth
of self-love, the central passion with which the constitutional order must contend is ambition.
Ambition in Greek is philotimia, literally “the love of honor” and recognition.318 It is closely
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connected with the love of power, fame and glory. Ambition is a thymotic desire characterized by
a form of self-assertiveness which motives men to seek regard, stand superior to their peers, or
even dominate them. Ambition is closely linked to self-interest. As a form of assertiveness, it
motivates men to pursue their interests. The fact individuals need power to satisfy their interests
guarantees that they will always pursue the means of attaining them as well. Human beings must
strive to attain the means that will fulfill their ends.
“Ambition,” writes Epstein, “is the love of power.”319 Recognition is an acknowledgement
of one’s superior power in whatever form it may come. The centrality of the love of power is an
observation made by Thucydides, and is central to the Bible and the political thought of St.
Augustine, Machiavelli and Hobbes. Hamilton refers to the extreme form of the love of power as
the “lust of domination.”320 Hume says the “love of domination is so strong in the breast of man,
that many, not only submit to, but court all the dangers, and fatigues, and cares of government;
and men, once raised to that station, though often led astray by private passions, find, in ordinary
cases, a visible interest in the impartial administration of justice.”321 Publius’ naturalistic vision of
constitutional order, as a mechanism managing psychological forces, places a natural emphasis the
love of power as a kind of Newtonian force.
In No. 6 Hamilton describes the “the love of power” as “the desire of pre-eminence and
dominion.”322 The rare few seek “an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow citizens.”323
Augustine called this extreme passion the libido dominandi. The libido dominandi is the “lust for
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mastery” and “desire to dominate others” against their will. 324 This passion “refuses to accept that
all men are by nature equal.”325 Augustine said man’s natural self-love makes him “constantly
subject to destructive emotions and impulses” which make him “envious and vindictive.” 326 Man’s
love of power drives him to desire glory and material riches.327 Augustine recognized the ambiguity
of the love of power. It was the source of the desire to rule but also to dominate. On one hand it
was the root cause of civil society which he says “arose out of man’s lust for power and
violence.”328 It was also the arch passion which beset the City of Man and the perennial source of
its problems.
Ambition is the double-edge sword of civic order. It is the fundamentally ambiguous
passion of the soul as it relates to the public good. This ambiguity forced Publius and the Founders
to view it with great ambivalence. Publius identifies ambition as one of the greatest threats to
political prosperity, but also a necessity for government, and even the cause of virtue in
officeholders. This ambiguity is caused by the varied manifestations of ambition. The nature and
consequence of ambition varies by nature and intensity. Ambition at the extremes of excess and
deficiency is a vice. There can be “too much or too little, implying a mean that is the right amount
and therefore a virtue.”329 As the love of domination it is the mother of tyranny, as the love of fame,
Publius recognizes it as perhaps the highest source of public spiritedness which inspires
benefactors to great deeds.330
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Ambition is a threat to liberty, but nor can civil society do without the humors of the
ambitious few. Ambition and the desire to rule is a necessary passion if men are to govern
themselves at all. Publius’ analysis of ambition applies both to private citizens in society and public
officeholders.331 Machiavelli spoke of the two humors found in human nature. There are those
many who neither want to rule, nor to be dominated, while there are the few who desire to
command, oppress and dominate.332 Mankind is divided by the degree and kind of their ambitions
into the political and apolitical.333 Ambition can be a common passion held by the ordinary man
who hopes to see his designs executed and desires fulfilled. Publius’ characterization of the
ambitions of private citizens centers on the fulfillment of economic self-interest. Meanwhile, the
truly ambitious seek recognition through the kinds of “honors and distinctions” only gained
through public office. This ambition tends toward the love for power and fame.334 A public office
stands for a publicly recognized power over others. The ambitious desire to differentiate
themselves from the great mass of the common people. Only the few have a desire to pursue public
office and seek its challenges and rewards. In No. 10 Madison refers to political leaders as those
who are “ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power.”335 Moderated ambition leads to a
concern for the opinions of others. This encourages officeholders to conform with public opinion
and even the opinion of posterity. They are inclined to see the fulfillment of their destiny as
tethered to the common interests of their constituents. Ambition properly channeled and
constrained, can lead to virtue and even greatness.
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Like the love of power, the love of fame is another extreme form of ambition. The desire
for fame exceeds the ordinary recognition seeking of the ordinary officeholder. It is an
extraordinary desire of the rarest of statesmen. Those seeking fame do not merely hope to be
recognized by their constituencies. Nor are they simply in competition with their immediate peers.
Instead they vie with the great statesmen and rulers of history. They seek to be appreciated not
only in the present but create “lasting monuments”336 and “earn the perpetual remembrance of
posterity.”337 Love of fame is perhaps the universal passion of men which inspires them to
greatness. In No. 72 Hamilton says the love of fame is “the ruling passion of the noblest minds”
which prompts them “to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public
benefit.”338 This passion has the power to spur men “to act with nobleness and greatness,” and
make them “rise above petty interests.”339 It is the noblest passion because of its ability to
“transform ambition and self-interest into a dedicated effort for the community.”340 Adair says
Publius and the Founders understood the pursuit of fame as “a way of transforming egotism and
self-aggrandizing impulses into public service.”341 It is one of the few extreme passions where
individual self-interest might harmonize with the demands of the public good.342
Publius and the Founders understood “public service nobly performed” as the primary path
to human greatness.343 If the statesmen could be renowned for their deeds, the founder all the more
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so. Not surprisingly, they understood the greatest product of the love of fame as the act of founding
a political order itself. Adair and Cesar argue Publius and the Founders were motivated by such a
desire. Adair believes the Founders had “become fantastically concerned with posterity’s judgment
of their behavior,” and were “concerned with the image” that would “remain in the world’s eye.”344
In No. 38 Madison acknowledged the Founding “as fair a chance for immortality, as Lycurgus
gave to that of Sparta.”345
Outside the act of founding, Hamilton saw the executive as the nation’s central outlet for
political ambition.346 His essays in The Federalist and his proposal on the executive at the
Convention make this clear. His analysis of the nature of the executive places “more stress” on the
salutary dimension of this passion than Madison was willing to.347 Madison held a more jaundiced
view of ambition than Hamilton. As Hamilton describes it, the executive is designed to allow rare
natures of extraordinary men to flourish. The nature of the executive will draw character types
motived by this passion. The faculties and virtues of extraordinary individuals find an office
commensurate to their nature. The unitary and national nature of the presidency make it the natural
platform for individuals of “irregular ambition.”348 In a self-governing republic stands as a
monarchical stage for individual human greatness. Hamilton asks whether it is wise to deny the
existence of such an office suited to men of such ambitions who might instead wander like
“discontented ghosts” in society without the opportunities it provides.349 With the necessity of
managing dangerous passions in mind, we must ask: Where in society would such extraordinary
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natures produce the greatest benefit and the least harm? Instead of creating their own platforms for
greatest within society, they will instead be housed within the confines of Article II. These
designing individuals will be limited by the office, constrained by the people, the states, and the
other two branches.
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3. The Interests

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but
from their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.1
-

Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

The language of interest was well-worn by the time of the American Founding. Hirschman
says this faculty was for them “an important intellectual tool for the purposes of constitutional
engineering.”2 Publius and the Founders rested their political calculations on what they believed
to be the sure and reliable foundation of self-interest. Hamilton wrote that “a vast majority of
mankind is entirely biased by motives of self-interest.”3 Therefore, he concluded, “The safest
reliance of every government is on man’s interests. This is a principle of human nature, on which
all political speculation to be just, must be founded.”4 Interest, properly understood, is perhaps the
fulcrum of The Federalist’s account of human motivation and conduct. It was to be the cornerstone
of the constitutional edifice even as the concept itself remained somewhat open-ended and
malleable.
The conclusion that self-interest was the vera causa of human conduct was one part
description and one part prescription. It was a general observation of experience as much as a
necessary presupposition and heuristic in crafting a political order. When for example Hume
followed Machiavelli and spoke of the necessity of treating men as self-interested knaves in
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matters of political calculations, he did not of course mean to say all men were. Self-interest would
instead serve as a motivational model providing the basis for making general predictions about
human behavior within the confines of civic order. With this model in hand, institutional order and
circumstances could be arranged accordingly. Interest, because it was built on a dialogue between
common desires and rational calculation, was deemed more predictable - less capricious than the
passions, but more reliable and durable than feeble reason. Its element of rational cost-benefit
analysis, coupled with its close association with economic desire, made this motivation ripe for
the attempt to predict and quantify its behavioral effects compared to the other more elusive
psychic motors.5
With the Enlightenment self-interest became a kind of Grail in its pursuit of the
fundamental laws of human conduct. This great hope was built on a more mechanistic and
naturalist vision of the human soul which sought to glean general laws of action from an analysis
of its faculties. If human motivation followed regular rules, its conduct could be predicted in
general terms. Thus, from the motive of interest, a “political arithmetic” could be devised and serve
as a reliable basis for civic order.6 This order would be a kind of Newtonian machine of political
kinesthetics set in motion by psychological forces centered on interest. Like any abstraction the
notion provided explanatory power to a variety of particular instances without always doing justice
to their distinct peculiarities. And, despite the centrality of self-interest to their thinking, the
authors of The Federalist remained keenly aware that it failed to capture the full range of vital
motivations necessary to the considerations of the founder or statesman. They never lost sight of
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those peculiarities of the human soul which overflow the banks of mere self-interest. Men of great
ambition, are often also, the most mercurial.
“Interest” is a term of Modern origin. While the likes of Plato and Aristotle clearly had
related concepts, there is no direct cognate for the Modern notion as a source of psychological
motivation. In its most general meaning, one’s interest is one’s real or perceived advantage.
Interest generically involves a thing that benefits oneself. The notion came to mean not only a
thing, such as a “concern, “benefit”, “profit” or “advantage,”7 but is also associated with a
psychological state of “being concerned or affected advantageously.”8 “Self-interest” is in a sense
redundant, as all interests refer by their nature to a desire for gain on behalf of the individual or
collective which possess them.9 Self-interest is not simply identical to the self-love spoken of by
the Ancients. Unlike interest, “self-love” connoted a primordial animal passion independent of and
prior to all reasoning. Perhaps the closest word in the thought of Plato and Aristotle is “advantage.”
Both recognized those in power tended to make laws in their own advantage, or interest. Versions
of this claim are made in the famous argument of Thrasymachus and in Aristotle’s Politics.
“Advantage” however has none of the psychological connotations of either self-love or selfinterest. The Modern notion does not merely denote a benefit, it is a faculty of mind wedged
between the competing forces of reason and passion. Self-interest has been called “reasonable selflove”, or self-love tempered by sedate reflection and rational calculation.10 Self-interest is then a
cooler, more rational concept than self-love.
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Interest became a psychological spring of both permission and restraint. It combined
traditionally distinct elements associated with reason on the one hand, and passion on the other.
The doctrine of interest allowed the self-serving nature of men’s actions to shift from an
observation to a kind of moral imperative. While it preaches moral acceptance of man’s selfish
pursuits, it also dictates those ends be pursued with rational restraint, prudence and moderation,
not the impulsiveness of unbridled passion.11 Unlike self-love, one’s true interests are found in
passion tempered and in greater harmony with the interests of others. Ancient Pagan and Christian
thought condemned the selfishness, vanity and greed which originate in self-love. Meanwhile, selfinterest had the potential to be politically, economically and even morally beneficial.12
The concept of interest has a “long and complicated history of shifting meanings.”13
Hirschman describes the notion as “extremely versatile” to the point of being “ambiguous.”14 This
history accounts for its ambiguities of meaning and use. Central to its historical transformation is
the shifting frames of reference through which its senses of meaning have been understood. First
a legal notion, it migrated to politics. From there it came to have moral, social, and economic
significance. Despite its variability, two aspects became essential to during the Enlightenment.
First, the notion implied self-centeredness regarding the ends of “interest propelled” conduct, and
second, it involved an element of rational calculation as an essential but not exclusive means of
achieving those ends.15 In the hands of Modern moral and political philosophy it took on a
psychological sense as a ubiquitous source of human motivation. The concept came to signify the
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“fundamental forces” in the human psyche rooted in the “drive for self-preservation and selfaggrandizement, that motivate or should motivate” statesman and citizens alike.16
The Modern use of the term originates in Roman Law. The Latin inter esse, literally “to be
between,” referred to legal “procedures for compensation” between individuals in a court of law.
Id quod interest meant “that which matters” or “that which counts.”17 An interest was “what one
has a legal concern in.”18 To have an “interest” meant to have a material stake in a legal preceding
which gave one standing under law to be involved.19 The origins of self-interest as the foundational
motive of conduct lie in political theories of the Renaissance. A new doctrine of interest emerged
from a new theory of the state designed to improve statecraft.20 In the first half of the 16th century,
around the time Machiavelli was writing The Prince, Francesco Guicciardini refers in his Ricordi
to “self-interest” and how it “prevails in nearly all human beings.”21 In his writings, Guicciardini
had already established the distinction and tension between the particular interest of the individual
and the public interest.22 Later that century Giovanni Botero spoke of a “reason of state,” or “reason
of interest,” expressions synonymous with the interests of the state.23 Renaissance thinkers
concluded “state interest” was “the only legitimate principle of action” for statecraft.24
The 17th century German jurist, Pufendorf, is credited with establishing interest in the
language of moral philosophy.25 Pufendorf’s doctrine of state interest was a theoretical formulation
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of the practical principles of Renaissance statecraft such as Cardinal Richelieu’s Raison d’État.26
The prudent discretion of calculating statesmen became a moral principle of Natural Law. Selfinterest was no longer simply a prescription for princes, it was part of the moral calculus of
international law. Later Vattel, a jurist carefully read by Hamilton, asserted a state’s primary task
is to preserve “the national interest” on the world’s stage.27 Given all nations were in a State of
Nature relative to one another, national interest was the only guiding principle of statecraft over
and above more noble considerations of morality and religion.
Machiavelli is often credited with making the first and boldest formulation of the modern
theory of interest avant le lettre. In fact he spoke the language of interest without using the term.
Hirschman says Machiavelli “did not name his child.”28 The concept can be found in his analysis
of how the prince’s actions under conditions of “necessity” are motivated by the interested
passions of acquisition and self-preservation. Machiavelli exhorted the prince to act in his selfinterest, describing in brazen terms what this would require. He laid down as a rule of conduct,
that the prince must always act with an eye to his own advantage, centered on his self-preservation,
both bodily and political. He must concern himself with his interests prior to moral codes of honor
and decency if he hoped to maintain power. Machiavelli teaches that any man who does not
selfishly mind his own interests, or engages in self-sacrificial gestures, is sure to come to his ruin
in a world of self-interested adversaries. Interest as a concept came to England by way of
Machiavelli’s migration in the later 16th century.29 While a printed English language edition did
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not appear until 1640,30 The Prince circulated widely in England by the 1580s in Latin, French and
Italian editions. Hand-written English translations had begun circulating as early as 1585.31
Meanwhile the term established itself in the English political vernacular through translations of
Henri de Rohan’s work, De l'Intérêt des Princes et des États de la Chrétienté of 1638.32 By the
18th century the idea had travelled from France and England to the American colonies and the
Founding Fathers.”33
From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment the notion of interest migrated from statecraft,
to the marketplace, and on to private conduct and individual psychology.34 Publius’ shifting use of
the term encompasses most of these related senses of meaning. Interest shifted from an idea
associated with the state and power politics, to one connected with the “concept of the self” and
its drives.35 The doctrine extended beyond questions of the prince and politics, to human nature at
large.36 Interest, in the “sense of concerns, aspirations, and advantage gained currency” in Europe
by the late 16th century.37 English moralist Charles Herle acknowledged that by 1655 interest, in
the sense of “concernment and importance” had become a commonplace.38 At this time it took on
a duel-meaning of “advantage” on the one hand, and the psychological “propensity for seeking
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benefits” on the other.39 By the 17th century it signified a universal species of human motivation
applicable to all practical and theoretical frames of reference. Interest as the now ubiquitous
motivation of mankind became sacrosanct. In 1659, Herle published a tract whose title summed
up this emerging world-view: “Interest Will Not Lie.”40
Only in the 19th century did the concept become primarily associated with material wellbeing.41 At this time it became a permanent fixture of economic theory. In the hands of political
economists and Utilitarians it took on almost exclusively material and biological meaning. This
shift was not so much a deviation from its historical use, as a definite narrowing of its scope. While
the notion became increasingly associated with economic striving, it did not begin that way. From
the Renaissance to the Enlightenment its meaning had never been limited to material welfare.42
Instead it encompassed “the totality of human aspirations.”43
With the Enlightenment, Western civilization and philosophy were said to have entered the
“age of interests.”44 The language of interest became a commonplace of moral and political
discourse. It became the universal “term for understanding human behavior.”45 The philosophy
which posited self-interest as the vera causa of man’s conduct was closely associated with the
economic and political liberalism central to the American Founding.46 In 1776, Smith would say
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interest is a “desire of bettering our condition.”47 Here, the seeds of the “pursuit of the Happiness”
and the American Dream are sow. By the end of the 18th century numerous philosophers accepted
that human conduct was primarily “interest driven.”48 Self-interest was now “the principle motive”
and “driving force” of all human action.49 Cardinal de Retz had summed up this view saying, “The
most correct maxim for accurately appraising the intentions of men is to examine their interests
which are the most common motive for the actions.”50 de Retz was a keen reader of Machiavelli,
and Madison was well acquainted with his commentaries on the nature of man and society.51
Meanwhile Rohan had captured the radical role assumed to be played by interest saying “princes
order their people around and interest orders princes around.”52 Interest was the “tyrant of tyrants”
and the “commander of princes.”53 It was interest which ruled the rulers as the true sovereign of
the world.
Interest came to be closely associated with utility. What was useful was directly connected
to the regular needs and desires generated by a common human nature. The pursuit of that which
is useful appeared to be the most reliable spring political scientists and statesman could depend
upon in gauging human conduct. Smith writes, “Society may subsist among different men, as
among merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection.”54 Society was
apparently able to function spontaneously on its interests, because they are so rooted in necessity.
Interest was natural precisely because it had that element of necessity which Machiavelli had
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identified. The prince did not choose to preserve his life or power, he did so out of necessity.
Locke’s right to self-preservation is essentially a right to self-interest properly understood. The
needs of life would be attained successfully only when the individual pursued their interests over
their raw impulses.
Self-interest came to be treated as a quasi-scientific term. Despite being posited as a central
source of volition, its connection with material necessity made it a more impersonal motive,
increasingly detached from subjective qualities or one’s sense of willing. As a cause of action, it
was less like a choice, and more like an act of compulsion. Machiavelli had captured this aspect
of self-interest in his emphasis on the role of fortune and necessity in human action. The notion
began to carry with it a kind of sanitized rationality redolent of the Modern scientific attitude,
detached from the more poetical vision of the soul found in the Ancients. Man was just a
sophisticated machine responding to exogenous forces. Here lay the incipient foundations of 20th
century Rational Choice Theory. These features made interest amenable to a more mechanistic
account of individual and collective behavior. Interest meant mankind’s conduct was subject to
regular rules which could be described and anticipated. This element of predictability meant
society could be thought of as akin to a Newtonian mechanism. “Interest,” it was said, “governs
the World.”55 It was “a part in the movements” of a great “machine.”56 God was a watchmaker
who had made an elegant mechanism which ran on ironclad laws of cause and effect. Man was
merely a component of that mechanism. In his De L’Esprit of 1759, Helvétius would say, “As the
physical world is ruled by the laws of movement so is the moral universe ruled by laws of
interest.”57 Self-interest had become the law of gravity of human motivation and conduct.
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The growing discourse surrounding interest was connected to the increasing naturalism of
18th century thought.58 The more the Enlightenment developed a naturalistic bent, the more it rested
its analysis of motivation on interest. This naturalism harbored a more realistic view of human
nature and affairs which animated much of Publius’ thought.59 The acceptance that mankind was
naturally self-interested has Ancient precedents in the Sophists, Epicureans and Skeptics.60
Publius’ immediate sources for the skeptical view can be found in the otherwise diverging sources
of Calvinist Christianity, Bacon, Montaigne and Hume.61 The Westminster Confessions and
Johnathan Edwards emphasized the fallen, and therefore selfish, state of mankind. Meanwhile
Montaigne sought to paint a more honest portrait of man than the Ancients, saying that “treachery,
disloyalty, cruelty” and “tyranny” were merely the “ordinary vices” of mankind.62 Machiavelli,
wrote that it was “necessary” for anyone devising a republic “to presuppose that all men are bad.”63
Hume said statesmen must treat ordinary humanity as self-interested knaves. The growing
consensus was that all men were self-interested and there was no choice in approaching them
morally and politically from any other perspective.64
The historical turn to interest was part of this new hardboiled thinking determined to look
at human nature without pretenses or utopian hopes. Ordinary vices were bad conduct we should
expect of human beings because they are neither “spectacular or unusual”65 Through a more
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forthright acceptance of these vices, society would be liberated from the hypocrisy and false hopes
of the Ancients and their imagined image of man. Taking men as they are, philosophers and
statesmen acquiesced to the fact that mankind is at base, driven by interest rather than altruism or
self-sacrifice. This sober observation forced many to conclude that interest was the “only realistic
rule of political conduct.”66 Interest was the common denominator of action when man is taken as
he is, rather than as it ought to be. It was more reasonable for the philosophers and statemen to
depend on interest than reason. They would have to accept that, on the whole, human action was
motivated by rational calculations of self-interest rather than more noble motives. They would
show their wisdom by setting expectations of conduct in conformity with the real capacities and
weakness of human nature. One could only hope for the best, unless they first had assumed the
worst. What was the value of exhortations to virtue if such goals were virtually unattainable and
therefore impractical? It was expected the passions would overwhelm reason, so this should be no
great cause for lamentation. The inability to achieve one’s interest, however, was viewed as a
failure precisely because they were considered, on the whole, to be regularly attainable.
The Enlightenment’s tendency toward a greater realism changed the language of moral
discourse. The hard fact of mankind’s selfish nature was not only accepted, but redescribed as
good. Interest-motivated conduct had shifted from vice to virtue. Helvétius argued that the
“moralists might succeed in having their maxims observed if they substituted…the language of
interest for that of injury.”67 In time the doctrine of interest gave sovereigns and citizens alike a
new sense of moral license which relieved them from certain traditional moral restraints handed
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down from Pagan antiquity and Christianity.68 It was morally permissible, even justified, for the
commoner as much as the king, to pursuit their interest. Ancient condemnations were set aside,
and the single-minded pursuit of material gain would eventually be praised.69 Private vices were
recognized for their public benefits. Yet, while Mandeville spoke of “passions” and “vices,” Hume
and Smith employed the more anodyne, less pejorative language of “interest” and “advantage.”70
By the 18th century, some private vices were simply private virtues. Even Machiavelli had blushed
at calling vices by anything other than their proper name.
Interest shifted from a matter of necessity to a positive moral good and the rule of action
for the individual.71 For Adam Smith, those seeking their advantage were no longer “knaves,” but
enterprising citizens. Humanity was fundamentally selfish and self-sacrifice a misguided fiction.
Altruistic gestures were merely self-interest turned inside out. Good deeds held selfish rewards
which were their true instigators. Hume acknowledged the average man rarely looks so “far as the
public interest, when they pay their creditors, perform their promises, and abstain from theft, and
robbery, and injustice of every kind.”72 Public interest was a “motive too remote and too sublime
to affect the generality of mankind, and operate with any force in actions so contrary to private
interest.”73 Smith said a man could not expect others to meet his needs through acts of
“benevolence only.”74 He would be “more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his
favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them.”75
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It was not from the “benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner,
but from their own interest.”76 We must “address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their selflove, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”77 This is how Tom
Sawyer got paid for the privilege he gave others to whitewash his fence.
Once interest had been identified as the prime mover of human conduct in the 16th century,
the problem of organizing a society composed of selfish individuals became a “dominate
preoccupation of politics and political theory.”78 The transvaluation from vice to virtue lead to the
idea that the pervasive pursuit of self-interest, writ large in society, was capable of spontaneously
generating civic order and the public good without anyone ever intending to do so. Some have
described this as a transubstantiation of water into wine.79 As men attended only on themselves,
they would inadvertently contribute to the common interest. Mandeville was one of the earliest to
assert the seemingly paradoxically notion that “private vices” could ever produce “public
benefits.” Before Smith gave this idea its classic formulation, Montesquieu captured it succinctly
writing that each man “contributes to the common good, believing he is attending to his own
interests.”80 Smith writes that when the average man labors he “neither intends to promote the
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it…he intends only his own security; and by
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an Invisible Hand to promote
an end which was no part of his intention.”81
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In fact, Steuart and Smith went further: The pursuit of private interest was the only way the
public good was achieved. If the road to hell was paved with bad intentions, the road to public
prosperity was paved with self-interested ones. In 1767, Steuart wrote “were everyone to act for
the public, and neglect himself, the statesman would be bewildered…were a people to become
quite disinterested, there would be no possibility of governing them.”82 They would be
ungovernable because the spring of action which makes them predictable would have been
disabled. Pursuing the public good was deemed intrinsically unnatural; it was an object lesson in
how not to achieve it. By contrast, Aristotle had held civic virtue to be one of the highest pursuits
precisely because it was more in conformity with a fully human existence compared to the mere
acquisition of life’s bare necessities through exchange. This line of thinking lead to the belief,
never seriously entertained by Publius, of the supremacy of economic and social forces over the
political as the determinative sphere of civic society. Supposedly, if society and economy were left
to themselves, motivated exclusively by private interests, politics and the public good would take
care of themselves. Despite the centrality of self-interest to Publius’s account of motivation, he
hardly believed the political dimension could ever be reduced to, or replaced by, the social or
economic spheres. Madison and Hamilton rejected notion of the spontaneous reconciliation of
factional interests and instead appealed to the necessity of “good government and national
character.”83 No Invisible Hand of interest-driven conduct would spontaneously generate order and
reduce serious political choices about ends, to the fait accompli of administering means.84
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Two main ambiguities to the notion of interest arose as it developed into the 18th century.
First was its two related but discreet meanings. Interest was both a good and a state of mind which
encourages one to pursue that good. A concept which began as an advantage sought, came to
denote “the manner in which these aspirations were to be pursued.”85 An interest is a concern for
a good deemed advantageous. But it also came to combine the object of desire and the
psychological motivation, the sense of being concerned to attain that end. An interest was a good
and an attitude taken toward it. To be interested, rather than disinterested, is to maintain an attitude
oriented toward one’s own practical benefit. This ambiguity is evident in Publius’ use of the term.
Scanlon says, “Action motivated by interest is action expected by the agent to have some
identifiable result which will be beneficial or advantageous.”86 Yet, the action “may at the same
time, proceed from an emotional state of the agent...but only insofar as the agent is influenced by
an expectation of some consequent benefit or advantage is the action motivated by interest.”87
The other more significant ambiguity was the relationship of the faculty of the interests to
those of reason and passion. In the 16th and 17th centuries interest emerged as an intervening
category between the two. Interest became a faculty, wedged between the competing parts of the
soul.88 It was a derivative term mediating between them. The faculty psychology of the 18th century
treated it as a hybrid term. It was a synthesis of reason and passion. As a faculty it was a “mixture
of self-seeking and rationality.”89 Yet, the nature of this synthesis and the precise role played by
each element was much disputed. Situated between the other faculties, interest was said to
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participate in both. It partook of “the better nature of each, as the passion of self-love upgraded
and contained by reason, and as reason given direction and force by that passion.”90 If reason ruled
in Plato’s model, interest was to be the new ruler of the soul in Modern faculty psychology. Interest
was the victor as it was said to be exempt from the deficiencies of the other two faculties. It lacked
the “ineffectuality of reason” and “the destructiveness of passion.”91
Despite superficial similarities of Plato’s tripartite soul to the three faculties Modern
epistemology, there were important differences. In Plato, the three parts of the soul represented
three distinct types of desires defined by their objects. One was logos, or reason, while the other
two, spirit and appetite, were passions. Despite their likely combination in practice, each part
specified a precise if general category of desire. Each was the source of motivation for a specific
type of good extant in the world. In the Ancient image, the middle term of the soul, thumos, was
not a synthesis of the other two, but its own unique motivation with its own distinct objects. Interest
alone does not indicate a specific type of good at all. Instead it represents a category of goods
defined by the manner in which they are pursued. One can pursue their interests as much through
the objects of the intellect and commerce, as those of politics. The Ancient tripartite soul was
reducible to a binary, as two parts were passions, the other reason. Interest as a synthesis of reason
and passion represented a novel third category foreign to the traditional bipartite division.92
With interest the common relation of the faculties shifted from war to reconciliation. The
Ancients viewed the soul as the battleground for a perennial war between reason and passion. In
this model reason ought to be the soul’s victor and the master of passion. The inclusion of interest
presented a new model of the structural relationship, or the constitution, of human psychology.
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Here there would be “no direct combat between reason and the passions.”93 Interest would play
the crucial role of buffer. It would attenuate direct conflict and establish a partial truce. Interest
was a middle ground where reason and passion were said to work in concert. Reconciliation was
achieved by both sides making certain concessions to the middle. In conflict with neither reason
or passion, interest massaged the assets and liabilities of each to achieve a desired goal. It was the
solution to reason’s Achilles’ heel in its strife with the passions. Meanwhile, reason gave foresight
to blind passions. The passions would be educated by instrumental reason on how to best satisfy
themselves. With the interests, reason would be coopted by the passions and vice versa.
Publius partially adopted this new relationship between reason and passion made possible
by interest, but never entirely abandon the Ancient model of direct conflict. Men were depraved
because reason is fallible and weak. This frailty meant reason “was likely to be over-whelmed by
man’s passions.”94 Yet, while passions had a “more active and imperious control,” reason was not
and should not be their slave. The passions were blind and could not assess the correctness of their
objects without the guidance of reason. Despite Publius’ repeated acknowledgement of the
weaknesses of reason, he never questioned its potential efficacy, including the role of practical
reason as an essential ingredient in human conduct and civic order. Publius, unlike Hume, never
rejected the ability of reason to determine ends and motivate action. Like the Ancients, he never
entirely abandoned the idea that reason was absolutely necessary to guide, channel and educate the
passions.
As the middle term, interest combined reason and passion into a single hybrid faculty of
mind. In doing so it combined elements traditionally understood as distinct. Interest represented a
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certain modification of passion by reason. It was passion cooled and tempered by sedate reflection
and rational calculation.95 If the passions were “sudden, tempestuous, violent,” interest was
“steady, calm, rational.”96 Interest was a heady motivation compared to unreflecting impulse. In
self-interest passion conspired with instrumental reasoning. It was self-love made reasonable.97
Interest included “an element of reflection and calculation with respect to the manner” in which
one’s desires were pursued.98 Forgoing conflict, reason could be enlisted in a less detrimental and
more secure satisfaction of the passions under its tutelage. Rejecting immediate impulse, interest
implied desire pursued “in an orderly and reasonable manner.”99 Interest represented a peculiar
marriage of rational foresight and an underlying passion, where reason modified that passion in
order to better satisfy it. Reason’s aid could ameliorate and avoid the negative consequences of
impulse, and prolong the benefits accruing from a moderated, but ongoing, satisfaction.
The doctrine presented “new passions in the more respectable but more mediocre form” of
interest.100 Tocqueville wrote:
Self-interest is a doctrine not very lofty, but clear and sure. It does not seek to attain great objects;
but it attains those it aims for without too much effort. ... [It] does not produce great devotion; but
it suggests little sacrifices each day; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude
of citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves; and if it does
not lead directly to virtue through the will, it brings them near to it insensibly through habits.101
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The Modern shift of civil ends away from the rigors of virtue and excellence to those of commerce
and commodious existence brought reason and passion closer together. In self-preservation they
align and converge as interest. Mankind desires to live, and reason validates this goal established
by the passions as necessary and therefore correct. Interest gives permission to certain passions the
Ancients considered vices, but restrains others with an eye toward commodious existence. The
doctrine of interest made selfish pursuits acceptable, but dictated they be pursued with prudence
and moderation, not the impulsiveness of unbridled passion.102
Guided by their interests, men achieved favorable results compared to “the calamitous state
of affairs that prevails when men given free rein to their passions.”103 Interest was resilient enough
to restrain the passions by coopting them. La Bruyere wrote, “Nothing is easier for passion than to
defeat reason: Its great triumph is to gain the upper hand over interest.”104 Montesquieu captures
the distinction between interest and passion when he says: “Happily men are in a situation such
that, though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an
interest in not being so.”105 Wickedness might involve short-term satisfaction, but it is not likely
to advance longer term goals when its consequences are considered. This description suggests
passion is not merely using reason instrumentally, but that reason must qualitatively modify the
given end of an initial impulse. In this model of the soul, reason is not merely the henchmen of the
passions. Even as it depends on their gale, reason directs the ship based on foresight of
consequences.
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The doctrine of interest dictated men learn to curb their desires if they were to successfully
pursue their interests. Interest is then a faculty of both license and restraint. It is less permissive
than the passions but also less restraining than right reason. Interest-driven conduct represented a
“methodical pursuit” of selfish ends, in contrast to the helter-skelter of raw passion.106 Interest
involved a “disciplined understanding of what it takes to advance ones’ power, influence and
wealth.” 107 Hume says that it is only by “reflection and experience,” that men learn “the pernicious
effects of that license, and the total dissolution of society, which must ensure from it.”108
Mankind’s instinctual impulses must be “checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or
observation.”109 Spinoza speaks for Publius when he writes, “All men certainly seek their
advantage, but seldom as sound reason dictates; in most cases appetite is their only guide, and in
their desires and judgements of what is beneficial they are carried away by their passions, which
take no account of the future or anything else.”110 Looking back on its development, Max Weber
recognized how capitalism contained a central element of interested “restraint” and “rational
tempering,” compared to the “irrational impulse” to unlimited acquisition.111
If interest became the most powerful explanatory concept of human conduct, it was also
the most elusive. The term evolved into a catch-all for a diverse set of relations between reason
and passion. The developing discourse construed the concept in contradictory ways. Numerous
ambiguities arose. Thinkers differed on the precise roles played by reason and passion respectively.
Was the dominate spring of interest reason, or the passions? Was interest, as a separate category
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of motivation, genuinely distinct from reason and passion? It could be seen as a derivative faculty,
merely partaking in a mixture of the other two, without any distinct characteristics of its own.
Varying “degrees of rationality” were attributed to faculty.112 Most, if not all, moral philosophers
held that the interests required some minimal degree of rationality, a minimal amount which was
absolutely necessary. Not all types of interest were created equal, or simply good. Interest was
beneficial or harmful depending on the role of reason. Some types were more like passions, while
others had an essential deliberative component. Others were virtually synonymous with the
passions. In No. 63 Hamilton refers to “strong passion, or momentary interest” as if they are
identical. Hume for example refers to the “passion of self-interest” and “interested affection.”113
Again departing from Hume, Publius’ notions of the true interests of the individual or the
community recognize a critical element of reason which detaches them from mere passion.
Another ambiguity was whether passions were tamed by reason or restrained by other
countervailing passions, or both. The two primary models depict countervailing passions
neutralizing one another, while reason or moral sentiment, direct passions gale toward one’s true
interests. In most paradigms, interest was instigated by passion, yet its fulfillment is detached from
the original impulse by rational calculation. The synthesis starts with passion. Passion remains the
motivating gale of action. Interest is the gale of passion given the vision of rational foresight.
Foresight alters the initial impulse. While the impetus for one’s actions is generated by passion,
reason shapes just how, and perhaps even what, is to be achieved. Interest could dictate one passion
bend to the force of another. Here, passion fought passion, with a reduced role for reason. As it
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resigns itself to their force, the superintending function of reason and sentiment was as the
adjudicator of the passions.
In another version, reason was unable to enter into direct conflict with the passions at all
because of its relative weakness. There could be no conflict because passion was the default victor.
“Nothing,” says Hume, “can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse.”114
The passions always dominate, while reason is reduced to being their permanent servant. Interest
is achieved when instrumental reason is employed passively to best meet passion’s demands.
Hume’s image of reason’s passivity was merely one paradigm. At the other extreme, interest
“stood in contradistinction to the passions.”115 Interest was not so much a tamed form of passion
as opposed to passion altogether.116 Meinecke suggested that interest implied a “sophisticated,
rational will, untroubled by passions and momentary impulses.”117 Here, reason became the “rule
of action” rather than the “disorderly appetites.”118
With interest the soul became a battleground for competing passions. Even the rationalized
model of interest acknowledged the centrality of a conflict between beneficial and destructive
emotions. Hirschman says interest became “a generic term” for certain beneficent passions which
served a “countervailing function” to more malignant ones.119 There were benign passions whose
encouragement could contribute to general well-being, and other more insidious ones needing
discouragement in order to protect the public good from their ravages. These countervailing

114

David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 264.
Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 32.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid., p. 33.
Friedrich Meinecke. Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History. New York:
Routledge, 2017. p. 147.
118
Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 19.
119
Ibid., p. 28.
115

478

passions existed within the psychology of the individual rather than between individuals, factions
or branches of government.120
This paradigm suggested that the fortification needed by reason could be found in selfish,
but non-threatening passions. Beneficial emotions were increasingly associated with “interest”,
while destructive ones were connected to “passion.”121 Interests became the “tamers of the
passions.”122 Countervailing passions could be broken down into categories of “the taming” and
the “to-be-tamed”123 Beneficial impulses counteract destructive ones. As passions contend reason
calculates and adjudicates the least detrimental satisfaction of the least detrimental desire. Reason
is more referee than combatant. In this model it became necessary to identify which passions
typically played “the role of tamers” and which were “truly wild” and “required taming.124
The two types of passion involved within the soul’s countervailing conflict are in a sense,
always the same. There is an original passion set against the passion of fear. In this paradigm the
voice of reason is increasingly replaced by the voice of fear. The immediate impulse can be any
number of passions, be it ambition, avarice or the love of power. This impulse is set in motion by
the blind hope of gain. The countermanding impulse is always some kind of fear which arises out
of an emotional awareness of the risks involved in the satisfaction of the original impulse. Interest
rests on fear. In the extreme, this is the fear of death, but more often, it is the fear of any loss
unacceptable in the eyes of the individual. The primary loss would be the thwarting of one’s desire
or future restrictions on its satisfaction. Fear as the taming passion has the power to restrain
reckless impulse and grandiose ambition. Fear tempers all others. It can retard, inhibit or modify
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them depending on the circumstances. Serving one’s interest generally came to mean becoming
more risk-averse compared to pursuing more all-or-nothing passions like glory and the desire for
domination.
Despite the many nuances of his thought, Hobbes can be given credit for envisioning the
founding of a political order on the principle of self-interest as a kind of Natural Law. Hirschman
credits Hobbes for providing the original analysis, in his depiction of the State of Nature, of how
countervailing passions arise in the individual and resolve themselves to produce one’s interest.125
Self-interest was what was left over after the extreme passions of ambition and fear played
themselves out in the State of Nature. The middle, more risk-averse impulses remaining, were
one’s interest. This accounting and calibrating of the passions need not be conscious rational
calculation. Instead, it need only be the playing out of contending impulses coupled with an
experiential memory of their past risks and rewards. For Hobbes, prudence was the product of
nothing other than experience itself.126 Reflection merely confirmed what experience had already
taught on an emotional level.
Hobbes identified the politically relevant competing passions in man’s ‘natural condition’
as social and asocial, those which incline men to war and those inclining them to peace. The State
of Nature was by definition a state of war because it lacked the conditions and organization to
effectively restrain bellicose passions or amplify peaceful ones. The exodus from this condition
was not to be achieved through transforming human nature, but by transforming the circumstances
and conditions of people so as to encourage peaceful passions and discourage belligerent ones.
This would be achieved through the formation of sound political institutions, a government with
the monopoly of force which alone interpreted and enforced law. Hobbes singles out glory and
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ambition as the arch passions representing the central threats to peaceful and commodious
existence. Men cannot enjoy life and the fruits of their labors when they are dead or under the
permanent cloud of mortal threat.127 The pursuit of glory and the love of domination, said Hobbes,
could be overcome by “passions that incline men to Peace.”128 The fact that the State of Nature is
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” provides the proper incentives to exit this belligerent and
destitute condition. Since men seek to avoid suffering or death, they are willing to exchange certain
freedoms for the rewards and pleasures of a more commodious existence. Men avoid what they
fear. For Hobbes the fear of death was the only motive powerful enough to thwart these the desire
for glory and honor and promote the interests of all in the form of peaceful self-preservation. Glory
and domination are sacrificed for a humbler, but more secure, existence.
Self-interest boils down to the way actions are motivated by common perceptions of future
potential rewards and punishments. Judgements about the future, are judgements about the
expectation of the two universal masters of human conduct, pleasure and pain. One’s interest is
generally the product of attempting to maximize benefits, while minimizing loses. Aiming at more
modest benefits, generally speaking, reduces the risk of more extreme loses. Hobbes’ analysis
foreshadows the “maximin” principle of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Rational Choice Theory.
Hobbes entire analysis of the State of Nature and the mechanism of departure is dependent on a
cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives of death and the fear of death, as opposed to aspirations of
glory. The bargain struck is that the necessary concentration of power will be granted to a
government for the sake of security. Security means a life liberated from the fear of violent death.129
In this, Hobbes encourages mankind to trade-in higher motives, like honor and glory, for lower
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ones, like comfortable self-preservation. Thus, the “primordial interest” of mankind is found in
leaving the State of Nature.130 This of course is, on the whole, the bargain Modern liberal
democracy has struck.
The central purpose of the Leviathan, as a “Mortal God,” was to instill the necessary terror
and awe, in order to inspire men to abide by the social contract. It is necessary, from Hobbes’
perspective, for subjects to be instilled with the fear of God. The state needed to inspire such terror,
that psychologically, the fear of punishment, in the scheme of costs and benefits, outweighed the
hope of ill-gotten gains. Only then would men keep their promises. Here, individuals “do the right
thing” purely out of hard-boiled cost-benefit calculations of interest. This was taking men as they
actually are. They weigh whether doing the right thing actually benefits them. This is not the only
reason they do the right thing, but it is the most reliable and predictable one. Therefore,
circumstances need to be devised accordingly. Hobbes calculus of fear was a substitute to
alternative sources and explanations of self-restraint such as duty, virtue, or religious piety. This
calculus warned against indulging in destructive passion for the selfish reason that moderating
them was more advantageous in the long term.
Publius’ use of the term “interest” falls well within the parameters of Enlightenment
thought. As with the faculties of reason and passion, no formal definition of interest is given in
The Federalist. As a common currency of epistemological discourse, moral philosophy and
political economy it is not hard to see the general orbit within which Publius’ use of the term
revolves. The ambiguities of interest, endemic to the broader discourse, are likewise found in The
Federalist. There are numerous configurations of interest. The term does double duty as a
motivation generated by impulse, or one properly tempered by reason. It is not so much a novel
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rendering of the concept which Publius provides, but the uses to which it is put in order to describe
the mechanics of power that will restrain passions detrimental to ordered liberty.
Publius’ usage reflects the historical trajectory of the term. Interests can be real or apparent,
private or public, individual or common. Interest can be viewed in the shorter or longer terms, and
can be understood more narrowly or broadly, well or poorly.131 Multiple types of interest
correspond to multiple types of agents under discussion. This answers the question of Whose
interest? It could be the interest of a nation-state acting on the world’s stage, or the common interest
of a nation in its domestic affairs. Interest could also reflect economic, religious and political
factions, as well as the individual officeholder or citizen in society. Officeholders could be acting
on behalf of their own self-interest or as a partisan on behalf of a factional interest. They could act
on behalf of regional or economic constituencies no less than the collective interest of the nation.
Publius’ conception of interest is framed in terms of man qua man, not merely as homo
economicus. Despite the political orientation of his concerns, man is seen as a whole. There is no
doubt of the centrality of economic self-interest in The Federalist’s understanding of political
psychology. The need for material well-being is a central component of human nature. The liberal
orientation of Publius and The Founders, built around the interlocking elements of Modern Natural
Rights, limited government, comfortable self-preservation, and a more modest conception of
human existence, all point to a central role for the pursuit of material well-being. This theme is
evident in Hamilton’s discussion of commercial republics and Madison’s analysis of liberty,
property rights and economic factions in No. 10. Madison asserts that the protection of men’s
faculties “from which the rights of property originate…is the first object of government.”132 This

131

Maynard Smith. “Reason, Passion and Political Freedom in the Federalist,” The Journal of Politics.
Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1960). pp. 527-28.
132
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. The Federalist Papers. New York: Signet Classics, 2003. p. 73.

483

economic focus is underwritten by some of their intellectual forebears such as Locke,
Montesquieu, Hume and Adam Smith. All touch on the psychological implications of wealth for
society. Hume, for example, tends to treat interest as synonymous with the “avidity of acquiring
goods and possessions” or he “love of gain.”133 Unlike Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Smith all placed
great emphasis on the protection of property as the central function of government. The role of
property placed economic interests at the center of their visions of civil society. Locke concluded
that “the great and chief end” of government was the preservation of property.134 Montesquieu
asserted “the public good consists in every one's having his property…invariably preserved” by
the laws.135 Despite his differences with Locke regarding the naturalness of property, Hume placed
the protection of property at the center of law and government’s administration of justice.136 Adam
Smith conceived of interest in primarily economic terms. For Smith interest was desire to be more
well off.137
Despite the vision of America as a commercial republic, The Federalist hardly reduced all
forms of interest to economic well-being. Historian Douglass Adair is credited for recuperating
the central significance of other motives to the Founders and The Federalist concealed under the
impact of Charles Beard’s economic determinism. Beard concluded the primary psychological
motive of the Founders in shaping the Constitution was economic class-interest. This motive was
said to determine the nature of the document as much as their account of the Founding. Adair
explicitly rejected the Beard’s premise that the “framing of the Constitution was reducible to
simple economic interest.”138 Instead he asserted there were moral and intellectual motives at
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work.139 Adair believed that the Founder’s experiences “led them to redefine their notions of
interest and had given them, through the concept of fame, a personal stake in creating a national
system dedicated to liberty, to justice, and to the general welfare.”140 He acknowledged fame as a
central motivator at the Grand Convention and in the penning of The Federalist. Fame, of course,
was not immune from the general accusation of self-interestedness Beard had levelled at the
Founders.
Beard’s aspersions aside, The Federalist’s framing of the psychological motors of civil
society extends well beyond material self-interest. This, if for no other reason than the necessity
of confronting all relevant assets and threats deriving from the passions. Publius never entertains
the notion that economic self-interest alone, could product public virtues. His rhetoric is often
concerned with public passions and virtues. Among the numerous motives mentioned which fall
under the category of private interest, many are not directly connected with economic well-being
at all. They understood the human soul as more expansive and acknowledged that, as least in the
few, material reward was not their greatest ambition. No doubt they speak of “enterprise”,
“industry”, “venality” and “avarice.” But they also speak of motivations, particularly of men who
pursue office, such as “self-love”, “ambition,” “the love of power”, “the desire of pre-eminence
and dominion,” “the jealousy of power”, “pride”, “vanity”, “fear”, “love of fame,” fear of infamy,
obscurity or humiliation, “revenge”, “hatred”, “honor”, “nobility” and “philanthropy”, to name
just a few. Meanwhile in No. 10, factions based on religious and political opinion are no less a
concern, as ones deriving from the division of labor.
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There are four related categories of interests at work in The Federalist. First, interest exists
on a continuum from more passionate to more rational. Impulsive interests are set in contrast to
self-interest rightly understood. This continuum cuts through all the other related categories of
interest. Second, there is a distinction between real and merely apparent interests. Third, is a
temporal distinction been short and long-term interests. Lastly, there is a spatial and numerical
distinction pertaining to the interests of the one or few who are immediately present, and the many
who are at varying degrees of distance. This represents the contrast between the partial interest of
an individual or faction in contradistinction to common interest of the whole. All these categories
intersect in a variety of ways. They are configured by those interests which act more like passions,
and those more tempered by reason.
Apparent interests, for example, stood in contradistinction to “true interest.”141 True
interests are those which represent a genuine good to the individual and their community in
contrast to the “temporary delusion” of immediate impulse. Therefore immediate interest is
associated with a merely apparent interest, rather than a true one.142 Short-term interests are more
like passion, while longer term ones involve greater rational foresight. Hamilton speaks of
“immediate interests”143 as synonymous with “private passion,”144 “strong passion,” and
“momentary interest”145 An immediate interest represents a “transient impulse” or “sudden breeze
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of passion.”146 Madison describes it as an “impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate
gain.”147 Such interests are more connected to passion than reason.
Immediate interests are both “temporary and partial considerations.”148 Interest has both a
temporal and spatial dimensions. Immediate interests are directed toward objects in the immediate
present which are in the immediate presence of the individual. They do not consider that which is
distant or remote in either time or space. They are “temporary” because they lack rational
forethought of the future. They are “partial” because they do not consider others, or the situation
as a whole. A situation not only includes the future, but other people not immediately present and
their interests. Partial interests neglect the common interest for the sake of immediate self-interest.
Publius generally associates immediate impulse with self-interest, while “distant,”
“remote,” enlarged, refined, or “permanent” interests are connected with the public good.
Hamilton sets “immediate interests” in contrast to “general or remote considerations” of justice.
“Temporary or partial considerations”149 do not reflect the “enlarged and permanent interest” of
the larger political community.150 “Men,” he writes are “inclined to prefer present interest to distant
and remote; nor is it easy for them to resist the temptation of any advantage, that they may
immediately enjoy, in the apprehension of an evil, that lies at a distance from them.”151 Hume says
there is “no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which
leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more
according to their situation than their intrinsic value.”152 When Publius asserts that republican
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institutions have the capacity to “refine and enlarge the public views” he is claiming that the
constitutional arrangement is designed to encourage and compel individuals at all levels of society
to clarify and broaden their opinion of their own interests in the direction of greater and greater
conformity with the common one. 153
Publius account of the countervailing passions at work in the interests leaves open the
possibility that either passion or reason provide the ballast against raw impulses. Clearly
immediate, momentary or partial interests are more like passions, while a “common”, “enlarged”
or “permanent interest” are more influenced by reason. Publius often speaks of the restraining role
of reason, but we cannot leave out the possibility that this role is actually achieved by adjudicating
in favor of beneficial passions which act as breaks on destructive ones. When he speaks of how
“the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought” to “prevail over the views of its rulers,”
the word “sense” walks a fine line between a form of thinking and a form of feeling.154
Publius leaves no doubt on the vital and necessary role of reason to interest. If the true
interests of the political community are to be fulfilled, passion must give way to reason. 155 It is
“the reason, alone, of the public that ought to control and regulate the government.”156 Meanwhile,
“the passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government”157 because they do not
“conform to the dictates of reason and justice.”158 Madison says it is “the mild voice of reason”
which pleads “the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest.”159 Hamilton writes that it is “the
deliberate sense of the community” in contrast to “every sudden breeze of passion” or “every
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transient impulse,” which “should govern the conduct” of its representatives.160 It is the men of
“wisdom” who can “best discern the true interests” of the people.”161 Publius endorses a version
of what Tocqueville would later call “self-interest rightly understood.” Self-interest rightly
understood was achieved with an essential component of reasoning. Here “immediate impulse” is
tempered by “cool and sedate reflection.”162 This interest reconciles the needs and claims of the
individual with the needs and claims of the political community. Self-interest rightly understood
represents the most rational way to satisfy one’s desires in conformity with the rights of others. It
does not merely involve choice in the means of satisfaction, but the rational modification of the
object of desire itself. This vision of impulse restrained by rational reflection and deliberation
harkens to an older Aristotelian tradition.
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VI.

Inventions of Prudence

1. Auxiliary Precautions

Publius and the Founders were keenly aware of Machiavelli’s insight that the act of
founding centers on the proper ordering of institutions.1 Madison and Hamilton held a quiet but
firm optimism regarding man’s capacity for republican self-governance if provided a system of
properly ordered institutions. In light of the frailties of human nature, genuine self-government
was only possible with such institutions. Man could be freely entrusted with the powers of office
only with “carefully constructed mechanisms of self-government.”2 Their focus on proper ordering
presupposed that no amount of individual virtue can compensate for bad institutions in the pursuit
of good government.
Machiavelli’s emphasis on virtuous institutions was a partial rejection of Aristotle’s cycle
of regimes, which distinguished between virtuous and corrupted versions of the same forms. This
distinction rested on the existence or lack of virtue in the ruling class. What mattered for Aristotle
more than the arrangement of virtuous institutions, was the existence of virtuous men. Aristotle
generally prioritized the matter of government over the form.3 Form was a function of matter. The
Modern emphasis on institutions is the product of taking men as they are, and recognizing the
natural scarcity of virtue. Virtuous matter is the exception rather than the rule. Good government
would be achieved through sound institutions, rather than being left to the mercy of fortune or a
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hoped-for arrival of virtuous men. If the founder desires to skirt fortune, he must take matters into
his own hands, and recognize that good government is a matter of proper ordering.
In order to establish good government, it is necessary to make “the proper deductions for
the ordinary depravity of human nature.”4 All threats to the common good emanate from the
limitations of human nature. The passions do not simply conform to the demands of reason and
justice. Jefferson spoke for all the Founders when he wrote, that “in questions of power…let no
more be heard of confidence in man.”5 They recognized self-interest as the “driving force of human
nature with which constitutions must contend.”6 To accept self-interest as the rule of conduct for
all human beings is to reject Aristotle’s distinction between virtuous regimes and their corrupt
counterparts. Machiavelli and Hobbes rejected this distinction and collapsed the higher form into
the lower. In matters of the rule of one, said Hobbes, the distinction between monarchy and tyranny
was only a matter of perception, not substance. This was because all monarchs act on self-interest
in a manner no different than any tyrant.7 Reckoned together, the people who form the matter of
any regime are by nature no more or less virtuous. Therefore, the primary criterion of a sound
regime is its form, not its matter. Since self-interested conduct was taken as given, the goal was to
design a set of institutions which at some “positive cost,” could curb the worst excesses of human
nature.8
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Since the founder cannot depend on the coincidence of wisdom and political power,
Modern political science conceived of government primarily as a restraint against the
destructiveness of the passions. Madison presents the two central functions of government in the
negative. “In framing government which is to be administered by men over men,” Madison writes,
“the great difficulty lies” in enabling “government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.”9 The central task is to arrange institutions in order to restrain the two
humors of human nature. Government must simultaneously manage threats originating in the few
who rule, and the many who are ruled. The primary task of government is then a negative
restraining function. This negative depiction of government is the product of the Founders’
observations of the scarcity of virtue and the perceived foolhardiness of those who attempt to
depend on virtue. Government is no longer primarily a positive platform for human flourishing
and excellence. The goal is not to habituate men to virtue, but stave off systemic vice. If men are
not good, properly ordered institutions must be designed to prevent them from being bad. Publius
argues that the ordering of institutions must compensate for human frailty. Designing institutions
commensurate to human nature is a juggling act between what Publius called his “circumspection
and distrust” and his “confidence” that man is capable of governing himself if provided the proper
institutions.
Machiavelli once promised a “perpetual republic” whose institutions would “have a
remedy for every danger and would represent a perfect conquest of the fortunes that sooner or later
brings down every human institution.”10 The central threats to the success and longevity of any
regime come from two sources: human nature and fortune. One is constant and predictable, the
other is not. Despite man’s unchanging nature, it is most inclined to exhibit its capricious

9

No. 51.
Niccolò Machiavelli. Discourses on Livy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. p. xlii.

10

492

variability in unforeseen or extreme circumstances and situations. Thus, the proper ordering of any
constitution involves accommodating both these potential seeds of destruction. Government must
employ and contain human nature as effectively as possible, yet maintain flexibility enough to
respond to circumstances which can never be entirely foreseen. Flexibility is freedom for those in
power to meet the demands of unforeseen circumstance. And, yet the unfettered use of power leads
to its abuse. Since human nature cannot be changed, the goal of the Constitution was to devise
circumstances of choice and action for society and government alike, by means of properly ordered
institutions, which would encourage their better angels and mitigate their weaknesses. This remedy
for the maladies of human nature hinged on contriving constitutional circumstances in such a way
to encourage the right faculties and motives of individuals under its yoke.
Institutions must compensate for the defects in human nature. They must supply the “defect
of better motives.” Absent angels who would rule and be ruled, institutions are the only means to
provide the necessary sentinels and precautions which might supply the deficiency of motives in
man’s nature. They must provide the powers and functions to govern the people at large, but must
also be arranged in such a way as to regulate the passions of rulers naturally inclined by their
ambition and love of power to wield those powers in destructive ways. Government is by definition
power concentrated. Concentrated power unchecked is tyranny. Yet, power must be sufficiently
concentrated in order to govern the people decisively. At the same time this concentration needs
to be stymied and checked without the diminution of government’s ability to perform its core
functions efficiently.
Nature and circumstance conspire to ensure that the supply of virtuous men, or their
willingness to govern, is never guaranteed. History demonstrates that wisdom and power rarely
coincide. Ideally, a “well-designed system of government” should allow men in the free “exercise
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of their political faculties” and encourage those “fit characters” who were most desirable.11
Institutions must encourage the virtuous to rise to office and restrain those of lesser character. In
No. 68, Hamilton says with feigned optimism that, “It will not be too strong to say, that there will
be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and
virtue.”12 Yet, in No. 57 he hedges this claim writing that the “aim of every political constitution
is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual
precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust.” 13 If the
Constitution could guarantee the necessary supply of virtuous men, a whole range of “effectual
precautions” against vice might have been dispensed with altogether. Publius’ regular refrain of
man’s depravity leaves no doubt that the Constitution is designed to withstand the expected
frailties of human nature and the scarcity of virtue they produce.
This account of human nature obliged Publius and the Founders to recognize that
“enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”14 If they could not depend on a regular
source of virtue, they were compelled to depend on good institutions. If all men were not simply
good, the only alternative would be to make them good through good institutions. While it would
no longer be the business of “government to cultivate virtue and to improve souls,” Publius
understood the necessity of reason and virtue for good government.15 Mansfield says that “virtue
is encouraged but subordinated to liberty.”16 Virtue was not to be the end of this novel republic,
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yet it remained a vital and necessary means to good government. Virtuous institutions of the proper
design could be capable of producing virtuous men. Such institutions must be imposed in a manner
such that men were not simply free to entirely reshape them at a whim in their own image and
likeness. Speaking of the origins of the Roman Republic, Cicero wrote that “if the state had not
had such morals, then the men would not have existed; nor, if such men had not been in charge,
would there have been such morals as to be able to establish or preserve for so long a common
wealth so great and ruling so widely.”17 Great men make good institutions, and good institutions
have the ability to make men good.18 Virtuous institutions encourage those of excellence character
to occupy them, but also have the power to take men as they are and make them as they need to
be.
The need for good institutions is a recognition that natural virtue cannot be the only check
on the abuse of government power. Hamilton and Madison knew it was in vain to believe that most
men would subordinate their partial interests to the public good.19 Hume thought it was certain
“self-love, when it acts at its liberty…is the source of all injustice and violence; nor can a man ever
correct those vices, without correcting and restraining the natural movements of that appetite.”20
Therefore, government must establish “the degree of authority required to direct the passions of
… society to the public good.”21 From this Spinoza concluded that “no society can exit without
government and force, and hence laws to control and restrain the unruly appetites and impulses”
of all men.22 “Given the universal venality and lust of human nature,” Publius and the Founders
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knew “that the natural tendency of all governments was to grow in power and for liberty to
decline.”23 Such was the case of Rome. Cicero had lived in the senescent age of the Roman
Republic, decaying as it had over time by the inherent weaknesses of its own constitution. These
weaknesses gave opportunity to men lacking in virtue, and such men gave rise to bad government.
The Constitution would bind down men and their vices. Necessary was a constitution “that could
tame and temper the passions through its institutional arrangements.”24
The Federalist’s account of the problems and solutions of government created by human
nature are not rhetorically dressed up in abstractions or impersonal forces. Government marks the
nexus of people and power. Henry Kissinger once remarked that “As a professor, I tended to think
of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference
personalities make.”25 Learned in books as they were, the years of experience collectively had by
Publius and the Founders gave them a first-hand understanding of politics as power, people and
their ambitions. Publius defines the constitutional order in terms of specific people, with specific
powers and functions, operating within a specific arrangement of institutions and procedures. He
recognizes politics and government consists of institutions animated by individuals and their
psychological faculties. Publius describes the life of the Constitution as consisting of concrete
circumstances coupled with the personalized forces and drives of the human soul which motive
individuals to act in the ways they do. The nexus of people and power demonstrates why faculty
psychology is so central to The Federalist’s account of the Constitution. It speaks not of a
disembodied rationality or an imagined public sphere with a transcendent good, but of the jostling
and collision of one man’s interest upon another, one man’s ambitions upon another. In No. 51
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Madison twice acknowledges how the powers and procedures of any office are animated by the
personal interests and ambitions of its holder.
When Publius describes the workings of government, he does not resort to disembodied
forces of history or arcane abstractions of the closet speculator. He speaks not of “progress,”
“deliberative democracy,” “public reason.” or a “general will.”26 For Publius politics and history
were solely a product of human nature tinctured with exogenous circumstances never entirely in
man’s control. Fortune was the impersonal foil to man’s personal ambitions. There is no notion of
a spirit driving history, of history as the unfolding of an inevitable process of progress, or as the
product of a grand dialectic of ideologies where political actors are merely their unwitting pawns
or victims. Ideas inhered in sects and individuals with interests and ambitions of their own.
Publius does not describe a “deliberative democracy,” but a “wholly popular”
representative republic. In this indirect form of democracy officeholders and the public deliberate
within the bounds of the powers and procedures of the Constitution. “Wholly popular” signifies
that the people, not an abstraction, are the true sovereigns. Thus, the question of Who rules? still
matters. The Constitution dictates who rules and how. When Publius asserts that it is not passion,
but the reason, or the “deliberate sense of the community,” that ought to “ultimately prevail,” he
is referring to specific people employing concrete faculties of mind which culminate in
constitutionally sanctioned decision and action. This deliberative sense is primarily instantiated in
the legislature, as the public body which reasons on behalf of the people. The deliberative process
involves reasoning together. Reason is not an abstraction floating above the heads of thinking
individuals and groups. Instead, it is a verbal noun referring to what men and women do privately
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or together. Publius speaks of representatives acting in their legislative capacity attempting to
reason and think together in public view. Reasoning is thinking which postpones impulsive action.
Representatives can reason well or poorly in light of their long-term interests. Often, only time
will tell. Reasoning does not specify the nature of the outcome of the deliberative process. What
was “reasonable” at the time was simply what fell within the bounds of the Constitution’s powers
and procedures, and was capable of gaining a constitutional majority.
The Federalist makes no mention of anything like a supervening “general will”, nor any
abstract Thomist notion of “The Good.” The public good is not a Platonic Form, but the
culmination of concrete institutional process. There is no notion of a supposed good independent
of individuals and their psychologies acting within the parameters of the Constitution’s procedures
and their outcomes. Publius’ references to the “public good” or the “common interest,” speak to
goods defined by the outcome of those procedures. Indeed, there is a constitutional good. The
constitutional good is established concretely amongst sects and individuals contending within the
institutional system of the Constitution. Institutions establish the prescribed powers and procedural
channels for public dispute and deliberation including the concrete criteria for their definitive
resolution. Constitutional deliberation achieves, not a general will, but a constitutional majority
and consensus.
The institutions of government are not marked by the effect of abstract causes, but by the
force of human psychology. Government marks a confrontation of political power and human
personality. Hamilton makes no bones regarding the original sources of government’s tendency to
expand, accumulate and concentrate its powers: this original cause is “the love of power.”27
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Jefferson asserted political power offers “the greatest temptations” to man’s venal nature.28 The
flaws in human nature necessitate government, but also necessitate controls on government.
Government must also govern itself. This second problem is more pressing than the first. History
demonstrates that ruling over the apolitical many is the easier task because government has the
monopoly of legitimate authority and force, while the many naturally tend to acquiesce to the
mastery of the ambitious who are themselves determined to rule. Even the problem of majority
faction remains a problem of government governing itself. Rulers are a self-selecting group, whose
ambitions distinguish them from the many. Ambition and interest are the inevitable springs which
animates this class of human beings to ascend to political office.
Underlying the two-fold problem of government identified by Madison is the perennial
conflict between the ambitious few and the less ambitious many. The few are by nature political
animals, while the many merely seek to avoid domination and pursue private self-interest. In
government the love of domination finds the ultimate instrument of its satisfaction, making its
offices naturally attractive to the ambitious. Power and ambition are a natural, yet menacing,
combination. Institutions, by their nature, grant such passions immense powers and provide the
opportunity to satisfy themselves at the expense of the people. Experience taught Publius and the
Founders “that the passions of mankind were the permanent problem of politics and that it was
only by a fixed and formidable constitution that they could be made to yield to the weaker restraints
of reason.”29 Since the American regime is based on the principle of popular sovereignty and good
government is sought for the many not merely the few, those who rule must themselves be ruled
by something other than their own appetites. At the Convention Roger Sherman said: “From the

28

Garrett Ward Sheldon. The Political Philosophy of James Madison. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2001. pp. 24-25.
29
Gary McDowell. “Liberty’s Vestal Flame.” Times Literary Supplement. No. 5013(April 30, 1999). p. 12.

499

nature of man we may be sure, that those who have power in their hands will not give it up while
they can retain it.”30 Adams simply wrote: “All men would be tyrants if they could.”31
Despite the ambition to craft an American republic on the rule of institutions over men, we
must now turn to the inevitable role played by human nature and character. Even if men are ruled
by institutions, they are destined to strive against their boundaries and each other in the quest to
enhance their power. Institutions must be designed to withstand the force of bad character and
corruption and provide mechanisms for their remedy. Ancient political philosophy had placed a
premium on the ruling faction of a regime. Thus, “the most important question to ask” about any
regime was: Who rules?32 More to the point, Whose psychology and interests rule? Whether the
one, few or many, all constitutions were defined and structured with respect to the nature of those
in power. What defined the character and fate of a given regime was its politeuma, or ruling class.33
The regime and its constitution were “identified with the class of citizens who rule” as they are
“the source of the laws.”34 Those in power rule by impressing their character and way of life on
the political community through those laws. The ruling classes make society in their own image
and likeness. The psychology of the community at large is then fashioned by the nature of the soul
of the ruling class. In a democracy the majority impress their psychology on all classes, just as
oligarchs or timocrats impress their character on the political community and its way of life. The
character and core motives of the rulers shape the constitution, not vice versa. Despite the strong
shackles the Constitution places on rulers, American history testifies to the fact that the character

30

James Madison. Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison. Athens:
Ohio University Press, 1966. p. 266.
31
C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 46.
32
Harvey C. Mansfield. “Machiavelli’s New Regime.” in Machiavelli’s Virtue. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1966. p. 236.
33
Plato. The Republic (trans. Allan Bloom). New York: Basic Books, 1991. pp. 440.
34
Ibid.

500

of its statesmen and leaders has often penetrated beyond those restraints and impressed itself on
American society for better and worse.
Ancient political thought and practice only understood class constitutions. Three classes of
men, the one, the few and the many, were legally recognized and reflected in the nature and
structure of regimes. For thousands of years, some version of these classes and their order of rank,
was understood merely as a social and political reflection of the cosmic order of things. Class
hierarchy was simply an expression of the inequalities and diversity of human nature. The mixed
regime, for example, was not divided by three branches with three distinct functions, but mixed
three institutions expressing the interests of three classes of men. Institutions and laws were merely
the product of the interests and psychology of a particular class rather than abstract principles or
impersonal political ideologies which have become so prominent in the last two centuries. In light
of their freedom as rulers to impose their interests, their virtue was the only sentinel of good
government. The possibility of good government was largely, if not entirely, dependent on their
character.
The personalized vision of government is illustrated in Madison’s assertion, that despite an
emphasis on institutions, government remains rule of men over men. Lurking in this statement is
the observation that political community involves the perennial conflict between the few and the
many. By definition a republic, in contradistinction to a pure democracy, operates through the
principle of representation which always guarantees rule by an elite minority. If government is the
rule of men over men, a conflict between the few who rule and the many ruled is inevitable. At the
Convention Hamilton observed that, “In every community where industry is encouraged, there
will be a division of it into the few and many.”35 The Federalist describes the Constitution as a
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structure devised with “the goal of regulating the conflict between the few and the many” and their
relative psychologies.36 “Give all power to the many,” asserted Hamilton on the floor of the
Convention, “they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few they will oppress the many.”37
Both Hamilton and Madison framed this conflict largely in terms of the distinction between
economic classes. Madison spoke of the political consequences of the “unequal distribution of
property” defined by differences in “degree and kind.”38 At the Convention Pinckney recognized
three politically relevant economic classes: “professional men,” “commercial men,” and a “landed
interest.”39 Despite the denial of legal classes, it was inevitable American society would be broken
into political, social and economic ones.
Part of the Constitution’s psychological management of the passions involves negotiating
the humors of the few and the many. The question of managing the passions and interests of the
few and the many is implicit in Madison’s assertion that government must control the governed,
and control itself. Despite the popular nature of the American republic, it is not hard to see the
inflection of Aristotle’s distinction between the few and the many and their respective
psychologies throughout Publius’ analysis.40 The Constitution guaranteed to every citizen “a right
to the same protection and security.”41 The question of balancing the needs and demands of the
few and the many is a matter of how to maintain fidelity to the principle of a wholly popular regime
in the face of differing circumstances, faculties, passions and opinions of men which give rise to
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factional conflict between them. One obvious challenge to a regime premised on equal rights, is
that humanity naturally divides itself into unequal camps of the few and the many. The natural
self-seeking of both sides poses a permanent threat to the equality of civil rights, as both attempt
to coopt and bend the powers of government to their own purposes. How is a regime dedicated to
a specific vision of human equality to cope with the other dimensions of human nature which make
them unequal?
At the Convention, Charles Pinckney spoke of the nation as a near classless society. “The
great body of the people,” said Pinckney, “among whom there are no men of wealth, and very few
of real poverty.”42 Pickney denied their existed any fundamental distinction between the few and
the many in American society. Instead there was “one great and equal body of citizens ... among
whom there are no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of fortune.”43 Madison and Hamilton,
for reasons empirical and philosophical, rejected this image of American society based on the facts
and those of human nature.
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison cagily asserted that “there can be no doubt that
there are subjects to which the capacities of the bulk of mankind are unequal.”44 Nor is it clear they
saw a near classless society as a positive good, or goal of the American republic. In No. 10 Madison
strongly recognizes that republican liberty combined with equal protections of law, necessarily
leads to unequal outcomes. Inequality then was a function of human nature and its faculties under
conditions of freedom and equality under law.
Despite the central role played by the middle class as a politically and economically
stabilizing force, the American regime, as all others before it and since, formed natural divisions
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between the few wealthy and the many who are relatively less wealthy. These are the two elemental
constituents of matter American society and government must work with and work on. Just as with
Aristotle, in our constitutional republic, the few rule and the many are ruled. This political
distinction runs parallel to economic inequalities and vice versa. The broad nature of the
relationship remains unchanged even as the mechanisms of rule differ. A Natural Rights republic
recognizes civil rights for all as a product of its recognition of a common and equal human nature.
Civil rights are guaranteed to all by citizenship, yet political rights are guaranteed only to those
few who gain them through a combination of fortune and ambition. Despite the popular nature of
the American regime, those in government are both a part of and apart from the great mass of
people. While the absence of qualifications of property or heredity to hold office denied the
existence of a permanent political class, once men occupy office, they have distinguished
themselves in political power from those peers not in government.
Despite the egalitarian element of Natural Rights in the nation’s founding principles, the
distinction between the non-political many and the ambitious few is essential to the workings of
government. The Federalist Party of course were not opposed to the few, so long as they formed a
natural aristocracy of merit, rather than an artificial aristocracy, or an oligarchy of birth, inherited
wealth or social status. Jefferson affirmed there exists “a natural aristocracy among men.”45
Jefferson defined an artificial aristocracy as “a mischievous ingredient in government, and
provision should be made to prevent it's ascendancy.”46 In American society a natural aristocracy
of merit would persist “despite the abolition of formal ranks and titles.”47 No one had any doubt
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that the new republic ordained a constitutional aristocracy, in the form of the people’s
representatives who would rule the nation.
Our liberal democracy appears to avoid the pitfalls of the few and the many intrinsic to
class constitutions. There are no Optimates and Populares inscribed in our constitution. And yet,
in No. 10 Madison recognizes the intrinsic conflict between “those who hold, and those who are
without property,” because they “have ever formed distinct interests in society.”48 Plato had said
that oligarchy create two cities within one, factions of rich and poor. Aristotle’s rejoinder was that
all cities were in nature two, and thus the seeds of factional strife and constitutional decay were
forever sown into political community. For Aristotle the problem of all regimes revolved to a large
degree around tensions between the few and the many in a see-saw struggle between oligarchic
and democratic tendencies. If the few oligarchs were too powerful they would make laws to
insulate their political power and wealth and deny opportunity to a now politically and
economically disenfranchised many. If the many democrats took power the concern was
confiscatory policies borne of jealousy which expropriate wealth from the few. Economically the
central political problem was to avoid excessive factional strife between the two which leads to
constitutional decay, and in the case of republics the decay of liberty and equality.
In class constitutions the very recognition of each faction of society guaranteed class
conflict. Machiavelli’s analysis of the history of Rome illustrates the corrupting potential of class
conflict and the way in which a class constitution guarantees that all conflicts are conceived and
framed through the lens of class. The innovation of our Constitution is based on the assumption
that direct class conflict is not inevitable.49 Machiavelli and Publius obviously rejected the image
of society as a static order, like Plato, and instead favored one where factional jostling leads to
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dynamic equilibrium. But the Modern dynamic perspective did not conclude that all forms of
conflict were created equal. Unlike the “class warfare constitution” which defined virtually all
regimes up to the time of the Founding, “the Constitution assumes relative economic equality in
society.”50 Since the Constitution makes no explicit provision for the recognition of class
distinctions the government is open to all and in theory represents the people. And yet this same
feature means there is no guarantee all the people will be represented uniformly or equally.
The lack of guaranteed representation for all classes makes possible the capture of all
branches of government by a single elite faction or economic interest. Unlike a class constitution,
the lower classes have no tribunate to guarantee their political voice. This problem is solved in
theory by the separation of powers, the distribution of government through federalism and the
nature and number of offices and their mode of appointment. The House of Representatives, being
closest to the people, was supposed to guarantee more direct responsibility to all people of a
district. Meanwhile the Senate, derived from the state legislatures, was by nature more
aristocratical. The presidency is a mixture. Voted on by the entire nation, yet his appointment is
still filtered through the principles of federalism manifest in the electoral college. Nonetheless,
since the Constitution is blind to feudal distinctions, it lacks the very safeguards against class
government made possible by the political capture of all branches by a single class of society. A
classless constitution therefore does not do away with the distinction and conflict between the few
and the many. No constitution can do away with the distinction between the few who rule, whether
by heredity or election, and the many who are ruled.
This distinction between the few and the many runs throughout The Federalist Papers. The
few may be the few reasonable, virtuous and wise, or the few wealthy and educated, or the few in
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the halls of power. The many are typically characterized by their more passionate nature and less
elite status in terms of wealth, education and prestige. Hamilton and Madison repeatedly refer to
the impulsiveness which arises, not so much in the many at large, but when a large group of any
class of people are brought together, such as in legislative assemblies, to decide matters of public
policy. “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed,” Hamilton asserts,
“passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates,
every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”51
Lurking is a distinction of the different psychologies and motivations of the few and the
many. The many will be content to rule through their representatives, while the few seek to rule
directly. Writing to American democrats and Anti-Federalist opposition, The Federalist quietly
divides mankind into “two different natural orders,” the political few and apolitical many.52
Machiavelli speaks of the “two diverse humors” found in human nature. The difference between
the few and the many is in fact a distinction over the nature and magnitude of their acquisitive
desires. The many are closer to homo economicus, seeking material well-being, driven as they are,
by the desire for comfort and the virtues of industry and enterprise. Meanwhile the ambitions of
the few make them political animals by nature. This distinction between the many and the few is
evident in Madison’s discussion of American society at large in No. 10, in contrast to Hamilton’s
analysis of the rare nature of the executive driven by great ambitions. The ambitions of the few
manifests in the desire to acquire, not only wealth, but glory and fame whereas the ambition of the
many manifests as the desire for comfortable self-preservation.53 In The Prince Machiavelli speaks
of those many who “desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great,” while the few
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“great desire to command and oppress the people.”54 In the Discourses, Machiavelli says the few
harbor “a great desire to dominate” while the many “only desire not to be dominated.”55 “Those
who seek glory,” says Mansfield, “despise those who want security, and the latter fear and hate
the former.”56 The few seek to dominate by seeking office, while the many say “Don’t tread on
me!”57
The preamble of the Constitution asserts that the people are the original source of all
sovereignty. Lincoln reminds us that the American regime was founded as a “government of the
people, by the people and for the people.” The people are sovereign and all “streams of national
power ought to flow immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority.”58
The true rulers were to be the people to which the government was to be ever dependent and
responsive. Government was merely a product of the transference of certain rights, and its function
was to protect against the invasion of rights from others and from government itself. But this of
course is not the whole story. Once ratified a written constitution is a social compact which
compels adherence on the part of the contracting parties. It is the true ruler of the American polity.
Once the Constitution is in place, the people, if they do not run for office, only express their
political will through elections. Elections express the people’s opinion of the best candidate or the
lesser of two evils. Selecting one is also about denying the other. Periodic elections are the arch
means to hold government directly accountable to the people. In a liberal democracy rule is called
“representation.” The many authorize the few to wield political power on their behalf.
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Representational government guarantees the political power of officeholders as much as it
restricts the political liberty of the electorate. The political authority of the people is only expressed
at election time. Elections are simultaneously an exercise of political liberty and, a process by
which the people alienate that liberty to a set of temporary rulers. Elections, then, are “essentially
aristocratic, not democratic” in nature.59 Representation through election means the average citizen
turns over their sovereignty to an elected aristocracy at best, or at worst, an oligarchy. Elections
represent a bargain and compromise between the few and the many.60 At their discretion, the many
authorize the few to occupy an office whose power and prestige are in conformity with their
ambition. Likewise, commercial society will provide sufficient objects of desire to those who’s
ambitions fail to rise to the level of political office. In a society where wealth and industry are
virtues, there is sufficient honor to be found in wealth that the “ambitious man need no longer seek
to hold mastery over others.”61 But this logic only goes so far. A sufficient number of the few will
not be satisfied by material well-being alone. Wealth and political power have rarely failed to go
hand in hand.
Whatever ties of dependence and responsibility existed between officeholders and their
constituents on election day, they are partially voided the day after. Once they have voted, the
many no longer have any direct say in their own rule. Once in office rulers are free to rule
independent of the people’s voice until the next election cycle. Officeholders act, not simply
representatives, but as the people’s rulers. Rousseau wrote: “The English people thinks it is free;
It greatly deceives itself; it is free only during the election of members of Parliament. As soon as
they are elected, it is a slave; it is nothing.”62 Instead of an “exercise of freedom,” elections can be
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considered “the surrender of freedom.”63 Only a fraction of the people ever rule directly; only a
fraction exercise genuine political, as opposed to civil, liberty. To translate the principle of
elections into the language of Machiavelli: elections are the process by which the many who
“desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great,” turn over their political power to the
few who harbor a great desire to dominate, “command and oppress” them.64
The perennial conflict of the few and the many presents the central challenge of how to
resolve the factional conflict generated by human nature within the republican form. Publius
believes he has a solution to the history of “misfortunes incident” to republican government.65 He
sought a “republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.”66 Thus, the
ills of popular government demanded solutions which adhered to the principle of popular
sovereignty. Publius identifies the risks of the usurpation of the whole by an interested part,
whether minority or majority. This usurping part of the whole, Madison calls a “faction.” A faction
is “a majority or minority…united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.”67 Publius was obliged to show how the Constitution solves the problems of both the
tyranny of the few and the many. The most obvious tyranny is that of a powerful minority, rulers
who oppress the majority. This oppression is the story of human civilization. The threat of minority
tyranny is a potential feature of all government. Government is by definition a small minority
given a monopoly of power. Given the nature of their dispute with the Anti-Federalists, Publius is
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at great pains to illustrate how the quite powerful government of the Constitution will not recreate
the conditions America liberated itself from in 1776.
And yet, the history of the republican form they sought was exposed to another common
type of factional threat. This form was the rare, yet unstable, flower of history, a free regime
dedicated in principle to the people’s good. Republics were based on popular majoritarian
principles. Since the emergence of pure democracy in Ancient Athens the primary threat to
political stability and the administration of justice came from an interested and overbearing
majority. At the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829 Madison asserted, “In republics, the
great danger is, that the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of the minority.” 68 In a
regime dedicated to majority rule, it is necessary “not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”69
Madison identifies the central ill of republics as the threat posed by the tyranny of the majority.
Experience shows majority tyranny is the natural disease of democratical regimes throughout
history. The emphasis given to this problem by Publius and the Federalist Party was a product of
their observations of Ancient democracies as well as the present failures of the Articles of
Confederation. Madison had already voiced these concerns prior to the Convention in his Vices of
the Political System of the United States.
In Nos. 10 and 51 Madison is concerned with the threat posed to the minorities by an
“interested combination of the majority.”70 A threat arising from “the secret wishes of an unjust
and interested majority” was a problem endemic to free governments.71 Speaking of government
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under the Articles, Madison say, that “Complaints are every where heard…that the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according
to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority.”72 Majority tyranny occurs when “a majority... united by a common
interest or a passion cannot be constrained from oppressing the minority.”73 Here, the interested
majority comes to dominate politically which allows it to “invade the rights of other citizens”
including minorities.74 The enflamed passions of the people carry them “away from sound
government into the violation of the rights of minorities and actions against the interest of the
whole.”75 A regime dedicated to majority rule necessitated additional protections for minorities.
Madison is however rather vague regarding the precise meaning of a “majority.” What does
he refer to by a “majority” in a representative republic? He does not, for example, mention a threat
posed by “the many” or the mob as the Ancients might have. A “majority” implies a political fact.
It is the product of political process, whereas “the many” is a reality of demographics and society
at large. The many might for example be actuated by common malevolent impulse toward a
minority and yet fail to invade its rights because they lack a sufficient grip on the necessary levers
of power. When Madison speaks of majority tyranny it is easy to conclude he is referring to a
majority of the people at large tyrannizing over the few where government fails to control them.
But he does not necessarily seem to be referring to ochlocracy, or the mob rule of Ancient
democracies. The mechanism by which a majority, in a republic compared to a pure democracy,
tyrannizes over minorities, is not identical. It does not require a popular majority to achieve an
electoral college majority in a presidential election, nor is a popular majority of society required
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to gain a majority in the national legislature. Therefore, the central feature of this “majority” need
not be a numerical majority of the population at large, but rather a large swath of society acting in
coordination with a constitutional majority of those in power. Only a constitutional majority could
have necessary weapons of government to tyrannize over a given minority.
In a representative republic any given majority of society can only manifest its will through
the instrumentality of their representatives. In a representative, as opposed to a pure, democracy
the tyranny of the majority can only be achieved with the help of the elected few. Majority faction
is achieved by combination, an alliance between a faction of the many and the few who govern.
To successfully “invade the rights” of minorities requires a majority commandeer the instruments
of government.76 A majority of ordinary citizens can only derive such power through an alignment
of interests with those who wield the powers of government. Likewise, a constitutional majority
of government must align with their constituents to remove checks and consolidate power. This
concentration of power in government is fueled by public support and leads to encroachment and
usurpation, usurpation to invasion.
In a representative democracy, an interested majority is either a majority of government or
a majority of the people able to coopt a constitutional majority. Large factions within and without
government employ each other as mutual instruments to advance their interests at the expense of
a given minority. Either the majority of society has captured a majority of representatives, or
officeholders have succeeded in coopting the collective will of the people against a minority
through demagoguery. Since Ancient times majority tyranny was often considered the product of
an alliance between a champion and the people against the nation’s elites. The passions of the
people would be exploited by “the ambition of enterprising leaders,”77 the demagogue, and the
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“artful leader”78 Populist leaders come to power “by paying an obsequious court to the
people…commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.”79 Majority tyranny in a representative
government, is not so much mob rule, as a particular alliance of the many in society and the few
in the halls of power. Solutions to the problem of majority faction lie in the extended republic and
the Constitution’s system of countervailing forces. Demagogue must be set against demagogue,
the ambitions of one must be set “against the ambition of the other.”80
The first volume of The Federalist claims to provide the republican “remedy” for the
problem of majority faction. This solution was the extended republic which would disperse and
diffuse factions in such a way that they would be unable to coalesce politically into an overbearing
majority. Despite the notoriety of the problem of the tyranny of the majority, Publius spends much
more time in the second volume accounting for how government will control itself. The remedy
was born out of the Federalist Party’s concerned for democratical instability. Meanwhile,
addressing the problems of power concentrated was a nod to the powerful apprehensions of the
Anti-Federalists. It was clear that the inefficiencies and instability of the Articles would likely be
solved by the strong aristocratical nature of the national government proposed by the Federalists.
Yet, the Anti-Federalists believed that this solution merely created new problems. Therefore, in
The Federalist Paper’s transition from the Articles to the Constitution, the problem of faction was
tipped from a threat posed by majorities in society to that of interested minorities in the halls of
government. The second half of The Federalist is dedicated to confronting the problem of the few
and explaining just how they will be “obliged” to govern themselves. Publius’ concerns now turn
to those who rule and “forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their
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important trust.”81 In a representative republic even the tyranny of the majority remains a special
species of the problem of power in the hands of the few. The problem of government is that the
same flawed nature that necessitates being ruled, must also rule.
Despite Madison’s concern for majority tyranny and Hamilton’s hope that only
meritocratic elites would occupy positions in the national government, both recognized the threat
which arises from the elite few. Publius’ concerns about the dangers of concentrated power in the
hands of the few and the need for government to control itself, make clear his concern regarding
the threat posed by the few in power. Publius may be naive regarding threats posed by
“socioeconomic elites” which might form a “natural aristocracy…despite the abolition of formal
ranks and titles.”82 And yet he held no such naivety regarding those elites wielding the powers
granted by the Constitution. John Adams, for example, focused more attention on threats posed by
“the designs of intriguing aristocratic minorities” rather than majority tyranny.83 Thompson argues
this difference is merely one of emphasis. Publius certainly recognized the necessity of binding
the hands of those in power with a written constitution, which denies class distinctions and
promotes the recognition of equal rights.84 To claim Hamilton and Madison did not recognized the
central threat posed by the few is to misunderstand the mechanics of majority tyranny in a
representative republic in which a constitutional aristocracy was anointed.
Man’s “defect of better motives” poses a threat to good government emanating from those
who rule and the people who are ruled. Human nature demonstrates that there “are not enough
‘better motives’ to go around, not enough citizens and politicians who will be animated by motives
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that rise above self-interestedness and the gratification of their own passions so as to get the work
of government and society done.”85 Despite adherence to the principle of wholly popular
sovereignty, elections turn out to be an insufficient guarantee of popular government. If elections
represent an external check on government emanating from the people, such defects also demand
internal “sentinels” and “auxiliary precautions” to constrain the rulers. The problem of how to
regulate the people’s officials, once elected, is the problem with which The Federalist concerns
itself in the second volume. The remedy is to be found in the “proper structure” of government.86
The revolution of Modern political science was to make good government less dependent
on the virtue of a given class, and more on the virtues of the arrangement of its powers. The Modern
state was to be more impersonal than any Ancient republic. It stood as a set of offices and
institutions, independent of and prior to particular holders of office. Rather than a mere vehicle for
the ambition of rulers, it would be a constraint, as much as their instrument. Increasingly the central
question regarding the nature of a given regime evolved from Who rules? to What system rules?
And yet, any system, remains a form built of mortal matter. Despite a dependence on the people
through periodic election, a lurking threat from the ambitions of the few remain. The Modern
political science of Publius and the Founders sought to devise a regime whose institutions would
both select and dictate the character of those who ruled.
The constitutional order is designed for virtue of a certain kind to rise to the top. Publius
makes several references to how the size of each branch and mode of election of each office will
filter and refine potential candidates to those of good character. It is clear that he took this argument
seriously, but also only so far. Certainly, Publius believed that without virtue good government
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was impossible. The question remained: How to achieve it? In articulating a republican form of
popular government, Publius was not only concerned to explain how elections would check those
in power, but to illustrate how government would check itself, through the separation of powers,
absent an impending election. The Constitution is designed to depend as little as possible on the
native character of individual officeholders. The vice of an individual officeholder would be
limited by duration of office, the dilution of their power by the total number of other officeholders,
and by the potential checks and balances of divided government. As described by Publius, the
Constitution does not merely presuppose their vice, it depends on it.
The first solution was to leave offices open to all rather than depend on the uncertain virtue
of a hereditary nobility. Aristotle and Machiavelli keenly observed that a blood-line nobility
provided no guarantees of noble character. Nature dictates that the virtue of one man is not passed
to his progeny through paternity. The Constitution does not recognize legally distinct classes or
titles of nobility. There would be no classical hereditary nobility pre-ordained to rule the many. A
“wholly popular,” constitution meant all offices would derive their authority, by means election,
directly or indirectly, from all of the people. The people would elect officials, and officials could
be drawn from all the people. Offices would be open to any man of merit. “The door,” to the halls
of power, “ought to be equally open to all” says Hamilton.87 Drawing from the whole of society
increased the likelihood of finding the few virtuous willing to rule. In No. 36 Hamilton says “strong
minds in every walk of life... will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command
the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from
the society in general.”88 Hamilton is clearly aware of the distinction between inborn social class
and human merit, and of the natural misalignment between the two found in every society. Opening
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the doors to all was the path to a natural aristocracy. The institutional arrangements of the
Constitution will be responsive to human merit wherever it may be found.
But another step remained necessary to avoid being dependent on the uncertain virtue of
individuals. They hoped to devise a virtuous structure of government that would ‘make’ men good.
Instead of the character of the ruling class defining the constitution of the political community, the
Constitution would define the character of the rulers. The psychology, character and choices of the
rulers would be restrained and channeled by something other than the people’s consent. There
must be additional measures which would oblige government “to control itself.”89 This regime
would not depend so much on the fortunes of which group came to power and their virtue. Rather
the constitutional order was designed to take imperfect matter and make it sufficiently virtuous.
The Constitution would use the very leverage of man’s own egoism, his ambitions and interests,
against himself in order to regulate those same interests. Given the powers they wield, the
ambitious are the only ones truly in the position to thwart the ambitious.
The second volume of The Federalist is dedicated to an illustration of how the provisions
of the Constitution are animated by the faculties of the human soul which motive men’s actions.
Those provisions establish institutions, powers and procedures designed to make men act in accord
with the constitutional good. These institutions are designed to encourage men of natural virtue to
rise to office, and if necessary, to make men good who are naturally otherwise. The solution to the
deficit of virtue was not to reach into man’s soul and change his nature, or enforce a stern education
that would purge vice and habituate virtue. This solution is as destructive as letting man’s passions
reign unchecked. Rulers capable of such remedies are themselves in possession of an unlimited
and concentrated power which gives their own passions an unchecked reign. Instead it was
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necessary to arrange institutional architecture to either leverage destructive passions against
themselves, or channel, coopt and educate less destructive ones toward the constitutional good.
Neither Hamilton nor Madison assumed that institutional architecture could be successful if
dependent on self-interest and countervailing passions alone. Success also depended on fortifying
and encouraging the relatively weak pull of moral sentiment and reason in order to generate virtue.
This architecture would provide the hard undergirding of incentives and deterrents which would
encourage those more delicate and benevolent faculties to flourish.
What Publius describes in the second volume is the ordering of a constitutional republic.
The challenge was to devise institutions which would simultaneously manifest republican
principles in practical structures, and ensure they could actually withstand man’s limitations. Since
moral and political principles do not enforce themselves, muscular institutions are necessary. This
form of government originates with a written constitution dedicated in principle to the res publica,
the public interest, or literally the common thing or property of the people.90 In forming such a
regime there were two dimension of human nature that needed to be addressed as matters of
principle and practice. As a “wholly” popular regime, on one hand, it must be arranged to recognize
the equal rights of all. These rights were a product of nature, or Nature’s god. It must guarantee
civil if not political freedom for all as a product of their common nature. On the other hand, despite
this equality, history demonstrated to Publius and the Founders that the failure of ancient
democratic republics was a product of their inability to properly manage political liberty. Ancient
republics lacked constitutions with the structural fail-safes to guard against the passions of those
in political power. In a Modern democratic republic, political liberty would be a privilege achieved
by the few, not a right guaranteed to the many. This meant that even the people’s sovereignty was
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in a fundamental sense limited. If efficacy and freedom were the principles of this regime it meant
government must have the power to govern, but also the checks which restrain this power and
preserve freedom.
These checks are a function of moral principle and practical utility. The passionate and
interested nature of men inclines those who rule to disregard the public good. The great problem
Publius’ describes in framing government was to thwart the natural tendency toward tyranny which
comes from the “concentration of several powers” in the same hands.91 Publius offers no doubt
that the threat of tyranny was sown into human nature. The interested nature of human beings
meant they would use and abuse power to fulfill their own desires if possible. The coincidence of
opportunity, impulse, and power would result in the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest. The path
from unchecked power to its abuse is traversed by predictable motives. Power unchecked will seek
more power; unchecked power will be abused. Therefore, the only way for government to preserve
the people’s rights and maintain its responsibly to them over time, is for it to be limited in its
powers and scope.
Limits on government are then required by man’s natural liberty and his limitations of
virtue. The problem of government was the problem of the usurpation of power by a faction
whether the few or the many. Limited government must solve the problem of faction. Publius
speaks repeatedly of a “limited constitution” which represents a limited grant of power to
government.92 Limited government, and its various strategies to constrain the passions and
immediate interests of men, is the mechanism designed to supply man’s defect of better motives.
The very nature of limited government means the regular exercise of government power manifests
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as both a positive assertion, but also a negative check on that same power. Efficiency and
impotence of government are two sides of the same coin.
Constitutional limitations begin with a written constitution, with expressed powers, whose
language and institutions are not a matter of opinion, and can be concretely referred to and litigated
in political disputes. A written constitution limits the actions and impulses of those who governed
by expressly enumerating the powers of government. This express grant of authority also defines
powers government cannot arrogate to itself. Despite the claimed inherent powers of the executive
lurking in the penumbra of the text, or found in a crisis, limitations on government are explicit.
Government is limited by powers “herein granted,” as well as the Tenth Amendment which
expressly provides that powers not granted, reside with the states. Despite the absence of the Bill
of Rights during the publication of The Federalist, the Tenth Amendment makes explicit what
Publius took for granted.
Publius’ depiction of limited government is underwritten by a Newtonian paradigm93
common to the day. Government was a system of forces set in motion by human psychology.
Publius envisioned the individual soul and the civil society in mechanical metaphors as a series of
forces and counterforces operating roughly in accord with psychological laws of nature.94 Soul and
society were like a watch whose movements are caused by sufficiently regular, identifiable and
therefore predictable motivational springs. Just as celestial bodies adhere to physical laws of
motion, man and his institutions adhere to psychological laws derivative of universal needs and
desires rooted in human nature. Employing a Newtonian metaphor of physical forces, Hamilton
speaks of how “every political association” is formed like a machine with various concentrations
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of power. The center has satellite powers, or what he calls superior and “inferior orbs” which
operate through a “perpetual effort…to fly off from the common center.”95
In Nos 47-51 Madison treats the structure and functions of government as so many quanta
of power mechanically arranged in accordance with the perceived laws of power gleaned from
experience. In his analysis of the separation of powers, very little space is actually dedicated to the
specific function of each branch, executive, legislative and judicial. Instead, these functions are
reduced to a distribution and arrangement of power. The goal was to properly partition and arrange
not merely branches of government, but power itself. Government, writes Madison, consists of
“several classes of power.”96 It consists of a “general mass of power” whose proper structuring
requires the proper “distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts.”97 Power can
be dispersed, power can be accumulated. Power must be sufficiently concentrated in order for
government to perform its task, and sufficiently divided and constrained in order that it not
overstep its proper limits.
The Constitution is a kind of Newtonian machine of opposing forces. Government is in
perpetual motion. Its actions always tend toward the accumulation of power and the overstepping
of its “proper places.” If government is to be limited, there must be a counterposing force, an equal
and opposite reaction toward this accumulation. Yet the only forces able to counteract government
are the people who do not wield political power, and government itself. The central restraining
features to limit government are “a dependence on the people” and the “auxiliary precaution” of
the separation of powers.98 As a “wholly popular” regime” based on the “consent of the people.”99
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Elections are the primary mode of consent and the expression of the people’s original sovereignty.
The Constitution establishes an unprecedented universal suffrage as well as periodic elections of
different duration. Only the states, whose representatives were sent to the national government,
could define the standards of suffrage, not the national government itself. They are designed to
provide regular opportunity for the people to express their political power and opinion by shaping
the makeup and direction of the national government. Periodic elections make officeholders
permanently accountable to the people and compel them to seek the people’s approval if they hope
to achieve or maintain office. Elections force officeholders to recognize that the constitutional will
of the people, as much as their own political acumen, is responsible for their power. The psychic
pull of the people’s opinion can redirect the immediate impulses of officeholders toward their selfinterest rightly understood.
Elections are, by themselves, insufficient remedy to the maladies to which republics are
exposed. The people control who rises to office, but have no direct constitutional lever once there.
Once the people’s opinion is registered, representatives rule until the next election. This defect of
elections necessitates additional measures to control and limit government.100 This means that the
mere sovereignty of the people, manifest through representational government is not enough to
actually ensure their rule. Oddly, the history of democratical regimes illustrates the paradoxical
principle a simple popular form of government is insufficient to actually achieve genuine popular
sovereignty. The exterior provision of elections is insufficient. This is what Madison means when
he speaks of the need for “auxiliary precautions.”
The central precaution of the Constitution is the separation of powers in all its forms. In
order to achieve and maintain limits, it would be necessary to contrive “the interior structure of
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the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means
of keeping each other in their proper places.”101 The great mass of government power would be
partitioned into smaller powers, and these powers would in turn be set against themselves, if
government is to remain limited. The separation of powers functions on the principle of “divide
and conquer.” In a letter to Jefferson, Madison refers to “divide et impera,” as “the reprobated
axiom of tyranny.”102 The irony of the separation of powers is that the unprincipled axiom
employed by the tyrant to control the people, can be applied no less to control the source of the
abuse of power. The “constant aim” of the principle of separation, in all “distributions of power,”
is “to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the
other.” 103
Madison’s discussion of the workings of the separations of powers is underwritten by the
mechanical analogy of forces and counterforces. The separation of powers seeks to divide and
arrange power in a mechanical system of mutually counterbalancing forces. The goal of the
separation of powers is to keep those “orbs” in place relative to the overall organization of the
machine. The Constitution delegates power broadly. This allocation takes the whole of
government’s power and divides it into fragmentary pieces of the whole. The separation of powers
achieves limits on government not by diminishing the total sum of necessary powers, but through
the division and special distribution of that sum total. Divided government limits power through
the strategy of divide and conquer. When power is divided it is weakened and vice versa.
Government energy and efficiency is only achieved with a broad constitutional consensus or
majority, such as the concurrence of two or more branches. If the three branches illustrate the
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separation within the national government, federalism illustrates the principle across the different
governments. Federalism is a method of limiting power by dividing it between federal and state
governments and setting them against themselves when necessary.
The play of forces in government, its assertion of power, is dynamic. Government is
portrayed as constantly expanding in power. It is an object in motion, constantly and naturally,
attempting to use its powers to accumulate more power. Since government consists of dynamic,
rather than static forces, it requires perpetual restraint. Likewise, the power of each department is
always in action, always dynamic. The proper ordering of institutions “must furnish the proper
checks and balances between the different departments.”104 Each assertion results in the
consolidation of more power if not checked by an opposing force. This opposing force is of course
naturally attempt to expand itself. If forces are properly pitted against one another, their natural
expansion becomes the means by which both remain limited. The attempted expansion of one is,
simultaneously, a check on the other and vice versa. Within this play of forces, there are three
likely outcomes. First, a given power asserts itself unchecked, in which case it expands, and
proceeds to encroach on and usurp other powers. Second, a given department loses power through
encroachment and usurpation by other powers. Lastly, power is maintained in a balance through
the perpetual action and dynamic equilibrium of assertion and checking. Madison warns that in
republics, the historical tendency is that the legislature is “everywhere extending the sphere of its
activities and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”105
The principle of limited government necessitates active and ongoing checks to deter the
expansion of power. Limited government is a parchment guarantee unless and until there exist the
proper agencies empowered with the ability to actively check government, and interested enough
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to motivate the checking action. “Mere declarations in the written Constitution,” writes Madison,
“are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal rights.”106 Madison speaks
of the vital difference between the “theory” of the separation of powers in contradistinction to the
“most difficult task” of providing “practical security” against encroachment of power between
departments.107 This practical task, he writes, is the “great problem to be solved.”108 One power
must have the constitutional means to control and limit the other in practice. In No. 51, Madison
says, “the provision for defence must…be made commensurate to the danger of attack.”109
How then was the separation of powers to lead to real checks and balances? It is actually
clear that prior to the analysis done by Madison, the Convention and The Federalist Papers, the
practical dimension of the separation of powers was not properly or fully understood. Despite the
fact that all the state constitutions were in principle dedicated to limited government, and selfconsciously employed versions of the separation of power, few states hand actually devised their
systems to achieve the aims they claimed their institutions were dedicated to. This resulted in
parchment barriers between the branches of state government whose failures to achieve real
separation are illustrated by Publius.
Perhaps the most important feature of the separation of powers, is that it does not merely
divide power, but sets those divided powers against themselves. “Power controlled or abridged,”
says Hamilton, “is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or
abridged.”110 Yet, just how are parchment barriers transformed into effective practical checks?
Only when powers are properly set against themselves can they check each other and limit
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government. The secret to effective checks is that the partition of power cannot be absolute. This
seemingly paradoxical conclusion, departed from Montesquieu, the “oracle” of divided power.
The key was to not completely separate one branch from another, but to “mix” and “blend” them
so a vital portion of their spheres of power overlap.111
It would be necessary for each department to have a “partial agency” in each of the other
departments.112 Instead of a total and clean separation, there must be overlapping spheres of
influence were multiple departments contend over the same or similar powers and functions. This
means each department cannot possess the whole if its own powers relative to its function. The
legislative must have an element of executive and judicial power, while the executive must have
some element of legislative and judicial power and so on. This overlapping results in similar
powers being exercised concurrently between multiple departments. Overlapping powers are
contested powers. Partial agency creates a site of contested powers where branches compete and,
if no consensus emerges through a constitutional process, mutually restrain one another. Only
through this partial agency can each department actually check the other. So long as sites of
contested powers are maintained between branches, and the competing powers are effectively
equal, they can, if necessary, neutralize each other’s attempted encroachments and usurpations.
The Constitution’s lack of specificity regarding the scope of where one power begins and
another ends, helps to encourage sites of contested power. The senate’s role in the confirmation
process of presidential appointments is clear, but did that also mean they had power to fire or
restrict the firing of an appointment? Likewise, the role of the Senate in passing treaties is equally
clear, but what if a presidential administration simple establishes an unsigned agreement not
technically called a “treaty” that amounted to much the same thing? Does the check of
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impeachment operate under a merely political standard of the interpretation of “high crimes and
misdemeanors,” or is there a legally binding definition based on historical precedent, which
constricts the legislature’s interpretation of those terms? What for example is the scope and limit
of the executive’s discretion in selectively enforcing the laws of congress or the use of military
force? In the 1831 decision, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court checked the state of
Georgia, ruling its laws had overstepped its bounds and were in violation of established federal
law. And yet, ambiguity arose over what lever of power the judiciary had to respond when Andrew
Jackson retorted, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”
The Constitution is not merely a blueprint for the mechanical arrangement of political
functions and powers, but the orchestration of a psychological forces. Oft discussed are the
political mechanics of institutional order, less reflected upon is the psychic dimension by which
those instruments actually achieve their designed ends. The constitutional arrangement of powers
is a system dependent on an underlying set of psychological assumptions and strategies. This
despite Madison’s and Hamilton’s numerous depictions of how these arrangements are animated
by a series of psychogenic forces and dynamics. At a deeper level, beneath the political veneer, is
a mechanism designed as a strategic response to the regular and predictable motives of human
nature. Institutions are actually designed to negotiate man’s psychological kinesthetics. The
enumerated powers of the Constitution are “inventions of prudence” designed to channel and
constrain, rather than transform, expected motivation and conduct.
The Constitution is a mechanism of impulse control. It must provide safeguards against the
tyranny, not only of concentrated powers, but of the passions which wield them. Its provisions
must manage the conflicts which arise from the human psyche in order to establish good
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government. 113 It must solve the “defect of better motives” through the proper distribution and
arrangement of power. Properly order institutions provide external constraints in lieu of man’s
internal lack of self-restraint.114 They manage those passions which pose a perennial threat to
political order and liberty, while promoting and strengthening more vulnerable, but salutary,
motives. Since the Ancient model of repressing the passions through severe moral education was
rejected, the mechanics of power must harness potentially destructive passions in the service of
the constitutional good. Lesser motivations would be regulated through representation and
accountability made possible by periodic elections and the separation of powers.
This Newtonian machine is a roughly law-abiding mechanism, operating according the
reliable and predictable springs of human motivation to be expected when men are taken as they
are. Publius’ observations of human nature led him to conclude political order cannot rely on
motives men ought to have, but only on those they are likely to have, especially when granted
power. Since men are primarily passionate and interested, they cannot restrain themselves through
internal means alone. External regulation of the passions becomes necessary. Lacking internal
restraint, a sophisticated system of external controls is required to mitigate and manage the
impulses of those in power. Since government is “administered by men over men,” institutions
must both contend with and depend on these same inclinations. To control human nature, it is
necessary to obey human nature. Properly ordered institutions will “use human nature to control
human nature, among both governors and governed, without requiring recourse to tyrannical
coercion.”115
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This psychological mechanism is built on a theory of motivation derived from Publius’
paradigm of the human mind and its three motivational faculties: reason, passion and interest. With
this model in hand, he could identify the “laws” by which the machine would operate. By assessing
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these motivations, he concludes that political order cannot
reliably depend on reason, virtue or social passions for the consistent production of action in accord
with the public interest. Passion is the perennial force. Of the passions ambition and the love of
power pose the most vigorous threats. The law of political gravity was the motive of self-interest
deriving from the passions. Like Newton’s laws of motion, men are naturally inclined to act
according to their passions and interests, unless acted upon by some outside force which alters the
trajectory of their thought and action. The various structures designed to limit government are
actually designed to thwart destructive motives or, if possible, redirect them. Institutions provide
incentives to encourage self-interest to align with the public interest. In case the passion cannot be
channeled or reshaped, they must pitted against one another through a system of countervailing
oppositions where motive is set against motive. The principle of the separation of powers is now
applied to psychological forces of human motivation. The force of passion which deviates from
the public good, must be met with an equal and opposite force of similar nature and magnitude.
Publius identifies ambition and its love of power as the passion which represents the arch
threat to the constitutional order. The task of the Constitution and its separation of powers is not
merely to restrain and neutralize ambition, it must also harness it. Ambition sits at the nexus of the
positive and negative functions of government. Ambition is an essential ingredient to govern, but
also represents a threat to the governed. Great, potentially destructive, ambition is the passion of
those few who rule. The Constitution is tasked with transforming the ambition of would-be rulers
and tyrants and making them into genuine representatives, responsible to the people. Its goal is to
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encourage or compel officeholders to recognize the alignment of their self-interest with the
common one. This task depends on the character of officeholders. Yet, virtuous character is a
scarce and unreliable commodity. Since men are not good, they would have to be “made good”
when necessary by the “circumstances and situations” contrived by the Constitution’s arrangement
of powers.
The “defect of better motives” is a defect of human character. How can institutions
compensate for this defect and make men good? Hume says “a remedy” for the ills of human
nature, “can never be effectual without correcting” its propensity to prefer immediate interest to
the remote public good.116 Since it is impossible to “change or correct any thing material” in human
nature, “the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and situations, and render the
observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest and their violation our most remote.”117 To
remedy such defects it was necessary to contrive constitutional “circumstances and situations”
through the proper arrangement of powers, in order generate the correct motives and conduct of
constitutional actors. It is necessary, says Montesquieu, for institutions to place men “in a situation
such that, though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless
have an interest in not being so.”118 Properly arranged elections and the separation of powers are
the two strategies employed to create the appropriate circumstances of choice and action.
Knowledge of how human character responds to circumstance is gleaned through history.
History is the story of a universal nature coming in contact with particular and wide-ranging
conditions. Hume wrote history demonstrates “the constant and universal principles of human
nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations” which acquaint us “with
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the regular springs of human action and behavior.”119 The sweep of history provides the full range
of circumstances, and therefore examples of the full breadth of human conduct, virtuous and
viscous. Experience teaches good conduct is largely dependent on salubrious circumstance. Men
are naturally inclined to do the right thing, when conditions are conducive to good conduct. The
right conditions can make virtue easy. Publius and the Founders hoped to arrange constitutional
circumstances in such a manner as to generate correct motive and conduct. Institutional
circumstances can compel virtue where it does not grow naturally, or when it is corrupted by the
powers of office. The first volume of The Federalist illustrates the institutional failures of
premodern republics, along with the Articles of Confederation, to produce the appropriate
circumstances conducive to good conduct, and hence institutional longevity. Having identified
those circumstances, the Constitution is designed to establish them in perpetuity.
The Constitution’s arrangement of the circumstances of each office, ordained by its
enumerated powers, establishes a system of rewards and punishments. Properly ordered
institutions anticipate predictable motives and actions and neutralize them through the proper
arrangement of incentives and deterrents. Institutions represent Hobbes’ “common power” which
encourages men to fulfill their duties by appealing to their hopes of gain and success, as much as
their fears of failure and loss.120 Circumstances contrived by elections and the separation of powers
are strategically designed to create a series of motivational pressures based on the system’s
deployment of incentives and deterrents. Human beings seek rewards and desire to avoid
punishment. Properly ordered institutions induce the appropriate pleasures and pains which
provide the necessary motives to induce conduct consistent with the constitutional good. Hamilton
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says “the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct.”121 The distribution
of pleasures and pains created by the orchestration of constitutional circumstance, is designed to
deters officeholders from abusing their powers. Circumstances are designed to encourage them to
relinquish their most extreme passions, and in the process, serve their own true interests. Men are
made good by correctly orchestrated circumstances which incline them toward rewards consistent
with the public good while deterrents are meted out on those who attempt to deviate from it.
Institutional circumstances set up a system of countervailing passions, not only between
branches, offices and individuals, but within a single individual. Operating within these
circumstances, officials are pulled in different directions by different passions. The pull of
divergent passions compels them to consider the benefits and costs of the considered alternatives.
These circumstances of decision and action “activate and enhance passions out of which the
virtuous directing sentiments are derived and through which they are enforced.”122 The primary
countervailing passions are ambition and fear. Circumstances are arranged so ambition and fear
constantly contend with one another in the mind of officials. Fear is the most common passion
which enforces virtue. The primal motive is the fear of ‘punishment’, in the form of the loss of
political power. The central reward is fulfilling one’s ambitions by means of attaining, maintaining
and using those same powers. One must stay in office to enjoy its perquisites. Ambition and fear,
reward and punishment are really just two sides of the same psychological coin. Desire for reward
implies hope of gain, while fear of punishment implies the fear of losing that same reward.
Constitutional circumstances must shape correct conduct by appealing to the correct
psychological calculus of incentives and deterrents. Hobbes says “there must be some coercive
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power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some
punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.”123 Fear of
punishment must be more powerful than hope of illicit gain. Motive for right conduct only comes
under circumstances in which the Damocles’ sword of the Leviathan hangs over the heads of those
in power. In other words, if you want individuals to do the right thing, you do not establish an
obligation or prohibition without the necessary power to effectively enforce it. One does not leave
men unguarded with the object of their desire. Auxiliary precautions beyond moral principles are
necessary. The stranger does not rob your house when the front door is locked. Publius would
concur with the neighbor in Robert Frost’s poem Mending Wall. Only “good fences make good
neighbors.” Only by contriving circumstances to compel proper conduct can institutions guarantee
the “convergence of the “ought” and the “is.”124
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2. “All That Government Will Admit…”

The founder’s challenge, of properly ordering institutions, is a problem of human
motivation. Government cannot depend on extraordinarily rare or insufficiently reliable motives.
Institutions, and the circumstances they create, must provide what Hamilton calls,
“incitements…to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.”1 They must fortify motivations
human nature lacks in sufficient abundance by itself. These inventions of prudence must regulate
and check the tempestuous passions residing within human nature. Proper ordering must provide
external constraints for the internal deficiencies of the human soul. They must establish appropriate
constitutional circumstances of choice in order to generate the right motives and conduct. In short,
institutions must provide what human nature does not. What does it mean then, in practice, to
supply the defect of better motives through institutions capable of contriving circumstances of
choice and action in accord with the good of the people? How do the mechanics of the Constitution
actually fulfill the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble?
The challenge of the Constitution is to “reconcile the claims of the individual with the
interests of the broader community.”2 Self-interest does not simply align with the public interest.
Hume says the “original motive for the establishment of justice is self-interest.”3 The common
guarantee of justice to all, is in the interest of all. And yet, self-interest is also served by
transgressing against the public good and avoiding punishment.4 The Constitution must bend the
interest of the individual toward the common one through the proper arrangement of powers. How

1

No. 30
Attorney General William Barr, “Lawful Access Summit” at the Department of Justice, October 11, 2019.
3
Robert S. Hill. “David Hume.” in History of Political Philosophy (edited by Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. p. 550.
4
This is one of the many lessons to be found in Books I & II of Plato’s Republic.
2

535

can the Constitution ensure this-worldly deterrents given men are naturally motivated to outrun
justice? Rulers check the passions of the people. Given their love of power, their interests converge
with their duties. The people are inclined to follow the dictates of justice because government
establishes the circumstances of their existence through law. It is in the interest of the people to
follow the law and in so doing avoid punishment. The avoidance of punishment is its own reward.
It is much less clear how the interests of the rulers will be made to align with the common one.
The Constitution must contrive circumstances in order to harmonize self-interest and the
public good. In No. 72 Hamilton says that the “best security for the fidelity to mankind is to make”
the interest of officeholders “coincide with their duty.”5 The goal of the Constitution is to provide
the necessary arrangement of circumstances and situations whose powers and barriers will educate
and guide passions toward what Tocqueville called “self-interest rightly understood.” Only once
the correct situations and circumstances are contrived by the correct political order are
officeholders and society at large “encouraged” to abandon their impulses for their proper interests.
Properly ordered institutions must encourage, and if necessary compel, officeholders to recognize
the alignment of their self-interest with the common one. Rulers must be habituated by
constitutional circumstances which establish the correct rewards and punishments, pleasures and
pains, in order to bring about this alignment.
The opportunities of office generate competing passions within officials which must be
ordered by the circumstances of office. The countervailing function of elections and the separation
of powers are not however simply intended to neutralize or thwart the asserted powers of the
opposing office, but to pull and “educate” the motives of its occupant in the direction of the
constitutional good. The countervailing strategy operates on the interpersonal and the intrapersonal
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levels. The threat of external checks from other parties, manifests simultaneously as the checking
passion of fear within the individual. The countervailing passions of fear and ambition serve as
“opposite and rival interests,” within the souls of officeholders which supplies “the defect of better
motives.”6 Ambition pulls officials toward immediate self-interest, while fear prods them toward
the common one. One passion prompts individuals to act, the other retards and checks men’s
actions. Few men have the daimonion of Socrates. They require circumstances to check them. Yet,
the demands of government necessitate that its offices not prohibit action altogether. Therefore,
vice is preempted through the threat of external checks. The circumstances of office prod this
countervailing play toward what is constitutionally acceptable. Ambition is met by the equal and
opposite force of fear. Self-interest rightly understood is achieved when ambition is correctly
counteracted and tempered by fear as a consequence of the circumstances of office.
The circumstances of office must be organized in such a way as to pull and align the
passions and faculties of officials in harmony with the people’s interests. In No. 57 Hamilton says
“Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which” representatives “will be bound
to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people.”7 Hamilton refers to these psychological
states as chords of motivation by which those in office are tethered to the people and pulled toward
their good. Hamilton’s language harkens to the image of Plato’s divine puppet whose soul is
actuated by strings which animates its actions in different and potentially contrary ways. Plato
describes how the passions within the divine puppet work “like tendons or cords, drawing us and
pulling against one another in opposite directions toward opposing deeds,” either toward or away
from the common interest.8 The problem as we have seen, is that these internal forces are not
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intrinsically in harmony with one another or the people’s good. They represent disparate and
conflicting sources of motivation, naturally pulling in opposite directions. The Federalist describes
these chords, not as tethered to the gods, but to the people by means of the Constitution.
The divergent tug of each string illustrates how different motivational sources guide men
toward different objects of desire concurrently, and hence toward different courses of action all at
the same time. As such only the proper orchestration of circumstances can bring them into
harmony. The pulls of reason, duty, virtue and sympathy are soft, while the passions of self-love,
ambition and the love or power or glory are ironclad. If reason is to have real efficacy over men’s
actions, its internal pull, needs external allies. The pull of these more delicate forces of the soul
are “in need of helpers.” 9 If constitutional circumstances can be arranged properly, the pull of the
three faculties can work in mutual harmony with one another and avoid vice and conflict. The
“sentinels” and “auxiliary precautions” of the Constitution will act as external constraints on the
passions and assist reason in the process. Institutional circumstances must help overcome the pull
of the passions and reinforce the pull of reason, duty and sympathy.
Publius recognized ambition as the dominate and most problematic chord in the souls of
those who rule. Untamed ambition is most powerful in its magnitude and destructive in is
consequences. Thus, the love of power is the central problem of human character for political
order. Publius identifies ambition as the arch-passion inimical to political order and prosperity.
Following The Federalist, Becker says, “Ambition is the central problem for the American
constitutional order, particularly the inequality of political ambition among the citizenry.”10
Therefore the task of “restraining ambition becomes the proper function of the constitutional
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government.”11 Government is the coupling of ambition and power concentrated; motive is given
opportunity. The powers of government provide unparalleled weapons to man’s passions. Since
government necessitates the existence of concentrated power, it raises the perennial “possibility of
ambition.”12 Ambitious men are necessary to the existence and administration of government. Yet,
ambition comes in many forms. Ambition, as the love of domination, is a malignant passion and
the source of tyranny.
The Federalist distinguished between the few and the many by confining “ambition to
institutional roles bound to serve the ordinary and normal interest of constituencies not inclined,
or expected, to see beyond their own narrow self-interest.”13 Often those who seek office, not only
seek to govern, but to dominate others and oppress them. The problem is that they do not merely
seek to govern other men in the public interest, but to dominate them in order to satisfy their own
desires. The Founder’s concerns regarding the concentration of power were caused by their
suspicions of human nature and its motives when given sufficient power to satisfy them. The
challenge resides in the fact that there are men who will satisfy their passions before their duties.
Publius recognizes that there are some able and willing to subordinate their passions to their duties,
but that “this stern virtue is the growth of few soils.”14 Madison recognizes that government must
control itself. Echoing Madison, Epstein says that “the issue of constitutionalism is just this: how
to constrain the misconduct of the sovereign while allowing him the necessary power to keep peace
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and good order.” 15 For government “to control itself” the ambitious who hold the reins of power
must be rule by something other than the force of their own passions.
The problem of popular government is solved then, by harnessing and channeling ambition
through its institutions. Mansfield says that the Constitution arranges offices in such a way to use
“interest to produce virtue.”16 The magnitude and regularity of ambition when coupled with
political power means that the only human motivation that can be relied upon to check it, is the
ambition of another. Publius chooses what he believes is the only solution commensurate to the
force of the passions, amongst the alternatives to controlling political vice. The problem of the
regularity and magnitude of ambition when coupled with power necessitates the permanent
division and separation of powers so that power and the passions cannot conspire without check.
The Constitution seeks to “break and control” this passion through institutional checks. The
challenge resides in the magnitude of the passions generally and ambition in particular. The nature
of ambition is such, that it can only be checked by another ambition.
Countervailing passions must be leveraged to control each other. The separations of powers
turns out to be an arrangement in which the passions of those who govern are ‘conquered’, by
being divided and arranged. Through this strategy ambition will be contained in a system of
countervailing passions where ambition must “counteract ambition.” The only force with the
sufficient magnitude to thwart and restrain passion, is passion itself. The strategy of mechanically
counterpoising ambition is not merely to check this passion, however. “Ambitious men,”
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Mansfield observes, “need to be counteracted by other ambitious men, but still perhaps as much
to bring out their virtue as to prevent them from doing wrong.”17
The ambitious are not simply thwarted by checks and balances, their motives are pulled from the
lower to the higher as they identify their true, over their immediate, interests in the face of the
circumstantial pressures of office. The foreseen threat of a check, rather than its execution, is often
enough to guide most men to rethink just where their interests really lie. Having the noose around
one’s neck allows one to think clearly about the alternatives. Given they ambitious seek
recognition, officials will be encouraged to seek notoriety through positive rather than negative
avenues.
The solution to the defect of better motives is a system of countervailing passions which
check or channel one another when necessary. As Madison describes, it is not merely a system of
divided power, but of counterbalancing interests and passions. If the greatest threat to liberty and
stability is posed by an unchecked concentration of power in the service of the ambitions of the
rulers, then their passions must be restrained. This will be achieved by two forces, a “dependence
on the people” through periodic election, and the “auxiliary precautions” of the separation of
powers. Both are part of the system of countervailing forces. The only way to control power is to
threaten it with the loss of power by some constitutional mechanism such as, for example, the need
for reelection, impeachment or some other check. Such potentialities have the power to tame
ambition and make it responsible to the people. Therefore the system of “rival and opposite
interests” is as evident in the psychological kinesthetics of elections as much as the separation of
powers. Through elections, the Constitution is able to provide a necessary, but not sufficient,
external check through regulating circumstances of time and power in order to provide one set of
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motives for officeholders to act on behalf of their immediate constituencies and the nation at large.
Meanwhile the separation of powers provides a perpetual internal check to curb power once in
office. Through the checks of election and the separation of powers, men are compelled to curb
their desires and pursuit their true interests.
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison said “that the people will have virtue and
intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom…If there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in
the community, it will be exercised in the selection of these men. So that we do not depend on
their virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them.”18 The very
existence of elections indicates that it is not expected that the people have perpetual confidence in
their representatives. Elections have consequences which compel prospective officeholders and
incumbents alike to respect the will of the people. The constitutional circumstances created by
elections compel officeholders to identify with the passions and interests which animate the
people’s opinions. They help guarantee the interest of the official is served by fulfilling their duty
and maintaining fidelity to the people’s voice.
In No. 52 Hamilton says it is essential to liberty that government “should have a common
interest with the people.”19 Without a “communion of interest, and sympathy of sentiments”
between the people and their representatives “every government degenerated into tyranny.”20 The
people’s passions and interests are given constitutional force through elections. Elections attempt
to give the people the title of kingmaker. The ambitious never succeed completely by their own
virtue. They are always dependent on those on whose backs they rose to power. Hamilton says
“dependence” on the people will be “effectually secured” through frequent elections.21
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Dependence on the people in achieving their ambitions, encourages gratitude, and reminds
officials to respect the people’s will. This dependence compels officeholders to be concerned with
the fate of the people. The election process habituates officeholders to recognize how their
electoral fate is bound to the fate of the people. The opinions of the people are in turn generated
by the conditions of existence over which representatives have influence. A representative will be
concerned with the people because his destiny as a man and politician is tethered to the opinions
of those who placed him in office.
Publius’ analysis of the psychological dynamics of elections illustrates how hard
constitutional checks work synergistically with the natural, if weak, social propensities of human
nature. The opportunities and threats posed by the election cycle help to engage the reason and
moral sentiments of those desirous of office, and encourage their sympathy and identification with
the people. Without the compulsion of the election cycle the faculties of reason and moral
sentiments would remain largely dormant. Sympathy between the people and their representatives
is only established and fortified through coercion and the uniform rule of law. The laws made by
the legislator apply equally to themselves as to the people. Hamilton says that the “strongest bonds”
which “can connect the rulers and the people together” which will restrain legislators from passing
“oppressive measures” is that they can “make no law which will not have its full operation on
themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society.” 22 In No. 35 Madison
says, “This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws
to which he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the
representative and the constituent.”23 The equal application of the same laws to all, creates national
unity and, out of unity, degrees of sympathy. Sympathy is, in part, a product the recognition of
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human equality before the law and the denial of feudal estates. Through the uniformity of law, all
citizens, rulers and ruled alike, are truly made one people. To the extent possible, one constitution
with one uniform rule of law allows sympathy to harmonize the interests of all.
The pull of sympathy will be one ingredient keeping elected officials responsible to the
will of the people. Elections are designed to provide chords of sympathy between the people and
their representatives. Elections encourage the various chords and faculties of the souls of
officeholders to be pulled in unison, by the same passions, and in the same direction as their
constituencies, creating degrees of psychic harmony. Sympathy with the people translates into
“responsibility to the people.”24 Hume understood that “the original motive and the natural
obligation to obedience to government is self-interest,” but that a man’s sense of moral obligation
and approbation comes from “a sympathy with the public interest.”25 This is only possible when
elected officials have an “immediate dependence on” the people.”26 The psychic pull of the
people’s opinion, coupled with the hard parameters of the Constitution, can redirect the immediate
impulses of an officeholder in a general alignment with the interests of the people.
Elections activate and orchestrate several chords of motivation within the souls of
officeholders. Dependency created by elections gives voice to the people’s passions, and primes
sympathy and social sentiment in their representatives. With these necessary reinforcements,
reason is able to win the battle with the passions. The Constitution provides the electoral
circumstances to encourage all those chords to pull on the representatives in the same direction
toward good conduct. These circumstances include the nature and powers of a given office, as well
as the mode and duration of election. Under the electoral constraints of the Constitution, the
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dominate passions of the people will guide the motives and conduct of officeholders.27 The mild
pull of reason, guarantees that it can only act as the guide and rudder of human conduct if assisted
by raw passions and which counteract the raw ambitions of officeholders and social sentiments
inclined in the direction of reason. While neither are good in themselves, elections allow the
people’s passions to serve as a countervailing force to the raw ambitions of those in office. In this
way, the people’s passions help steer officials toward their self-interest rightly understood.
Another circumstance is represented by the varying degrees of proximity and distance to
the people of each office. This proximity or distance created by the mode of election and the nature
of the constituency of the office which create varying degrees and types of sympathy. The role of
sympathy is most evident in the numbers on the House of Representatives, the branch closest to
the people and mostly likely to be motivated by such sentiments. Hamilton and Madison argue the
period and mode of election, the total number of congressmen, and their geographical closeness to
the people will be sufficient to establish a “due sympathy between the representative body and its
constituents.”28 Hamilton indicates such constitutional constraints will inspire in congressmen
feelings of “duty, gratitude, interest, ambition” which will serve as “the chords by which they will
be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people.” 29 The Constitution will
foster a “temporary affection” and gratitude in representatives toward their constituents as a
product of the people elevating them to office.30
Elections will compel sympathy by exploiting the fears and ambitions of officeholders. The
external check of the people’s passions, registers as the internal check of the fear of not gaining or
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losing power in the souls of officials.31 Here the system of countervailing forces works in a
complimentary manner both between and within individuals simultaneously. Fear and ambition
are the tools exploited by the circumstance of periodic election which help guarantee, to the extent
possible, the convergence of interests between government and the people. Fear and ambition only
coincide through the force applied by constitutional circumstances. Ambition and fear are
reciprocal passions. Ambition represents an individual’s most extreme hopes he seeks to achieve,
while fear represents the direst consequences he hopes to avoid. These primal passions are psychic
chords activated by the rewards and punishment of circumstances of elective office. The powers
of office are the instruments of their ambition. Fear, is the fear of losing the opportunities presented
by the powers of office. An elections loss, is a loss of power representing the political “death” of
the individual officeholder. Fear is provoked by anything which threatens the reelection of
officeholders. Fear is generated by the threat of losing the very power which is the pathway to
achieving their ambitions. Thus, in electoral politics, the first priority is self-preservation. They
seek to maintain office, by appealing in some fashion to the people, before all else.
If an officeholder desires to continue in office, “his wishes” conspire “with his fears.”32
The threat an election loss compels officeholders to respect the liberties of the people. Hamilton
says the threat of the failure to win reelection provides “the inducements of good behavior.”33
Ideally, the Damocles sword of fear encourages them to use their powers in ways that do not
deviate too far from the interests of the people, the law and the Constitution itself. Fear helps pull
the chord of ambition and direct it toward an object in conformity with the interests of the people.
Fear of losing office trains his ambitions to choose constitutionally acceptable objects. Fear
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sharpens his reason and provokes moral sentiments, if for no other reason, than it is in his interest
to heed their pull.
Perhaps the clearest explanation of the psychological impact of elections in found in
Hamilton’s discussion of the term of the presidency and the possibility of reelection. All terms of
office, excluding the life tenure of judges, are based on a minimum duration to become acquainted
with the office, yet are short enough to prevent them from ever becoming too sure of their own
power. The Convention had contentiously debated whether the president should serve a single
seven-year term or consecutive four-year terms predicated on reelection. On one hand, Hamilton
argues the occupant of the presidency will take greater care of an office held for a significant
duration. Hamilton say that it “is a general principle of human nature that a man will be interested
in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which
he holds it; will be less attached to what he hold by a momentary or uncertain title, that to what he
enjoys by a durable or certain title.”34 Hamilton acknowledges that if the occupant of the executive
is aware “that in a very short time he must lay down his office,” he “will be apt to feel himself too
little interested in it to hazard any material censure or perplexity from the independent exertions
of his powers.”35 Publius and the Convention concluded that the four year duration of the office
meant that it would be held neither too securely nor too loosely. It was long enough for
officeholders to feel sufficient possession, yet short enough to be constantly reminded that their
hold on office remains dependent on the people.
Jefferson had said that “when the government fears the people there is liberty.” Fear of
losing office is connected with accountability to the people by means of the ballet box. The
abandonment of the single term in favor of indefinite reelection is central to maintaining the
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executive’s adherence to the Constitution and the people’s interests. Most men would feel “less
zeal in the discharge of a duty” when they know it “must be relinquished at a determinate period”
whereas the “hope of obtaining by meriting a continuance” of office creates the “inducements to
good behavior” which allow their interests to coincide with their duties.36 The possibility to be reelected engages the desire to remain in office, and this passion coupled with fear of losing power
encourages modifications of passions that tend toward the abuse of power. The avaricious man,
writes Hamilton, denied the possibility of reelection “would feel a propensity…to make the best
use of his opportunities, while they lasted; and might not scruple to have recourse to the most
corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory.”37 And yet, that very same
man of avarice, given opportunity of reelection, “might content himself with the regular
emoluments of his station, and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse of
his opportunities.”38
Add to this,” writes Hamilton, “that the same man might be vain or ambitious as well as
avaricious. And if he could expect to prolong his honours by his good conduct, he might hesitate
to sacrifice his appetite for them, to his appetite for gain. But with the prospect before him of
approaching an inevitable annihilation, his avarice would be likely to get the victory over his
caution, his vanity, or his ambition.”39 If he can serve but a single term he will recognize that “no
exertion of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome reverse,” and he may “violently
tempted to embrace a favourable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his power, at every
personal hazard, than if he had the probability of answering the same end by doing his duty.”40
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This ambitious man might threaten the very constitutional order if not given the opportunity to
reelection.
Hamilton’s example could not more clearly illustrate the way correctly organized
circumstances channel immediate interests toward right conduct through the logic of
countervailing passions. The circumstances of reelection allow for the strategy of countervailing
passions to play out within the individual. It is not his high sense of duty, but rather his avarice
which “might be a guard upon his avarice.”41 Thus, his appetite a check on his appetite. Meaning,
his interests and his appetites are best served by partially curbing them in conformity with the
expectations of office. His avarice is best served by subordinating itself to the will of the people
in order to guarantee his continued slaking of his passions in a constitutional modified and
acceptable form.
The Constitution was designed to provide the “dykes and dams” necessary to restrain and
channel the raw passions of the human soul while amplifying its virtuous elements in the cause of
the preservation of liberty.42 Achieving this task was a matter of an institutional design that would
provide the proper circumstances to encourage right motive and therefore, right conduct. This task
might not have been so difficult had they not also sought to achieve it under the principles of liberty
and popular sovereignty. The Constitution’s arrangement of powers represents the “republican
remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.”43 This means it is the popular
solution to the historical ills of popular government. The solution to the weakness of democracy
proposed by Publius and the Founders, was not more democracy, but a smarter form of democracy,
a constitutional republic.
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The appropriate constitutional mechanisms would be necessary to preserve popular
sovereignty and simultaneously mitigate its ills. This solution maintains the principle of majority
rule by attempting to solve the very weaknesses of the rule of the majority. Between the
experiences of history and the trials and tribulations of the nation under the Articles of
Confederation, the malady of popular government was identified as the usurpations made by
interested legislatures and their majorities. Without the commensurate checks, legislatures tended
to draw “all powers” of government “into its impetuous vortex.”44 The proof that Publius and the
Founders identified the legislature as the central source of the ills of popular government is evident
in the fact that they did not merely divide it against other branches of government, instead they
made sure it was the only branch divided against itself. The diseases incident to republican
government are caused by human limitation, the passionate nature of man. The periodic nature of
elections is shown however to be an insufficient popular remedy to constrain passions and inspire
sympathy and virtue. Elections cannot directly protect the people from ambitious rulers until the
next ballot they cast. That is, if they are able to cast a meaningful ballot when the next election
cycle rolls around. In the meantime, much can happen. Where is this restraining force to come
from the day after elections if not from the people themselves?
Looking at the totality of the Founder’s project, they devised a series of core structures to
establish properly functioning government, and restrain those who govern. As a republican order
it is rooted in the popular sovereignty of all the people. All are eligible for office and popular
consent is registered through suffrage left undefined by the Constitution as a prerogative of the
states. The extended republic would disperse and diffuse factional conflict, and a composite
republic devised on the principles of federalism would divide power between national and state
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governments. Lastly, the final checking capacities were provided by the separation of powers,
three branches of government divided and set against themselves. In fact, the separation of the
branches is only one special instance of the separation of powers. The dividing of various powers
which are set against each other is a condition which exists between individual officeholders,
branches, and states alike. All examples of the separation of powers are underwritten by the same
psychological strategy to mitigate the passions, and stave off tyranny. This strategy is what
Madison calls the “policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better
motives,” which he says “might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as
well as public.”45 The appreciation of this system is typically confined to the separation of political
power and government functions, but as Madison says, it can be traced through the entire system
of the Constitution’s arrangement of powers. The principle of the separation of powers is based on
the underlying psychological principle of employing “opposite and rival interests” which mutually
counteract one another through the entire system of government and society. In No. 5 Hamilton
speaks of the “the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions”46 The principle of
countervailing passions, or what Madison called the setting of “opposite and rival interests” against
one another, is at the heart of every political strategy of impulse control found in the Constitution.
The Constitution supplies the external remedy to the internal defect of better motives
through the strategy of countervailing passions.47 This strategy is the solution to the “defect of
better motives” lacking in human nature. This system is at the heart of all the structures of the
Constitution, not merely the separation of the three branches. Given Madison’s emphasis in Nos.
47-51, coupled with the need to allay the fears of the Anti-Federalists, the separation of branches
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is presented as the most significant manifestation of the strategy to limit government. The
provisions of the Constitution needed to be based on motives more reliable and durable than
reason, virtue or moral sense. “Nothing,” says Hume, “can oppose or retard the impulse of passion,
but a contrary impulse.”48 Since the passions are the strongest spring of human conduct, they can
only be counteracted by the equal and opposite force of other passions.
Oddly this places the passions, not reason, as the central focus of The Federalist’s
psychological account of man. A system of countervailing passion is perhaps the most reasonable
way of counteracting a force typically stronger than reason itself while, at the same time
maintaining liberty. Reasonable institutions, which prudently recognize reason’s limits, would
contain the passions by playing them off against one another. This solution harkens to their
skepticism that either reason or moral sentiment have sufficient efficacy to restrain men, especially
when holding the reins of power. Countervailing passions oddly preserves liberty, yet restrains the
problematic consequences of the passions precisely because they are checked by an equal and
opposite force. The Constitution channels these forces in order to promote the virtue necessary for
the public good, without making excessive or unrealistic demands on human nature.
The principle of countervailing passions arose in the 17th century “on the basis of its sober
view of human nature and of a general belief that the passions are dangerous and destructive.”49
The countervailing paradigm was shared by a disparate group of thinkers from Bacon and Spinoza
to members of the British, Scottish and French Enlightenments. All agreed that reason, virtue and
duty where defective as sure motives because they lacked power and consistency in most
circumstances. By the 18th century “both human nature and the passions came to be widely
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rehabilitated.”50 Man, it was said was more “more wild than wicked.”51 John Adam himself had
said that it was “weakness rather than wickedness” which defined human nature.52 This
rehabilitation of the passions intensified among the French particularly in the more radical stages
of the Enlightenment. Rousseau and Helvétius went so far as to praise passion over reason. For
most moralists and statesmen, including Publius, this rehabilitation did not result in the passions
being considered benign simply. Rather taking men as they are, meant abandoning either extreme
distain for what they are, or excessive hope in something they are not. Indeed, this rehabilitation
altered the strategic approaches of morality and politics in coping with the challenges posed by the
passions. Rather than condemning them and imposing repressive moral strategies, they needed to
be accepted and employed to beneficial effect.
Statements asserting the superior force of the passions and the necessity of checking
passion with passion abound in the Enlightenment. Hirschman considers Spinoza the “first great
philosopher” to give “pride of place to the idea that passions can be fought successfully only
through other passions” but had no intention of “translating this idea into the realm of practical
moral or political engineering.”53 Spinoza, following Descartes was the first to treat man’s moral
life in the tropes of mechanical forces and physical nature. In this spirit, Spinoza called passions,
“affects.” Speaking the language of mechanics, Spinoza writes, “An affect cannot be restrained
nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger affect.”54 Hume took this logic to the extreme,
denying reason’s efficacy, saying that “it is the passions and the passions alone” which motive
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human beings.55 “Nothing,” wrote Hume, can oppose impulse, “but a contrary impulse.”56 Given
Hume’s denial of reason’s efficacy, the assertion that only passion can counteract passion,
necessarily followed. Baron d’Holbach meanwhile stated that “The passions are the true
counterweights of the passions; we must not at all attempt to destroy them, but rather to direct
them: let us offset those that are harmful by those that are useful to society. Reason…is nothing
but the act of choosing those passions which we must follow for the sake of our happiness.”57
Helvétius meanwhile said that moralists and statesmen must “know how to arm our passions
against one another…for the purpose of having their counsel adopted…that only a passion can
triumph over a passion.”58 “No affect can be restrained,” Spinoza wrote, “by the true knowledge
of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.”59 The central
message of Spinoza’s teaching on countervailing passions, was that mere wisdom and parchment
principles alone cannot thwart passion and vice, only the forces of passion and vice, wisely
deployed, can counteract one another.
The psychological observation of the unrivalled strength of the passions was then translated
into a theory asserting that the passions ought to be set against one another in order to achieve
psychological, social and political order. The recognition of the relative weakness of both reason
and the moral sentiments, meant the passions where the prime mover of human conduct. This made
them the bedrock of the theory of countervailing forces. Given that the passion were the strongest
motors of conduct, only a passion could neutralize a passion. Fire must be fought with fire. Passion
ought to be set against passion, vice against vice, interest against interest, and so on. By “playing
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one off against the other,” the passions would control and regulate one another.

60

If destructive

passions must be neutralized, only the equal and opposite force of another passion, no less
destructive on its own, was necessary. And yet, if rival passions were given the proper
circumstances in which to contend, they could neutralize one another and even yield a virtue of
sorts.
Once it was recognized as the soul’s strongest force, and that they should be pitted against
one another, the question remained of the mechanics of just how countervailing passions resolved
themselves in relation to the other faculties of mind. Hume writes that whether “the passion of
self-interest is considered “vicious or virtuous,” is irrelevant, “since itself alone restrains it.”61 He
says that “if it be virtuous, men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same
effect.”62 Hume writes, “There is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested
affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must
necessarily take place upon the least reflection.”63 Thus the “alteration” of the direction of a passion
first requires the equal and opposing force of another passion. The opposing passion does the
“grunt work” of opposition. Even Hume does not deny, once in place, that the alteration of conduct
through countervailing passions did not involve a modicum reason or moral sentiment. Hume says
this alteration occurs under the “least reflection.” As we have seen, reason and moral sentiment,
do not play the role of opposing and thwarting the passions, but rather as provide a guide and
rudder to conduct once operating in the slipstream of their gale. When circumstances have been
correctly orchestrated to counterpoise passion against passion, reason and moral sentiment are able
to pull and direct the course of motive and action. With passion counteracting passion, men to
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come to the realization with these helpers, that their ambitions are best served by pursuing their
self-interest rightly understood.
The logic of countervailing passions was a well-worn trope of moral philosophy by the
time of its formulation in The Federalist Papers. The logic of countervailing forces which would
maintain one another in dynamic equilibrium, was a principle of physics and kinesthetics, while
that of countervailing passions, was its psychological analog. The hope was that a countervailing
system “would pit one passion against another…to the benefit of man and mankind.”64 Originally,
the notion of countervailing passions was a psychological theory concerned with “problems of
individual conduct” which was “imported back” into schemes of political order.65 This theory was
primarily geared toward observation and analysis, not action. The strategy of countervailing
passions “laid the intellectual groundwork for the principle of separation of powers” in all its guises
in the Constitution.66 The novelty of Publius’ formulation was to treat this theory as something
more than an analytical tool to describe the workings of government, society or individual
psychology. They took this theory and made it “flesh,” by transforming it into a practical political
strategy manifest in the provisions of the Constitution. Never before had this theory been so
concretely applied to the actual building of a political edifice. The innovative use of the principle
of countervailing passions by Publius resides in a few related facts. First, he appropriated an
internal model of countervailing passions within the individual and applied it externally across
individuals and factions, offices and branches. Additionally, he illustrated a how a strategy of
moral psychology could be designed and redeployed to achieve efficacy in matters of political
power. Lastly, his achievement rests on the mechanical specificity with which he explains just how
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this psychological strategy is employed and embedded in the concrete institutions of government,
which would soon shape American character and history.
The principle of countervailing passions was neither unknown, nor new, to the Convention
participants as a whole. Nor was Publius’ exposition an ex post facto rationalization of
constitutional logic, designed to gussy up mere partisan horse trading with glossy intellectual
veneer. In his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, John Witherspoon wrote, “every good form of
government must be complex, so that the one principle may check the other.”67 It was of course
optimal, he wrote, to have as much virtue in a political community as possible, but it was “folly to
expect that a state should be upheld by integrity in all who have a share in managing it.” 68
Therefore, said Witherspoon, government “must be so balanced, that when every one draws to his
own interest or inclination, there may be an over poise upon the whole.”69 On Tuesday, July 2,
1787, Gouverneur Morris gave a speech at the Philadelphia Convention employing much the same
language as Witherspoon and Madison’s No. 51. Morris succinctly articulated the principle of
countervailing passions, saying, “Vices as they exist, must be turned against each other.”70 On July
11, Morris himself, paraphrased Madison saying that “the political depravity of men” necessitates
“checking one vice and interest by opposing to them another vice and interest.”71 He acknowledged
that the “checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch, one interest
must be opposed to another interest.”72 Madison and the Convention had already gone through
numerous rehearsals of this language before it appeared in print in the numbers of The Federalist.
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The Founders’ belief in the correctness of the strategy of countervailing passions was the
product of their realistic view of human nature, what Morris called man’s “political depravity.”
Various redescriptions of the passions however, did not make them good simply. From the
perspective of Publius and the Founders, it mattered little whether man was “weak”, “wild” or
“wicked.” Vices where vices, whatever their cause. Regardless of their precise characterization,
his passions represented the central threat to social and political order and harmony. The question
remained, just how to employ this undeniable psychological force. Hume wrote statesmen cannot
wait for a “miraculous transformation of mankind,” which “would endow them with every species
of virtue, and free them from every species of vice.”73 Instead wrote Hume, the magistrate “cannot
cure every vice by substituting a virtue in its place.” Instead, the only solution is to “cure one vice
by another.” 74 The acceptance of countervailing passions is predicated on the rejection of the
general efficacy of reason. Reason’s all too mild voice necessitated the neutralizing and taming of
passions by pitting them against themselves. Given the dominance of the passions, virtue was less
and less considered a product of the rule of reason, but instead made possible once destructive
passions had neutralized themselves. This did not mean that the passions were good in themselves,
or that reason played no role. Rather such conclusions addressed the problem of what force in
man’s faculties might be able to mitigate the worst effect of the passions. Such observations of the
defects of human motivation befell the citizen and the statesman, no less than the political scientist
and founder investigating political phenomena and seeking the best possible order.
Once the principle of countervailing passions was articulated as a psychological
phenomenon, it was then turned around as a strategy for the ordering political power and
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institutions. The connection between the psychological theory and the political theory of
countervailing forces is found in the intersection between the passions of rulers and the powers of
their office. “Eternal experience,” writes Montesquieu, “shows that all men who have power come
to abuse it, and this they will do to the limits of their power.” 75 Power in the hands of appetite
unrestrained is the source of the abuse of power and the road to tyranny. Montesquieu asserted that
“the abuse of power is greatest when laws do not anticipate it.”76 To say that mortal men rule, is to
say political power they wield is always a potential instrument of their appetites, unless
circumstances of office are properly ordered to provide the necessary checks on those very
passions. Taking men as they, the goal was not to change this fact, but only to properly account
for it. Once the precise role of the passions is understood vis-à-vis the abuse of power, properly
ordered institution can arrange circumstances to anticipate and counteract them. “So that none can
abuse power,” Montesquieu writes, “we must arrange, by the disposition of things, that power shall
check power.” 77 If ordered liberty requires that power check power on the political level, passion
must also check passion on the psychological one. The inevitable combination of the ingredients
of power and passion in those who govern, only reasonable strategy for limiting power is to set the
rulers against themselves. In this observation, the separation of powers is born.
The underlying logic of the divided powers is not only to thwart the concentration of power
generally, but to prevent the accumulation of different types of power in the same hands.78 Not
only will an individual, office or branch be denied the general mass of power yielded to
government, they will be prohibited from performing all its functions, legislative, executive and
judicial. This prohibition stems from another psychological observation regarding the influence of
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man’s passions on his judgement. Locke claimed that “it is unreasonable for men to be judges in
their own cases,” because their “self-love will make the partial to themselves and their friends.”79
If a man or faction were to have all the powers of government in their hands, they would be judge,
jury and executioner, with no check on their judgements and assertions of power. With a Lockean
ring, Madison writes, “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”80 This is because an
all too strong “connection subsists between his reason and his self-love.”81 Power concentrated
will abet motives which need no external instigation.
Neither Madison, nor Hamilton speak of the “terror” or “awe” inspired by the Leviathan to
compel men to comply with their covenants. Hobbes was content with a rigid monolithic statism,
a static top-down monarchy where liberty was subordinated to security. Security was found in
force-backed guarantees of man’s compliance with the law unwritten by the ‘Mortal God’ of the
state. In a constitutional republic however, the preservation of freedom cannot be achieved by the
concentrated top-down power of the Leviathan. The principle of counterpoised passions was
specifically developed under the premise that it was the most effective strategy of political
organization and control, which still maintained the liberty intrinsic and necessary to the human
being.
Countervailing powers solved the Founder’s delicate juggling act between the demands of
order and those of liberty. Liberty is here formulated here as the denial of power concentrated.
This denial is achieved through countervailing, and therefore checking, powers. A system of
counteracting powers is not necessary in a regime whose goal is domination achieved through
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concentrated power. The countervailing strategy only functions under the premise of equality. In
a government dedicated to liberty, checks can only come from rival interests and passions of equal
magnitude. Powers with the capacity to check, but not dominate, each other must be roughly equal
by definition. Thus, rival interests operate horizontally in the separation of powers, rather than
vertically as in the Leviathan. There are no rivals to the Leviathan. Without this equality there can
be no rivalry, and without rivalry, no genuine checks. Fear remained a central motivator for Publius
in generating correct conduct, but this was not the fear of a ‘Mortal God’. Instead fear originated
from the threat posed by “opposite and rival interests” vying for supremacy, yet from a position of
effective equality. Fear, was fear of interested rivals wielding their powers in ways which
threatened one’s own political destiny.
The strategy of countervailing passions is the fundamental principle underlying the
separation of powers. The separation of powers is then not merely a political strategy, but a
psychological one. The separation of powers sets up a system not only of counteracting powers,
but psychological forces. One man’s impulses are set against another’s in order to limit, check or
channel them toward the constitutional good. This principle, or what Madison called the setting of
“opposite and rival interests” against one another, is at the heart of every political strategy to
maintain order and liberty in the Constitution. It is the Constitution’s arch strategy of impulse
control. All manifestations of the separation of powers are built on the psychological kinesthetics
of countervailing passions. The separation of branches and their functions is only one
manifestation. It is the principle of the separation of powers, instead, which provides the
underlying logic for the division of government into three branches. Divided power does not
merely set one branch or office against another, but counterpoises the motives, the passions and
interests of a given man or faction against another. Even elections represent a version of the
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separation of powers. Through the franchise, the electorate is given a “partial agency” in the
administration of government. The people’s passions and interests are freely expressed at election
time, placing potential checks on incumbents. While elections are external to government, the
countervailing forces set up by the division of branches represents an internal source of checks,
within government itself. In the absence of elections, only the separation of powers and the
potential checks of other branches and offices, is able to provide the necessary opposing force to
resist encroachments, usurpations and the concertation of powers in the same hands.
Publius’ urgent task is to illustrate how the separation of powers will result in substantive
checks and balances, as opposed to mere parchment barriers, in the face of Anti-Federalist concern
that the degree of concentrated power authorized by the Constitution would result in an
overbearing national government.
Publius central concern in the second volume of The Federalist is to demonstrate how checks on
power work, only when the passions, interests and ambitions of officeholders are properly married
to the powers of their office. The lynchpin of the separation of powers resides in the correct
arrangement of this marriage. Only in this way does the separation of powers become more than
paper barriers. Checks would not be guaranteed by morals rectitude, good intentions or simply left
to chance. Checking and balancing would only be achieved when the “provision for defense” of
one’s powers are “made commensurate to the danger of attack.”82 Defence and attack both require
sufficient parity of power and proper spur to motivation. All constitutional officers must have the
necessary motivation and the proper structure of powers, to be able to successfully deploy them in
order to “attack”, or “defend” themselves and their office from an encroaching one. Only when
office and interest were properly married could every action be subject to an equal and opposite
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reaction. If properly balanced, every attack was merely a defense of the powers of the office, which
would keep all offices in their “proper places.”
In No. 51 Madison twice acknowledges how the powers and procedures of any office must
be animated by the personal interests and ambitions of its holder in order for the separations of
powers to work effectively.83 Madison asserts that the success of the countervailing system
depends on the proper tethering of personal motive to the powers of office, or what he calls the
“interest of the man” and “the constitutional rights of the place.”84 The dynamic equilibrium of
countervailing powers only occurs when the appropriate “constitutional means” are properly
married to “personal motives.”85 The counterbalancing of reliable and predictable motives, such
as self-interest, ambition and fear are only instigated by properly arranged powers. When powers
are properly structured they provide the necessary circumstances to incite the natural inclinations
of constitutional officers to assert them. Only in this way does the system of countervailing passion
operate according to plan and preserve liberty.
The only protection against tyranny “consists in giving to those who administer each
department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of
the others.”86 The “constitutional means” and “rights” are those powers of office which can be
levied against another office when each is given personal incentive to assert them. Meanwhile
“giving” an official the “personal motives” to employ the instruments of office, means arranging
the circumstances of office in a way to activate self-interested motives. Incited by circumstance,
each officer would be naturally and reciprocally driven by their own self-interest to assert their
powers, in order to inhibit others from usurping them. The capacity to check is tied to the ability
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to assert. And, the ability to assert is tied to the necessary powers, and motivation to use them
accordingly. Offices must be designed in a way that each man’s self-interest is satisfied through
the assertion of the instruments of that office. If each man’s exercise of his “constitutional rights,”
is not simultaneously an assertion of his interest, he will not employ his office to proper effect.
Madison famously says, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”87 He was keenly
aware that if powers and circumstances were not properly arranged the ambition of one man would
fail to counteract the ambition of another. The assertion of power, which culminates in a check on
another office, is only made possible when officers recognize that it is in their self-interest to do
so. Power is only properly structured when it is first divided, but then also mixed and blended so
that there are contested areas of overlapping power. Madison says “each department should have
a will of its own.”88 Each department must have its own general sphere of powers where most
powers can be employed uncontested, but their must also be a domain in which the wills of
different departments contest over similar powers. When the separation of powers is not absolute,
it provides the circumstances in which one office or department can effectively check another. It
is precisely these areas of overlapping and contested powers which provide the necessary
circumstances to activate the will and interest of the officeholder to attempt to assert his powers.
The domain of contested powers gives any officeholder an interest, not only in his own
office and branch, but one in other offices and branches. In the circumstances created by a domain
of contested powers, the instigated motive at work becomes self-evident. All government, all
institutions naturally tend toward the assertion, expansion, encroachment and usurpation of power.
This is the natural physics of government power. Given ambition and the love of power are the
central passions of officeholders, they have a natural impetus to assert their powers in order to
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either defend, maintain or expand them. The assertion of power by other offices registers as an
impingement and threat to one’s own power. Power not asserted or power disinterested, is
necessarily power contracting. Under these circumstances each officer has natural incentive which
incites his use of office as an instrument of his own self-interest. By asserting his powers, he is
merely preserving the means to advance his interests and his own political survival. In protecting
the means which advance his interests, his is also protecting the integrity constitutional powers of
the place. Thus, counterpoised by the circumstances of the separation and mixture of powers,
interest would counteract interest, ambition would counteract ambition.89 Without the connection
between his powers and his personal inclinations, this arrangement would provide no more than
parchment protections.
Offices must be designed in a way that each officers’ self-interest is satisfied through the assertion
of the instruments of his office. Only when interest and office are properly married can “the private
interest of every individual…be a centinel over the public rights.”90
On the psychological level, the system of countervailing passions remains an educational
instrument of soulcraft. It is designed not simply to check power, but to transform raw impulse
into refined sentiment and perhaps even virtue. This system does not simply operate between
national and state governments, or between branches and offices, but also within a single human
soul itself. In his exegesis of No. 51 Hirschman says the separation of powers is designed in such
a way that “the ambition of one branch of government is expected to counter that of another,”
rather than establish a scenario where “passions are seen to be fighting it out within the arena of a
single soul.”91 When ambition counteracts ambition, it is understood that the ambition of one man
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is pitted against the ambition of another. The countervailing strategy is achieved through the
counterbalancing of multiple actors and factions throughout the entire government rather than
within the individual. Meanwhile, the original model of countervailing passions as it developed in
the 16th and 17th centuries was one which operated within the psychology of the individual. For
example, fear and ambition battle in the soul and, under the correct circumstances, yield true selfinterest. Madison’s psychological kinesthetics of the separation of powers involves passion
asserted from one official and counteracted by the like impulse of another. But this, as it turns out,
is not the whole story.
In the separation of powers, the orchestrated countervailing passions play out both between
individuals and branches and within the souls of those individuals simultaneously. Operating
concurrently with the external drama of counterbalancing offices, there exists an internal drama of
competing passions within the soul of each individual involved in the conflict. The external
provocation of the separation of powers is the generates the countervailing passions within the
souls of parts involved. The external struggle is the cause of the internal effect on the soul. External
pressure created by an opposing office, causes an internal recalibration of raw impulse within the
soul of the reciprocal official and vice versa. Both parties experience the action of the other as a
threatening assertion of power which impinges on their ability to satisfy their interests. Both are
compelled to reciprocally respond to one another, and both will experience a recalibration of the
initial passions which originally motivated the clash. This psychological recalibration occurs on
both sides of the competing agencies so long as their passions and powers are equally employed.
The jostling between parties is also necessarily a jostling of competing passions within the soul of
the individual. The external war creates an internal war. Therefore, Hirschman’s claim that the
countervailing passions of divided power, merely between individuals, is “very different” from the
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original historical model operating within the “single soul,” is only half true.92 The full story is that
the passions counteract one another both externally and internally at the same time and that the
one, in fact, instigates the other.
How does the strategy of countervailing passions solve the defect of “better motives”?93
The countervailing function of the separation of powers does not simply thwart the passions and
asserted powers of an opposing office, but is intended to pull the motives of its occupant in the
direction of the constitutional good. To understand just how the constitutional good is achieved
through selfish conduct it is necessary to see how the constitutional circumstances of the separation
of powers impinge externally on the powers of office, and how this external pressure internally
compels officeholders to good conduct.
The culmination of the external drama of countervailing passions is its internal effect on the soul
of the individual officeholder. The two types of passion involved within the soul’s countervailing
conflict always the same. The primary countervailing passions identified are ambition and fear.
The two perennial passions of ambition and fear are the matter which political science must
orchestrate and mold through the circumstances of government. Ambition and fear must be
properly set against one another in order to refine motive and produce good conduct. Some form
of ambition is the initiating and active passion, be it avarice or the love of power. Fear is the
reactive passion which modifies the initial impulse. The passions being blind, an initial impulse is
set in motion by the hope of gain without careful considering the consequences of its fulfillment.
In general, fear has the power to temper all other passions. The countermanding impulse of fear
arises out of an emotional awareness of the risks involved in the satisfaction of the original
untutored desire. Fear is fear of any loss unacceptable in the eyes of the individual. In the case of
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divided power, it is the fear which arises from the awareness of the risks of the loss of power or
office which provide the very instruments of one’s ambitions. The journey toward one man’s selfinterest rightly understood rests on a path trodden by fear. Here, the voice of reason as the soul’s
guide and rudder, is largely replaced by the voice of fear. Fear has the power to restrain reckless
impulse and grandiose ambition. The truly ambitious are determined to succeed. For ambition to
be satisfied it must heed the warnings of fear and consider the pitfalls of impulses which might
thwart their own satisfaction. Nor does heeding the voice of fear result in passivity. The truly
ambitious are able to correctly calculate the risks and rewards, costs and the benefits, of their
overarching desire by coolly and sedately listening to the voice of fear. In fact, they cannot succeed
without fear. Properly arranged circumstances allow fear to educate the passions which motivate
action, and alter both their means and ends.
The system of countervailing forces is designed to established circumstances which
generate a conflict between the passions of fear and ambition. This conflict ideally moves men to
best calculate their interests, rather than pursue their immediate impulses. The checking threat of
an opposing office is designed to provide the circumstances to instigate the necessary fear which
will modify raw ambition. In No. 70 Hamilton speak of how “the differences of opinion, and the
jarring of parties in that department of the government… promote deliberation and
circumspection; and serve to check excesses in the majority.”94 Only through the threat posed by
another official or branch, and the commensurate fear this inspires, can “deliberation and
circumspection” be promoted. Reflection and deliberation are the product of passion thwarted by
passion, not virtuous restraint made possible by reason’s mastery.
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With this model of the tempering of each man’s soul, we turn to Hamilton’s illustration of
the psychology of the Executive. His description of the Executive emphasizes the fact that the
branch, the office and the individual are all one and the same. The “constitutional means” and
“rights” of the office are emphatically married to the “interest of the man” and his “personal
motives.” Hamilton’s depiction of the Executive is one of the most comprehensive illustrations to
be found in The Federalist of the way correctly organized circumstances can channel immediate
interests toward right conduct through the logic of countervailing passions. His account illustrates
how the countervailing passions within the soul of the Executive collide, and encourage him to
pursue the constitutional interest. Since the Executive is an office of one, the drama of the passions
occurring within the arena of his soul, created by the separation of powers, is the most accentuated
of all constitutional officials.
Hamilton depicts an “avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office.”95 Hamilton,
determined to illustrate the resiliency of the office to the raw passions of human nature says,
consider for example, that this “same man might be vain or ambitious, as well as avaricious.”96
The force of checks, whether through elections or those coming from other branches, temper his
immediate passions, compelling him to adjudicate the best satisfaction of his avarice, bound as it
is, by the constitutional circumstances. Without the appropriate checks the office might merely
give his passions “recourse to the most corrupt expedients to makes the harvest as abundant” as
possible. With the proper arrangement of powers and circumstances his avarice might be inclined
to satisfy itself “with the regular perquisites of his situation, and might even be unwilling to risk
the consequences of an abuse of his opportunities.”97
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Through proper orchestration of institutional circumstances, Hamilton writes, “His avarice
might be a guard upon his avarice.”98 If by the properly orchestrated circumstances of office, the
executive could “expect to prolong his honours by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice
his appetite for them, to his appetite for gain.”99 But if circumstances are not so designed, “his
avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity, or his ambition.”100 His true
interest is a check on his immediate interest, his appetite a check on his appetite. Meaning, his
interests and his appetites are best served by partially curbing them in conformity with the
expectations of office. Hamilton depicts a psychological conflict of countervailing passions within
the soul of the individual. Furthermore this conflict involves the same passion, in which its short
term and long-term manifestations are set in countervailing opposition to one another. A conflict
is also incited between the passions of avarice, and the fear of no longer being able to slake it. The
circumstances of office, channel and direct these passions, softening if not eliminating their
corrosive effects. His avarice is best served by subordinating itself to the Constitution and the
irrepressible force of external checks, in order to guarantee the continued slaking of his passions
in a constitutional modified and acceptable form.
The Constitution is ultimately a “character-forming” device.101 Its arrangement of powers
acknowledges the vital relationship between circumstance and human character. The organization
of power creates the conditions within which men think and act. Each office establishes a set of
circumstances which provide parameters which impinge on the motives and actions of its
occupants. These parameters promote and cultivate the necessary character of officeholders and
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the people alike. The system of countervailing passions is designed to habituate men to the needs
of the republic. Free and limited government depends on the Constitution’s ability to establish the
necessary circumstances “to correct, mould, or sustain character.”102 These circumstances cultivate
the character necessary for republican self-government. The regime articulated by the Constitution
establishes a regiment of conduct. The force of its circumstances will habituate men to the
constitutional good. Its circumstances and procedures help form constitutional habits. Thus,
Modern political science did not abandon soulcraft, so much as reconceive it along lines of interest
and necessity rather than excellence and virtue. The character-forming nature of the Constitution
attempts “to forge a convergence of the “ought” and the “is,” by contriving circumstances which
generate the necessary incentives and deterrents to encourage men as they are to behave as they
ought.103 When institutional conditions incline to men to virtuous conduct, they need only oblige.
The goal of the constitutional system of countervailing passions is for ambition and avarice
to be transmuted by circumstance into self-interest rightly understood. The door is open to virtue,
and some degree of virtue is ultimately required, but not to be regularly expected. Virtue is
achieved only after counteracting passions have already brawled and done their dirty work.
Sorenson writes “Madison depends equally upon virtue and ambition: upon virtue to direct to
restraint and upon ambition to cause that restraint.”104 Here, he reiterates the precise role played by
each of the faculties in the process by which men’s passions are tempered into their interests.
Tempestuous passions like ambition provide the gale. Once fear has performed its restraining
function under circumstance of genuine threat, more delicate social sentiments and reason are then
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able to hold the field in their capacity as judges in guiding men’s actions. Reason and moral
sentiment do not have sufficient force to thwart passions but are only able to act as guide and
rudder to conduct once passions have neutralized each other. Mansfield says that “the interest of
the office is a kind of interest that permits and requires the cooperation of virtue.”105 This
observation is complicated by the fact that “true interest” and “virtue” do not appear to be entirely
distinct or mutually exclusive in Publius’ vernacular. When true interests are achieved by an
officeholder, they are generally compelled by the circumstances of the separation of powers. True
interests are synonymous with “compelled virtue.” Since the office must be married to the interest
of the man, there can be no real distinction made between private self-interest and the public
“interest of the office.”106
The psychic kinesthetics of the Constitution tenuously juggle the demands of liberty and
necessity. If men of virtuous character could not always be at the helm, a second best was for
institutions to be arranged in such a way to create circumstances which make men good. Yet, to
depend on a mechanical system which might be able to do without natural virtue altogether “is to
suppose like Machiavelli that all rule is the consequence of ‘accident and force.’”107 Such a system
appears to be at odds with Publius’ bold claim that the American regime will be ruled by “reflection
and choice,” not merely in the deliberative nature of its founding, but in its general administration
as well. It is hard to say that men make choices when Damocles’ sword hangs over their head. The
character of Machiavelli’s prince was shaped by the conditions of necessity. Under such
circumstances, the prince had no choice but to preserve his life or his power. Under the system of
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countervailing passions each officer naturally seeks to preserve their political life and maintain
office. Yet, Aristotle contends that virtuous conduct can only occur under certain circumstances.108
Aristotle is concerned with the choice that leads to action and “with respect to what or in what
circumstances,” that choice is made.109 For Aristotle, virtuous conduct is only possible under
conditions of free choice. 110 If one is compelled to act, virtue is moot. Choice entails the existence
of freedom and alternatives in contradistinction to the forcing hand of necessity. Virtue is the
product of facing challenging circumstances, and often taking courses of action they militate
against, rather than capitulating to their pressures.
The institutions of the Constitution are designed to compel officeholders into near
“choiceless choices.” If circumstances deny choice, action is involuntary. Acts of self-preservation
are not made by choice and the typical subject proclamations of virtue by moral philosophers. In
the absence of men of natural virtue, the Constitution must compel them to be good by means of
the virtuous designs of virtuous founders. We might call this type of virtue, “compelled virtue,” a
type Aristotle would not have recognized. Does a president typically choose between satisfying
his desire to act corruptly if this act threatens a potential election loss or impeachment from a coequal legislature? Most likely, he will simply modify his initial impulse and instead satisfy his
desire to maintain office. In most cases such choices become moot. Lincoln’s unilateral executive
action, for example, at the outset of the Civil War, was one such moment when the forcing hand
of necessity appeared to be pressing down on all sides. And yet, in the face of what must have
seemed like insuperable obstacles, Lincoln made a consequential and unprecedented choice which
manifest real virtue.
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Compelled virtue is the product of the principle of countervailing passions. Like the
physical force of gravity which holds planets in their proper places, fear is set against ambition.
The system of countervailing forces comes suspiciously close to making the passions that dwell
within human nature, the bedrock of the entire constitutional order. It is a system which
paradoxically depends on necessity in the hopes of preserving liberty. It preserves liberty and
provides security, by placing the motives of men under circumstances of near necessity.111 We are
left with the seeming paradox, that destructive passions under circumstances in which they are
mutually counterpoised can result in virtuous conduct of a sort. No principle calls into question
the tenuous balance between liberty and necessity as that of countervailing passions. The system
is premised on the notion that no amount of conscience, choice, reason or virtue is alone capable
of restraining the power of the passions. Only another passion, not deliberative choice, can
counteract passion.
If the possibility of republican self-government is dependent on the perquisite use of reason
and reflection, the theory of countervailing passions acknowledges that reason and virtue cannot
regularly hold the field in their war with man’s impulses. Speaking of the separation of powers,
Rahe says that it strangely “seems to deny what it asserts, and its seeks to vindicate man’s capacity
for self-government by teaching him to acknowledges the limits of the capacity and to conduct his
affairs accordingly.”112 Or as Edmond Burke put it, “Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact
proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites; in proportion as they
are more disposed to listen to the counsels of the wise and good, in preference to the flattery of
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knaves.”113 Men are only equipped for free self-government in proportion to their ability to devise
a virtuous system which might perpetually restrain their lesser appetites. Liberty is only achieved
by teaching men the limits of their liberties and providing robust sentinels and precautions to
perpetually remind them of that lesson. Such inventions of prudence appear to be “all that
government will admit,” and that mortal wisdom can devise.114
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